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Back to Issue: No.4, 2026

Assessment of the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine to secure defence support from the United States and the EU

Mykola Sakaly*, Mykola Pohrebytskyi

msakaly@ukr.net

Abstract

The purpose of the study was to determine how the organisational structure of diplomatic formats of defence interaction affects the character, scale, and sustainability of support for Ukraine in political, procedural, and military-strategic dimensions. The methodology of the study was based on a combination of structural-institutional analysis, a comparative approach, and causal interpretation, which enabled the assessment of political processes, decision-making procedures, and the production capacities of partners. The study established that the institutional maturity of cooperation formats involving the United States and the European Union determines the level of predictability of decisions and the pace of defence support, which is reflected in differences in financial contributions, including more than USD 45 billion from the United States in 2023 and more than USD 9 billion from the EU in 2025. The analysis of political cycles showed that the four-year presidential cycle in the United States and the electoral calendars of Germany, France, Italy, and Poland caused periodic fluctuations in the speed of defence decision-making. Production constraints among leading defence companies, including the capacity of Lockheed Martin to produce 500 ATACMS missiles per year and the limited production of Patriot systems and artillery ammunition by Raytheon and Rheinmetall, determine the timing of deliveries. The training programmes of the European Union Military Assistance Mission in Ukraine, Operation Interflex, and Operation Unifier trained more than 60,000, 40,000, and 5,000 Ukrainian service personnel, respectively, reflecting the scale of support. The findings confirm that the sustainability of defence assistance depends on the coherence of political decisions, the effectiveness of multilateral coordination, and the ability of defence-industrial complexes to increase production in line with the needs of Ukraine. The practical value of the study is that its results can be used by analytical centres, public administration bodies, and international partners to improve support coordination mechanisms and increase the effectiveness of defence policy planning in Ukraine

Keywords

institutional resilience; political cycles; coordination; operational capabilities; training missions; structural parameters; procedural constraints

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Suggested citation

Sakaly, M., & Pohrebytskyi, M. (2026). Assessment of the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine to secure defence support from the United States and the EU. Foreign Affairs, 36(4), 22-36. https://doi.org/10.59214/ua.fa/4.2026.22
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