

З.С. | Зовнішні справи

*Заснований у 1991 році
Випускається 6 разів на рік*

**Том 32, № 5
2022**

ISSN: 2663-2675
E-ISSN: 2663-2683

**Свідоцтво про державну реєстрацію
друкованого засобу масової інформації**
Серія: KB № 24816-14756 ПР від 31.03.2021 р.

Журнал включено до
Переліку фахових видань України (Категорія «Б»)
з історичних наук (Наказ Міністерства освіти і науки України № 1188
від 24 вересня 2020 р.)

Журнал представлено
у таких наукометричних базах:
Google Scholar, НБУ ім. В.І. Вернадського,
Фахові видання України

Зовнішні справи / Ред. кол.: Т. В. Сидорук та ін. – Київ: Громадська спілка «Редакція журналу «Зовнішні справи», ТОВ «Наукові журнали», 2022. – Том 32, № 5. – 49 с.

Засновник і видавець:
Громадська спілка «Редакція журналу «Зовнішні справи», ТОВ «Наукові журнали»
01001, пров. Рильський, 6, Київ, Україна
E-mail: info@sjournals.com.ua
www: <https://uaforeignaffairs.com/uk>

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ТОВ «Наукові журнали», 2022

F.A. | Foreign Affairs

*Founded in 1991
Published six times per year*

**Volume 32, No. 5
2022**

ISSN: 2663-2675
E-ISSN: 2663-2683

**Certificate of state registration
of the print media**

Series: KV No. 24816-14756 PR dated 31.03.2021

Journal included in List of professional publications of Ukraine (Category “B”)
in Historical Sciences (Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No. 1188
of September 24, 2020)

**Journal is presented
in the following scientometric databases:**
Google Scholar, VNLU, Professional publications
of Ukraine

Foreign Affairs / Ed. col.: T. V. Sydoruk et al. – Kyiv: Public Union Editorial Board of the Journal
“Foreign Affairs”, LLC “Scientific Journals”, 2022. – Volume 32, No. 5. – 49 p.

Founder and publisher:
Public Union Editorial Board of the Journal “Foreign Affairs”, LLC “Scientific Journals”
01001, 6 Rylskyi Ln, Kyiv, Ukraine
E-mail: info@sjournals.com.ua
www: <https://uaforeignaffairs.com/en>

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UDC 172.4: 314.743
DOI: 10.46493/2663-2675.32(5).2022.8-15

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Features of Adaptation of Ukrainian Refugees in the EU, Great Britain, USA, and Canada

Abstract. Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, destruction of cities and towns, homes and infrastructure. The constant threat is a consequence of the large flow of refugees who are forced to leave the country in search of security and asylum. European Union countries, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada have accepted those fleeing the war and provided temporary protection. The relevance of the study consists in the identification of ways for assistance and benefits conferred, which are aimed at adapting and supporting Ukrainian refugees. The purpose of this paper is to study the features of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in the EU, Great Britain, USA, and Canada, the socio-psychological state of refugees during the adaptation period, to compare the concepts of "refugee" and "person in need of temporary protection", the characteristics of the social assistance package for Ukrainian refugees. The methods used to investigate the topic are: comparative, legal recognition, logical and legal method, hermeneutical method, analysis, etc. The results of this study are a comparison of the main concepts, including: "refugee", "person in need of temporary protection", characteristics of Ukrainian and international laws and regulations on refugee protection issues, clarification of the features of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in the EU countries, Great Britain, USA, and Canada, psychological aspects of refugee adaptation, comparative analysis of social assistance and benefits for refugees between EU countries, Great Britain, USA, and Canada, processing statistics to compare the number of refugees between countries that provide asylum and protection. The provisions presented in this paper reveal the current problems of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in the EU, Great Britain, USA, and Canada and may be useful for further study

Keywords: temporary protection, asylum, social assistance, migration, national minorities

Introduction

Adapting to a new environment, accepting society, cultural and social needs is a complication of migrant adaptation. Parties to adaptation are migrants or refugees and authorities, residents of the region, and national minorities. The best option for adaptation is to preserve national identity and cultural values, ensuring the inherent and useful nature of the subject for society. Maintaining such an adaptation model is possible due to an environment

that accepts refugees and is open to knowledge [1]. For refugees, the fact of expecting is an opportunity to make the adaptation process easier if such an expectation is realistic, but false expectations lead to stressful situations and problems. Positive adaptation depends on internal needs, which are manifested in the desire for self-realisation and social contacts, and external factors associated with the support and help of the surrounding society [2].

Received: 20.05.2022, Revised: 19.08.2022, Accepted: 22.09.2022

Suggested Citation:

Sokar, A., Wells, I., Leod, M., Reeners A., & Stephanes, M. (2022). Features of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in the EU, Great Britain, USA, and Canada. *Foreign Affairs*, 32(5), 8-15.

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N. Palagina suggests that the process of adaptation of refugees affects their psychoemotional state and is manifested by low self-esteem, which causes a destructive personality disorder. This condition maladapts the person, causes emotional tension and anxiety. Since migration is forced, the process of adapting to new conditions is complex [3].

The category of “refugees” refers to persons in need of protection and asylum in order to ensure complete security. The conditions of assistance and protection are diverse, as they depend on the country in which the person is seeking asylum. This status provides an opportunity to receive monetary assistance in the form of payments, pensions, access to education, and medical care provided by the state that provided protection [4].

O. Kolomiyets expresses assistance from host countries as an important aspect in adapting Ukrainian refugees to a new place of residence, which provides an opportunity for a full life and a sense of security. The adaptation of Ukrainian refugees has a great impact on the demographic situation in Ukraine and its future prospects. Ways to help European Union countries find employment and provide social benefits to Ukrainian refugees ensure respect for their rights and promote socio-economic adaptation. This will be an impetus for the migrant's self-realisation, since many EU countries need specialists in the pedagogical and medical fields, for which they assist specialists in learning languages and passing a special diploma confirmation procedure [5].

Assistance from Europe, Great Britain, the United States, and Canada has a positive trend, as, thus, there is an awareness of the danger of the aggressor to other countries. One of the conditions for adaptation is the support of society, which is conditioned by cultural unity and skills in communicating with Ukrainian migrants in recent years. Another circumstance is the literacy of Ukrainians, a high level of education and knowledge of languages, which allows them to quickly integrate into the country, get asylum, and find a job [6].

The purpose of revealing the features of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in the EU, Great Britain, USA, and Canada is to analyse and monitor the scope of social guarantees provided and conditions for temporary protection to respect the rights and freedoms of refugees.

The author of this study has identified a list of tasks that need to be solved in the framework of the study:

- comparison of the concepts of “refugee” and “person in need of temporary protection”;
- disclosure of Ukrainian and international legislative provisions regulating refugee protection issues;
- establishment of the specifics of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in the EU, Great Britain, USA and Canada;
- processing of statistics to compare the number of refugees among countries providing asylum and protection;
- analysis of support programmes and border crossing procedures for Ukrainian refugees.

The relevance of the study is to determine how refugees are provided with assistance abroad and what privileges are granted to them. The originality of the study is conditioned by the fact that this topic is rather unexplored, because against the background of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, there is a need to investigate such a phenomenon as support for refugees abroad.

Materials and Methods

Various methods of scientific cognition were used in the course of the study. Using the comparative method, the paper compares statistical data on the number of refugees who arrived in the European Union, Great Britain, the United States, and Canada since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine.

The legal recognition method consisted in using methods and techniques of cognition, and ideas to achieve a scientific result. Based on the method, the features of legislative provisions adopted by the government of countries that have granted asylum to Ukrainian refugees to promote adaptation and respect for human rights are highlighted. This method also helped to investigate the features of the social assistance package and its duration.

The logical and legal method contributed to the characterisation of the basic concepts of “refugee” and “person in need of temporary protection”. It helped find a logical relationship between the help provided and the status received.

The hermeneutical method helped interpret the provisions of Ukrainian and foreign scientific publications, the Law of Ukraine “On Refugees and Persons in Need of Additional and Temporary Protection”, the Convention on the Status of Refugees, the Protocol on the Status of Refugees, the Council of Europe Directive 2004 “On Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third-Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons in Need of International Protection”. These regulations indicate guarantees of respect for the rights of refugees fleeing armed aggression and occupation, creation of necessary and safe living conditions, provision of asylum and protection to refugees, and provision of material assistance and employment.

Quite an important role in the study was played by the synthesis method, which consisted in the consideration of the practice of applying to Ukrainian refugees a package of assistance for providing access to education, health care, legal assistance, employment in EU countries, the study of a simplified programme of residence in the UK for 3 years, the right to stay in the US for two years with the possibility of employment, the opportunity to get a free visa to Canada under a special programme for Ukrainians, with the right to work and study.

The method of analysis consisted in analysing the studies on the peculiarities of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in the EU, Great Britain, and Canada, revealing the main assistance programmes and their components, adaptation of Ukrainian refugee children to the educational process in a foreign country, and the rate of refugee migration. As a result, the analysis method allowed identifying the positive and negative aspects of the countries that have sheltered the most refugees.

This study was divided into three stages. At the first stage, the author processed statistical data on the migration of Ukrainian refugees to the EU, Great Britain, USA, and Canada and considered laws regulating the refugee problem.

The second stage consisted of studying the specifics of refugee adaptation, disclosing the conditions of assistance and special programmes provided by the host state.

The third stage was a comparative analysis of the availability of social and material security for Ukrainian refugees in the EU, Great Britain, USA, and Canada, and forecasting of further actions of refugees to return to Ukraine or live on the territory of the host state.

Results

The Russian Federation's widespread armed aggression against Ukraine has forced Ukrainian people to flee their homes due to the occupation of territories or the constant shelling of cities, towns and villages in search of safety and shelter. According to the UN High Commissioner for refugees, about 5 million Ukrainians have left the territory of Ukraine, of which 3.2 million have received the status of refugees or persons in need of temporary protection. The largest number of refugees, compared to the EU countries, crossed the borders of Poland and reaches 1 million 152 thousand Ukrainians. Germany accepted 780 thousand Ukrainian refugees and granted special status to 566 thousand migrants. Germany is followed by the Czech Republic, where 373.82 thousand refugees applied for temporary protection. In Spain, about 120 thousand refugees arrived for special status, France – 90 thousand, Slovakia – 78, 11 thousand) [7].

Obtaining a special status in the European Union countries provides an opportunity to quickly obtain social and material assistance, work and study permit. Data from the Polish Border Guard Service indicate the arrival of 3.8 million Ukrainian refugees since the beginning of a full-scale war, however, most of them did not receive temporary status and went in transit to other countries. The UN refugee agency published data from a survey of Ukrainians: some refugees want to return to Ukraine as soon as possible, 65% of refugees do not plan to return before the end of the war, 15% – temporarily visit close relatives, 8% of Ukrainians will not return and 40% want to return to Ukraine for permanent residence, because they believe that the situation in the region of residence has improved [8].

The US Department of the Interior confirmed that 15 thousand Ukrainian refugees entered the country and 23 thousand Ukrainians received permission to cross the border, but have not yet made a trip [9].

Assistance to the rapid adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in countries depends on the amount of assistance and respect for their rights. Granting refugee status or a person in need of temporary protection is a manifestation of guaranteed legislative provisions that provide for: rights and obligations, legal status.

The concept of “refugee” is understood as persons who have left their state of citizenship and are seeking asylum for security reasons. The basis of refugee status is the fear of being the victim of persecution on discriminatory issues or political views, armed aggression. Such persons cannot be protected in their own country, so in order to avoid danger, they seek asylum in a foreign country. The procedure for obtaining refugee status is based on the submission of an application upon entry into the country. Various social programmes, benefits, and access to the labour market are applied for refugees [10].

Persons in need of temporary protection – a category of people who are fleeing from armed aggression, persecution, or other factors that are dangerous to human life

and health. The main document regulating the provision of temporary protection is EU Directive 2001/55/EC, the main purpose of which is to provide asylum and respect for the rights of persons in need of assistance. The difference between this concept lies in the automatic receipt of temporary protection, since it does not provide for treatment and a special procedure, but is a collective process [11].

According to the legislation of Ukraine on refugees, persons who have received a special status have the right to employment, education, health care, access to a place of residence, and receive free legal aid. In other words, such a scope of rights and freedoms is granted to citizens of Ukraine [12].

The Convention relating to the status of refugees provides for the legal status of refugees in the field of social security at the level of citizens residing in the host state. This status includes the right to receive wages for work performed, social guarantees, which include protection from accidents at the workplace, assistance for illness, motherhood, unemployment, etc. [13].

Poland has made a number of changes to the legislation regarding the provision and support of Ukrainian refugees due to the armed conflict, which contain a simplified regime of entry to the country's territory. Starting from July 1, 2022, it is allowed to cross the border not only with Ukraine, but also through the internal borders of the European Union. The Polish government creates the necessary conditions for adaptation and provides the scope of rights for Ukrainian refugees:

- every Ukrainian refugee who arrives in Poland can legally stay for 18 months;
- the right to use reception points that provide food and housing;
- the right to work without appropriate permits, only with the proof of identity;
- the right to free medical and psychological assistance;
- refugee children are entitled to free education and additional Polish language classes;
- right to social assistance;
- the right to free travel by train [14].

In addition, Poland has launched a financial program for Ukrainian refugees, which allows them to receive financial assistance in the amount of PLN 710 for three months. This right is provided for single women, women without husbands, persons with disabilities, persons who support children, pregnant women, students, etc. Payment under the programme, first of all, is for the most vulnerable categories [14].

Germany has introduced a visa-free regime for Ukrainian refugees and the ability to live in the territory with a permit, which is issued for 1-2 years with the possibility of extending up to 3 years. The law on asylum seekers provides for financial assistance in the amount of EUR 300 per adult and, considering the changes made to the law, the rate will be EUR 449 for the unemployed. Ukrainians who receive education can use the right to receive educational loans and continue the educational process. The German Residence Act provides guarantees for receiving benefits for daily needs and medical care. A consultation programme for migrants has been introduced, which helps with adaptation, solving the issue of finding

housing, work, or access to medicine. A course has also been created to help navigate a new area, which aims to show life in Germany; a programme to support women, which provides information about the school system and improvement skills; language courses on writing letters, messages in German, or job applications.

The Czech Republic provides temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees and a residence permit in the country, which provides for:

- stay in the Czech Republic for 1 year;
- right to employment;
- providing social assistance;
- multiple travel permit to the Czech Republic;
- access to schools and kindergartens;
- the right to health insurance [15].

In addition, to adapt people in need of temporary protection, a mobile application “Smart Migration” has been created, which helps them navigate in a foreign city. The software allows solving issues related to job search, education, and medical care. To adapt Ukrainian refugees, the application is designed to meet their needs [15].

The member states of the European Union, due to the large number of Ukrainian refugees, have activated the directive on temporary protection, the purpose of which is to facilitate the employment of refugees. EU countries need qualified specialists, so first, they analyse the skills and competencies of people looking for protection. This is important for understanding the need for additional training. Such a Directive guarantees the right to employment or the right to be self-employed, and provides access to education and the labour market in EU countries. The measures of the host countries should be aimed at quickly restoring the lives of Ukrainian refugees and providing skills for their qualifications that can ensure stable employment, decent pay, and self-development [16].

Entry to the UK is possible if a person has a residence permit for up to 3 years. Those who have relatives who legally reside in the country can use the Ukraine Family Scheme Visa sponsorship programme, which allows them to find a job, get housing and state aid. Every Ukrainian who arrives in the UK can open a bank account for wages, social assistance, pensions, etc. The country has a special system for receiving social assistance for those who have financial difficulties. Payments include benefits due to low income or unemployment; pension payments; disability benefits; and child benefits. The local council helps solve short-term problems upon arrival in the country and provides a school place for refugee children [17].

The UK provides Ukrainian refugees with protection and asylum with the opportunity to work for three years. Local residents provide housing for Ukrainians for at least 6 months. Adaptation in terms of the language barrier is easier due to the common use of English in the world. After leaving the European Union, the country has a lot of vacancies and a need for labour, so the probability of employment of migrants remains at a high level. The “Apprenticeships” programme allows simultaneously working and studying to obtain the necessary qualifications. All Ukrainian refugees arriving in the UK have free access to medicine and medical advice. Anyone who has received

psychological injuries from armed aggression can seek psychological help [18].

The government of the United States of America has announced its readiness to accept 100 thousand Ukrainian refugees. However, the US attention is focused on those Ukrainians who have relatives in the country, and on protecting Ukrainians who were in the United States before the war began. The US Department of Homeland Security provides humanitarian aid to those in need and grants temporary protection status for 18 months. Ukrainians who have stayed in the country can apply for a work permit. Individuals who have crossed the border with a tourist visa are subject to restrictions, as the visa does not grant the right to obtain a work permit and prohibits refugees from attending public schools, only private ones for a fee. However, the support of the United States is tangible for those Ukrainians who are in other countries of the European Union. The programme of the United States of America “Unity for Ukraine” is one of the largest in recent years, according to the terms of the programme, Ukrainian refugees can stay in the country for up to two years of the programme's operation. But in order to temporarily reside on its territory, it is necessary to find a sponsor to provide financial assistance for the period of stay in the states [19].

