Suspension of budgetary funding for certain EU countries: Legality and prospects for improving the Union's organisational discipline

Karlis Ketners

Suspension of budgetary funding for certain EU countries: Legality and prospects for improving the Union's organisational discipline

Karlis Ketners

Abstract

The cessation of budgetary allocations for specific EU nations to uphold the rule of law is especially pertinent amid the escalating values crisis in certain member states. The aim of this study was to assess the validity and effectiveness of financial sanctions for maintaining organisational discipline in the European Union and to outline the potential for improving the systems. The research utilized the comparative legal technique, critical analysis of European Union rules and official documents, and structural-functional analysis of institutional systems for upholding the law. The research concluded that the conditionality mechanism established in Regulation 2020/2092 provides a legal foundation for the suspension of financial aid to nations that consistently breach the law. The examination of the European Commissionʼs rulings regarding Hungary and Poland revealed the intricacy of this system and its possible effects on the cohesion of the Union. The research highlighted the necessity for more nuanced and adaptable strategies to uphold shared values, according to the unique characteristics of the legal and political frameworks of each member state. This studyʼs practical significance resides in cultivating a thorough comprehension of the challenges linked to employing financial sanctions as a means of upholding the law, as well as formulating recommendations to enhance the mechanisms of organizational discipline within the European Union

Keywords

esupranational mechanisms; institutional capacity; European integration; constitutional pluralism; demo- cratic values; judicial independence

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Suggested citation

Ketners, K. (2024). Suspension of budgetary funding for certain EU countries: Legality and prospects for improving the Union's organisational discipline. Foreign Affairs, 34(5), 82-91. https://doi.org/10.46493/2663-2675.34(5).2024.82