Divide and conquer: Russian information operations in South Africa

Burgert  Senekal

Divide and conquer: Russian information operations in South Africa

Burgert Senekal

Abstract

Understanding the pervasive and evolving nature of Russian disinformation campaigns is crucial for safeguarding democratic processes and information integrity globally. The purpose of this study was to dissect Russia’s multifaceted disinformation strategies, specifically examining their global reach and distinct impact on South Africa. For this, the study employed a qualitative analysis of Russian information operations, tracing their historical roots in Soviet-era “dezinformatsiya” and investigating contemporary methods such as the dissemination of false narratives, conspiracy theories, and social media manipulation. Furthermore, the study included case studies detailing Russian interference in various geopolitical contexts, including the United States, Europe, and Ukraine, to illustrate the scope and intensity of these operations. Subsequently, the study focused on Russia’s escalating engagement in Africa, with a particular emphasis on analysing its growing investment and targeted disinformation activities within South Africa’s unique historical and political landscape. The study found that Russia strategically exploits existing societal divisions and historical ties within target countries, including leveraging racial tensions in South Africa to propagate pro-Russian and anti-Western viewpoints through carefully crafted narratives. The analysis of global case studies revealed consistent patterns in Russia’s disinformation tactics, highlighting a deliberate effort to undermine Western institutions and advance specific geopolitical objectives through the strategic manipulation of the information environment. Ultimately, the present study underscored the intricate and adaptive nature of Russian disinformation campaigns, demonstrating their capacity to exploit vulnerabilities in diverse political landscapes. The findings of this study offer valuable insights for policymakers, media organisations, and civil society groups in developing effective countermeasures and fostering resilience against manipulative information tactics both in South Africa and across the international arena

Keywords

conspiracy theories; disinformation, hybrid warfare, media literacy, propaganda

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Suggested citation

Senekal, B. (2025). Divide and conquer: Russian information operations in South Africa. Foreign Affairs, 34(2), 33-44. https://doi.org/10.59214/2663-2675.35(2).2025.33