Canada has launched a special programme “CUAET” to support Ukrainian refugees, which provides an opportunity to get a free visa for employment and education. The Government of Canada provides refugees seeking asylum with one-time cash payments of CAD 2,400. Renting housing for refugees is difficult, as landlords need a credit history. Canadian cities have a small number of residential buildings, so during the period of large migration flow, it is difficult to find suitable housing. Moreover, difficulties arise when finding a job in the specialty due to the need for a license. The help of volunteers is crucial for Ukrainian refugees. At the beginning of a full-scale war, such assistance consisted in providing clothing, household items, now the volunteer centres promote the adaptation of Ukrainians, conduct various lectures, help with paperwork, and provide support to victims of the war [20].

Discussion

Features of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees consist in providing the host state with an appropriate amount of rights and opportunities. Providing financial assistance, providing social guarantees, and employment opportunities serves to create normal living conditions for people who are forced to leave the country to save their lives from war. Usually, the problem for Ukrainians is ignorance of the language of the country where asylum is granted, which makes socialisation with local residents impossible and makes it difficult to find a job. The socio-psychological adaptation of refugees depends not only on the creation of important conditions, but also on internal factors. Quite often, refugees enter a depressive state due to the so-called “survivor syndrome”. Isolation from society can lead to a negative impact on the psychoemotional state and lead to loneliness.

G. Abdarkhamov considers relations with local residents to be difficult for refugees to adapt. The local

population accepts refugees as aggressive, unfriendly, and impudent people. They usually feel envious if refugees have taken property or certain items with them, believing that migrants live better. For refugees, local residents look indifferent and angry, but there is a certain part that helps, shows kindness and compassion [21].

Host states that develop adaptation programmes for refugees can improve the effectiveness of other countries, reduce social tension and internal political conflicts. Thus, migrants who have arrived in the country will reveal their abilities, join the labour force, and improve the level of the economy. However, it is important for the refugee to accept the social environment, culture and values of the country to which they arrived [22].

The policy of the EU countries should be aimed at creating an accessible system for coordinating Ukrainian refugees. One of the ways is to represent the interests of Ukrainians at the EU level and review the EU directive on temporary protection for better support and assistance. Protecting the health of migrants requires assistance in the fight against diseases and reducing the workload of regions where Ukrainians are located [8].

K. Kerneis suggests that providing assistance to refugees requires significant resources and time to stabilise. The European Union states aim to create stable support in the areas of health care, social security for the unemployed, education and housing. Since refugees stay in host countries for a long time and are employed, from an economic standpoint, this is a positive trend in the countries' profits and the achievement of high economic results [23].

The World Health Organization is considering promoting the adaptation of refugees in creating appropriate conditions for legal and social protection and health care. Health policies need to ensure access to unhindered access to health services, and the provision of necessary medicines and medicines for refugees in need of protection. In addition, it allows getting the necessary information about medical care in a convenient way for migrants. Health policy verification is a favourable aspect in respecting the rights of persons in need of temporary protection, and in the exchange of experience between host countries [24].

E. Ochepa-Kichinskaya and M. Gorzalska-Kochkodai consider that the main goal of supporting refugees is to create safe living conditions. First of all, security measures are the use of identification of persons who provide shelter in the host country and are engaged in volunteer activities. Such a check would help identify intentions and prevent threats to the life and health of refugees, and prevent crime from human trafficking [25].

R. Dzhabarov divides the adaptation of people who are forced to leave the territory of their country into two approaches: economic and psychological. The first approach is understood as the loss of acquired property and other resources that remained in the country, the second approach is an awareness of the global nature of the problem, a sense of shock and fear of getting used to a new place, people, culture, and conditions. The adoption of economic and psychological factors provides awareness of the new and provides an opportunity to overcome the depressive state through obtaining a new place of residence and social assistance from the host country [26].

According to J. Owens-Manley and R. Coughlan, the adaptation of refugees to the new environment consists in psychological, social, cultural, and economic adaptation. The complication manifests itself in longing for home and family members. The host nation provides the necessary living conditions on its territory, but the poor situation of family members who are unable to leave a country where hostilities are taking place or there is a threat to life is of concern. Employment of refugees and full adaptation to the economic situation of the country to which they arrived were necessary upon arrival in the host country. A decent salary was determined by the employee's qualifications and level of language proficiency. Therefore, employment is recognised as one of the conditions for successful adaptation of migrants [27].

The conditions of reception of refugees are important during their adaptation, as the services provided by the host countries in the field of work, study, health, and asylum ensure the migrant's independence and rapid integration into the new environment. International assistance programmes and innovations for refugees serve to unlock potential, guarantee the protection of their rights and prevent discrimination against those who have arrived in search of protection. Measures taken to support and provide asylum encourage contributions to the development of the economy and have an impact on the demographic situation of the host country [28].

M. Abedtalas, L. Toprak and other Turkish researchers put forward the theory of economic adaptation of refugees, which consists of three factors: social, human, and institutional. It is the social factor that helps refugees get assistance in the form of access to the labour market, education, receiving cash payments, assistance to pensioners, etc. Social protection of migrants helps to quickly adapt financially, providing appropriate living conditions. The human factor contributes to socialisation and establishing relationships with citizens of the host country, as support for refugees is important. The institutional factor is the creation of support and assistance programmes for refugees, providing simplified border crossing and residence permits. This factor is a guarantee of preferential conditions for migrants [2].

The author of this study considers it necessary to investigate the social adaptation of Ukrainian refugees with citizens of the host country. Quite often, local residents provide housing to migrants or act as sponsors in a support programme, however, at one of the stages of adaptation, conflicts and misunderstandings arise. Therefore, this area is relevant for further research of the topic and identification of factors that provoke negative behaviour. Another important area of research is the role of consular institutions in the process of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees. Since, having arrived in another country, refugees are in a state of stress, so there is a need to provide information by the consulate to find persons of common citizenship and avoid feelings of loneliness.

Based on the above an important stage in the adaptation of Ukrainian refugees is the assistance and support of host countries. Social and financial assistance provides an opportunity to mitigate feelings of loss and adapt to the new environment. The creation of special refugee assistance

programmes serves as a guide in a new place and provides the necessary living conditions. Most Ukrainians feel guilty because of monitoring the situation in the country and the inability to help. In order to get rid of this feeling, it is important to use one's own strength and resources in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, engage in volunteer activities, participate in actions supporting Ukraine, which would allow expressing oneself, and feel own importance and role while in a foreign country.

Conclusions

Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to a large migration of Ukrainians abroad in search of asylum and protection. One of the problems of migrants is adaptation to a new place, people, culture, and language. With the help of countries that provide social and financial assistance, the adaptive process is easier.

According to the purpose of the study, the peculiarities of adaptation of Ukrainian refugees in the countries of the European Union, Great Britain, the United States, and Canada were identified, legislative acts regulating the refugee problem were analysed, and guarantees of compliance with the rights of Ukrainian refugees were disclosed. It was found what assistance programmes operate in the host countries. The concepts of "refugee" and "person in need of temporary protection" were compared.

It was determined that the largest number of Ukrainians, according to the UN High Commissioner for refugees, from the European Union countries were accepted by Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, providing migrants with financial assistance, social guarantees, and

access to employment. The activation of the EU temporary protection directive ensures the process of granting asylum to refugees and the creation of temporary protection in the countries of the European Union, which serves as a guarantee of the inviolability of their rights and freedoms. To facilitate adaptation, EU countries provide Ukrainian refugees with social support in the form of: access to health care and medical care; access to the labour market, employment permits; social assistance in the form of monetary support; access to education; language courses, etc.

The UK has improved the conditions for entering the country, but with a mandatory permit. The introduction of the Ukraine Family Scheme Visa sponsorship programme helps to find housing for Ukrainians, get the resources necessary for normal life and rapid adaptation of refugees. In addition, Ukrainian refugees can use the assistance provided by local residents for up to 6 months.

The United States of America provides assistance to Ukrainians who were on its territory before the war began, and provides financial assistance to refugees in European countries. In the country itself, there are restrictions on the number of accepted Ukrainian refugees, but it is possible to enter the country on a tourist visa. Canada has launched the "CUAET" programme, which provides an opportunity to get a free visa to stay in a state with the right to work and study. Adaptation of refugees is complicated by the peculiarities of finding real estate.

Promising areas for further study would be the following: social adaptation of Ukrainian refugees with citizens of the host country and the role of consular institutions in refugee adaptation.

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Особливості адаптації українських біженців у країнах ЄС, Великобританії, США та Канаді

Анотація. Збройна агресія Росії проти України призвела до десятків тисяч смертей, руйнувань міст та селищ, будинків та інфраструктури. Постійна загроза є наслідком великого потоку біженців, які змушені покинути країну в пошуку безпеки та притулку. Країни Європейського Союзу, Великобританія, США та Канада прийняли осіб, які втікали від війни та надали тимчасовий захист. Актуальність дослідження полягає у визначенні шляхів допомоги та наданих привілеїв, які спрямовані на адаптацію та підтримку українських біженців. Метою даної статті виступає дослідження особливостей адаптації українських біженців у країнах ЄС, Великобританії, США та Канади, соціально-психологічний стан біженців у період адаптації, порівняння понять «біженець» та «особа, яка потребує тимчасового захисту», характеристика пакету соціальної допомоги українським біженцям. Методами за допомогою яких здійснюється дослідження теми є: порівняльний метод, правопізнавальний метод, логіко-юридичний метод, герменевтичний метод, метод аналізу та інші. Результатами даної статті є порівняння основних понять, серед яких: «біженець», «особа, яка потребує тимчасового захисту», характеристика вітчизняних та міжнародних законодавчих актів та положень, які регулюють питання захисту біженців, з'ясування особливостей адаптації українських біженців у країнах ЄС, Великобританії, США та Канади, психологічні аспекти адаптації біженців, порівняльний аналіз соціальної допомоги та переваг для біженців між країнами ЄС, Великобританії, США та Канади, опрацювання статистичних даних для порівняння кількості біженців між країнами, які надають притулок та захист. Положення, які наведені в даній статті розкривають актуальну проблематику адаптації українських біженців у країнах ЄС, Великобританії, США та Канади та можуть бути корисними для подальших досліджень

Ключові слова: тимчасовий захист, притулок, соціальна допомога, міграція, національні меншини

UDC 341.1
DOI: 10.46493/2663-2675.32(5).2022.16-23

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Strengthening EU Defence Capabilities Under Conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian War

Abstract. The issued article describes the military-political dimension of the European Union's activity and its prospects for transformation into a collective security association within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This topic was the focus of researchers, however, it was considered by them in the context of the history of the European Union and did not involve a separate study. The purpose of this study is to consider the gradation of the defense capability of the European Union in the period from the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014) to the moment of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine (2022) and the prospects for further development of this area within the EU. The basis of methodological basis of the research is a combination of general historical and political science methods, among which retrospective and institutional methods take the leading place. Analytical work with materials and selection of certain works for each of the tasks was accompanied by the use of critical-dialectical, historical-systemic, action, and problem-chronological methods. As a result of the study, it was found that the military component of the defense capability of the European Union consists of the review and development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the creation of new defense programs (PESCO), "loyalty programs" (European Partnership Policy) and other possible structures for the emergence of a large security space on the borders with Russia and its satellites. The practical value of the work is revealed in the possibility of using the mentioned facts in the further study of the topic of the development of the defense sphere of the European Union in the 21st century, as well as the problems of supranational security formations, in particular on the territory of Europe

Key words: European Union, partnership policy, NATO, Global Strategy, European security, defense policy

Introduction

The end of November 2013 was notable for the opposition to the attempts of the then Ukrainian leadership represented by V. Yanukovich and the cabinet of M. Azarov to return the state under the yoke of "allied" relations with Russia, while Moscow itself did not even attempt to hide its intentions of economic and political expansion of the Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin calculated that the Ukrainian leadership and military command would be incapable of a qualitative response to military aggression. After the overthrow of the Yanukovich regime, Moscow's plan was implemented during the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine in March-April 2014 [1].

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin at the time never decided on a full-scale invasion due to the multilateral agreements – the First Minsk Protocol (often

referred to in the media as "Minsk-1") – the idea was cultivated in the corridors of the Russian power cabins for eight years until the invasion in February 2022 [2].

The Russian military intervention has forced European Union countries to try on the Ukrainian scenario and think about their security, as Brussels has realised that in a new phase of the war with the Ukrainian people, Moscow has launched a plan to return so-called "historical justice", which means that the EU's eastern borders are under threat of military conflicts (At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, some countries of the current EU were members of the former, while others had a membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, which was established as a counterweight to NATO). In particular, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has disturbed the countries of the Visegrad Group (V4), which includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia

Received: 26.05.2022, Revised: 26.08.2022, Accepted: 22.09.2022

Suggested Citation:

Czubenko, C., Gendelis, D., & Bschor, B. (2022). Strengthening EU defence capabilities under conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian War. *Foreign Affairs*, 32(5), 16-23.

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and Hungary. It is particularly relevant to Poland, where Soviet domination after World War II was deeply engraved in the national consciousness of Poles [3]. The situation was similar in the Czech and Slovak Republics, which had once survived the Prague Spring (1956), knowing the value of the Russian “helping hand”. Thus, the European leadership expressed a desire to revise the very concept of the operation of the European Union, which requires modernisation by modern challenges [3].

The above statements define the problems of the research. The subject of the study is the means of strengthening the defence capabilities of the European Union against the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The object of the study is the countries of the European Union and their contribution to enhancing the defence capabilities of the EU itself as a monopoly collective entity within modern Europe and its capacity regarding its security. The purpose is to explore the gradation of European Union defence capabilities from the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war (2014) to the moment of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022) and the prospects for further developments in this area within the EU.

The available source base is implicitly relevant. In particular, the research by I. Gurak and P. d'Anieri covers the evolution of Russian policy towards Ukraine and examines its modifications and the role of leading figures [4]. A. Chervyatsova's research is significant. It covers the issues of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014-2022. In particular, the author explores the specific features of the Minsk Agreements, both in the context of this war and in the context of international law [5]. In a more generalised way, the security aspect of European Union policy was considered in “Refugees, Security and the European Union” by S. Leonard and C. Kohnert [3]. They emphasised the European defence concept but analysed in detail the factors that threaten it. Major trends in the European Union policy are discussed in the book by M. Sini and N. Borrigan “European Union Politics” [6]. The problems of the European Union's security paradigm after Brexit are discussed in detail in the study by S. Paladini and I. Castellucci “European security in a post-Brexit world” [7]. V. Rish, in his study, thoroughly analyses the prerequisites for the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation in early 2014, connected with the factor of the Revolution of Dignity and its perception in the Donbas [8]. And G. Sharafutdinova in her publication described in detail the specifics of the legal legitimisation of Russia's occupation of Crimea and the reflection of this process both in the field of security and in the areas of identity development and international perception [9].

However, notably, the references used do not fully cover the issues dealt with in the study, which first of all distinguishes and highlights the relevance of the research. The scientific novelty is in the analysis of European Union activities designed to strengthen the collective defence capacity of the organisation and use the results in further studies of European policy institutes.

Materials and Methods

The methodological foundation of the study is a combination of general historical and political science methods, among which the leading place is occupied by retrospective

and institutional. With their help, a structural and functional analysis of the source base was performed, which contributed to the coherent presentation of the material. The theoretical foundation of the study comprises several Western publications of a historiographical, political and military analytical nature, thematically and chronologically covering the activities of the European Union as a coherent subject in the security and defence of its borders.

The research itself was performed in several stages:

The first stage was defined by the preparation of a source base on the three above-mentioned types, which are represented by the works of Western historians, political scientists, military analysts, and other researchers. In processing the sources, a systematic analysis method was used to identify the problem, highlight the purpose, and the relevant main objectives, and identify the relevant literature for the disclosure of all of the above. The content analysis method allowed for structuring the existing body of information according to its purpose and objectives, gathering a list of keywords and the necessary background database. Thus, the selection of the methods mentioned above at this stage of the work resulted in the definition of problems, and purposes, identifying relevance and novelty, and studying and systematising the source base, which helped to organise the work plan.

The second stage was distinguished by its analytical work with materials, the allocation of specific works for each of the objectives, and finally using special historical and political science research methods – critical-dialectical, historical-systemic, action, and problem-chronological. Using the critical-dialectical method in the research has resulted in the identification of the issues of the current European Union in its domestic, foreign policy, and military aspects and in the attitudinal-political background on which the “self-defence strategy” is based. The historical-systemic and action-oriented method helped to analyse the internal situation of the EU as a coherent subject of international relations, to distinguish the varieties of activities designed to ensure defence capability according to the specific organisation, the motivation component of the European leadership, the specifics of implementing particular strategies and plans in line with the challenges. In particular, the problem-chronological method provided background to successful analysis of the source and literature based according to the problem blocks, identifying and systematising the genesis of the issues, and considering them in a strict chronological dimension. Notably, the critical-dialectical and action-oriented methods played a crucial role in this study, which resulted in a qualitative in-depth analysis of the individual spheres of possible influence (pressure) on the enemy: political and military. It entailed an additional definition of the social factor, which in its essence, considered the conditions and motivational component of resource mobilisation. Consequently, the second phase of the study provided background data on the relevant work of the European Union leadership concerning its international bodies in ensuring the organisation's defence capabilities in several dimensions, trends toward internal structural changes at the EU level to ensure effective mobilisation of forces in case of an immediate military threat, and further actions in developing

particular internal and external security institutions of the Union.

