Specific regional features of modern euroscepticism: A comparative analysis

Oksana Dmytrenko

Specific regional features of modern euroscepticism: A comparative analysis

Oksana Dmytrenko

Abstract

This study investigated the topical issue of regional variation of Euroscepticism in the modern EU. The growing opposition to European integration in different parts of the continent threatens the unity and legitimacy of the European project, which necessitates a thorough study of the specifics of this phenomenon in a comparative perspective. The pur- pose of this study was to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the specific regional features of modern Euroscepticism based on theoretical understanding and empirical verification of its determinants and manifestations in different con- texts. The study employed methods of comparison, structural, and functional analysis, cluster analysis, discourse analysis, and case studies to identify common patterns and differences in the nature and dynamics of Euroscepticism in different countries and regions. The findings of the study suggest that Euroscepticism is a multidimensional and context-specific phenomenon, the intensity and nature of which is determined by a complex of historical, socio-economic, political, and cultural factors. The comparative analysis has found three main regional models of Euroscepticism – Central European, Southern European, and Northwestern – each with a distinctive profile and determinants. Despite the differences, a com- mon pattern is the link between the dynamics of Euroscepticism and the asymmetric effects of integration at the local level – the growth of Euroscepticism is most pronounced in peripheral regions and communities that have been margin- alised by economic development and feel threatened by their own identity. At the same time, the penetration of moderate Euroscepticism into the political mainstream poses risks of normalising populist criticism of the EU

Keywords

geography of discontent; local specificity; historical heritage; socio-economic determinants; political culture

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Suggested citation

Dmytrenko, O. (2024). Specific regional features of modern euroscepticism: A comparative analysis. Foreign Affairs, 34(2), 52-61. https://doi.org/10.46493/2663-2675.34(2).2024.52