Pro-Russian political forces in Europe: Factors of electoral support

Stepan Dmytrenko

Pro-Russian political forces in Europe: Factors of electoral support

Stepan Dmytrenko

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to identify and systematise the key factors that determine the electoral support for pro-Russian political forces in the European Union in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. To fulfil this purpose, a comprehensive analysis of the historical dynamics and current state of pro-Russian parties in the EU was performed, the level of their electoral support was investigated, and the key factors influencing their popularity were identified. The findings of the study show that Russian aggression against Ukraine has become a catalyst for significant transformations in the strategies and rhetoric of pro-Russian forces, forcing them to adapt to new geopolitical realities. The study covered a heterogeneous picture of electoral support for these parties in different EU countries: while in some states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, there was a decline in the popularity of openly pro-Russian forces, in other countries they maintained or even strengthened their positions. The key factors contributing to the rise in popularity of pro-Russian political forces were economic problems related to the energy crisis and inflation, Euroscepticism and anti-globalisation sentiment, and the influence of Russian disinformation. Cultural and historical ties with Russia also play a significant role, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. The study found that pro-Russian forces have adapted their rhetoric, often po- sitioning themselves as “neutral” and focusing on criticising sanctions against Russia from an economic perspective. This strategy allows them to maintain electoral support while avoiding direct accusations of supporting the aggressor. A signif- icant aspect of their activities has been the use of information technology to spread alternative narratives and undermine trust in European institutions. The findings of this study highlight the need for a comprehensive approach to counter- ing pro-Russian influences in Europe, including strengthening economic solidarity in the EU, improving communication between European institutions and citizens, and developing effective strategies to combat disinformation

Keywords

euroscepticism; populism; disinformation; sanctions; energy crisis; inflation; electoral behaviour

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Suggested citation

Dmytrenko, S. (2024). Pro-Russian political forces in Europe: Factors of electoral support. Foreign Affairs, 34(4), 104-115. https://doi.org/10.46493/2663-2675.34(4).2024.104