The final – the third stage of the study – helped to obtain the results that resulted in the conclusions. At this stage, the method of synthesis of the obtained information was used. These results are the solution to the initially defined objectives and the implementation of the purpose of the study. The conclusions of this study can be used in further research on the European Union and similar supranational entities in the context of the globalisation of the European community.

Results

The following results were obtained during the study:

1) along with the changing geopolitical situation in Europe, in particular, due to the emergence of new military conflicts on the eastern borders, there has been a return of the ideas of a “united Europe”, which were presented by the EU as the only European geopolitical player on the international scene;

2) due to the war in Ukraine, the European Union began to implement internal transformations in security policy, which gradually resulted in reforms to existing legal and military programs and the emergence of new initiatives that were intended to create the conditions for the establishment of a “defence force”;

3) against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian war, relations between the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union have become closer but are partly competitive.

The annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas in 2014 demonstrated Russia as an immediate threat to the European Union for the first time rather than in theory, although despite everything, the idea of “mutual understanding and cooperation” with the aggressor has not disappeared among European politicians [5]. Anti-Russian policies did prevail in the then EU but were inconsistent: after all, trade and cooperation remained quite strong at many points, as the construction of Nord Stream 2 and the unofficial sale of arms to the Russians after 2014, despite sanctions and embargoes, confirm. Notably, with the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, several anti-Russian sanctions have been strengthened (Table 1). At the same time, the idea of a “united Europe” was beginning to percolate in the cabinets of European leadership, which essentially represented a model for the development of a coherent political system within the EU and was a kind of “guarantor” of the three key elements on which the European project was initially to be based: a stable security system, economic growth in the Union member states and the positioning of the Union on the international stage as a collective player [10].

However, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has forced a questioning of the idea's format. While previously it was not even an issue, as the format accommodated the EU of 2013 (after the accession of Croatia), at this stage, the ambitions of the EU, which has seen strong resistance from the Ukrainian people have potentially expanded to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (after the overthrow of the Lukashenko regime) [11]. This impetus is quite positive and openly promotes the idea that the

“united Europe” has not been implemented, and new integration processes on the part of the “Eastern Partnership” – states are a matter of time.

On the other hand, a new algorithm for conflict warning and prevention was defined in 2014 to quickly anticipate and counteract military conflicts within the EU and in the states bordering it. Having had the painful experience of failed conflict resolution in the Balkans and on Georgian territory in the past, the EU has considered the issue quite seriously. This framework is based on a definition of the risk of conflict, capturing the factors that expose civilians to danger and that undermine the functioning of the state apparatus or the components of the international system of relations [12]. Therewith, the establishment of the system chronologically coincided with the development and implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, of which the Eastern Partnership is a part, prompting a corresponding reaction to the invasions first in Crimea and Donbas and then a full-scale intervention in 2022, which can be called a particular kind of value solidarity.

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which is developing as a complementary structure of the EU, should be distinguished apart. Its leading purpose is to develop opportunities to further increase the European Union's mechanisms for the settlement of military conflicts or border defence specifically. The development of this defense structure resulted in the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016 [6].

At the same time, the European community, based on the same fundamental principles of the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU Global Strategy and the mechanisms of cooperation between the Member States of the Union, has thought about the establishment of a “European army”. In 2017, during a meeting of EU defence heads in Tallinn, the Lithuanian delegation proposed the introduction of a so-called “military Schengen area” for the rapid movement of European Union forces and civilian response forces established under the ESDP programme across Europe [13]. In November of the same year, 23 countries of the Union signed the relevant notification on the coordination of the special program. The new program is called PESCO, which stands for “Permanent Structured Cooperation”. Proponents thought that the established cooperation of signatory countries will allow for savings in armaments development and thus redistribute objectives in such a way that each country has its military specialisation. In this framework, PESCO includes cooperation to develop new security and military capabilities by addressing the shortcomings of past programmes, thus clarifying that Structured Continuous Cooperation is not an alternative to NATO but is intended to improve cooperation among EU member states. The costs associated with the projects are covered, first of all, by the participating countries and then by the general EU budget. It allows for a gradual increase of defence budgets in real terms by about 20% and investing this profit in common defence capability projects [14].

The next step in strengthening the European Union's defence capabilities was the signing in 2018 of the Agreement on Civilian Missions of the SPSS (known as

the ESDP) – it was the conclusion of a two-year effort by a team of European diplomats, military, and analysts, and intended to strengthen the European Union's ability to deploy civilian crisis management missions, supporting the police, administration, etc. [3].

In 2021, the idea of European armed forces was supported by 14 EU countries (Germany and France, in particular), which proposed to establish a rapid reaction force with the possibility of their usage abroad. The primary purpose was to establish a “strategic autonomy” from NATO, in which the EU member states would consolidate their defence capabilities to use defence budgets more efficiently in times of financial constraints (crises). Such an essentially revolutionary proposal confirmed the tenets of the Lisbon Agreement (2007), which defined defence cooperation as the concept of “concentration and distribution”, providing all necessary defence capabilities to a member state that requires them without having them at its disposal [6].

Meanwhile, the Alliance itself was at the time implementing major processes to improve its defence capabilities, such as the development of new operational and tactical military command structures and the strengthening of bases in Eastern Europe, thus the European Union initiative was met with jealousy, assuring that such developments would never replace the North Atlantic Alliance format, and such initiatives could, on the contrary, weaken the ability of NATO's EU and non-Alliance allies to cooperate. Therefore, the European leadership was forced to partially listen to the opinion of its partners and to continue the parallel deepening of cooperation between these structures [3].

Nevertheless, the Alliance supported the European Union's aspirations to pursue an independent self-sufficient policy in the defence sphere, which provided the opportunity to develop its military measures. It is confirmed, in particular, by regular consultations of experts of both organisations to ensure access of EU working groups to the operational planning capabilities of the Alliance and adaptation of EU defence planning to these standards. In addition to this, NATO is developing some options for exclusive leadership of operations under the aegis of the EU. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU countries can decide for themselves how deeply they will integrate into the military sphere. Therewith, the treaty provides for the possibility of member states whose military potential is higher than the criteria and which are bound to each other by obligations to establish “permanent structured work” within the EU [15].

The latest available step towards autonomy from NATO is the “Strategic Compass”, adopted by the EU states in 2022. Due to it, the European Union is reconsidering the current approaches to the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy and seeks to strengthen the capabilities of this association in response to security challenges in Europe. Considering the current steps of

Ukraine towards its accession to the European Union, the “Strategic Compass” is the leading document, the provisions of which should be considered in the next stages of European integration [5].

Its regulatory framework describes Russia's war against Ukraine in general terms as an imminent change in Europe's history, prompting action by returning to power politics in a contradictory multipolar world that is gradually acquiring the tendencies of the bipolar confrontation of the second half of the twentieth century. In particular, considering the demand for increased mobility, robustness, and flexibility in crisis management operations, the EU plans to develop the rapid deployment capabilities of defence military entities (around five thousand troops, but other components of capabilities) over several years, for which the rapid reaction force battle groups will be modified by 2023 already. The existing EU missions will change their structure: it is planned to deploy about two hundred experts per month in such civilian missions [4]. Therewith, they plan to reform civilian and military command structures and improve existing conflict early warning capabilities in line with modern requirements in the extreme tensions of the European region.

The European collective leadership has decided to enhance capabilities and strength in the face of threats. For this purpose, the intelligence services of the European Union will consider all potential threats to the union, which will simplify the transfer of intelligence data within the Union. Separately, the document considers the plan of cooperation in the field of security and defence with the Union's partners, in particular with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia on the eastern borders. The priority of such collaborative work of the European Union with these partners will be the response to hybrid threats, disinformation, and additionally – cybersecurity [16].

Thus, the above demonstrates that the emergence of a European security space in the form of a fully-fledged European Union army, the development and evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which includes the deployment of rapid reaction forces, and in the enhanced arrangements with the North Atlantic Alliance, which inherently encourage close cooperation in times of crisis, are coming to the surface. The Russian-Ukrainian war, in particular its phase of a full-scale Russian invasion from 24 February 2022, can in this respect be called a kind of “bifurcation point”, which a) demonstrated the potential threat to EU member states in Eastern Europe and b) demonstrated the irrelevance of previous European Union defence concepts to the challenges and threats of the present, c) established the necessity for a radical change both in its military orientation in strategic terms and its political vector to the aggressor state (Table 1).

Table 1. European Union anti-Russian sanctions after the start of a full-scale Russian invasion in 2022

Title	The bottom line
Sanctions against individuals and legal entities	The prohibition on providing funds, travel prohibition and assets freeze were imposed on 654 individuals and 52 legal entities
Financial sanctions	Complete freezing of assets and financial blocking of 3 leading Russian banks, prohibition of all types of lending to Russian banks

Table 1, Continued

Title	The bottom line
Energetic sanctions	Export of oil refining technologies is restricted
Transport sanctions	Export and sale of aircraft and aircraft equipment is restricted
Sanctions against high technologies	Restricted access to a number of high-tech developments, including drones and encryption devices
Visa sanctions	Visa-free regime for diplomats suspended

Source: [17]

Discussion

The study proved that by identifying the main range of problematic political and other issues based on the available source base, their systematic analysis and synthesis, not only demonstrates the “blank spots” in the historiography and analytical literature but allows outlining the following list of problems:

1. Political component of strengthening the defense capabilities of the European Union in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war.
2. Problems and perspectives of the European Union on the way to the development of defense mechanisms.
3. The influence of the EU ambitions on relations with NATO.

However, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has become a major challenge for the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe and has raised questions about how the countries can defend themselves against a possible Moscow invasion. Against this background, the issues of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the EU countries' security have become of equal significance. The system of bipolar world order has become a precarious target, as the European Union itself has recognised. The one logical solution was a return to the ideas of a “United Europe”, the format of which, for the reasons mentioned above, had significantly changed to include the countries of the Union itself and its potential partners. However, researchers M. Sini and N. Borraran in their study “European Union Politics” emphasised that at the present stage of the EU functioning, there is a tendency to substitute the idea of “united Europe” for that of the Union itself, that is, to attempt to deactivate the concept of this union, the grounds of its existence and potential perspectives [6]. This, in particular, is the work of Eurosceptic politicians, who are somehow financed by the Russian Federation.

In contrast, S. Leonard and C. Kohnert, in their study “Refugees, Security, and the European Union”, among others, discussed the problems of strengthening the EU's position and defence capacity. Security and defence issues are prioritised, determining that the transformation of the Alliance into a cooperative defence organisation is motivated by a lack of confidence in the strength of the North Atlantic Alliance. Its desire to monopolise its influence on the territory of Europe in opposition to all initiatives of the European collective leadership is becoming, according to the authors, painful, while no major transformations have been noticed [3].

In addition, the available historiography notes that a definite advantage of the European Union in matters of domestic, foreign, security, and defence policy is its flexible distribution of competencies between the EU institutions

(in particular the military) and the national governments of the member states. According to researchers S. Paladini and I. Castellucci in their study “European security in a post-Brexit world”, this position is a type of impetus for a new transformation that will force the European collective leadership to design a different development strategy in consideration of the Union's new ambitions, resulting in its accomplishing its purposes and expanding its activities in the matter of its security and international cooperation [7]. The political willingness of the EU countries can establish a strong enough counterweight to the existing security concepts in the form of NATO. The problems of Russian neo-Soviet revanchism are mentioned by V. Vebel and Z. Sliva in their research. They emphasised that the latest threats to the EU by Russia in the form of territorial claims on the Soviet Union legacy, without exaggeration, question the legitimisation of the current socio-political paradigm and indicate a systemic crisis of both European and global defence policy in general [18].

The motivation to improve the security and defence capabilities, the course to reduce NATO's influence on the defence wing of the European Union, and the corresponding policy of a new perspective on security are discussed in the study by D. Fiott. The author emphasised that these factors encourage internal institutional developments of the organisation in the military field. Consequently, a system was established at the time to harmonise the EU's algorithm for warning against threats of conflict and to ensure the rapid anticipation and countering of military conflicts within the EU and in the states bordering it. Threat analysis through this system is performed several times a year (often twice) [19]. Such a scheme should provide up-to-date data on the probability of crisis phenomena in “experimental” countries of this system. It was the System that envisaged a military conflict in Ukraine, and its outcome prompted a measured EU response in the form of sanctions leverage on Russia, which temporarily curtailed its appetite, delaying a full-scale invasion for as long as eight years. Notably, before the introduction of this system, the European Union used expert assessments. Thus, the European Neighbourhood Policy has frequently been considered a mechanism for conflict assessment and prevention to establish an axis of countries with a low risk of military conflicts and social crises, developing according to European standards through support programmes [3].

To strengthen the borders, the European Neighbourhood Policy program was established as a response to the EU expansion. The multilateral dimension of the program operates at the following levels: summits with the participation of both EU member states and partner countries; bilateral meetings of foreign ministers. Its primary purpose is

to cooperate with the neighboring countries in the fields of trade, security, and defense with the further establishment of a wide area around the borders of the European Union, where peace, stability, and prosperity will be ensured due to the established long-term relations. As for political encouragement for partners who successfully manage to improve all standards declared by the Union, the opportunity to conclude broader bilateral agreements of a new generation is considered. They, however, are designed to become a significant tool for strengthening the security area. Financial support, which is provided by the partnership policy, is considered an incentive for partners to fulfill all requirements. A number of these financial and economic aspects of the EU policy are mentioned in the study by T. Formanek [12].

The program itself does not guarantee accession to the EU for partner countries, but promoting economic and political reforms, supporting closer economic integration, sustainable development, and political leadership of the partner is an option to prevent military threats and expel unreliable parties to the initiative. However, this demonstrated a willingness on the part of the European collective leadership to defend its interests at the borders [10].

Subsequently, the above-mentioned resulted in the revision of the main principles of the European Security and Defense Policy, defining as a priority the desire for “structural and strategic autonomy” from transatlantic defense establishments (in this case – NATO). T. Sale noted that these trends resulted in the adoption of the EU Global Strategy, which recognized that the autonomy of the association is essential for the implementation of the defense and security plan [7]. It required member states to “unite their borders” (again, a curtsey towards the ideas of a “United Europe”) and to implement a consistent use of all – from preventive to proximate – means to defend their interests, including through swift decisions at local, national, regional and global levels. In addition, according to this strategy, the EU strives to establish a new international order based on its principles of sustainable development.

The effects of the EU Global Strategy were visible a year later, in 2017 when another qualitative improvement in the Union's security and defense sector was the introduction of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), which provides a new framework for EU countries to implement ambitious defense projects. The leadership of the European Union pursues the purpose of accumulating a specific part of defense expenditures to use them more efficiently [7].

Another significant stage in improving the management of the security environment, and at the same time affirming the European Union's position, has been the reformatting of the civilian mission procedure, which includes the significance of rethinking EU member states' engagement strategy in conflict resolution missions and an orientation towards expanding the security space.

The EU countries do not abandon the idea of full autonomy from the Alliance. Although NATO is assisting in the expansion of the defense area through the “European security format”, its leaders declare that this format will never substitute the North Atlantic Alliance. However, researcher A. Boven, examining the issue in his research in the context of EU and Russian diplomatic policy towards Donbas, noted that against the background of

Russian aggression in Ukraine, the European community has decided to follow its priorities, which gradually pushes the way to a new establishment – the European Defense Forces. For this purpose, the EU has selected a new area of work: reforming the ESDP and implementing its qualitative potential, which in turn highlights the dialogue that would help achieve security policy agreements among member states, review and establish new crisis management and strengthen the capabilities of the defense industry [20]. Accordingly, this defense policy has a straightforward impact on the redefinition of military concepts in both Ukraine and Russia, ranging from financing and industrial provisioning to the motivational component of a soldier training, both conscripts, and cadres [21].

Thus, it must be stated that the European Union's resources in the context of prospects for strengthening its defence capacity cover the military and diplomatic fields. At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014 and its full-scale phase from 2022 demonstrate both the general necessity to reset the European Union's defence policy and the necessity to thoroughly analyse all areas of potential pressure.

Conclusions

During the Russian-Ukrainian war, the idea of a “united Europe” as a system-forming concept started to gain popularity in the European Union, with the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022 being the high point of understanding on the matter. At the same time, the crisis phenomena against the background of military intervention raised the question of the very “form” of such a concept and provoked an open dialogue.

The development of the European Union into a collective defence organisation is logical, as some members of the European leaders lack confidence in the strength of the Alliance at this stage. Its desire to monopolise its influence on the territory of Europe as opposed to all initiatives is becoming painful, while no major changes have been noticed.

