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Assessment of the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine to secure defence support from the United States and the EU

Abstract. The purpose of the study was to determine how the organisational structure of diplomatic formats of defence interaction affects the character, scale, and sustainability of support for Ukraine in political, procedural, and military-strategic dimensions. The methodology of the study was based on a combination of structural-institutional analysis, a comparative approach, and causal interpretation, which enabled the assessment of political processes, decision-making procedures, and the production capacities of partners. The study established that the institutional maturity of cooperation formats involving the United States and the European Union determines the level of predictability of decisions and the pace of defence support, which is reflected in differences in financial contributions, including more than USD 45 billion from the United States in 2023 and more than USD 9 billion from the EU in 2025. The analysis of political cycles showed that the four-year presidential cycle in the United States and the electoral calendars of Germany, France, Italy, and Poland caused periodic fluctuations in the speed of defence decision-making. Production constraints among leading defence companies, including the capacity of Lockheed Martin to produce 500 ATACMS missiles per year and the limited production of Patriot systems and artillery ammunition by Raytheon and Rheinmetall, determine the timing of deliveries. The training programmes of the European Union Military Assistance Mission in Ukraine, Operation Interflex, and Operation Unifier trained more than 60,000, 40,000, and 5,000 Ukrainian service personnel, respectively, reflecting the scale of support. The findings confirm that the sustainability of defence assistance depends on the coherence of political decisions, the effectiveness of multilateral coordination, and the ability of defence-industrial complexes to increase production in line with the needs of Ukraine. The practical value of the study is that its results can be used by analytical centres, public administration bodies, and international partners to improve support coordination mechanisms and increase the effectiveness of defence policy planning in Ukraine

Keywords: institutional resilience; political cycles; coordination; operational capabilities; training missions; structural parameters; procedural constraints

Introduction

The need for the study is determined by the development of a multi-level system of defence interaction between Ukraine and its key partners, such as the United States and the member states of the European Union. This system combines political, procedural, and military-strategic mechanisms and is characterised by different degrees of institutionalisation across individual formats. The problem lies in the absence of a comprehensive

academic synthesis capable of explaining the influence of political cycles, decision-making procedures, and the production capacities of defence-industrial complexes on the character and dynamics of defence support, while also outlining the limits of the influence of political risks, technological constraints, and coordination barriers. Addressing these problems supports a systematic understanding of the structural parameters of defence

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partnership and the factors of its resilience, creating a basis for further analysis of patterns in the functioning of support mechanisms for Ukraine.

The combined influence of military, economic, and diplomatic support on the defence capability of Ukraine was analysed by O. Buriachenko *et al.* (2025), who emphasised the decisive role of military components in ensuring short-term resilience and the importance of macro-financial instruments in mitigating structural shocks. The researchers established that diplomatic activity contributes to the development of a stable political coalition of states focused on supporting Ukraine in the medium term. The influence of military assistance on changes in the balance of power on the battlefield was considered by J. Szőke & K. Kusica (2023), who demonstrated that the timeliness of deliveries and the technical characteristics of the systems provided determine the level of their effective use. The study also clarified that the United States focuses on technological re-equipment, whereas the member states of the European Union strengthen the institutional resilience of defence support. The analysis of defence interaction between Ukraine and Poland by F. Baranovskyi *et al.* (2024) showed that Polish military-diplomatic activity plays a leading role in developing cooperation channels, since support for Ukraine is one of the priorities of the foreign policy course of the state. The study noted that the combination of political support, logistical participation, and arms transfers within multilateral initiatives expands the possibilities for the practical implementation of defence assistance. The study by A. Laufer *et al.* (2025) considered the production capacities of the defence-industrial bases of the United States and its allies; the results indicated substantial pressure on existing capacities because of rising demand for precision systems. The researchers argued that limited production resources require the modernisation of production lines, increased investment in the defence industry, and deeper intergovernmental coordination. The study concluded that the stability and scale of defence support directly depend on the ability of allies to adapt production cycles to growing demand under conditions of prolonged armed conflict.

V. Pashkov (2024) analysed the dynamics of defence interaction between Ukraine and the United States in 2014–2021 and established that cooperation developed through a gradual expansion of the content and instruments of support. The study showed that changes in White House administrations affected the volume and formats of assistance, although the general vector of partnership remained stable and focused on strengthening the defence capabilities of Ukraine. The structural parameters of support gradually evolved from mainly limited programmes to long-term defence decisions, forming an institutional basis for further deepening interaction. The study by S. Fischer (2023) demonstrated that diplomatic activity during the escalation of the conflict acquired a multidimensional character, combining the instruments of classical diplomacy with crisis-management approaches. The results indicated that the relevant initiatives influenced not only the parameters of military-technical interaction but also the development of new international support formats adapted to changes in the strategic environment.

The participation of European allies in supporting Ukraine was considered by J.R. Deni & L. A. Aronson (2024), who established that the key elements of this support remain the provision of logistical routes, ammunition supplies, and the strengthening of political coordination mechanisms. The European Union performs a stabilising institutional function, compensating for risks related to political fluctuations in the United States and supporting the continuity of interstate interaction. As noted by C. Mills (2022), the speed of response to the challenges of war is determined by the adaptability of national legislative procedures, particularly the capacity to activate mechanisms such as Presidential Drawdown Authority and combine them effectively with parliamentary oversight. The same study emphasised that developed multilateral coordination increases the predictability and rhythm of defence support. N. Chaban & O. Elgström (2023) indicated a transformation of the public diplomacy system of the European Union under the influence of the war, which affected the content and intensity of political support for Ukraine. The researchers clarified that the development of a pro-Ukrainian international discourse contributed to strengthening the legitimacy of defence decisions in member states, while the development of targeted communication strategies increased the effectiveness of diplomatic initiatives.

Taken together, the studies reviewed cover key aspects of defence interaction, political coordination, and diplomatic support for Ukraine, but leave several gaps related to the analysis of the degree of institutionalisation of individual cooperation formats, the influence of political cycles on the sustainability of partnership, and the procedural constraints of decision-making and production barriers in defence-industrial complexes. The relationship between the institutional structure of defence interaction and the actual effectiveness of support remains insufficiently addressed, and no comprehensive assessment has been made of the multi-level influence of political, bureaucratic, and technological factors on the parameters of defence assistance. These circumstances determined the need for further specialised study of these aspects. The purpose of the study was to establish how the structure of diplomatic formats of defence interaction affects the dynamics and effectiveness of support for Ukraine in political, procedural, and military-strategic dimensions. The following tasks are set to achieve this purpose: to analyse the institutional characteristics of the main cooperation formats and assess their degree of institutionalisation; to clarify the influence of political processes, bureaucratic procedures, and military-strategic constraints on the development of defence interaction; and to summarise the actual results of defence support and identify the structural factors determining its sustainability.

