Back to Issue: No.3, 2026

Transformation of the global trade architecture after 2022: Sanctions regimes, regionalisation and the formation of new economic blocs

Violeta Neza*

nezavioleta445@gmail.com

Abstract

The aim of this study was to provide a comprehensive analysis of the fundamental restructuring of the global trading system after 2022 under conditions of intensified sanctions pressure, advancing regionalisation processes, and the emergence of new economic centres of gravity. The methodology was based on a systematic comparison of the regulatory strategies and policy documents of Ukraine, China, India, and the countries of the Global South with the approaches adopted by the Group of Seven and the European Union. The findings indicate that the deconstruction of the neoliberal architecture occurred through the widespread withdrawal of most-favoured-nation status and the manipulative use of security exceptions within the framework of the World Trade Organization, resulting in a slowdown of trade growth between geopolitical blocs by 4-6% compared with the internal dynamics of those groupings. It was established that a complete fragmentation of global markets could lead to a loss of 5% of global income, while the combined share of developing countries in world output exceeded 43% as of 2020. The study found that China consolidated its position as the world’s largest exporter, with exports amounting to USD 3.58 trillion, successfully utilising Vietnam and Mexico as connector economies to mitigate tariff barriers. It was also observed that India adopted a model of assertive sovereignty by increasing tariffs on information and communication technology products to 20% and introducing rules of origin verification that compelled foreign suppliers to forgo preferential treatment. The data confirmed that the logistics crisis in the Red Sea caused a 60% reduction in traffic through the Suez Canal, resulting in a fivefold increase in maritime freight costs and delivery delays ranging from 6 to 25 days. Furthermore, the development of alternative payment systems based on distributed ledger technology and the rapid expansion of the digital services sector to USD 4.95 trillion emerged as key drivers of financial autonomy for new economic blocs operating beyond Western banking infrastructure. The practical significance of the results lies in their potential application by public institutions in the development of survival strategies under conditions of technocratic protectionism

Keywords

logistics crisis; export restrictions; blockchain technologies; digital services sector; “connector-country” mechanism

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Suggested citation

Neza, V. (2026). Transformation of the global trade architecture after 2022: Sanctions regimes, regionalisation and the formation of new economic blocs. Foreign Affairs, 36(3), 137-147. https://doi.org/10.59214/ua.fa/3.2026.137
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