Therefore, the improvement in European defence cooperation – is the emergence of new security programs, such as the European Partnership Policy, PESCO, or Strategic Compass, which, in particular, are generally accepted instruments for the protection of Europe and its values.

Therewith, the adoption of the EU Global Strategy has set the purpose for the EU Member States to “unite their borders” and to implement consistent use of all – from preventive to immediate – means of defending their interests both on the territory of the Union and beyond its borders.

The escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the form of a full-scale invasion has actualised the EU's requirement for increased military mobility and the emergence of a “defence force”, which makes autonomy from NATO considered a natural occurrence. Therefore, the European security space in the form of a full-fledged army of the European Union can be considered a matter of time. Currently, the main question in the establishment of a European army is whether all EU members will agree to transfer to official Brussels the authority to use their troops. In addition, it should not be forgotten that for several European countries, the army has been an important symbol of national sovereignty for many years.

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Посилення обороноздатності країн ЄС в умовах російсько-української війни

Анотація. Проблематика статті проливає світло на військово-політичний вимір діяльності Європейського Союзу та його перспектив у перетворенні на об'єднання колективної безпеки у рамках російсько-української війни. Ця тема потрапляла у фокус дослідників, проте, розглядалася ними в контексті історії Європейського Союзу і не передбачала власне окремого дослідження. Мета цього дослідження – розгляд градації обороноздатності Європейського Союзу в період із початку російсько-української війни (2014) до моменту повномасштабного вторгнення РФ в Україну (2022) та перспективи подальшого розвитку цієї сфери в межах ЄС. Основа методологічної бази дослідження полягає у поєднанні загальноісторичних та політологічних методів, серед яких провідне місце займають ретроспективний та інституціональний. Власне аналітична робота з матеріалами, виокремлення певних робіт для кожного із завдань супроводжувалися використанням критико-діалектичного, історико-системного, дійового та проблемно-хронологічного методів. У результаті дослідження було виявлено, що військова складова обороноздатності Євросоюзу полягає у перегляді та розбудові Європейської політики безпеки і оборони (ЄПБО), створенні нових оборонних програм (PESCO), «програм лояльності» (Європейська політика партнерства) та інших можливих структур задля появи великого безпекового простору на кордонах із Росією та її сателітами. Практична цінність праці виявлена у можливості використання зазначених фактів у подальшому вивченні теми розвитку оборонної сфери Євросоюзу у XXI ст., а також проблематики наднаціональних безпекових утворень, зокрема на теренах Європи

Ключові слова: Європейський Союз, політика партнерства, НАТО, Глобальна стратегія, Європейська політика безпеки і оборони

UDC 341.24
DOI: 10.46493/2663-2675.32(5).2022.24-31

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Prerequisites for the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in the Context of Ukrainian-American Relations

Abstract. The Budapest Memorandum is one of the many international guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity. That is why the study of this treaty turned out to be relevant and necessary not only in the context of Ukrainian-American relations but also in the context of modern events related to the threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The purpose of the research work was to study the development of Ukrainian-American relations against the background of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. It was also necessary to find out the main prerequisites that became catalysts for the signing of the Budapest Memorandum. The main methods used in writing the work are: historical, terminological, statistical methods of scientific knowledge, systematic, and others. As a result of conducting scientific research on the specified topic, some events that became the reasons for signing the Budapest Memorandum were outlined, and the relationship between the development and improvement of Ukrainian-American relations and the signing of the relevant international agreement was clarified. The question of the influence of the United States of America on the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine was also investigated. Attention was also paid to the issue of guarantees and assurances of the signatory states regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the obligation to fulfill them. The research paper also provided some statistical data on the nuclear potential of Ukraine as the third nuclear power in the world after the USA and the Russian Federation. The consequences of signing the Memorandum and its direct effect in the context of encroachments on the territorial integrity of Ukraine were outlined. The results of research work can be used in further research by historians, legal scholars, and other authors as a comprehensive study of American-Ukrainian relations in the conditions of nuclear disarmament of the Ukrainian state

Keywords: nuclear disarmament, international treaties, nuclear potential, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, territorial integrity, security guarantees

Introduction

Ukraine's declaration of independence marked the emergence of the third state with the largest nuclear potential in the world, after the United States of America and Russia. Accordingly, the vector of Ukrainian-American relations in the context of Ukraine having such a nuclear stockpile was slightly modified and oriented to a great extent towards laying the foundations for further nuclear disarmament of the Ukrainian state. The main purpose of the United States was to reduce the external nuclear threat and to obtain the status of a nuclear-free state for Ukraine.

This research subject is interesting for consideration in the works of several other authors, whose considerations should be examined for a better understanding of the meaning and purpose of the study.

Thus, for example, V. Steshenko in "International Legal Characteristics of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum" notes that the Budapest Memorandum appears as one of

several international legal instruments designed to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the security guarantees provided by the signatory countries [1].

The American researcher J. Gaines in "Ukraine and the Misconception of the Budapest Memorandum" presents considerations about the appropriateness of the security guarantees underlying this treaty, describing them as having insufficient strength and mechanism to withstand attacks on the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine and losing to actions such as freezing the aggressor country's assets and other actions that could limit the economic stability of the latter [2].

Ukrainian researcher L. Shachkovska in "Prerequisites of the Budapest Memorandum and Security Guarantees for Ukraine" expresses a similar opinion about the lack of a defined and coherent mechanism for protecting Ukrainian integrity under this memorandum [3].

Received: 03.06.2022, Revised: 26.08.2022, Accepted: 22.09.2022

Suggested Citation:

Serneda, O.V., & Tsummer, A. (2022). Prerequisites for the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in the context of Ukrainian-American relations. *Foreign Affairs*, 32(5), 24-31.

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As for the issue of Ukrainian-American relations, an interesting work to consider is "The International Legal Aspect of Relations between Ukraine and the United States (1991-1994)" by R. Kharitonov. In particular, the author refers to the perception of Ukraine by American politicians and academics as a so-called "buffer zone" between Europe and Russia. According to this territorial positioning of Ukraine, American policy towards it should support the independence of Ukraine first to ensure a stable security situation in the region and to contain Russia's capabilities. P. Kharitonov suggests that America's policy towards Ukraine should consider the events and the role of Ukraine on the world stage, and suggests that the policy should be considered as a function of the re-election of a particular President of United States [4].

In addition to the state of the Ukrainian-American relations in the context of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, there are the thoughts of the American author E. Paisley in the study "The Denuclearisation of Ukraine and its Implications in Twenty Years' Time". The researcher highlights such a prerequisite for the signing of the Budapest Memorandum as the unsatisfactory state of the Ukrainian economy. In particular, she notes that the scenario in which Ukraine refused to be a non-nuclear state would entail several economic sanctions and restrictions, following the precedents of Pakistan, India, and other countries [5].

Another work devoted to Ukrainian-American relations is the study by N. Seredyuk "Ukraine-US Strategic Partnership". The research contains considerations on the reasons for the gradual modification of the type of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the United States of America. In particular, this modification, according to the author, is to separate the American authorities from the "Russian approach" to establishing communications with Ukraine. The "Russian approach" consisted of a short-term coincidence of interests in the denuclearisation of Ukraine and using various measures of influence from both Russia and the United States. Further expansion of the partnership, to some extent, was due to the West's desire to get rid of Russia's influence on Europe through the anti-democratic tendencies of the first one [6].

According to the historian S. Plokhyy, whose arguments can be found in the book "The Last Empire. The Decline and Collapse of the Soviet Union", the beginning of Ukrainian-American relations can be officially considered to be 1994, when the agreement was signed, according to which Ukraine renounced its nuclear potential as a successor country of the USSR [7].

Materials and Methods

The research was conducted using several methods of scientific cognition. The main among them is the historical method of research, which allowed determining the chronology of the prerequisites for the conclusion of the Budapest Memorandum, including the recognition of Ukraine as an independent state, inheritance of nuclear potential, etc. The historical method was based on the study of the development of Ukrainian-American relations. The complementary method for clarification of the aspects of this subject was the comparative method of scientific knowledge, which allowed tracing changes in the partnership

and diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the United States of America and identifying the main stages in the development of diplomatic relations between the aforementioned countries at the turn of the 21st century.

The statistical method, which was involved in the research, allowed for defining the scale of Ukraine's nuclear potential. Using the terminological method was useful in the analysis of the essence and nature of the Budapest Memorandum, the study of such concepts as "international treaty", "security guarantees", etc.

Furthermore, it is useful to outline using a systematic method by which it allowed for a series of separate events to be considered, such as the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine's independence, the series of Ukrainian succession possibilities, and their further interconnection as the main preconditions for the signing of the Budapest Memorandum.

The research was performed in three main stages:

1. At the initial stage of the study, the theoretical basis of the relevant subject was investigated, in particular, attention was devoted to the issues related to the causes and prerequisites for Ukraine's acquisition of nuclear-free status. Attention was devoted to researching statistics on Ukraine's nuclear capabilities and the threat that several researchers believed they represented. In addition, attention was devoted to the influence exerted on Ukraine by the two states with the largest nuclear potential – the United States and Russia.

2. The second stage was distinguished by the study of Ukrainian-American relations and their interrelation with the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. The main stages in the development of the respective diplomatic relations and partnerships were identified, among which the following should be distinguished: the stage of the "Russian approach", the stage of recognition of Ukraine as a full-fledged actor in the international arena and the stage of deepening the relationship between Ukraine and the United States of America, the counter version in Russia-US relations. Attention was devoted to security guarantees from the US and several other countries, which provide the foundation for the Budapest Memorandum as an international legal instrument for the protection of Ukraine's security, independence, and territorial integrity. Its content and the question of whether or not there is a mechanism for implementing these guarantees, and the appropriateness of the treaty and its strength against the backdrop of a series of controversial developments in recent history marked by the expansionist aspirations of the Russian Federation and its encroachments on Ukraine's territorial integrity have been examined.

3. The third final stage of the research is devoted to the comparison of the results with the considerations and studies of other scientists and authors, both Ukrainian and foreign. In particular, several positive aspects that were obtained as a result of the study of related issues by other scientists were identified. Consideration and analysis of the relevant results provided the basis for the conclusions of the research work on the relevant subject.

The relevance of the research is the study of relations between Ukraine and the United States, especially in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The purpose is to develop these relations against the background of

nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. The novelty of the study is that this subject has not been explored fully enough before.

Results

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) ceased to exist on December 26, 1996. It provided an impetus for the previous republics that were part of it to declare their independence and autonomy. One such republic was Ukraine, which as one of the successors of the USSR, received a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons. Such potential turned Ukraine into one of the three states with the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It significantly changed the status and perception of Ukraine in the world [8].

Despite the wide possibilities to use nuclear weapons, the Ukrainian state, in several regulatory legal acts, proclaimed the so-called “non-nuclear principles” and

defined itself as a non-nuclear state. In particular, such documents can be considered the Declaration of State Sovereignty of 1990 [9], the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On the Basic Principles of Foreign Policy of Ukraine” [10]. The collapse and termination of the USSR signified not only the proclamation of independence by several former Soviet countries but the establishment of new diplomatic relations. Thus, given the emergence of an independent Ukraine on the international scene with a legacy of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the United States considered it essential to respond in a variety of ways and means, which represented the beginning of diplomatic relations between the two independent states.

The nuclear potential of Ukraine consisted of variable weapons (Fig. 1). As for other countries of the world, in total 9 of them have nuclear weapons (Fig. 2).




Figure 1. Ukraine's nuclear weapons as for 1991

Source: [11]




Figure 2. Quantity of nuclear warheads by countries of the world in percentage terms

Source: [12]

Thus, the analysis concludes that the country with the greatest nuclear capability is Russia, whose total number of nuclear warheads exceeds the total number of nuclear warheads deployed by NATO member countries, in particular the United States, France, and the United Kingdom [13].

As for Ukrainian-American relations, the first stage of their development was notable for its tension and restraint. The reason was the significant nuclear potential of Ukraine at that time, which caused a biased and adverse

perception of the country's independence. Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the position of the US administration was to support Ukraine's freedom, but not independence, as it would result in losing external control over nuclear weapons usage, which would have devastating consequences for Europe and the US, according to American politicians of the time. However, there were opposing opinions on the significance of Ukraine as a new subject of international law, in particular the weighty role of the Ukrainian state as a deterrent to Russian influence in the West [14].

The change in diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the United States is based on the political leadership of the latter and the coming to power of Bill Clinton. B. Clinton engaged the Ukrainian side in negotiations on the solution of some issues concerning the development and stability of the economy, and the political situation in the country. Such a step allowed preparing the suitable ground for the further solution of the issue of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament [15].

Despite declaring itself a nuclear-free state, against the background of complicated relations with the Russian Federation, the Parliament initiated a statement on the succession of the Ukrainian state to the nuclear potential of the USSR. Accordingly, Leonid Kuchma proposed to keep part of nuclear weapons in Ukraine for defensive and deterrent purposes. Considering this policy vector, the ratification of the Lisbon Protocol was not fully implemented [16]. In general, the Lisbon Protocol is a supplement to the START-I Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, which defined the main aspects of strategic offensive arms reduction. Signing and ratifying it was against the background of the collapse of the Soviet Union, thus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed it on 23 May 1992 as successor countries to the USSR. Thus, Ukraine ratified the corresponding protocol but did not approve the provision of binding law on the mandatory accession of the country to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In addition, the reduction of nuclear weapons by Ukraine against the background of ratification of the agreement was as follows: 42% of nuclear warheads and 36% of intercontinental ballistic missiles [18].

The ratification of the Lisbon Protocol did not fully signify an aggravation of diplomatic relations not only with the Russian side but with the United States. Both the first and the second parties could not allow the minimal nuclear potential of the Ukrainian state, thus, all efforts were devoted to achieving the corresponding purpose.

Another appropriate step was the signing of agreements between Ukraine and Russia, named the "Massandra" agreements, which defined the main ways and means of removing and disposing of nuclear weapons stored on the territory of the Ukrainian state [19]. The relevant decision of the Ukrainian authorities established the foundations for the signing of the Budapest Memorandum and opened the way for an expanded partnership with the United States of America and appropriate compensation and financial assistance.

The subsequent significant event that accompanied Ukraine's path to nuclear-free status was the negotiations between the American and Ukrainian sides between Leonid Kravchuk and Bill Clinton. Later, on January 12, 1994, the intentions of the three countries were expressed in the declaration on the provision of definite guarantees and appropriate compensation from these countries for the export of nuclear potential of Ukraine [20]. Thus, the American side provided economic assistance in the amount of 300 million dollars, and later about 700 million. In addition, the US authorities provided loans to Russia to compensate the Ukrainian side for nuclear disarmament [20].

After Leonid Kuchma came to power in 1994, the position regarding the preservation of Ukraine's non-nuclear deterrent capacity slightly changed, and the President appealed to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to remove the restrictions that had been applied when ratifying the Lisbon Protocol. As a result, Ukraine was able of joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [21].

Thus, several prerequisites that led to Ukraine's acquiring the status of a nuclear-free country, in turn, allowed establishing the fact of significant improvement of relations between the Ukrainian and American sides. Ukraine's nuclear weapons absence, which signified a conditional threat to European and US security, allowed a Joint Statement on Partnership and Friendship between Ukraine and the United States of America to be concluded [22]. Another significant document is the Charter of the Ukrainian-American Partnership, which signified an increase in investment by the United States in Ukrainian development [23]. The declaration of 1994 as the "Year of Ukraine" signified the final strengthening of diplomatic relations for the development and cooperation of both countries.

In addition, against the background of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, it was appropriate to support it in its efforts to preserve the territorial integrity of the state and its sovereignty.

As a consequence of the nuclear disarmament policy over the following years, all stockpiles of nuclear weapons were gradually exported from the territory of Ukraine. In addition, there was the liquidation of infrastructural developments that could provide the facilities for the storage and production of such weapons. In particular, nuclear disarmament continued in 2010, when as a result of the agreement V. Yanukovich and B. Obama, the main component in the production of nuclear weapons – highly enriched uranium – was exported from the territory of Ukraine [24].

In the terms of nuclear disarmament, Ukraine needed guarantees of its territorial integrity. Such support was provided in the terms of the Budapest Memorandum as security guarantees. The essential issue is to analyse them and establish whether these guarantees contain an enforcement system and elements of the law of obligations.

The Budapest Memorandum (originally "Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons") is one of the types of regulatory acts of international character, i.e. an international treaty. As with any agreement, the Memorandum must include the parties to the agreement, its content, subject matter, and the obligations imposed on the parties. The signatories to this treaty are Ukraine, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America [25].

Thus, the content of the Memorandum is several security guarantees regarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. Accordingly, the signatory states, in particular the United States of America, confirmed their commitment to the non-use of armed aggression against Ukraine, its independence, etc. The exception is the necessity of self-defence, as indicated in the second paragraph of the Memorandum, and the first paragraph states that each party is obliged to respect the independence and

borders of the Ukrainian state. Paragraph three defines the obligations of the signatory states to refrain from any kind of economic pressure on the Ukrainian side; the fourth paragraph notes the obligations of each of the signatory states in case of aggression using nuclear weapons to demand a response to the relevant act by the United Nations Security Council. In addition, rather significant is the fifth point, which notes the obligation of the signatory countries not to use weapons against each other the exception is the necessity to respond to the act of using nuclear weapons against them, etc. In the event of any situation requiring the performance of the above-mentioned obligations, the parties are required to organise consultative meetings, as stated in paragraph six of the Budapest Memorandum [25].