Materials and Methods

The analytical study covered 2021–2025, which allowed the evolution of diplomatic formats of defence interaction and their influence on the dynamics of support for Ukraine to be traced during the period of the most active international assistance mechanisms. The analysis considered the United States as the leading arms supplier and initiator of multilateral defence decisions, together

with the member states of the European Union, Germany, France, Italy, and Poland, which shaped the key political and technical parameters of European defence support. The Benelux countries were considered separately, with the Netherlands playing a leading role through participation in bilateral arms programmes, funding for multilateral initiatives, and involvement in training missions for Ukrainian service personnel. The list included EUMAM Ukraine (European External Action Service, 2024), which coordinates the training process and the standardisation of training programmes within the European Union. The United Kingdom, which implements Operation Interflex (UK Ministry of Defence, 2024), and Canada, which trains personnel within Operation Unifier (Government of Canada, 2025), have separate significance. The participation of these states and missions was included in the analysis because of their leading role in arms supplies, training support, the provision of logistical routes, and the development of multilateral political decisions, which enabled a comprehensive understanding of the structure of defence interaction in the defined period.

Empirical material was collected through the examination of official documents and analytical reports reflecting the political, procedural, and production-technological parameters of defence interaction. Data from the U.S. Department of Defense (2024) and materials of the U.S. Congress (2024a) were used. The analytical component concerning the European Union was formed by summarised information materials from the European Union (n.d.) and conclusions published within the initiatives of the Council of the European Union (n.d.) and the European Peace Facility (n.d.). The content of multilateral coordination was reconstructed using the official communiqué of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2025) and information releases from NATO (n.d.), which enabled the recording of personalised commitments and contributions from the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Political cycles were analysed using the official Elections Calendar 2024-2029 (European Committee of the Regions, 2025). The study of production capacities was based on SIPRI databases (n.d.), visualisations of the global arms market (SIPRI, 2022), and annual reports of defence corporations: Lockheed Martin Corporation (2025), RTX Corporation (2025), Rheinmetall AG (2025), KNDS (2025), BAE Systems (2025), and MBDA (2025), which contain data on production capacities, investment cycles, contract parameters, and the potential to increase defence production.

The structural-institutional method was used in the study. It allowed the organisational parameters of diplomatic formats to be identified, their internal structure to be determined, and the relationships between political, procedural, and military-strategic mechanisms of defence interaction to be assessed. It was used to reconstruct the institutional architecture of multi-level partnership, which included political coordination instruments, mechanisms of regulatory governance, and decision-making procedures in formats of interstate cooperation. The method allowed key structural elements of each format to be distinguished and their dynamics during the study period to be traced. Comparative legal analysis and

comparative political-institutional analysis were used to identify differences between models of organising defence support. These methods allowed the features of legal regulation, political-procedural approaches to the development of defence decisions, and the logic of their implementation in different jurisdictions to be compared. Their use enabled the degree of variation between interstate approaches to be determined, differences in decision-making procedures to be assessed, and the influence of national political processes on the sustainability and rhythm of defence interaction to be compared.

The analytical method for assessing defence-industrial capacities was used separately. It was directed at establishing production constraints, determining the scalability of production cycles, and assessing the ability of defence-industrial complexes to maintain stable volumes of assistance. This method systematised technical and production characteristics, identified key parameters of defence production, and established how technological, economic, and organisational factors influenced the potential intensity of support. The conclusions obtained enabled the production component to be integrated into a broader model for analysing defence interaction. The results were interpreted through a combination of structural and causal approaches, which allowed key elements of the institutional architecture to be identified and cause-and-effect relationships between political processes, procedural constraints, and the actual effectiveness of defence support to be established. The results were considered in the context of multi-level defence interaction and assessed according to their influence on the stability of support mechanisms and their capacity to adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

Results

Diplomatic instruments and formats of cooperation between Ukraine, the United States, and the EU after 2022. After the start of Russia's full-scale aggression, the development of the system of defence interaction between Ukraine and its key partners, including the United States and the EU, required the organisation of cooperation formats that provide different levels of coordination, planning, and implementation of decisions in the field of defence. The expansion of the range of instruments for interaction with partners required their structural alignment according to institutional characteristics, functional purpose, and degree of formalisation. This approach helps outline how these formats affect the organisation of defence support and how they interact with one another in a changing security environment. Differences between mechanisms of defence cooperation reflect their distinct institutional characteristics, their level of integration within the political systems of the United States and the EU, and their adaptation to the dynamics of international security. These mechanisms are at different stages of institutional development, which causes differences in their stability, predictability, and ability to provide continuous support. The systematisation of instruments enables their strengths to be identified, the potential for ensuring the sustainability of defence support to be assessed, and the practical results of applying individual formats after 22 February 2022, the beginning of Russia's full-scale

invasion of Ukraine, to be compared. The level of procedural certainty and institutional development correlates with the effectiveness of the relevant mechanisms under crisis conditions. Table 1 presents a summarised

description of the key formats of cooperation between Ukraine and international partners, reflecting their substantive parameters and creating a basis for further analysis of the factors of their effectiveness.

Table 1. Comparative overview of the main formats of defence cooperation between Ukraine, the United States, and the EU after 2022

Cooperation format	Purpose	Participants	Functional purpose
Multilateral format Ukraine Defense Contact Group ("Ramstein")	Coordination of military assistance and determination of priorities for strengthening the defence capability of Ukraine	More than 50 states, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, EU member states, and NATO structures	Coordination of arms supplies, training programmes, and logistics optimisation
Bilateral security agreements	Consolidation of long-term defence commitments within Ukraine-United States and Ukraine-EU cooperation	The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and other European states	Creation of a legal basis for stable support, development of the defence industry, and technology transfer
Ukraine-United States Strategic Dialogue	Formation of agreed decisions on the modernisation of the defence sector of Ukraine	Defence and foreign policy institutions of Ukraine and the United States	Coordination of political and military decisions and cooperation in defence procurement
EU instruments (European Peace Facility)	Financing of weapons and military equipment for the defence needs of Ukraine	EU member states through the relevant institutions of the Union	Compensation of EU member states' expenditure and provision of weapons and equipment to Ukraine
EU instruments (EUMAM Ukraine)	Training of service personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine according to EU and NATO standards	EU training missions and military instructor units	Implementation of training programmes and improvement of interoperability with NATO
Inter-agency cooperation formats	Coordination of decisions between government structures in the fields of defence, finance, and foreign policy	Relevant bodies of Ukraine, the United States, and EU member states	Planning of defence procurement, coordination of logistics, and technological support for defence programmes

Source: systematised based on U.S. Department of Defense (2024), Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2025), European Union (n.d.), Council of the European Union (n.d.), European Peace Facility (n.d.), NATO (n.d.)

