The Russian-Ukrainian war 2014-2023: Interference factors of the War

Alla Kyrydon; Serhiy Troyan

The Russian-Ukrainian war 2014-2023: Interference factors of the War

Abstract

At the end of February 2022 Russian aggression against Ukraine escalated into a full-scale war. This provoked strong resistance from the Ukrainian state and society, as well as Western anti-Russian sanctions. The Russian-Ukrainian war has gone far beyond the borders of Ukraine and Russia and has acquired regional and global significance. The interim results and outcomes of the war encourage understanding and generalisation of experience for Ukraine, Europe, and the world. The purpose of this study was to analyse the key aspects of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of their impact on national, regional, and global processes. The methodology of the study is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, systematicity, generalisation, multifactoriality, combined with the use of methods of analysis and synthesis, historical-comparative and historical-genetic, systemic, and structural-functional analysis. The coverage of aspects of the large-scale stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war is based on the analysis of the current state of the situation at the front, military-technical, and diplomatic efforts to ensure Ukraine’s victory. This is necessary to stop Russian aggression and the crimes of the Russian occupiers, restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, punish the aggressors, return to international law and order, and ensure lasting and stable peace in Europe and the world. Another generalisation is that Ukraine’s allies and partners understand that it opposes militarism and authoritarianism and defends democratic rights and freedoms and universal human values. Ukrainians, through their resilience and struggle, have given new impetus to the North Atlantic partnership and European integration. In the long run, this is of great practical importance for strengthening the democratic priorities of European and global civilisational development. The applied aspect of the study of the aspects of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war is also important for the establishment of democratic trends in the evolution of modern international relations and the world order

Keywords

Russian-Ukrainian war 2014-2023; full-scale aggression; aspects of war; international relations; world order

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Suggested citation

Kyrydon, A., & Troyan, S. (2023). The Russian-Ukrainian war 2014-2023: Interference factors of the War. Foreign Affairs, 33(6), 30-39. https://doi.org/10.46493/2663-2675.33(6).2023.30-39