Based on the analysis of the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum and its legal nature, note that the security guarantees contained in its content have a binding legal nature. Considering the discrepancy in the translation of the text of the Memorandum from English into Ukrainian, which consists in the following aspect: "Memorandum on Security Assurances" – literal translation sounds like "Memorandum on Security Assurances", in the Ukrainian version the name is translated exactly concerning guarantees, not assurances; thus, one should note that there is no mechanism for ensuring security and territorial integrity for the Ukrainian side as such [26]. The sole mechanism existing and prescribed in the Memorandum is consultations, the practice of which is insufficient for a precedent-setting response to aggression and encroachment by other signatory states.

Regarding the practice of convening consultations in response to Russia's territorial claims to Ukraine, for example, the British side expressed its willingness to perform the obligations prescribed in the memorandum. Thus, in 2014 a meeting of the signatories of the Memorandum was convened, in particular Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The exception was the representative of Russia, who refused to attend the meeting [8]. The representative of the United States of America expressed willingness to comply with the assurances provided both collectively and individually by each of the parties to the treaty [15].

Thus, the Budapest Memorandum is an international legal agreement considered by the United Nations and certified by the relevant certificate of registration of March 2015 [27]. Considering the content of the Budapest Memorandum, which consists of several obligations undertaken by the signatories to the treaty, assurances of Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence, and of its security, it is appropriate to refer to the binding nature of the Memorandum and to certify its legal validity as an international legal document. An essential aspect, in the author's opinion, is the absence of any time limit in the Budapest Memorandum, i.e., there is an indefinite duration of the treaty, which signifies its permanent validity and the absence of a security guarantee period for the preservation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Discussion

The subject of nuclear disarmament in Ukraine is rather interesting and is the subject of research in the works of several authors and scientists. Such considerations should be examined to compare the results with the achievements of others.

For example, in the study "Ukrainian-American relations at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries", S. Lyaskovets identifies the fundamental documents which established the beginning of Ukrainian-American diplomatic relations against the background of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. In particular, according to the author, such documents are The Agreement on Providing Assistance for the Elimination of Nuclear Strategic Weapons, which included a protocol agreed between the Ukrainian and US Ministries of Defence, which defined the material and technical base that was required to perform the relevant disarmament, and personnel, services, etc. In addition, it is interesting to consider that with the removal of the nuclear threat from Ukraine, the United States further developed alternative ways of cooperation with the Ukrainian state, in particular the US interest in investing in and promoting trade with Ukraine [28].

Similar considerations have R. Kharytonov in his work "International Legal Aspect of Relations between Ukraine and the United States (1991-1994)". He notes that since Ukraine's independence, the United States has not only been unwilling to establish strong diplomatic relations with the new state but has pressured Ukraine to acquire nuclear-free status. The author argues that considering Ukraine's desire for recognition of its independence and autonomy by the US, its concessions to agree to nuclear-free status were quite logical. This particular circumstance guaranteed the absence of global isolation of Ukraine and the stability of the economy [3].

Thus, the development of Ukrainian-American relations largely depended on Ukraine's refusal to be a nuclear power. The main adverse consequences of such a refusal could be economic sanctions, global isolation, non-recognition of independence by several countries, including the United States, etc.

Interesting thoughts on the Budapest Memorandum as a consequence of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine were expressed by the American author D. Yost. In particular, he indicates the inefficiency of the document based on the events of 2014, which resulted in the annexation of Crimea and became a gross violation of those security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for its nuclear-free status. In addition, D. Yost notes that insufficient safeguards by signatory states could result in non-nuclear weapon states developing and implementing national strategies to develop nuclear weapons, which would significantly contribute to shifts in the current international order. Such opinions are conditioned by the absence of authority of the Budapest Memorandum as an international document that should guarantee Ukraine's security and territorial integrity [29].

The so-called "inauthenticity" of the international agreement signed by the United States, Russia, the United

Kingdom, and Ukraine is reflected in the absence of a coordinated system of response by the guarantor states to attempts to infringe on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, its sovereignty and independence. The Memorandum provides only for consultation meetings, which do not provide significant results.

Another American author T. Grant, in "The Budapest Memorandum of 5 December 1994: Political Participation or Legal Obligation?", examines the question of the legal nature of the Budapest Memorandum. In his opinion, the nature of those security guarantees provided by the signatory states is a legal obligation, not the assurance of respect for the integrity and independence of Ukraine. But the author has some doubts about the seriousness of the defence guarantees provided by countries, in particular by the United States of America. The argument for these doubts is the absence of domestic ratification of a treaty granting guarantees of territorial integrity to another state, and the absence of a detailed description and specifying a mechanism for responding to territorial claims against a Ukrainian state [30].

Quite an essential work on nuclear disarmament of Ukraine is the study of P. Gai-Nyzhnyk "Budapest Memorandum: Prerequisites and Consequences of (Non)Guarantee of National Security of Ukraine". The author notes that after Ukraine acquired independence, about 15% of all nuclear weapons in the world were concentrated on its territory [31]. The core strike weapon with this nuclear capability was 46 solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 10,000 kilometres [31]. The presence of such weapons provided a pretext for allegations of Ukraine's violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and gave reason for pressure on Ukraine by Russia and the United States of America. P. Gai-Nyzhnyk underlines the main prerequisite for Ukraine's nuclear-free status and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, which is uncertainty on the Ukrainian side about security guarantees and in what form they should be provided to Ukraine. It, in the author's opinion, was the mistake of the Ukrainian authorities and conditioned the signing of a treaty that lacked a mechanism for responding to aggression by other countries against Ukraine. Another prerequisite, according to the researcher, is the US refusal to support independent countries with nuclear capabilities, thus Ukraine had to obtain nuclear-free status for such recognition [31].

Similar prerequisites are presented in study V. Myronenko's "Features of the development and transition to denuclearisation of the Ukrainian nuclear missile program". Thus, the author quotes the arguments concerning the main reason for Ukraine's acquiring nuclear status and for signing the Budapest Memorandum, which was the acquisition of independence by the Ukrainian state and other post-Soviet countries, which prompted the introduction of an independent policy and is an equal subject on the world stage. In the opinion of V. Mironenko, the nuclear capabilities that were available in the successor states to the USSR were designed to destabilise the United States, which is why the US authorities expressed clear conditions, the performance of which allowed access to the Ukrainian-American partnership. Thus, the acquisition of a nuclear-free

status for Ukraine was a priority of US foreign policy, and a condition for the opening of diplomatic relations between the Ukrainian and US authorities, a pledge of recognition of Ukraine's independence and financial support [32].

Author L. Shachkovskaya, in her research "Prerequisites for signing the Budapest Memorandum and security guarantees for Ukraine", identifies the following prerequisites for signing the relevant memorandum: Ukraine's possession of the world's third-largest nuclear capability, which significantly influenced the geopolitical situation; the signing of the Lisbon Protocol between the US, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which opened the way for gradual reduction of strategic and offensive weapons; and accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provided an essential condition for the development of Ukraine. In addition, the researcher notes that the entire process of nuclear disarmament in Ukraine was completed in 1996, and the last missile launcher for SS-24 was already destroyed in 2001 [4].

Thus, when analysing the considerations of other authors and researchers and combining them with the results obtained, it is reasonable to identify the following preconditions for the signing of the Budapest Memorandum in the context of Ukrainian-American relations: Ukraine's independence and possession of the world's third-largest nuclear capability; the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty, which proclaimed that Ukraine is nuclear-free; the threat of economic sanctions and global isolation with the assistance of the United States; pressure from the US and the absence of diplomatic relations development with Ukraine's nuclear capabilities; Ukraine's signature of the Lisbon Protocol of 1992 [16]; accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with financial support from the United States [21]. As a result, these preconditions became crucial on the way to the signing of the Budapest Memorandum by Ukraine.

First of all, the signing of such an international treaty was strategically significant in the context of the recognition of Ukraine as an equal actor in the international arena. In addition, Ukraine's rejection of nuclear weapons prompted the strengthening of the regime that was introduced as a result of the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ukraine's nuclear-weapon-free status has opened the door to economic assistance from the United States, which allowed for crucial reforms at home, integration into international financial institutions, and the maintenance of economic stability in the country. US support has been crucial in separating the Ukrainian state from Russian influence.

The signing of the Budapest Memorandum allowed obtaining of security guarantees from such states as the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. The determining issue is their efficiency, which, as recent geopolitical events demonstrate, is not crucial in the context of ensuring the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Conclusions

As a result of the research, the main events in the state life of Ukraine, which were the main prerequisites that prompted the country to sign the Budapest Memorandum,

were analysed. Significant in this aspect is the influence of the United States of America, which was designed to convince Ukraine to acquire the status of a non-nuclear state in exchange for security guarantees and financial support. In addition, the presence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would hamper the development of Ukrainian-American diplomatic relations, trade between the respective states, and cooperation on economic, social, and other levels.

International isolation, economic sanctions, and the country's lack of development were the main constraints that prevented Ukraine from continuing to be a nuclear power with the world's third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan, and other countries were suspended from trade in the international arena in a similar manner. According to the data, almost 15% of the total nuclear potential belonged to Ukraine. In addition, the USA, Russia, France, etc. are nuclear powers. It was through security

guarantees from these countries that Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for renouncing nuclear weapons. The main guarantees in the Memorandum are respected for Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, commitment to respond to armed aggression against Ukraine, and obligation to convene consultations as a consequence of such aggression. The study identified the inefficiency of these assurances from Ukraine's security guarantor states due to the lack of a detailed mechanism for responding to actions against the state's territorial integrity and independence.

The study of nuclear disarmament in Ukraine is not restricted exclusively to this subject. The following studies should be devoted to clarifying the legal nature of the Budapest Memorandum, the question of the binding nature of the obligations of the Memorandum against the threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and the possibilities for Ukraine to restore its nuclear status.

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Передумови підписання Будапештського меморандуму 1994 р. в контексті українсько-американських відносин

Анотація. Будапештський меморандум є однією з багатьох міжнародних гарантій територіальної цілісності України. Саме тому дослідження цього договору виявилось актуальним та необхідним не лише в контексті українсько-американських відносин, але й в контексті сучасних подій, пов'язаних із загрозою територіальній цілісності України. Метою науково-дослідної роботи поставало дослідження розвитку українсько-американських відносин на тлі ядерного роззброєння України. Також необхідним було з'ясування основних передумов, що стали каталізаторами підписання Будапештського меморандуму. Основними методами, що були використані при написанні роботи є: історичний, термінологічний, статистичний метод наукового пізнання, системний та інші. У результаті проведення науково-дослідної роботи за вказаною тематикою було окреслено низку подій, що стали причинами підписання Будапештського меморандуму, з'ясовано співвідношення між розвитком та покращенням українсько-американських відносин і підписанням відповідної міжнародної угоди. Також було досліджено питання впливу Сполучених Штатів Америки на ядерне роззброєння України. Приділена увага і питанню гарантій та запевнень держав-підписантів щодо територіальної цілісності України та обов'язковості їх виконання. У науково-дослідній роботі також були наведені й деякі статистичні дані щодо ядерного потенціалу України як третьої ядерної держави світу після США та Російської Федерації. Були окреслені наслідки підписання Меморандуму та його безпосередня дія в контексті зазіхань на територіальну цілісність України. Результати науково-дослідної праці можуть бути використані в подальших дослідженнях істориками, правознавцями та іншими авторами як всеосяжне дослідження американсько-українських відносин в умовах ядерного роззброєння української держави

Ключові слова: ядерне роззброєння, міжнародні договори, ядерний потенціал, Договір про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї, територіальна цілісність, гарантії безпеки

UDC 327.8

DOI: 10.46493/2663-2675.32(5).2022.32-39

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The Causality of the Abkhaz War and russia's Role in the Conflict

Abstract. The relevance of the research is determined by the active intervention of the occupying Russian troops and the implementation of the general policy of officials in the external and internal processes of the state system of post-Soviet countries, in particular, in the processes of the occupation of part of Georgia. The purpose of the work is to identify the main prerequisites for the beginning of the military conflict. The article used such methodological approaches as a theoretical approach, a formal-legal approach, a logical analysis method, a synthesis method, a deduction method, and others. The main reasons for Russia's aid to Abkhazia were identified, among which it is worth noting the geopolitical location of the territory, the obstruction of Georgia's accession to NATO, access to pipelines for the transport of hydrocarbon resources, and the increase in the sphere of influence in the space of post-Soviet countries. A detailed analysis of the factors influencing political and military processes in Abkhazia by Russia was carried out. An important stage during the work was proving the fact about the policy of a violent nature, which is manifested in the occupation and annexation of sovereign territory by another state. It was found that Russia usually uses a wide range of military and non-military influence tools and methods to implement its plans; such influence is carried out on a systemic basis and has a comprehensive character in various spheres. It is worth noting that the military confrontation between Russia and Georgia has a significant impact on the strategic and political outlook of Georgia and, directly, on the occupied region. The practical value of the obtained results will help establish the cause-and-effect relationship of the Russian-Georgian confrontation and highlight the role of Russia as an aggressor state, which will help to highlight ways to avoid possible military conflicts for other countries of the post-Soviet space

Key words: transit, international recognition, occupation, annexation, unrecognized states, post-Soviet space

Introduction

Russia's transition in the early 2000s to an active phase of political and economic expansion into the post-Soviet republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) necessitates a qualitative reassessment of its instruments of influence and purposes in the post-Soviet space.

As M. Orenstein notes, one of the main features of the current foreign policy of russia concerning the territories of post-Soviet countries is the implementation of the "Putin regime doctrine" [1].

In the opinion of K. Pinniemi, at the global level, russia strives to establish itself as a distinct pole with inherent independence in a multipolar international order and the status of an influential integration centre in

Eurasia, especially in the post-Soviet space [2]. As R. Johnson defines, the policy of this state is oriented toward gaining decisive influence on the external and internal structure of post-Soviet states, which is an area of its priority geopolitical interests [3]. With such a concept, the former republics of the USSR would be stripped of their independence, and their sovereignty would be confined to those interests determined by russia. Based on this, the model of relations will not be based on cooperation between equal partners but on demands for acceptance of russian hegemony in the regions.

As M. Galeotti notes, among the main arguments for a certain "greatness" of russia and its claim to a special place in the international arena, Putin mentions the existence of nuclear deterrent forces, the size of its territory, its

Received: 09.06.2022, Revised: 01.09.2022, Accepted: 22.09.2022

Suggested Citation:

Gelenidze, Z., Sekhniashvili, N., Akhvlediani, A., Semeni, O., & Zalamai, V. (2022). The causality of the Abkhaz war and russia's role in the conflict. *Foreign Affairs*, 32(5), 32-39.

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subsoil wealth, and its “talents” in the production of cultural goods [4]. With these conceptual arguments, he justifies the “legitimacy” of the intervention against Georgia, the aggression against Ukraine, and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.

In the opinion of L. Jopling, the main thrust of Russia's aggression is toward those countries that have an explicit commitment to Euro-Atlantic and European integration, such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, a factor that prevents Russia's ambitions from being implemented. Thus, Russia is not able to propose effective models of integration but cannot allow alternative options for this process in the post-Soviet space, as this would call into question their influence in the region and supremacy [5].

In general, Russia considers the territories of the South Caucasus as a sphere of its privileged interests and competes for the sphere of influence with the countries of the West and the regional factor, namely Turkey. The countries of the South Caucasus in geopolitics have to count on the support of external partners. In this sub-region, there is a geopolitical confrontation between Russia and Western countries that support Georgia as their “outpost”.

As noted by J. Almenga, the strategy of Russia provides for the preservation of power and control over such satellites as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as these territories provide an opportunity to use them as geopolitical springboards [6]. The analysis of the Abkhaz war, namely the identification of historical preconditions and causes, helps to analyse Russia's overall strategy in the international arena and the post-Soviet space. Determination of the causal link is especially relevant today, particularly due to the military aggression against Ukraine.

According to J. Gauter, Russia's attempts to influence have been applied systematically for many years, using a wide range of methods and tools in various fields, and are comprehensive and complex [7]. It targets individuals, institutions, and processes and is implemented on a global scale. The methods and ways of influence, and their priority, are not sustainable. Thus, analysing the situations in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia abandons the means of “soft power” in favour of “hard power”. In particular, describing the Abkhazian war, notably, that it is inherent in multi-stage, extended in time, and creeping nature of the expansion process. Based on the above, of particular importance is the issue of identifying the cause-and-effect relationship to describe the actions of Russia, and identifying the main ways to prevent military aggression for the countries of the post-Soviet space.

The relevance of the study is the exploration of the Russian occupation of Abkhazia. The purpose of the study is to identify the main causes of the outbreak of military conflict. The novelty is that the subject has not previously been researched as extensively as it is now.