The comparative analysis of the formats presented in Table 1 indicates the development of a multi-level structure of defence interaction that ensures comprehensive support for Ukraine in political, military, and technical dimensions. The multilateral format within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2025) functions as a coordination centre that integrates the political views of partner states with the practical needs of the defence sector. Bilateral security agreements form a stable normative basis that defines the long-term commitments of the parties, whereas the Strategic Dialogue facilitates the coordination of strategic decisions between the governments of Ukraine and the United States. EU instruments provide the resource and training components of defence support, while inter-agency formats allow diplomatic agreements to be adapted to specific defence

tasks, creating structural coherence in the actions of the institutions involved.

In the context of the transformation of defence support mechanisms after the start of Russia's full-scale aggression, assessing the degree of institutionalisation of each format is an important task, since this parameter determines the stability of mechanisms and the predictability of decision-making processes. The results obtained allow the characteristic features of cooperation formalisation, its durability, and procedural maturity to be distinguished, which is important for assessing the long-term potential of partnership interaction. In this regard, Table 2 systematises the parameters of meeting regularity, legal consolidation, and the level of procedural structuring of each key format, enabling an assessment of their institutional development and degree of integration into the international security system.

Table 2. Degree of institutionalisation of key formats of defence cooperation between Ukraine, the United States, and the EU after 2022

Cooperation format	Regularity of meetings	Legal consolidation	Procedural structure
Ukraine Defense Contact Group ("Ramstein")	High; periodic monthly and extraordinary meetings	No formal legal consolidation	High; standardised working formats and thematic groups
Bilateral security agreements	Regular intergovernmental consultations	High; consolidated in interstate agreements	High; prescribed commitments and monitoring mechanisms
Ukraine-United States Strategic Dialogue	Regular diplomatic rounds	Medium; consolidated in bilateral arrangements	Medium; working groups and agreed areas
European Peace Facility (EPF)	Continuous decision-making regime	High; full legal consolidation within the EU system	High; defined financing and control procedures
EUMAM Ukraine	Continuous training cycles	High; EU decision launching the mission	High; formalised programmes and standards
Inter-agency cooperation formats	Operational meetings according to need	Partial; memoranda and protocols	Variable; adaptive procedures depending on the project

Source: systematised based on U.S. Department of Defense (2024), Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2025), European Union (n.d.), Council of the European Union (n.d.), European Peace Facility (n.d.), NATO (n.d.)

Table 2 demonstrates differences in the institutional design of the main formats of defence interaction, which directly affects the sustainability and predictability of their functioning. The highest level of formalisation is characteristic of EU mechanisms, since they are integrated into the regulatory system of the bloc and have strictly regulated decision-making procedures. The multilateral “Ramstein” format is not formally legally consolidated, but it is characterised by high meeting regularity and formalised procedural elements, which partly compensate for the absence of legal institutionalisation. Bilateral security agreements are distinguished by a significant degree of legal certainty, since they are based on ratified or government-approved documents that establish clearly structured implementation mechanisms. Inter-agency formats remain more flexible and adaptive, showing variable structuring depending on the content of specific defence projects. This analysis enables the different levels of embeddedness of each instrument in the international security architecture to be assessed and their capacity to maintain stable interaction under dynamic security challenges to be determined.

Notably, the different levels of institutionalisation of the formats of defence interaction between Ukraine and international partners, particularly multilateral mechanisms such as “Ramstein” (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2025), bilateral security agreements, EU instruments, and inter-agency coordination platforms, determine not only the stability of their functioning but also their ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment. A high level of procedural certainty is characteristic of formalised European Union mechanisms, above all EU-MAM Ukraine (European External Action Service, 2024), which provides standardised training cycles and unified training programmes; this increases the resilience of this format to political fluctuations in partner states and

guarantees long-term predictability of decisions. Less formalised instruments, such as Operation Interflex of the United Kingdom (UK Ministry of Defence, 2024) and Operation Unifier of Canada (Government of Canada, 2025), are distinguished by high operational responsiveness, which allows the training of service personnel to be scaled rapidly in line with the current needs of Ukraine. Such mechanisms do not provide strict procedural regulation, but they compensate for this through flexibility and the capacity for rapid response when the security situation changes.

Political, bureaucratic, and military-strategic factors in the effectiveness of the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine. The analysis of political factors influencing the effectiveness of the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine determined that the political cycles of partner states form one of the key parameters of the predictability of defence decisions. The relationship between political dynamics and the volume of defence support indicates that the periodicity of elections, changes of administrations, and the level of party competition determine the stability of foreign policy priorities. The summary of these characteristics shows that political processes create the basis for potential fluctuations in the pace and scale of assistance, especially during transitional periods between electoral cycles. These patterns require further detail, since different political systems show different sensitivity to internal changes and foreign policy challenges. The stability of decisions on support for Ukraine depends not only on the ideological orientation of political forces but also on the institutional ability of states to adapt foreign policy priorities rapidly to changes in the security environment. Table 3 specifies these conclusions and structures the parameters of the influence of political processes by systematising the duration of political cycles, their effect on defence decision-making, and existing risks of fluctuations in political support for Ukraine.

Table 3. Political cycles of the United States and key EU states and their influence on defence decisions concerning support for Ukraine

State	Duration of political cycle	Features of influence on defence decisions	Potential risks to support stability
United States	4 years (presidential election), 2 years (House of Representatives elections)	A change of administration can adjust the volume and pace of defence assistance; the party composition of Congress plays a significant role	Risks of delays in assistance packages, dependence on Republican Party positions and inter-party conflicts
Germany	4 years (Bundestag elections)	Defence policy depends on coalition configuration and domestic political consensus	Risks of slower decisions in the event of coalition disputes and public pressure
France	5 years (presidential election), 5 years (parliament)	The consistency of decisions is determined by the presidential vertical of power, which ensures greater predictability	Risks of defence policy adjustment in the event of political polarisation or protest movements
Italy	5 years (parliament)	Defence decisions depend on government stability and coalition structure	Risks of changing priorities because of unstable government coalitions
Poland	4 years (parliament), 5 years (president)	A high level of inter-party competition affects the intensity of defence interaction	Risks of changing position depending on election results and changes in political elites

Note: political cycle means the period between regular nationwide elections; coalition configuration means the structure of a government formed by several parties; presidential vertical means a governance model in which the powers of the head of state dominate in foreign policy

Source: systematised based on SIPRI (2022), U.S. Congress (2024a), European Committee of the Regions (2025), SIPRI (n.d.)

