Back to Issue: No.2, 2026

Poland’s political and security strategy amid growing external threats

Abstract

The purpose of the study was to determine the areas of transformation of Poland’s foreign policy and security approaches after 2022. The study used structural, functional, content and quantitative analysis, which allowed summarising the data of official documents, and scientific and analytical publications on the dynamics of threats and modernisation of the defence sector. The analysis showed that after 2022, Poland has implemented a systematic build-up of its defence potential, increasing military spending from USD 18.1 billion up to USD 38 billion in 2022, increasing its share of gross domestic product to 4.2%. It was established that the renewal of the regulatory framework and the creation of a fund to support the Armed Forces provided institutional conditions for financing large-scale weapons programmes. As part of the upgrade, key purchases were identified, including the purchase of 366 Abrams and 360 K2 tanks, 364 K9/K9PL self-propelled artillery guns (SPG), 48 AHS Krab, Patriot and Narew systems, and the expansion of missile capabilities through HIMARS and K239 Chunmoo. The results showed that these investments formed a multidimensional structure of defensive capabilities, able to insure increased mobility, depth of fire, and resistance to modern threats. It was established that Poland has strengthened its role in the decision-making process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in particular, by participating in the development of regional defence plans and supporting the transition of the alliance to the model of advanced defence and expanding the new model of the Armed Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to more than 300 thousand high-alert military personnel. It was revealed that Poland has become a key logistics hub on the eastern flank, which is confirmed by the development of the APS-2 infrastructure in Powidz and the expansion of Host Nation Support mechanisms. The study showed that the country simultaneously strengthened its position in the European Union by promoting the implementation of Strategic Compass, Military Mobility 2.0 and expanding defence cooperation tools, in particular, in the areas of sanctions policy and the defence industry. It was also determined that the Bucharest Nine and Lublin Triangle formats have become key platforms for coordinating regional positions, developing joint threat assessments, and coordinating practical measures, including joint counter-disinformation initiatives

Keywords

defence sector; hybrid threats; military challenges; institutional solutions; escalation