Materials and Methods

The study, the scope of which is to identify the main causes, preconditions and consequences of the Abkhaz war and to determine Russia's role in this military conflict, has been conducted through the application of various methodological approaches, exposing the theoretical

and practical content of the work. Due to the application of the theoretical approach, the main historical and political reasons for the outbreak of the military conflict between Georgia and Russia were identified. The Aristotelian approach helped to identify the main reasons for Russia's assistance to Abkhazia, such as the territory's geopolitical location, preventing Georgia from joining NATO, access to pipelines to transport hydrocarbon resources and increasing its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. The method of logical analysis helped to identify the factors of influence on the political and military processes in Abkhazia by Russia. The dogmatic approach helped to prove the fact of interference and violent policy, in particular, the occupation and annexation of sovereign territory by another state, namely, Abkhazia by Russia. Due to the application of legal hermeneutics, it was identified that Russia usually uses a wide range of military and non-military instruments and methods of influence to implement its plans and that such influence is systematic and overarching in a variety of fields. Using a functional approach, the consequences of the Abkhaz war were analysed, and the factors contributing to the replenishment of the Russian regime's supporters in the annexed territory were assessed. The method of deduction helped to assess the impact of the military conflict on the strategic and political outlook of Georgia and the occupied region – Abkhazia – based on the identified causes, preconditions and consequences of the Abkhaz war. The method of induction, based on specific features of Russia's military aggression against Georgia, helped determine the role of the aggressor state in this conflict. The importance of applying the synthesis method is conditioned by the fact that based on the obtained results of theoretical and practical content the cause-and-effect relationship of the Russian-Georgian confrontation was established and Russia's role as an aggressor state was outlined, which will help to identify ways of avoiding possible military conflicts for other countries of the post-Soviet space in the future.

Thus, the study was conducted in several stages:

1. The first stage of this research was to analyse the historical and political background of the Russian-Georgian conflict and to identify the main events that contributed to its outbreak.

2. The second stage was based on an analysis of the main causes of the Abkhaz war and Russia's assistance in establishing Abkhazia as an unrecognised state and identifying a set of factors contributing to the replenishment of supporters of the Russian regime in the annexed territory.

3. The third phase identified the consequences and assessed the impact of the military conflict on the strategic and political worldview of Georgia and the occupied region of Abkhazia, based on the identified causes and preconditions of the Abkhaz war. Equally crucial in this phase was the identification of ways to avoid possible military conflicts for the other post-Soviet states.

Results

According to the principles of international law, the Republic of Abkhazia is an integral part of Georgia, but the latter does not control the territory. With limited support

from the international community, the Republic of Abkhazia prefers an uncertain status on the international stage rather than being under the control of the Georgian government. Russia is the patron state assisting Abkhazia; military, economic, financial, political, technical, and other types of assistance enable Abkhazia to exist in rather difficult conditions, in particular, Russia receives geostrategic benefits and “reinforcement” of national security [8].

Russia sees patronage of the new political entities as part of its assertion on the international stage and the transformation of the current system of international relations through the weakening of those countries on whose territory these aggravations have emerged.

After the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of 1992-1993, Abkhazia declared its independence. The specific feature of this conflict is that Georgia tried to preserve the integrity of its territory, and Abkhazia – expanded the rights of autonomy and independence [9].

However, Russia's support for Abkhazia increased as a result of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 2008, which began with an armed confrontation between South Ossetian separatists and the Georgian authorities. Before the occupation of the territories of Georgia, Russia had been carefully preparing for at least 2.5 years [10]. One of the reasons for this was the new course of the Georgian authorities, which purpose was to conduct democratisation and cooperation with the Western countries. However, as a result of the events of August 2008, the situation on the territory of Abkhazia changed drastically, as two opposite trends emerged, namely, an increase of Russian influence and patronage and a weakening of the international presence in the region.

In analysing the main reasons for Russia's support of Abkhazia, notably, the strategic significance of the territory for Russian foreign policy, as it provides open access to western Georgia; in addition, significance is the presence of the largest military airfield in Transcaucasia, in Gudauta, and Sukhumi airport, which has one of the best runways in the world and can accommodate “Ruslan” cargo planes [10]. Thus, the most significant factor in Russia's support for Abkhazia is the geopolitical location of this territory, which allows expanding influence in the

Caucasus region and Georgia and strengthens the security and military-political sphere of Russia's policy [11].

Among other factors, there are obstacles to Georgia's accession to NATO [11]. Notably, the strengthening of control over the Caucasus, in particular, over strategic pipelines that provide an opportunity to transport hydrocarbon resources and restore influence in the post-Soviet space by force.

The policy of Russia is strengthening its position in the international arena by establishing itself in the countries near its borders. Thus, the common purpose of Russia in the post-soviet space is to strengthen its supremacy and dominant position, which should be based on economic, political, and security components that unite the neighbouring countries with Russia [12]. The war with Georgia allowed Russia to expand its military presence in the region.

The influence of Russia can be traced to the consequences of granting Russian citizenship to residents of Abkhazia, which began in 2003 [13]. As a result, most citizens received Russian citizenship, which allowed them to travel across the border and receive Russian pensions. It is part of Russia's overall strategy, known as “certification”; its purpose is to enhance the number of citizens who will be loyal to the Russian regime in the post-soviet space.

Notably, Russia is the main sponsor of the budget of Abkhazia, as more than 50% of revenues are official assistance from Russia or the result of trade with it. Thus, for example, in the period from August 2008 to May 2010, 900 million US dollars were spent on the development of Abkhazia [14]. The official currency of the Republic is the Russian ruble. In the period from 2017 to 2019, 6 billion rubles were used to fund investment projects [14].

Russian culture penetrates all spheres of public life in Abkhazia. Due to the expanding influence of Russian television, Russian has emerged as the main language for receiving news from abroad. The presence of minorities and the popularity of Russian culture and language provide Russia with additional levers of influence on Abkhazia.

Although the people of Abkhazia see Russia as the main guarantor of security and receipt of financial assistance, they do not want to be completely overtaken by it. Notably, a survey was conducted among the population in 2019 (Fig. 1).

Survey among the population of Abkhazia




Figure 1. Survey among the population of Abkhazia

Source: [15]

Thus, according to the statistics, the majority of the population is in favour of preserving the independence and national identity of Abkhazia, while less than 1/3 is in favour of the republic's inclusion into Russia. It allows

concluding that despite the provided assistance in “guaranteeing” security and finances, the population of the unrecognised state does not have the will to be completely absorbed by Russia.

Notably, the federal centre of russia has poor control over the internal policy of Abkhazia. The admission of another uncontrolled entity to russia can be a factor in weakening russia's influence in the North Caucasus. Although russia's popularity in Abkhazia is quite high, this does not deny the fact of regional pragmatism, which will "force" the Abkhaz elite to assert independence and autonomy in matters of domestic politics. Since Abkhazia has no desire to become part of russia, the scenario of the republic's accession to russia is improbable. Currently, the status of an unrecognised state suits both sides. Based on this, it is most obvious that the Republic of Abkhazia will remain a de facto independent quasi-state on the Black Sea and will act as a buffer between russia and Georgia.

Notably, Abkhazia expected Moscow's support back in the 90s of the last century, but then it was limited [15]. The support increased after russia and other states recognised Abkhazia as an independent state, after which the republic became partially recognised but dependent on russia. In addition, it is essential to note that russia's support for Abkhazia constitutes pressure on Georgia to respond to its will to steer policy toward the West and prevent it from joining NATO [16]. Although the population of Abkhazia desires to preserve its autonomy, independence, and national identity, the most probable scenario is a gradual absorption of the republic by russia and a greater involvement of the quasi-state in the field of russian geopolitical interests.

In general, the fixation on the expansion of the territory of Abkhazia has been hampered for many reasons, and several factors contribute to this. Among these is the "hybrid" nature of aggression, in which the aggressor state, namely russia, does not recognise its role as a proximate party to the conflict, attempting to identify itself as a "peacemaker" and attributing the role of the attacker to the target. Notably, there are socio-cultural, socio-economic, ethnic, and political reasons for the confrontation, which will mask the fact that the conflicts are artificially supported and controlled from the outside. In the future, notably, russian expansion is inherent in a multi-stage, creeping, and multi-stage nature. Particular attention needs to highlight the difficulty of proving the legal nature of the involvement of certain individuals, structures, or states in the initiation and organisation of armed conflict, due to the disguise of real political objectives and the obstacles for international organisations to monitor the situation in conflict areas [16]. Equally significant is the dependence of the intellectual orientation on russian narratives and excessive academic political correctness, which prevented the situation in Georgia from being unambiguously qualified as a russian occupation.

A study of the situation in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine provides sufficient grounds to assert that armed conflicts and the resulting pseudo-states are one of the instruments of hybrid aggression by russia in the post-Soviet space, whose purpose is to regain its geopolitical influence in this region.

The involvement of russia in armed conflicts is part of a well-established mechanism of hybrid warfare, which is playing an increasing role in the discourse of military orientation in the post-Soviet space. In the most

general terms, this mechanism has several stages. First of all, it is the support or instigation of interstate or intra-state conflict, which manifests itself in provoking or allowing a crisis in the conflict; subsequently, this crisis is escalated to the stage of confrontation using weapons; the intervention of russia as a "peacemaker" and "defender" of a particular category of the population on the respective territories; the next step is to "freeze" the conflict, which manifests itself in preventing its real resolution, while the key objective is to maintain influence over the parties to the conflict by imposing various negotiation processes, peaceful settlements, etc.; subsequently, a political-territorial entity is established in the conflict area, which will position itself as an independent republic; the last step is to escalate or intensify the conflict, using weapons at the right time to exert pressure [17].

The main advantages of conducting "frozen conflicts" for russia are that they divert significant material and human resources that could have been used for defence and development; impede democratic and economic transformation and force the government to favour unpopular and authoritarian solutions; compromise the authority of the central government; establish conditions for external interference against countries weakened by internal conflicts, which allows the russia to use hybrid warfare tools and open a wider space for manipulation and influence the positions of political elites; notably, establishing a potential threat to national security for a category of such countries, and implementing an adverse impact on regional and global security [17].

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the russian authorities will continue to influence the post-Soviet countries by using hybrid wars. The most significant objectives for all post-Soviet republics are to strengthen their defence capabilities, develop their economic system, be able to resist disinformation and find new non-standard and comprehensive responses to asymmetric armed aggression. Notably, every opportunity should be explored to maximise the existing international legal mechanisms to restore territorial integrity and inviolability on the principle of respect for national interests. One of the most rational solutions for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, and for the other post-Soviet countries, is to join NATO and move as close to the EU as possible; this would represent a kind of victory in the hybrid war with russia since the purpose of introducing these conflicts is to prevent the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries, and to preserve russian dominance and supremacy in the post-soviet space.

Further research will focus on a more detailed analysis of post-Soviet policy, namely in the area of EU rapprochement; assessing the prospects and challenges of EU and NATO accession, and providing recommendations to close gaps in current policy.

Discussion

The events of August 2008 shook the international community with a new aggression on the territory of the post-Soviet state and a new confrontation in the Caucasus, where the Georgian-Abkhazian-russian conflict has

been ongoing for many years. In analysing the history of this issue, the origins of the conflict can be seen in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the new states, which were forced to solve conflicts with members of national minorities on their territory.

While highlighting the main causes, note that they can be evaluated variously based on the intentions of the geopolitical orientation of the conflict factors. According to the conclusion of the International Commission of Inquiry under the leadership of H. Tagliavini established that Georgia started the war, but Russia provoked it, using the disproportionality of the used forces [18].

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in the 1990s was one of the most acute conflicts of ethnopolitical nature, which required a diplomatic approach of all parties involved in the confrontation.

In the opinion of A. Kvakhadze, among the primary factors that manifested themselves in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, is the migration policy pursued by Beria; the consequence was a decrease in the number of Abkhazians in the region; as of the 1990s, Abkhazians accounted for 17% of the population, and the rest were Georgians and Armenians; until the 1950s, the Abkhazian language was not taught in educational institutions, as it was replaced by Georgian [19]. Subsequently, in 1989, 30 thousand people of Abkhazia declared the restoration of the union status of the republic and secession from Georgia [20].

In the opinion of K. Berglund, Georgia lost Abkhazia in 1992, as the population of the republic, having a rather conditional autonomy, was able to preserve its own national identity and nationalised power structures at the local level [21]. Most of the key positions in the administrations of the Abkhaz SSR were occupied by representatives of ethnic Abkhazians, and it was they who performed a decisive role in raising the issue of Abkhazia's obtaining the status of a union republic with the support of Moscow [21].

After the abrogation of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR by Georgia and the restoration of the Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic, the Abkhaz leadership single-handedly restored the Abkhaz Constitution, according to which the country was declared sovereign [22]. However, the international community has not recognised these acts of arbitrariness.

On August 14, 1992, the Georgian-Abkhazian war began using heavy artillery, aviation and other means of military weapons [20]. As noted by A. Kartsonaki, the purpose of the Georgian government was to establish control over a part of the territory and maintain territorial integrity, just as the purpose of the Abkhazian government was to expand autonomy rights and obtain independence [23]. The material and political assistance offered to Abkhazia by Russia, under the leadership of B. Yeltsin, contributed to partially and temporarily defusing the confrontation [23].

Russia attempted to maintain its neutrality status, although its armed forces were accused by Georgia of conducting intelligence operations [24]. Later, a Georgian-Abkhaz protocol was signed, according to the provisions of which the upper part of the Kodori Gorge was transferred under the control of Russian peacekeepers and UN observers [24].

In October 2006, the Abkhaz leadership presented an appeal to the Russian leadership to recognise the territory's independence; however, the Russian leadership has repeatedly stated that it recognises the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is a part [25].

At the beginning of the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, the territory of the autonomy was governed by citizens and natives of the Russian [25]. Notably, other significant events in 2008 were the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the US and most EU countries, and the NATO summit in Bucharest, according to which Georgia and Ukraine were to become NATO members [26]. In the opinion of A. Gavrich, these decisions were unacceptable for the Russian authorities, as it is losing control and supremacy over the territories of the post-Soviet countries [27].

Before the events of 2008, Russia had developed plans for a military operation to impose its will on Georgia; the purpose was to provide the Russian authorities with a plausible denial of Georgia's accusations of the conflict and prevent the country from choosing its strategic vector of development [28].

At the end of April 2008, an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft was downed over Abkhazian territory from Georgian territory. This event caused a serious international scandal. Georgia brought accusations against Russia due to its air force being downed, thus the case was referred to the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter the UNSC) [29]. However, the UN Security Council did not agree on the situation on the territory of Abkhazia, thus its members heard only the opinion of Russia [29]. In the opinion of N. Torun, due to this, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict became sharply escalated, and therefore the Russian authorities sent additional forces of "peacekeepers" to Abkhazia; the Georgian authorities regarded this step as military aggression [30].

By the end of May 2008, the railway connections between Russia and Abkhazia were repaired, which allowed Russia to deploy large-scale forces to the separatist enclave in case of hostilities with the Georgian side [31]. After Abkhazia requested recognition of its independence and Russia granted the request, Russian authorities argue that they have a full right to have their military units, subject only to an agreement with the Abkhaz leadership [32].

According to the opinion of J. Sharkin, Russia was interested in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and acted as a mediator [33]. Annexation of the autonomies that were part of Georgia was a denial of the territorial integrity and inviolability of an independent sovereign state.

However, despite the historical background of the Russian-Georgian conflict, the current outbreak of violence demonstrates the instability of the political situation in the Caucasus. As R. Ganohariti notes, this lies in the fact that peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia have been ineffective in establishing the necessary conditions to solve the conflict; the essential objective for the separatist entities is not separation from Georgia but recognition of their independence in the international arena; Russian policy towards Abkhaz residents is a factor that contributes to deepening the contradictions in the positions of the parties to the conflict and increases their radicalisation [34].

The conflict between Georgia and Russia should be a serious lesson for the post-Soviet countries. Namely, it is a question of uniting political elites around the national interests of the state, identifying and defending important priority areas in foreign policy that are of particular importance for society and the state, strengthening the sphere of national security in the concept of development of the country, and providing information course in international policy and relations with neighbouring countries.

Common interests of the post-Soviet countries provide greater opportunities for cooperation. Of significance is the issue of implementing inter-state cooperation of a diverse nature in a wider regional context, namely within alternative integration projects and cooperation frameworks such as the Lublin Triangle, the Associated Trio, military cooperation with the EU Eastern Partnership program states, etc. In addition, it is essential to stimulate the revival of GUAM and the Commonwealth of Democratic Choice with the expansion of the competencies of these organisations, which will provide an opportunity to be a hybrid response to the aggression of Russia.

The analysis helped to clarify the main mechanism and essence of modern hybrid aggression, and identify mechanisms to counteract the “brutal force” of Russia, which will help to restore the territorial integrity of both Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Further research will be oriented toward identifying the prospects and problems that may arise in the development of international cooperation in post-Soviet countries.