The analysis of Table 3 indicates that the political cycles of the United States and leading EU states form different levels of predictability and stability in decisions on defence support for Ukraine. High volatility is observed in

the United States, where frequent changes in the political composition of Congress affect the pace of approval of assistance packages and the parameters of defence budgeting. In EU states, adjustments to foreign policy priorities are

often caused by coalition processes that can slow the implementation of defence decisions or change their scale and character. The presidential model of France provides a relatively stable trajectory of support, whereas Italy and Poland show elevated risks related to the dynamics of domestic political competition. Taken together, this confirms that the political situation of partners is a significant external factor in the effectiveness of the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine.

Within the analysis of military-strategic factors determining the effectiveness of the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine, a key task is to distinguish groups of factors

related to the needs of the defence sector, the capabilities of partners, restrictive frameworks for arms transfers, and escalation risks. The systematisation of these components enables the relationship between the technological and resource parameters of defence demand and the available capacities of partners to be traced and allows an assessment of how constraints affect the pace and volume of international support. In this regard, Table 4 summarises the relevant groups of factors, providing a structured presentation of their content in the context of the defence policy of the partners of Ukraine.

Table 4. Groups of military-strategic factors influencing the effectiveness of defence support for Ukraine

Group of factors	Content	Analytical assessment
Needs of Ukraine	Air defence systems, long-range missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles, and ammunition	A high level of technological requirements creates the need for long-term planning and coordination, increasing resource pressure on partners
Production capacities of partners	Capacities of the defence industries of the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and the potential to scale production	Limited production volumes and long manufacturing cycles reduce delivery speed and create dependence on the modernisation of the military-industrial complex
Arms transfer restrictions	Technological, political, and export restrictions, and end-use monitoring procedures	Sensitive technologies and political risks slow decision-making and restrict access to certain types of weapons
Escalation risks	Concerns among partners about the expansion of the war, the reaction of Russia, and the effect on regional security	Strategic caution among partners restrains the transfer of high-technology systems and causes a gradual increase in assistance volumes

Note: end-use monitoring means a mechanism for controlling the final use of weapons, including restrictions on transfer, modification, or re-export; air defence means anti-aircraft defence; production capacities refer to the existing and potentially expandable capacities of defence enterprises in the United States and EU states

Source: systematised based on U.S. Department of Defense (2024), Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2025), European Union (n.d.), Council of the European Union (n.d.), European Peace Facility (n.d.), NATO (n.d.)

Table 4 demonstrates that military-strategic factors form a multidimensional system in which each group of factors affects the effectiveness of defence support through a specific mechanism. The needs of Ukraine are characterised by high technological complexity, which causes long cycles of production, modernisation, and adaptation, reducing the possibility of rapidly meeting needs under conditions of active hostilities. The production capacities of partners are one of the main limiting parameters, since the defence industries of the United States and EU states do not always provide the necessary scaling of production to maintain an intensive delivery pace. Arms transfer restrictions related to political, technological, and export requirements create an additional barrier to access to precision systems, which substantially affects the operational capabilities of Ukraine. Escalation risks determine the degree of caution among partners, since any strengthening of the range of weapons is interpreted as a potential threat to regional security. The combined influence of these characteristics enables the depth of systemic constraints to be identified and possible directions for optimising the diplomatic efforts of Ukraine to be outlined.

The combined influence of political, bureaucratic, and military-strategic factors forms an integrated trajectory of effectiveness for the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine. These factors cause a shift from a linear model of interstate interaction to a multi-level system in which the importance of maintaining stable political dialogue and the ability to adapt to the procedural requirements of partners increases. The analysis showed that the sustainability of international coordination depends on the

combination of long-term political commitment by partner states, the functional readiness of their institutions, and the balance of military-technical decisions. In this context, not only the volume of support but also the effectiveness of the mechanisms that provide it becomes significant. The summary of the established patterns forms a basis for further study of how the functional parameters of defence formats affect the ability of Ukraine to maintain stable defence interaction under a changing security environment. The conclusions formed indicate that diplomatic instruments should be considered as elements of a broader coordination system within which political, procedural, and military-technical decisions are aligned. This approach allows the long-term potential of defence partnership to be assessed and directions for its further improvement to be identified.

Results of diplomatic initiatives: Changes in the volume and character of defence support. The analysis of the results of the defence support received established that the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine after 2022 led to a substantial increase in volume and an expansion of the range of military-technical assistance provided by key partners. This is confirmed by data from C. Trebesch *et al.* (2023), according to which total bilateral donor commitments in 2022–2025 reached about EUR 413.1 billion, of which more than EUR 309.6 billion was actually allocated, with military components forming the largest share of support. The identified dynamics reflected a structural transition from one-off emergency deliveries to the development of multi-level schemes of long-term rearmament, combining financial support,

the transfer of high-technology weapons, the implementation of joint ammunition production projects, and the deployment of comprehensive training missions (Marsh, 2023). The analysis showed that the increase in the scale of assistance was accompanied by the growing complexity of its internal structure, reflecting the emergence of a new system of defence commitments between Ukraine and its partners in the transatlantic space. The United States played the leading role in the volume of bilateral commitments, with more than EUR 118.9 billion, whereas the combined contributions of EU members and the institutions of the bloc formed a comparable but more diversified support block in terms of instruments (Trebesch *et al.*, 2023).

The deepening of defence cooperation was also evident in the transformation of the instruments used by the United States and the EU after the start of Russia's full-scale aggression. The United States increased the use of legislative mechanisms and financial instruments,

including the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act (U.S. Congress, 2024b) and the expanded possibilities of Presidential Drawdown Authority (U.S. Department of State, 2025), and from 2024, it began the transition to a system of commercial arms supply contracts instead of a model of free transfer. The EU, in turn, expanded the institutional role of the European Peace Facility (n.d.), activated joint ammunition procurement, and substantially scaled up the activity of EUMAM Ukraine (European External Action Service, 2024), which ensured the stability of military support in the medium term. Taken together, these changes reflect the transformation of partnership mechanisms and the strengthening of their institutional resilience. Given the need for a systematic presentation of quantitative and qualitative indicators of defence support, Table 5 summarises the dynamics of assistance from the United States and the EU to Ukraine in 2021–2025 and allows the key structural trends identified in the study to be distinguished.

