The Taliban movement as a challenge to security and political order in Central Asia

Andrejs Vilks

The Taliban movement as a challenge to security and political order in Central Asia

Andrejs Vilks

Abstract

The purpose of the study was to consider current and potential threats in the Central Asian region after the Taliban came to power in order to develop recommendations for minimising such threats. With the help of a content analysis of a number of mass media outlets, the reaction of the governments of the Central Asian region to the rise to power of the Taliban was analysed. In particular, the governments and ministries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan noted that they do not recognise the current government in Afghanistan. However, representatives of Turkmeni- stan and Uzbekistan expressed support and desire for active cooperation with the new actor of international relations in the region. It is classified that the population of Afghanistan, in addition to the ethnically largest group of Pashtuns, also consists of Uzbeks and Tajiks. Accordingly, the governments of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan face the threat of over- throwing secular regimes in their states. This problem is particularly important for Tajikistan, as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Tajikistan terrorist group is active in the northern provinces of Afghanistan. General poverty in some countries in the region and lack of prospects lead to the dependence of certain groups of the population on Islamist extremist groups, and the rise to power in Afghanistan by the Taliban only increases such risks. In addition to the problem of terrorism and extremism, the Talibanʼs infrastructure projects are also a problem. The most significant is the Kosh Tepa canal project, which will disrupt the water balance in the region, diverting most of the riverʼs resources to Afghanistan. This problem becomes even more relevant in light of data from the World Resources Institute, where each of the countries in the region is among the 30 countries in the world with the largest shortage of water resources by 2040. The governments of the Central Asian region need, despite the rejection of some of them to the Taliban movement, to try to cooperate with them in a new international legal framework, since the Taliban did not comply with the agreements signed by previous governments. In addition, it may be useful to create a working group on water resources management together with the new Afghan authorities, or to involve them in the work of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea

Keywords

climate change; water balance; ethnic composition; terrorist threat; separatism

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Suggested citation

Vilks, A. (2024). The Taliban movement as a challenge to security and political order in Central Asia. Foreign Affairs, 34(5), 120-130. https://doi.org/10.46493/2663-2675.34(5).2024.120