Conclusions

In conducting research, the field of study, which was to determine the causal relationship of the Abkhazian war and the role of Russia in this conflict, the main mechanism and stages of the hybrid war of the Russia in the territories of the post-Soviet countries were identified.

First of all, it was analysed that the origins of the Abkhazian war originate from the conflict between the republic and Georgia, after which Abkhazia declared its

independence. One specific feature of this conflict is that Georgia's purpose was to preserve the territorial integrity of the state, while Abkhazia's purpose was to expand its autonomy and independence.

It was determined that Russia's support for Abkhazia increased as a result of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 2008. One of the reasons for support was the new political course of Georgia, which purpose was to implement democratisation and cooperation with the Western countries. In addition, notably, the territory of Abkhazia has significant strategic importance for Russian foreign policy; that is, the geopolitical location has been a significant factor, allowing the process of exercising influence in Georgia and the Caucasus to spread and strengthening the Russian military-political and security sector.

As Russia's role in the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia has been defined, it serves as a mediator with a “peacekeeping” outlook. However, the crucial purpose of this peacekeeping mission is the occupation of the territory and its further use for strategic purposes. These occupations continue to exist in the territories of the post-Soviet countries and damage the territorial integrity and inviolability both in Georgia and in Moldova and Ukraine. Based on this, the ways of counteracting aggression against Russia were considered in the study.

Among the identified recommendations are the identification and defence of important foreign policy priorities of particular importance to society and the state, the strengthening of national security in the country's development concept, and the ensuring of an informative course in international policy and relations with neighbouring countries. To mention the implementation of interstate cooperation of a diverse nature in a broader regional context. The recommendations will help the countries of the post-Soviet Union to protect themselves from the hybrid aggression of Russia.

Further research will concentrate on the analysis of problematic aspects and prospects in the implementation of international and interstate cooperation of the post-Soviet countries.

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Причинно-наслідковий зв'язок Абхазької війни та роль росії у цьому конфлікті

Анотація. Актуальність проведення дослідження обумовлена активним втручанням окупаційних російських військ та проведенням загальної політики чиновників у зовнішні та внутрішні процеси державного устрою пострадянських країн, зокрема, у процесах окупації частини Грузії. Метою роботи є виявлення основних передумов початку військового конфлікту. У статті було використано такі методологічні підходи, як теоретичний підхід, формально-юридичний підхід, метод логічного аналізу, метод синтезу, метод дедукції та інші. Було виявлено основні причини допомоги росії Абхазії, серед яких варто зазначити про геополітичне розташування території, перешкоджання вступу Грузії до НАТО, доступ до трубопроводів для транспорту вуглеводних ресурсів, збільшення сфери впливу на просторі пострадянських країн. Було детально проведено аналіз факторів впливу на процеси політичного та військового характеру у Абхазії з боку росії. Важливим етапом під час проведення роботи було доведення факту про політику насильницького характеру, яка проявляється в окупації й анексії суверенної території з боку іншої держави. Було з'ясовано, що для реалізації власних планів зазвичай росія використовує широкий спектр інструментів та методів впливу військового та невійськового характеру; такий вплив здійснюється на системній основі та має всеосяжний характер у різних сферах. Варто зазначити, що військове протистояння між росією та Грузією здійснює вагомий вплив на стратегічний та політичний світогляд Грузії та, безпосередньо, на окупований регіон. Практична цінність отриманих результатів допоможе встановити причинно-наслідковий зв'язок російсько-грузинського протистояння та виокремити роль росії як держави-агресора, що допоможе виокремити шляхи уникнення можливих військових конфліктів для інших країн пострадянського простору

Ключові слова: транзит, міжнародне визнання, окупація, анексія, невизнані держави, пострадянський простір

UDC 94:327
DOI: 10.46493/2663-2675.32(5).2022.40-47

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The Foreign Policy of the UPR Directorate Through the Prism of Cooperation with the Entente

Abstract. The relevance of the article lies in the need to study the topic of the peculiarities of the functioning of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic and its international policy with the countries of the Entente and Europe, because in recent years access to new archival documents from the times of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920 has opened. The purpose of the research work is to analyze the aspects of creation and management of foreign policy of the UNR Directorate, in particular V. Vinnichenko and S. Petliura, taking into account the specifics of cooperation with the Entente countries, as well as the determination of the achievements and losses of the Directorate, which influenced the creation of the Ukrainian state. Research methods were used in the work, namely: chronological, historical, and analytical methods. Ukrainian and foreign historiography was analyzed, which described aspects of the foreign policy activity of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic, highlighted the greatest achievements during the conduct of foreign policy and the peculiarities of the Directorate's struggle for the liberation of the Ukrainian people and the recognition of Ukraine as a state by Europe and the world as a whole. The results of the study are the determination of specific actions by the Directory that led to the recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic, namely the establishment of rights and laws for the population. It was established that the authorities did not have a specific example from the side of running the state, which explains the use of erroneous policies by the leadership, and despite all the problems created on the way to the creation of a new state, the result of such work was the formation of a clear structure of diplomacy and the recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The practical significance of the results obtained in the research lies in their use to continue learning about the topic of the formation and work of the Directory, as well as the movements of national diplomacy during the creation of state entities and the creation of Ukraine. The results of the study can serve as a basis for creating analytics regarding Ukraine's foreign policy and possible prospects for cooperation with neighboring countries

Key words: foreign policy, state, negotiations, strategic course, political parties, cooperation

Introduction

The revolution of 1917-1920 is considered to be one of the outstanding periods that occurred in Ukrainian history. Nowadays, researchers have been able to study the military and domestic politics of the time almost thoroughly, but the question of foreign policy and the features of the management of a future independent state by prominent conductors remains open. Notably, after the restoration of Ukrainian independence, more and more historians began to study the period of the Directorate's activity, and the features of S. Petliura's leadership in the UPR, where one part of the scientists recognised the politician as a fighter for the freedom of the Ukrainian people and a wise leader, while another part of the researchers considered him an unrealised dictator and the worst leader who led the Ukrainian people [1].

The foreign policy pursued during the Directorate's reign had an impact on the national liberation struggle for the freedom and independence of the Ukrainian people. In addition, for a more detailed and comprehensive examination of the foreign policy of the UPR Directorate, it was essential to consider the military, political and social aspects, which were of great significance in the establishment of international relations.

The political activity of the UPR Directorate is of great interest to researchers of modern times, as everyone is trying to demonstrate the policy of the young state from various angles. The scientists who were interested in the political structure of the UPR in 1918-1920 include I. Matyash [2], who studied the specific features of diplomacy of the UPR in the revolutionary era and analysed attempts to establish the processes of development

Received: 13.06.2022, Revised: 01.09.2022, Accepted: 22.09.2022

Suggested Citation:

Merio, L., & Lemonier, A. (2022). The foreign policy of the upr directorate through the prism of cooperation with the entente. *Foreign Affairs*, 32(5), 40-47.

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and implementation of diplomacy of the same period; T. Rendyuk [3], who in his study described in detail the specific features of relations between the UPR and Romania, considering diplomatic relations; N. Kravchenko [4], in her work, studied the specific features of the establishment of the UPR diplomacy, which became the protection of Ukrainian statehood and independence, and identified the main achievements of the Ukrainian Revolution era, which became support in the establishment of an independent state; K. Kondratyuk [5], who in his scientific work explored the diplomacy of the UPR, which established the fundamentals of Ukrainian nationality; M. Stakhiv [6] was able to explore and highlight the specific features of the establishment of international relations of the UPR with neighbouring countries step by step and noted that disputes between members of the Directorate had an adverse impact on the development of foreign policy; O. Kropyvko [7], who in his scientific work explored the diplomacy of the UPR, which established the foundations of Ukrainian nationality; O. Kropyvko [7] in her scientific article highlighted the legal specifics of conducting the policy of the UPR, and identified the principle of multi-vectors in conducting the state, which has been observed since the establishment of the UPR until the establishment of the Constitution in 1996; V. Pylypov [8], who devoted his research to the development of Ukrainian diplomacy during the years of the Ukrainian liberation struggle for the freedom of the people and noted that the establishment of well-defined diplomacy was an essential step in the Ukrainian revolution.

Among foreign researchers who examined the subject of the UPR Directorate and its foreign policy activities, one can identify M. Dornfeld and E. Seewald [9], studied in their work the political and economic relations between the UPR, Germany, and neighbouring countries of the UPR. These studies should be considered, but they cannot fully explore the essence of the subject, and elaborate on important details that could affect the position of the Directorate and its relations with the Entente countries. In addition to the use of literary sources, information from the documentation of the Directorate and political institutions of the Entente countries and Europe was considered, which allowed exploring the specific conditions of cooperation of the UPR in the international aspect.

The main purpose of the research is to analyse the specific features of the establishment of the Directorate and its policy during the leadership of S. Petliura to establish strong and friendly relations with neighbouring countries, including the Entente, to implement a well-defined international policy, to improve the situation of the UPR, and to recognise the Ukrainian Republic as an independent state at the official level. In addition, significant events that influenced the further development of international relations were highlighted, and the positive and adverse consequences of the Directorate's activities that could affect the position of the UPR and political relations with other countries were considered. The novelty of the research is the consideration of the specific features of the UPR Directorate's foreign policy towards the Entente countries and Europe, and the establishment of events in international politics that influenced the situation of

Ukraine in 1917-1920, based on new sources and scientific works, and new archival sources that were previously not available for research.

Materials and Methods

During the development of the scientific research, the beginning of the functioning of the UPR Directorate as a new body of power over the state, significant events in the work of the Directorate in the international arena, and the main missions and negotiations that influenced the further development of events in Ukraine and Europe were studied in chronological order. Scientific methods were implemented for a deeper understanding of the subject, namely chronological, based on which the main aspects of the establishment and implementation of the UPR Directorate were highlighted in sequence, in addition to its foreign policy and the events that had a strategic nature for the activities of the public authority; the historical method, which was essential for analysing significant historical events that were crucial to the functioning and implementation of the Directorate's policy, and analysing the features of the Directorate's foreign policy movement and its relations and cooperation with the Entente countries; the analytical method used to explore the impact of the main events of 1918-1920 on the conduct of S. Petliura's domestic and foreign policies. Petliura established specific features during the continuation of the policy of establishing an independent Ukrainian state and analysing the relations of Central and Eastern European countries in cooperation with the newly-established UPR. In general, the methods used were able to accurately demonstrate the specific features of the foreign policy of the UPR Directorate, its relations and details of cooperation with European countries and the Entente, and the preconditions for the recognition of the UPR. Using research methods, they presented the main aspects of the functioning of the Central Rada, and its diplomatic processes with the Entente countries, Central and Eastern Europe.

The source base of the study was the research of scientists, including I. Matyash [2], T. Rendyuk [3], N. Kravchenko [4], K. Kondratyuk [5], M. Stakhiv [6], O. Kropyvko [7], V. Pylypov [8], Ya. Popenko [10], O. Boyko [11], V. Solovyova [12], etc., and documentation of the Directorate, which was established during the development of relations and cooperation with other countries, and other legal documents of strategic importance to the Directorate, namely the document establishing the Directorate of the UPR [13], the Declaration of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic [14], the "Law on the Establishment of the General Secretariat of International Affairs" [15], and the Bessarabian Protocol [15].

The issue of interpreting the events and facts of the history of 1918-1920, and the specific features of the development of the foreign policy of the UPR has interested historians and researchers for many years, as every year scientists have access to significant new documents and other historical literature of those times, which can fundamentally change the development of conclusions about the activities of the Directorate, which was closed to all and kept in the archives. Currently, there are USSR

archives, which contain documents of the UPR years, access to which is impossible and prohibited for any purpose, which excludes the possibility of learning the political aspect of the early 20th century.

To provide a structured and thorough knowledge of the subject, the study chronologically describes the stages and specific features of the establishment of the UPR Directorate, its leaders, in particular S. Petlyura, and their main thoughts from 1918-1920; it analyses the Directorate's foreign policy activities, related political movements, and cooperation with neighbouring countries and the Entente.

Results

The Directorate was established as the new main state authority of the Ukrainian People's Republic in November

1918 [13], which came to power after the overthrow of the Hetmanate in the same year. Headed by the leaders of Directorate B. Vynnychenko, S. Petliura, and other members of the UPR Directorate (Table 1), the main objective of the Directorate was to find allies to reach a new level in the international arena and to assist in the fight against the Bolsheviks for the independence of the Ukrainian Republic. At the beginning of the new government's functioning, the decisions made by the Rada demonstrated a divergence in opinions on the management of foreign policy: V. Vynnychenko, from the beginning of his leadership, supported the development of Ukraine in the socialist trend, while S. Petliura tried to get closer to European countries and improve the position of Ukraine in the international arena [10].

Table 1. Members of the UPR Directorate

Person	Position in the Directorate	Years of participation
Volodymyr Vynnychenko	Chairman of the Directorate	December 14, 1918 – February 10, 1919
Symon Petliura	Chief Otaman	February 11, 1919 – November 10, 1920.
Fedir Shvets	Party member	November 14, 1918 – May 25, 1920
Opanas Andrievskyi	Party member	November 14, 1918 – May 13, 1919
Andriy Makarenko	Party member	November 14, 1918 – May 4, 1919
Yevhen Petrushevych	President of the WUPR	January 22, 1919 – end of June 1919

Source: [16]

On 26 December 1918, the Directorate officially issued its first Declaration [14], which declared that in terms of international relations, the UPR Directorate was prepared to maintain neutrality towards any state, and demonstrate its peaceful intentions towards them, thereby demonstrating to neighbouring countries the possibility of cooperating with the UPR. With the Declaration, the government faced difficult problems, which were designed to obtain good-neighbourly relations with Eastern Europe and to continue peace on the borders of the states [17]. Consequently, on 26 January 1919, the independent Ukrainian Social Democrats established a separate declaration, which declared that the Workers' Congress had to deal with the members of the Directorate in the short term and transfer all power to the workers' deputies and was able to proclaim the independent Ukrainian Socialist Republic. On the international relationship side, the Social Democrats proposed the establishment of peaceful relations with Socialist Russia to further the withdrawal of Entente forces from Ukrainian lands [11]. The Directorate's desire to enter the international arena was quite divergent from European democracy's thoughts on the governance of the Ukrainian Republic, for such movements were similar to the early decisions of the Central Rada, which during its reign had tended towards declaring independence and pursuing a demilitarised policy. V. Vynnychenko, who perceived the Central Rada's ways of governing the state as necessary to continue, further developed good relations with Russia.

Negotiations of the Directorate with representatives of the French government in Odesa were the first step towards the beginning of diplomatic relations with the Entente, where F.G. d'Anselm and G. Freidenberg declared the necessity to continue the fight against Bolshevik

movements and to establish peace in the territory of the UPR and neighbouring countries [18]. In addition, during the negotiations, it was decided to sign a declaration of the UNR with the Entente, in which the main purpose was to establish cooperation with the Entente for the joint struggle against the Bolsheviks, and the recognition of the independence of the UNR and the Entente countries. On January 21, 1919, new negotiations were held, headed by A. Nazaruk and S. Ostapenko, to reach an agreement with the French delegation on the new demands of both sides, which included: the deprivation of the power of V. Vynnychenko, S. Petliura, and V. Chekhivsky (who were considered representatives of the Bolshevik movement), and the reform of the Directorate; agrarian reform by the Entente, with the Ukrainian side assuming monetary compensation for those providing large plots of land for agrarian reform; the establishment of an army to be subordinated to the Entente; the transfer of the UPR's financial management to France while the fighting with the Bolsheviks was conducted [12].

A new success for the UPR in negotiations with representatives of other countries' diplomacy was noted at a meeting of the UPR with all members of the Entente in Italy in early January 1919, where the Ukrainian side was headed by D. Antonovych. Notably, since the start of the mission, the Italians have been cautious about the Ukrainian diplomats and decided to allow them to visit Rome on the condition that there was no diplomatic activity. In addition, it was established that the Ukrainian delegation arrived in Italy without an invitation but only with the permission of the Consul in Kyiv. V. Mazurenko was warned by the Italian authorities that if they continued their diplomatic activities, which were designed for the recognition

of the UNR by the Italians, Ukrainian diplomats could be expelled to Ukraine. Notably, the Italian Department of Foreign Affairs was informed about the attempt to urge the Italians to recognise Ukraine through local newspapers and publications, which caused excitement and a picky attitude towards Ukrainian diplomacy [19].

After the reform of the UPR Directorate to the government came S. Petliura and representatives of the government, who had the same views on the foreign policy of the Entente, which included S. Ostapenko, K. Matsievich, A. Margolina and T. Galipa, who continued negotiations with representatives of the Entente. During negotiations on 11 February 1919, the UPR and the Entente agreed to sign a decree, the essence of which was to introduce Entente troops into Ukraine to restore land, patriotism and law, and order in the country. After the decree was signed and the Entente agreed to perform the necessary actions, relations with European countries were established, and the course of the UPR towards Europe had clarity, as the government got rid of representatives with pro-Russian views, which affected the position of the UPR in the international arena [20].