Table 5. Comparison of the volumes of defence assistance from the United States and the EU to Ukraine in 2021–2025 by financial categories and main types of weapons

Year	Source of support	Financial assistance (billion USD)	Lethal weapons	Non-lethal assistance	Main types of weapons and equipment
2021	United States	~0.6	Limited supplies	Limited supplies	Javelin ATGMs, light small arms
	EU	~0.25 (through EPF)	Minimal	Protective equipment	Protective gear, medical equipment
2022	United States	~26.0	Significant	Significant	HIMARS, 155-mm artillery, NASAMS air defence
	EU	~3.5	Expanded	Significant	Artillery, ammunition, air defence, equipment through EPF
2023	United States	~45.0	Large-scale	Significant	Patriot air defence, Bradley IFVs, M1 Abrams tanks
	EU	~6.0	Moderate	Growing	Leopard 2 tanks, Marder, ammunition, EUMAM Ukraine training
2024	United States	~23.0	Targeted	Significant	Long-range ATACMS missiles, air defence systems, UAVs
	EU	~8.0	Significant	Expanded	Ammunition, air defence, joint procurement, EPF expansion
2025	United States	~27.0	Stable supplies	Stable programmes	Enhanced air defence systems, precision missiles, modernised armoured platforms
	EU	~9.2	Gradual growth	Stable programmes	Joint ammunition programmes, equipment modernisation, expanded training cycles

Note: ATGM – anti-tank guided missile; IFV – infantry fighting vehicle; UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle

Source: systematised based on European External Action Service (2024), UK Ministry of Defence (2024), U.S. Department of Defense (2024), U.S. Congress (2024a), Government of Canada (2025), Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2025), European Union (n.d.), Council of the European Union (n.d.), European Peace Facility (n.d.), NATO (n.d.)

Table 5 demonstrates a substantial expansion in the scale and content of defence support, which became a direct result of the diplomatic initiatives of Ukraine and the revision of the strategic approaches of the United States and the EU to ensuring security in Europe. Table 5 uses qualitative criteria for assistance dynamics, where “significant” denotes a sharp increase in volumes, “growing” denotes gradual expansion, “targeted” denotes deliveries of priority systems, “large-scale” denotes large comprehensive packages, “moderate” denotes a medium level of support, and “stable supplies” and “stable programmes” denote predictable assistance within multi-year commitments. The United States showed the highest dynamics of assistance growth in 2022–2023 through the active use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (U.S. Department of State, 2025) and the adoption of several packages under the Ukraine Security

Supplemental Appropriations Act (U.S. Congress, 2024b). After 2024, a transition to the model of commercial arms sales within Foreign Military Sales (DSCA, n.d.) was recorded, accompanied by the use of the PURL mechanism, the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (NATO, n.d.), aimed at accelerating the production of high-technology systems without reducing national defence stocks of the United States. During this period, the European Union focused its efforts on the institutional strengthening of support: the European Peace Facility (n.d.) provided the main financing for lethal and non-lethal capabilities, and joint ammunition procurement mechanisms supported the scaling of deliveries of artillery systems and air defence components. The comparative analysis showed that the United States performed the function of a supplier of high-technology platforms (Patriot, ATACMS, Abrams), whereas the EU ensured the development of

the institutional basis of support, interoperability, and joint production. The combination of these characteristics confirms the transition from an emergency assistance model to the development of a multi-level system of long-term defence commitments.

The functioning of the multi-level system of military training organised by partner states of Ukraine became one of the key results of deepened defence interaction after 2022. The study established that training of service personnel gradually transformed from fragmented courses into comprehensive training programmes covering basic, technical, and specialised areas aimed at increasing the

combat capability and technological compatibility of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with NATO structures. The expansion of training missions, particularly the scaling of EUMAM Ukraine, the deepening of specialised training within the programmes of the United States and Germany, and the strengthened role of Operation Interflex confirmed that partners had developed a systematic approach to strengthening the personnel potential of the Defence Forces of Ukraine. Given these trends, Table 6 summarises the structure, content, and coverage of training programmes that form the basis for the long-term development of defence capabilities of Ukraine.

Table 6. Structure of training programmes of partner states of Ukraine (2022-2025)

Training source	Types of training	Approximate duration	Number of service personnel (2022-2025)	Areas covered
EUMAM Ukraine (EU)	Basic training; specialised courses; combined training modules	3-8 weeks depending on course	More than 60,000	Infantry training, engineering work, medical assistance, work with artillery and UAVs
United Kingdom (Operation Interflex)	Intensive basic training; non-commissioned officer courses	5-7 weeks	More than 40,000	Small-unit tactical training, fire training, unit command
Germany (through EUMAM Ukraine and bilateral programmes)	Specialised technical and engineering training	4-10 weeks	More than 10,000	Operation of air defence systems, engineering, and sapper training
United States (Security Assistance Training programmes)	Training of air defence crews, artillery personnel, and AFV crews	3-12 weeks	More than 7,000	Patriot, NASAMS, Bradley systems, and artillery complexes
Poland	Instructor training; medical training	2-6 weeks	More than 8,000	Strategic medicine, instructor training, work with small arms
Canada (Operation Unifier)	Basic and specialised individual training	4-7 weeks	More than 5,000	Tactical medicine, small arms training, assault actions
France	Technical training for operators of armoured vehicles and air defence	3-6 weeks	More than 3,000	Operation of AMX-10 RC and short-range air defence
Netherlands and Benelux countries	Joint tactical training	4-5 weeks	More than 2,000	Coordination of small-unit actions and work with UAVs and observation systems

Note: AFV – armoured fighting vehicle

Source: systematised based on European External Action Service (2024), UK Ministry of Defence (2024), U.S. Department of Defense (2024), Government of Canada (2025), Council of the European Union (n.d.)