References

  1. 116 Abrams M1A1 tanks will go to the equipment of the Polish Armed Forces. (2023). Retrieved from https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/116-abrams-m1a1-tanks-will-go-to-the-equipment-of-the-polish-armed-forces2.
  2. A strategic compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade. (2022). Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/.
  3. Act of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland “On the Defense of the Homeland”. (2022, March). Retrieved from https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20220000655.
  4. Action plan on military mobility 2.0. (2022, November). Retrieved from https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/action-plan-military-mobility-20_en.
  5. Analysis of the security of the Polish internet in 2024. (2025). Retrieved from https://www.gov.pl/web/baza-wiedzy/analiza-bezpieczenstwa-polskiego-internetu-w-2024-roku.
  6. Armed Forces support fund. (n.d.). https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/fundusz-wsparcia-sil-zbrojnych.
  7. Atkinson, R. (2025). Collaboration among NATO’s defence innovators: Lessons from Poland. Security and Defence Quarterly, 51(3), 21-37. doi: 10.35467/sdq/205139.
  8. Bath, J. (2025). Strengthening deterrence in the East: Poland provided logistic support. Retrieved from https://www.army.mil/article/282660/strengthening_deterrence_in_the_east_poland_provided_logistic_support.
  9. Beznosiuk, M. (2025). Russia’s hybrid war on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastern flank quietly escalates. Retrieved from https://neweasterneurope.eu/2025/06/13/russias-hybrid-war-on-natos-eastern-flank-quietly-escalates/.
  10. Bucharest Nine in Warsaw: Russia is the biggest threat to NATO, Ukraine belongs in the Alliance. (2023). Retrieved from https://uatv.ua/en/bucharest-nine-in-warsaw-russia-is-the-biggest-threat-to-nato-ukraine-belongs-in-the-alliance/.
  11. Cadier, D. (2021). Populist politics of representation and foreign policy: Evidence from Poland. Comparative European Politics, 19, 703-721. doi: 10.1057/s41295-021-00257-2.
  12. Ciekanowski, Z., Żurawski, S., & Oskierko, M. (2025). The migration crisis as a tool of hybrid warfare: Analysis of selected cases at the borders of the European UnionUnited Europe, 22, 20-25.
  13. Defence innovation accelerator for the North Atlantic (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.diana.nato.int/.
  14. Edström, H., & Gyllensporre, D. (2023). Exploring NATO’s enlargements in Northern Europe: Theorizing military transformation. Comparative Strategy, 42(2), 264-286. doi: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2182111.
  15. Gizicki, W. (2025). Poland’s security geopolitics in crisis times in 2025Baltic Rim Economies, 3.
  16. Jacuch, A. (2024). Defending Europe: Strengthening resilience through civil preparedness. Politeja, 21(6(93)), 245-260. doi: 10.12797/Politeja.21.2024.93.11.
  17. Joint report to the European Parliament and the Council “On the Implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 from November 2022 to October 2023”. (2023, November). Retrieved from https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/af788c99-8233-11ee-99ba-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
  18. Joint statement by the leaders of Bucharest Nine (Warsaw, 22 February 2023). (2023). Retrieved from https://klausiohannis.presidency.ro/en/media/joint-statement-by-the-leaders-of-bucharest-nine-warsaw-22-february-2023.
  19. Joint statement of the ministers of foreign affairs of Lublin Triangle. (2025). Retrieved from https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-ministriv-zakordonnih-sprav-lyublinskogo-trikutnika.
  20. K2 tanks will be produced in Poland. (2024). Retrieved from https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/k2-tanks-will-be-produced-in-poland.
  21. Komarnytskyy, M. (2023). From policy to practice: Interpreting Polish strategic culture amidst the Russian full-scale invasion of UkraineStrategic Review, 13(16), 309-320.
  22. Kulczycki, M., & Musioł, M. (2024). The security of NATO’s eastern flank following decisions made at the allied summit in Vilnius: Is it a short-term or long-term solution? Politeja, 6(93), 231-244. doi: 10.12797/Politeja.21.2024.93.10.
  23. Kushnikov, V. (2024). Poland signs agreement for production of 48 Patriot launchers. Retrieved from https://militarnyi.com/en/news/poland-signs-agreement-for-production-of-48-patriot-launchers/.
  24. Lanoszka, A. (2020). Poland in a time of geopolitical flux. Contemporary Politics, 26(4), 458-474. doi: 10.1080/13569775.2020.1777042.
  25. Learn about the Tarcza Wschód program. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://tarczawschod.wp.mil.pl/o-programie/.
  26. Lesyk, B. (2025). Military potential of Central and Eastern European states and its significance in strengthening the EU’s military actorness. Modern Historical and Political Issues, 51, 97-109. doi: 10.31861/mhpi2025.51.97-109.
  27. Leuprecht, C., & Hamilton, R. (2019). New opportunities in common security and defence policy: Joining PESCOAustralian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, 11(3), 78-96.
  28. Mälksoo, M. (2021). Militant memocracy in international relations: Mnemonical status anxiety and memory laws in Eastern Europe. Review of International Studies, 47(4), 489-507. doi: 10.1017/S0260210521000140.
  29. Maślanka, Ł., & Szymański, P. (2025). The resilience of the European Union and NATO in an era of multiple crises (OSW Commentary). Retrieved from https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-02-28/resilience-european-union-and-nato-era-multiple-crises.
  30. MBDA delivers first CAMM missiles and launchers to Poland for PILICA+. (2025). Retrieved from https://www.mbda-systems.com/mbda-delivers-first-camm-missiles-and-launchers-poland-pilica.
  31. Mejino-Lopez, J., & Wolff, G.B. (2025). Boosting the European defence industry in a hostile world. Intereconomics, 60(1), 34-39. doi: 10.2478/ie-2025-0007.
  32. Meyer, C.O., Van Osch, T., & Reykers, Y. (2024). From EU battlegroups to rapid deployment capacity: Learning the right lessons? International Affairs, 100(1), 181-201. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiad247.
  33. Military expenditure in Poland increased to 38000.70 USD million in 2024 from 26342.80 USD million in 2023. Military expenditure in Poland averaged 6758.91 USD million from 1951 until 2024, reaching an all time high of 38000.70 USD million in 2024 and a record low of 950.00 USD million in 1951. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.com/poland/military-expenditure.
  34. Mix, D.E. (2025). Poland: Background and U.S. relations (CRS Report R45784). Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45784/R45784.5.pdf.
  35. Nagy, T.A. (2024). The Bucharest Nine. Enhancing security on NATO’s eastern flank(2024). Washington, DC: GMF.
  36. NATO Innovation Fund. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.nif.fund/.
  37. NATO to increase high-readiness forces to over 300,000 – Stoltenberg. (2022). Retrieved from https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/3518134-nato-zbilsit-ciselnist-sil-visokoi-gotovnosti-do-ponad-300-tisac-stoltenberg.html.
  38. NATO trust funds. (2025). Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/nato-trust-funds.
  39. NATO’s defence capacity building initiative. (2023). Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm.
  40. Pęzioł, A., & Borucka, A. (2025). Polish Armed Forces in national strategic documents and defence expenditure perspectives. European Research Studies Journal, 2, 326-343. doi: 10.35808/ersj/3981.
  41. Poland – M1A2 SEPv3 main battle tank. (2022). Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/09/2003604075/-1/-1/0/PRESS%20RELEASE%20-%20POLAND%2022-20%20CN.PDF.
  42. Poland has launched military exercises Dragon-24. (2024). Retrieved from https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/polshcha-rozpochala-viyskovi-navchannya-prichina-1709003026.html.
  43. Poland’s HSW to deliver Krab artillery systems under EUR 2.1 billion defence contract. (2024). Retrieved from https://defence-industry.eu/polands-hsw-to-deliver-krab-artillery-systems-under-eur-2-1-billion-defence-contract/.
  44. Spanger, H.-J. (2025). The future of NATO: Country report Poland.   Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
  45. Stach, Ł., & Pizzolo, P. (2025). The conundrum of modernising Polish Armed Forces: Polish decision-makers between co-operation and polarisation (2011-2024). Defense & Security Analysisdoi: 10.1080/14751798.2025.2582938.
  46. Strategic Studies Institute. (2024). Annual estimate of the strategic security environment. Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC.
  47. Strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. (2023). Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank.
  48. Sus, M. (2025). Status-seeking in wartime: Poland’s leadership aspirations and the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 27(4), 1199-1222. doi: 10.1177/13691481251329767.
  49. Sus, M., & Kulesa, Ł. (2023). Breaking the silence: Explaining the dynamics behind Poland’s desire to join NATO nuclear sharing in light of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The Nonproliferation Review, 30(4-6), 241-263. doi: 10.1080/10736700.2024.2432807.
  50. Torbicka, K. (2025). Poland’s security in the 21st century: Challenges, strategies and prospects. Paris: Foundation for Political Innovation.
  51. Vilnius summit communiqué: Issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius, 11 July 2023. (2023). Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.

Suggested citation

Kusznieruk, P. (2026). Poland’s political and security strategy amid growing external threats. Foreign Affairs, 36(2), 19-28. https://doi.org/10.59214/ua.fa/2.2026.19
Submit an article