As a result of positive developments in negotiations with French diplomatic representatives, a treaty was signed for joint military action against the Red Army, which was advancing from the southern coast of Ukraine, after which the military went to Odesa to defend it and liberate the southern territories of the UPR. However, on 27 March 1919, the representatives of the Council of Four of the Paris Peace Conference announced the obligatory withdrawal of the troops from the line of the UPR South, and on 6 April, the French-Greek army left the offensive positions due to heavy losses and not being able to fully resist the army of M. Grigoriev [11].

On 12 April 1919, in summary regarding military action in Ukraine, Marshal Foch said in a commentary: "To enable the UPR to free its territory and thus become a barrier against the advance of the Russian Bolsheviks on Europe, it is essential to stop the Bolsheviks on their approaches to Europe:

1. That the Allied powers (Entente) supplied the necessary ammunition through the single available route Constanza-Chernivtsi-Stanislav.

2. That the Allied powers recognised the independence of Ukraine and therefore added great moral strength to the UPR government and its army" [21].

Notably, propaganda in Poland indicated the Bolshevik intentions of Ukraine and named them as allies of Germany during the First World War, after which Eastern Galicia became part of the Polish Republic with the status of autonomy. The Russian Bolsheviks used this propaganda to change the world's view of Ukraine, calling it enemies of the Entente, in particular emphasising S. Petliura's adverse intentions towards it. In July 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was conducted, which coincided with the dates of the diplomatic mission from Ukraine to Paris. Meanwhile, the question of the status of Eastern Galicia was being considered by the peoples of Austria-Hungary, to which the representatives of Galicia wanted the right of independence from representatives of international diplomacy, and, in

parallel, tried to pursue appropriate policies that were designed to achieve the independence of Galicia. The result of the Galicians' actions was to split the French delegation, and the Ukrainian diplomatic mission to France was also adversely impacted. In addition, the protests and expressions of the Polish and Russians had a adverse impact, which caused damage to the Ukrainian diplomacy [22].

August 15, 1919 Ya. Olesitsky went to London on a mission to establish relations with the British and persuade them to mediate negotiations with the Volunteer Army, which in mid-August had reached left-bank Ukraine and was moving towards Kyiv. Notably, in the process of any meetings with Ukrainian diplomats, the British tried to avoid such dialogues where the problems of Ukraine were mainly discussed. As a result of the mission of Ya. Olesitskyi returned to Ukraine without resolving the issue, as the British side did not accept the diplomats. In November 1919, the head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission was A. Margolin, who in January 1920 had a conversation with British Minister Balfour and other political activists. The main purpose of A. The main goal of A. Margolin was to maximise contact with the British government and to establish specific features in the conduct of their foreign policy to allow negotiations to achieve friendly relations between the countries and British recognition of Ukraine's independence [21]. In addition, in the same period, namely in the autumn of 1919, I. Sokalsky, who represented Ukraine in negotiations with representatives of the Kuban diplomacy, went to Tiflis with the question of the establishment of the Black Sea Federation. Subsequently, at the end of April 1920, the representatives of the UPR and Kuban conducted a meeting regarding the preservation of interests in the desire to recognise the independence of both sides and decided to sign a military agreement in which the parties agreed to jointly fight the Bolsheviks [23].

Between Ukraine and Finland political ties were established during the reign of P. Skoropadskyi, but after Finland's leadership was established by K. Mannerheim, relations between the states received new prospects for cooperation and friendship, after which the Entente in May 1919 was able to declare Ukraine an independent young state [22].

The Ukrainian embassies in Berlin and Vienna, which had been operating there since the establishment of the Ukrainian state and which had great influence over other Ukrainian embassies in Europe, continued to operate during the rule of the UPR Directorate. Notably, the personnel of the embassies have been completely reorganised, as have their main functions. Ukrainian embassies in German and Austrian capitals attempted to do everything to gain confidence in Ukraine for continued partnership and cooperation and made efforts to ensure that neighbouring countries had a similar opinion, but this differed radically from the Ukrainian missions in Entente countries, where the main purpose was to recognise the UPR as an independent [24]. In addition, M. Porsch, who headed the consulate in Germany, did everything to improve relations between Berlin and Moscow to further establish relations between Germany and Ukraine for the sake of the joint struggle against the Bolsheviks.

In November 1919, when A. Makarenka ta F. Shvets was sent abroad and the full management of the affairs of the UPR Directorate was entrusted to S. Petliura, who could now independently approve and enforce the new laws. On April 24, 1920, Petliura was able to conclude the secret treaty, known as the Warsaw Pact, which concerned the introduction of Polish forces on the territory of Ukraine and the establishment of the 15 thousand-man UPR army to continue fighting in the Polish-Soviet war, which ended in October 1920 with the victory of the Polish Republic and the UPR. Notably, the peace between Poland and the UPR ended in betrayal by the Polish, who during the signing of the Peace of Riga of March 18, 1920, which indicated the cessation of hostilities on all fronts from October 18, 1920, found common ground with Russia, thereby changing the attitude of Ukrainian diplomacy, with the Polish decision to ignore the demands of the UPR, and gave the previous ally under the authority of a stronger state [25].

On May 21, 1920, the Ukrainian government decided to recall A. Makarenka ta F. Shvets back, but the politicians did not return to Ukraine, due to which the Directorate was no longer a collective authority of the state, after which full control went to S. Petliura, who became the sole representative of the council on November 12, 1920, which can be considered the end of the Directorate rule [16].

After the Directorate collapsed, S. Petliura decided to continue his policy toward the West and the recognition of Ukraine as an independent state. S. Petliura continued to perform political actions in the UPR government, began to publish his thoughts on the current situation and possible prospects for Ukraine, and continued to defend his position concerning the Bolshevik movements. In January 1926. S. Petliura with the support of Yu. In January 1926. S. Petliura, with the support of J. Pilsudski, established the organisation "Prometheus", whose activities were devoted to the peoples affected by the Bolsheviks and their struggle against Soviet Russia, after which the Russians began to perceive S. Petliura as the main enemy of the country, and on May 25, 1926, a Bolshevik's agent killed the Ukrainian politician. Eventually, the Ukrainian state management was passed to A. Livytskyi [26].

Discussion

Based on the study of the foreign policy activities of the UPR Directorate, it can be stated that with the arrival of the new political council in Ukraine, the specific foreign policy and its areas have changed dramatically, and the development of the country began to move towards Western Europe, but not from the first time the main politicians managed to establish friendly relations with all neighbouring countries and the Entente, as the Directorate consisted of members-supporters of the socialist rule of Russia. After the establishment of the General Secretariat headed by V. Vynnychenko and the influential policy of O. Shulgin, official international missions were established after the signing of the "Law on the Establishment of the General Secretariat of International Affairs" [15], which was the push for many missions to European countries to acknowledge Ukraine, establish relations between countries and search for allies.

I. Matyash, in her monograph, noted that, first of all, the efficiency of Ukraine's missions abroad depended on the geopolitical situation and the domestic policy of individual countries after the end of the First World War [2]. In addition, the non-recognition of Ukraine's independence by the Bolsheviks resulted in a necessity for the Entente and the Fourth Union to intervene in the struggle against the Bolshevik movement in Ukraine. In addition, the process of establishing friendly and cooperative relations was influenced by individual countries' attitudes to the rule and movements of imperial Russia and their desire to help Ukraine fight for its people's freedom. The same opinion was expressed by researcher N. Kravchenko in her work [4], where she described the necessity of liberating Ukraine with the help of neighbouring allied countries. In addition, while receiving assistance, reliable economic relations were established between the countries, which was a significant privilege to further develop cooperation and assistance to Ukraine in the war with Russia, followed by diplomatic connections with several neutral countries, which eventually resulted in a breakthrough and a movement to liberate the Ukrainians from the Bolshevik offensive. It can be agreed with this opinion, as the search for allied countries was necessary to resolve the UPR's conflicts with the Bolsheviks and to recognise Ukraine as a separate, independent young state.

Only after a short period, the Ukrainian diplomacy managed to establish international relations with the countries of Europe, which were able to become allies for the UPR in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Strong connections were established with the Entente, Great Britain, France, and partly Poland, which provided significant resistance in the Ukrainian-Russian war. The peaceful alliance with the Entente countries opened new opportunities for the UPR and its foreign policy towards Europe. According to M. Stakhov, after the negotiations in Odesa, the Entente, without warning or understanding of Ukrainian diplomacy, independently decided to send its troops to the south of the country, which the author recognised as a violation of international law [6]. Notably, if this was considered a hostile act by the Entente, then its further diplomatic relations with the UPR were escalated, which was not the case in reality, as the troops were acting according to a previously established military plan of action against the Bolsheviks.

Regarding the UPR's relations with Romania, T. Rendyuk expressed in his study and noted that diplomatic ties between the countries were tense due to Romania's occupation of part of Ukraine [3]. Throughout the entire period of establishment of diplomatic relations Ukraine has been trying to protect the interests of the Ukrainian people, who were under Romanian rule. As a result of the resolution of the issue of Bessarabia, the Entente gave the land under the administration of Romania after the signing of the Bessarabian Protocol [15], which was a new way to resolve the outstanding issues of the Paris Peace Conference. Despite the occupation of Bessarabia, Dnieper, and Western Ukraine, representatives of the state continued to demand recognition of the independence of their people in the occupied territories.

A study of the general foreign policy activities of the Directorate by E. Kropivko in her research notes the great merit of A. Shulgin, in international negotiations with European countries, on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, implemented the purposes and objectives established by the Directorate at the negotiation stages with European diplomacy [7]. To this opinion should be added the merit of S. Petliura, who guided his people and council to Europe after the initial disagreements in opinions on the conduct of policy with V. Vynnychenko. As noted by V. Pylypov in his work, the Ukrainian government considered Germany and Austria-Hungary to be its powerful allies and potential countries for the development of the UPR, despite the presence of supporters of Moscow's views [8]. Notably, it was this state of affairs and foreign policy that brought Ukraine to the international arena and cooperation with European countries, and the recognition of the independence of the UPR by them. In addition, the Entente countries and other allies of the UPR supported it in eliminating Bolshevik hostilities in the Ukrainian territories, which was the push for further development of relations with Europe. M. Dornfeld and E. Seewald, in their research, noted that the establishment of relations between the UPR and Austria-Hungary and Germany was complicated, as, in the arrangement of Ukrainian food supplies to these countries, the UPR could not fully provide them with the necessities, which was a prerequisite for the withdrawal of the UPR from the international arena [9]. Notably, such a problem did emerge for the European countries to consider, but as a result of correctly placed conservative negotiations between Ukraine and Europe, and the West's benefit in establishing the UPR as a strong state to continue exporting raw materials and products, the problem disappeared, and relations between the countries improved, as noted by K. Kondratyuk [5]. The conclusions on the establishment of qualitative connections should be supplemented by the common purpose of the European countries to strengthen and unite their armies to end the fight against the Russian Bolsheviks, who had completely different views and refused to contact and negotiate, leading to new problems and hostilities on the territory of Ukraine.

Summarising all scientists' opinions on the foreign policy of the UPR Directorate, it can be stated that scientists are divided into two categories: the first includes those who consider all political actions of the Ukrainian government to be successful and designed for success and prosperity in Europe, while others are convinced that the actions of the Directorate were not clear-cut due to disagreements within the government, which contributed to new problems regarding foreign policy, finding allies against Bolsheviks and acknowledging the independence of the UPR. Despite the different opinions of academics, it can be stated that these foreign policy actions improved the position of the UPR in the international arena and freed Ukrainian territory from Russian hostilities. It can be developed further by examining material concerning the international missions of the UPR by analysing sources from European countries, especially Entente member states, where a different opinion can be developed concerning the events of 1917-1920, and to examine in detail the intentions of countries towards

Ukraine, namely neighbouring countries such as Austria-Hungary, Poland, and Russia, to explore in more detail the causes of conflict and to identify possible other developments and features of UPR international policy that could change relations between countries and counterbalance the diverging opinions of diplomacy between countries.

Conclusions

Despite all the events that occurred on the territory of European countries, in particular the Entente, the UPR continued to move towards the recognition of its independence. The UPR and the politicians of the Directorate during its prosperity were able to grant the Ukrainian people their rights and freedoms, begin to introduce aspects of self-government, and establish Ukrainian education and science, which was a great boost to the establishment of an independent state.

The main conclusions that were identified during the research on the subject are the following:

1. The beginning of the foreign policy of the UPR Directorate was hard work for the leading persons, as they had to deal with a legacy in which relations with countries were not established, which was the reason for the initial lack of policy with the Entente countries. The foreign policy aspect of the UPR with neighbouring countries was complicated, namely due to the outbreak of the Ukrainian-Russian war, Romania's desire to take Bessarabia into its composition, and the desire of the Polish Republic to occupy the western part of the UPR.

2. While governing the state and conducting domestic and foreign policy, the Directorate made big mistakes that did not allow the government to overcome adverse conditions to continue the struggle for Ukrainian independence. Party infighting and the different opinions of V. Vynnychenko and S. Petliura's conduct of the government interfered with the acceleration of future events. However, despite a lack of experience and examples of statecraft, the Directorate continued to extend its rights and took significant steps toward establishing a diplomatic structure.

3. After the beginning of S. Petliura's rule in the Directorate, foreign policy began to orient towards the West, after which a great accomplishment was the signing of the Warsaw Pact with the Republic of Poland. S. Petliura tried to establish friendly relations with neighboring countries to conduct international policy activities and acknowledge the independence of the Ukrainian people.

The subject of the specific foreign policy of the UPR Directorate and its cooperation with the Entente countries can be studied further by analysing archival documents and the history of European countries where the Directorate may have appeared, which will help to consider the events of the Ukrainian Revolution from a different perspective. In addition, detailed studies can be conducted on events that influenced relations and cooperation between European countries, and the UPR during the First World War, which may have affected further relations between the countries and the conduct of policy by the European states and the UPR. For a better understanding of the actions that were performed in the Directorate headed by S. Petliura, V. Vynnychenko and other political figures, it is

essential to study their biography in detail to establish the prerequisites for the establishment of the highest body of

state power of those times and to analyse the political actions of the Directorate, which were crucial in its history.

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Зовнішньополітичний курс Директорії УНР через призму співпраці з Антантою

Анотація. Актуальність статті полягає у необхідності вивчити тему особливостей функціонування Директорії Української Народної Республіки та її міжнародної політики з країнами Антанти та Європи, адже з останніми роками відкрився доступ до нових архівних документів часів Української Революції 1917–1920 рр. Метою дослідницької роботи є аналіз аспектів створення та ведення зовнішньої політики Директорії УНР, зокрема В. Винниченка та С. Петлюри, враховуючи специфіку співробітництва з країнами Антанти, а також визначення досягнень та втрат Директорії, що вплинули на створення української держави. У роботі було використано дослідницькі методи, а саме: хронологічний, історичний, та аналітичний методи. Було проаналізовано українську та зарубіжну історіографію, в якій описувались аспекти зовнішньополітичної діяльності Директорії УНР, виділено найбільші досягнення під час ведення зовнішньої політики та особливості ведення боротьби Директорії за визволення українського народу та визнання України як держави з боку Європи та світу в цілому. Результатами дослідження є визначення конкретних дій з боку Директорії, які призвели до визнання Української Народної Республіки, а саме встановлення прав та законів для населення. Було встановлено, що влада не мала конкретного прикладу з боку ведення держави, що пояснює використання керівництвом помилкової політики, та попри усі утворені проблеми на шляху створення нової держави, результатом такої праці стало формування чіткої структури дипломатії та визнання УНР. Практичне значення отриманих у дослідженні результатів полягає у їх використанні для продовження пізнання теми становлення і роботи Директорії, а також рухів національної дипломатії при створенні державних утворень та створення України. Результати дослідження можуть слугувати базою для створення аналітики стосовно зовнішньої політики України та можливих перспектив у співробітництві з сусідніми країнами

Ключові слова: зовнішня політика, держава, переговори, стратегічний курс, політичні партії, співробітництво

**Журнал
«ЗОВНІШНІ СПРАВИ»**

**Том 32, № 5
2022**

Випусковий редактор:
О. Таукач

Редагування англomовних текстів:
К. Касьянов

Комп'ютерна верстка:
К. Соседко

Підписано до друку з оригінал-макета 15.12.2022
Ум. друк. арк. 5,7
Наклад 300 примірників

Видавництво: Громадська спілка «Редакція журналу «Зовнішні справи»,
ТОВ «Наукові журнали»
01001, пров. Рильський, 6, Київ, Україна
E-mail: officeua.foreign.affairs@gmail.com
www: <https://uaforeignaffairs.com/uk>

**Journal
“FOREIGN AFFAIRS”**

**Volume 32, No. 5
2022**

Managing Editor:
O. Taukach

Editing English-language texts:
K. Kasianov

Desktop publishing:
K. Sosiedko

Signed to the print with the original layout 15.12.2022
Conventional Printed Sheet 5.7
Circulation 300 copies

Publisher: Public Union Editorial Board of the Journal “Foreign Affairs”,
LLC “Scientific Journals”
01001, 6 Rylskyi Ln, Kyiv, Ukraine
E-mail: officeua.foreign.affairs@gmail.com
www: <https://uaforeignaffairs.com/en>