Table 6 illustrates that partner training programmes cover a wide range of training areas combining basic, technical, and specialised modules aimed at improving different components of the defence capabilities of Ukraine. The summary shows that the largest training volume is provided by EUMAM Ukraine and Operation Interflex, which form basic competencies and maintain a stable level of trained personnel within short time cycles. In high-technology areas, the United States and Germany play the leading role, since the training of operators of Patriot and NASAMS systems, modern armoured vehicles, and engineering units requires longer training cycles and more intensive technical preparation. Poland and Canada focus on instructor and medical training, ensuring the development of an internal personnel reproduction system, which is critically important for prolonged operations. The combined contribution of these programmes demonstrated the development of an integrated and adaptive training system that develops according to the changing needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and supports their capacity for prolonged defence activity.

The analysis demonstrates that the results of diplomatic initiatives are reflected in the transition of Ukraine to a new level of strategic interaction with international

partners. This development is evident in the inclusion of Ukraine in multi-level mechanisms of defence policy planning, the expansion of coordination procedures within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, and the strengthened role of diplomatic institutions in coordinating defence support priorities. Partner decisions increasingly consider the long-term needs of Ukraine and are oriented towards creating a stable model of rearmament and defence technology development, which indicates a completed transition from short-term emergency measures to systematic security interaction. The gradual institutional embedding of the relevant formats points to a change in the logic of cooperation, within which Ukraine is integrated into structures of long-term defence planning. This forms the basis for further analysis of the resilience of defence formats and their ability to adapt to transformations in the international security environment while maintaining continuity of support under different development scenarios.

Constraints, risks, and prospects for further provision of defence support to Ukraine. The study established that political and security risks constitute one of the key groups of external limiting factors determining the ability of partners to adopt long-term decisions on defence support for Ukraine. Distinguishing these risks

clarified which shifts in the political situation in the United States and the EU have the greatest effect on the pace of forming defence packages, the scale of assistance, and the sustainability of strategic commitments. The summary of the findings forms a comprehensive understanding of the limits of predictability in partners' policies and emphasises structural factors that expand or narrow

the opportunities for supporting Ukraine in the medium term. Given the need for a systematic presentation of the established trends, Table 7 provides a comparative description of the key political risks in the United States and the EU, the mechanisms of their influence on defence decision-making, the probability of their realisation, and potential consequences for Ukraine.

Table 7. Political risks in the United States and the EU and their influence on defence decisions concerning support for Ukraine

Region	Dominant political risk	Mechanism of influence on defence decisions	Probability of influence	Potential consequences for Ukraine
United States	Strengthening of isolationism in Congress	Blocking of budgets and military packages	High	Delays in decisions and reduced scale of support
EU	Growing influence of right-wing populist parties	Revision of defence priorities and attitudes towards Russia	Medium	Reduced participation of individual states in support programmes
United States	Transition to a burden-sharing model	Shifting the financial burden to the EU	Medium	Increased dependence on EU decisions
EU	War fatigue	Reduced political will to maintain high volumes of assistance	Medium	Reduced supplies and financing
United States/EU	Competition of defence needs within their own armies	Priority for internal modernisation	High	Reduced availability of weapons

Source: systematised based on U.S. Congress (2024a), European Committee of the Regions (2025), Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (2025), European Union (n.d.), Council of the European Union (n.d.), European Peace Facility (n.d.), NATO (n.d.)

The analysis of Table 7 gives grounds to state that political risks in the United States and the EU have different origins, but their influence on defence decision-making is interconnected and, in some cases, mutually reinforcing. The probability of influence was assessed on a three-level scale: "high" means significant historical recurrence and strong political dynamics of the factor; "medium" indicates potential realisation of the risk if the political situation changes; "low" indicates a limited ability of the factor to directly affect defence decisions. In the United States, the strengthening of isolationist positions in Congress remains the determining factor, creating risks of delays in budgetary decisions and reducing the predictability of military support packages. In the EU, the key threats are related to the growing influence of right-wing populist political forces, since such parties tend to reorient state expenditure towards domestic needs and show scepticism towards long-term defence commitments to Ukraine. The risk of a United States transition to a burden-sharing model should also be considered separately, since it implies the redistribution of the financial burden to European partners with the expectation of their greater involvement in ensuring defence support. Competition

between allies' internal defence needs also increases the pressure on existing production capacities, which directly affects the availability of critically important weapons for Ukraine. The summary of these characteristics outlines the structural limits of further support and determines the need to consider such risks when forming long-term diplomatic strategies.

In the context of assessing structural constraints that determine the prospects for further defence support for Ukraine, the analysis of the production capacities of leading defence companies in the United States and the EU is particularly important. The parameters of defence production determine not only the speed of forming new assistance packages, but also the ability of partners to modernise the range of deliveries and scale production to the needs of high-intensity war. The study confirms that asymmetry between the United States and European defence-industrial complexes substantially affects the pace of deliveries and the technological level of available systems. Table 8 presents comparative production capacities of leading defence companies in the United States and the EU for key types of weapons to systematise these characteristics.

Table 8. Comparative production capacities of leading defence companies in the United States and the EU for key types of weapons

Company	Region	Main types of products	Approximate production capacities (per year)	Strategic constraints
Lockheed Martin	United States	ATACMS and JASSM missiles; HIMARS systems; air defence	Up to 500 ATACMS missiles; 96 HIMARS launchers	High workload under FMS contracts; long production cycles
Raytheon	United States	Patriot systems, AMRAAM missiles, short- and medium-range air defence	Up to 12 Patriot batteries; more than 1,000 AMRAAM missiles	Priority provision for the needs of the United States Army; shortage of individual components
Rheinmetall	Germany	155-mm artillery shells; armoured vehicles	Up to 700,000-800,000 shells; 200-250 AFVs	Dependence on joint production sites; logistical delays
KNDS (KMW + Nexter)	Germany/France	Leopard 2 and Leclerc tanks; CAESAR artillery systems	60-70 tanks; 100-120 CAESAR systems	Limited number of production lines; complexity of modernisation programmes
BAE Systems	United Kingdom	IFVs, artillery systems, MLRS	Up to 100-150 armoured platforms	Dependence on cooperation with the United States and the EU

Table 8. Continued

Company	Region	Main types of products	Approximate production capacities (per year)	Strategic constraints
MBDA	EU	Mistral, Meteor, and Brimstone missiles	200-300 missiles of different types	Limited components; high competition between programmes

Note: MLRS – multiple launch rocket system; FMS – Foreign Military Sales

Source: systematised based on SIPRI (2022), U.S. Department of Defense (2024), Lockheed Martin Corporation (2025), RTX Corporation (2025), Rheinmetall AG (2025), KNDS (2025), BAE Systems (2025), MBDA (2025), SIPRI (n.d.)

Table 8 indicates a clear asymmetry between the production capacities of defence companies in the United States and the EU, which directly determines the pace and stability of the development of defence packages for Ukraine. The study established that United States manufacturers are characterised by considerably higher volumes and speed of production of precision missile weapons, air defence systems, and combat platforms, which creates more predictable delivery dynamics and gives Ukraine access to critically important technologically complex weapons. European companies are focused on increasing the production of artillery ammunition, armoured vehicles, and support systems, but their capacities are limited by longer production cycles, fragmented production lines, and interstate coordination within the EU. A significant part of European production capacity requires long-term investment for scaling, which limits the ability to respond rapidly to increased demand. As a result, the differences established form structural imbalances that influence the quality, pace, and predictability of defence support for Ukraine in the medium term.

Within inter-institutional interaction, the study determined that the procedural complexity of decision-making in NATO and EU structures, together with the governmental institutions of leading partners, substantially affects the timing of deliveries and the coordination of multilateral defence initiatives. The analysis showed that the multi-level structure of coordination processes, the need to agree positions among several agencies, and long consultation cycles reduce the adaptability of support mechanisms. The results of the specialised study by L. Centner (2024) demonstrate that the fragmentation of the European defence-industrial base, differences in regulatory regimes, and slow joint procurement procedures are systemic factors that further delay the implementation of defence decisions in the Euro-Atlantic space. Even when sustained political will exists, established institutional procedures remain a key structural constraint slowing the development of new decisions and delaying their implementation. This institutional context creates a systemic challenge for increasing the operational responsiveness of defence cooperation and requires continuous improvement of coordination mechanisms.

The study also established that the perception of the war as a prolonged conflict substantially affects the sustainability of political attention to the Ukrainian issue in partner states. The reduced visibility of the war in the media space and changing public priorities correlate with a decrease in motivation to maintain significant defence packages, which is already reflected in the pace of decision-making in several EU countries. Data from the analytical study by A.M. Khan (2025) indicate that reduced public focus on the conflict and the redistribution of political

interests directly reduce the readiness of governments to maintain high volumes of both military and humanitarian assistance, increasing the sensitivity of decision-making to changes in domestic political dynamics. The cumulative effect of “war fatigue” transforms political agendas, influencing the level of resource mobilisation, the willingness of governments to maintain further financing, and the intensity of interstate coordination. Under such conditions, strengthening diplomatic channels and institutions capable of compensating for fluctuations in public attention and political sentiment is critically important.

The summary of the identified constraints and risks provides grounds for assessing the prospects for the development of defence cooperation, which implies a transition to a more institutionalised model of support. The analysis demonstrated that the gradual adaptation of partner states is based on the development of multi-year financial instruments, the expansion of production capacities, the strengthening of joint mechanisms of defence production, and the development of long-term commitments within bilateral and multilateral formats. These processes create the preconditions for a more predictable and structurally stable model of defence interaction capable of maintaining a high level of capabilities of Ukraine over a prolonged period. The conclusions reached form a logical basis for further consideration of the functional mechanisms of effectiveness of defence formats and their ability to adapt to the evolution of the security environment.

Discussion

The findings indicate that the variability of defence support for Ukraine is determined by a combination of political, institutional, and production factors that form different decision-making trajectories in the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The identified dependencies show that changes in political cycles adjusted the pace of adoption of defence packages, whereas the level of institutional ordering of diplomatic formats determined the predictability and rhythm of deliveries. Production constraints of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Rheinmetall, KNDS, BAE Systems, and MBDA influenced the time horizons for contract fulfilment and the range of weapons delivered to Ukraine. Data on the functioning of the training missions EUMAM Ukraine, Operation Interflex, and Operation Unifier demonstrated the dependence of service personnel training on interstate coordination and the standardisation of training programmes. The totality of these indicators confirms that the sustainability of defence interaction is determined by the interaction of political processes, procedural architecture, and production capacities, providing an integrated explanation of the identified trends.

The established characteristics of defence interaction correlate with the approach of K. Anisova (2024), who considered the significance of minilateral formats in the functioning of the European security architecture. The role of flexible interaction mechanisms described by the researcher is consistent with the results obtained, since the stability of support for Ukraine depends on the interconnectedness of multilateral initiatives, particularly the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, with the formalised structures of the European Union. The interaction of training missions, production capacities, and political decisions recorded in the study confirms the importance of multi-level governance in ensuring the effectiveness of defence processes. Comparison of the results with the conclusions of A. Damjanovski (2023) noted the consistency of the patterns established in the study with the concept of institutional stability in European Union defence cooperation. The researcher demonstrated that permanent structured mechanisms of interaction reduce the sensitivity of states to short-term political changes. The parameters of the European Peace Facility and EUMAM Ukraine identified in the analysis support this dependence, since structured architecture contributes to the predictability of deliveries and the stability of multilateral support.

The identified patterns of multi-level coordination correspond to the conceptual propositions of R. Väyrynen (2023), who characterised interaction between states through the categories of common, cooperative, and collective security. The data obtained showed that support for Ukraine combines elements of the cooperative approach within training and technical programmes and the collective approach in the activity of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. This correspondence confirms the relevance of the theoretical framework concerning the role of institutions in maintaining the predictability and coherence of defence decisions. The features of procedural support for defence assistance established in the study correspond to the conclusions of S. Mayer (2023), who analysed decision-making mechanisms in the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. The dependence of the pace of defence decisions on procedural transparency, the coherence of partners' positions, and the ability of governments to fulfil commitments, identified in the study, confirms the importance of the procedural-political factors described by the researcher. This alignment reflects the influence of the internal organisation of multilateral structures on the effectiveness of defence interaction concerning Ukraine.

The analysis of political cycles in the study corresponds to the conclusions of A. Payne (2023), who considered the influence of electoral processes on the dynamics of security decision-making. The established dependence of fluctuations in the volume of United States and European assistance on phases of electoral cycles confirmed the relevance of the researcher's propositions concerning the influence of transformations of political elites on the configuration of defence support. The data obtained indicate that political processes are a key factor in the variability of the pace and scale of international defence interaction. The patterns identified in the study concerning the uneven defence contributions of partner states correlate with the conclusions of J. George & T. Sandler (2022), who analysed manifestations of free riding within the North Atlantic

Alliance under the conditions of the 2022 escalation of the war. Their study showed that some alliance members systematically rely on the financial and military resources of the United States, creating an asymmetric distribution of the defence burden. The results obtained confirmed this tendency: in 2022, support for Ukraine from the United States amounted to about USD 26 billion, whereas EU states provided approximately USD 3.5 billion, demonstrating the persistence of structural imbalance. This comparison suggests that differences in budgetary resources and political readiness for long-term commitments continue to determine the configuration of defence interaction. The results concerning production constraints in defence-industrial complexes are consistent with the conclusions of M.A. Hill (2021), who investigated the strategic implications of defence industry throughput. The researcher emphasised that limited production rates for high-technology systems prevent the rapid scaling of deliveries during intensive conflicts. The analysis of the production capacities of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Rheinmetall, KNDS, BAE Systems, and MBDA demonstrated similar constraints: annual production of up to 500 ATACMS missiles and up to 700,000 artillery shells defines the upper limit of the speed of fulfilling commitments to Ukraine. This confirms that industrial capacities remain one of the key constraining factors in scaling defence support.

The dependencies identified in the study concerning the role of the financial and institutional capacity of the United States are consistent with the conclusions of J. Amara & R.E. Franck (2021), who analysed the economic model of the United States defence sector. The researchers showed that the structure of budgetary procedures, the features of defence procurement, and financial instruments determine the ability of the state to change arms production volumes rapidly. The data obtained in the study demonstrated similar dynamics: support for Ukraine from the United States increased from USD 0.6 billion in 2021 to USD 45 billion in 2023, reflecting the influence of budgetary decisions and procedural constraints. This comparison confirms that the parameters of defence assistance are directly related to economic capacities and the flexibility of defence-industrial policy. The trends identified in the study concerning the role of intelligence and training components of defence interaction correlate with the conclusions of M. Arbani (2024), who focused on the significance of intelligence structures in strengthening defence capabilities. The researcher emphasised that non-combat missions, including analytical, coordination, and advisory activities, play an important role in strengthening the capabilities of partner states. The results obtained point to a similar effect: the training programmes EUMAM Ukraine, Operation Interflex, and Operation Unifier trained more than 120,000 Ukrainian service personnel in 2022-2025, which had a direct influence on the combat effectiveness of units. The comparison indicates that training missions perform the function of a key institutional amplifier of defence capabilities.

The findings concerning the content of training programmes and the systematic participation of partner states correspond to the conclusions of A. Sudarya (2021), who analysed the training of reserve components as a basis for strengthening national defence, and D. Sangwan &

P. Raj (2021), who considered the development of professional skills in modern military structures. The researchers emphasised the importance of combining basic, command, and specialised training for the development of resilient combat capabilities. The analysis of training cycles of the partners of Ukraine showed similar patterns: course duration within 3-12 weeks provides both basic and specialised training for operators of artillery, armoured vehicles, and air defence systems. This comparison confirmed that standardised training practices are an important element of the effectiveness of defence interaction. The patterns established in the study concerning the contribution of training missions to increasing the defence capabilities of Ukraine are consistent with the results of S. Pinzariu & A.-I. Pinzariu (2024), who studied the optimisation of educational and training processes in missions of the North Atlantic Alliance. The researchers noted that the effectiveness of personnel training depends on the unification of standards, clear distribution of functions, and integration of training processes with command structures. The results obtained demonstrate a similar logic: the implementation of EUMAM Ukraine, Operation Interflex, and Operation Unifier, with total coverage of more than 120,000 service personnel in 2022-2025, indicates the influence of unified approaches on the qualitative parameters of combat training. This confirms that training missions constitute a central element in strengthening defence capabilities.

The results obtained concerning the dependence of the effectiveness of defence support on institutional capacity and the structural characteristics of security cooperation are consistent with the conclusions of B.Y. Saab (2023), who analysed the limitations of the "train and equip" model in United States practice. The researcher noted that the effectiveness of this model decreases when political and military decisions are fragmented. The study demonstrated a similar dependence: multilateral coordination within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group determined the distribution of resources and noticeably influenced the pace of support in 2023-2024. This comparison shows that the effectiveness of defence interaction depends on the coherence of procedural and strategic decisions among partners. The patterns established in the study concerning the political and institutional preconditions of defence integration correspond to the conclusions of M. Mader *et al.* (2024), who analysed the influence of international threats on support for integration processes in the security sphere among European states. The researchers emphasised that the strengthening of external threats stimulates the consolidation of state positions and the expansion of defence initiatives. The results obtained indicate similar dynamics: the growth of the Russian military threat after 2022 contributed to the acceleration of defence decisions by the United States and the European Union, reflected in the increase in support to USD 45 billion from Washington and more than USD 6 billion from the EU in 2023. This comparison confirmed that external threats act as a key factor of institutional consolidation in the defence sphere. The findings on multi-domain interaction and the technological aspects of support correlate with the approach of A. Gilli *et al.* (2025), who considered the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance under

conditions of multi-domain operations. In their concept, the central element was the integration of cyber, air, land, and information dimensions into a single operational architecture. The data obtained on the structure of assistance to Ukraine in 2023-2025, where deliveries of air defence systems, precision missile systems, and unmanned platforms dominated, reflect the practical implementation of this multi-domain approach. This allows defence support to be interpreted as a process in which the technological component determines not only the range of weapons but also the requirements for its scaling and coordination among partners.

The institutional parameters of partnership interaction established in the study correspond to the analytical conclusions of A. Marrone (2022), who focused on the role of command architecture, budgetary mechanisms, and the distribution of capabilities in the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. The identified dependencies showed that decision-making procedures in the United States and the European Union influence not only the pace of approval of assistance packages, but also the configuration of multilateral programmes, including EUMAM Ukraine and joint defence procurement. From this perspective, institutional mechanisms act not only as channels for implementing decisions but also as structural constraints or catalysts for the stability of defence interaction. The dependence of defence support for Ukraine on interaction between NATO and EU structures recorded in the study is consistent with the conclusions of J.P. Fritsche (2021), who analysed the institutional dependence among states participating in both organisations. The researcher emphasised that dual institutional commitments support the reproduction of established formats of cooperation and narrow the scope for abrupt changes in decision trajectories. The dominance of EUMAM Ukraine and the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in the structure of support for Ukraine confirms this logic: they became the core of multilateral interaction, while the adaptation of support mechanisms to operational needs took place within already established institutional frameworks. This allows decision-making inertia to be interpreted as a derivative of institutional configuration. The features of interaction between the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union identified in the study correlate with the approach of L.A. Schuette (2023), who considered structural overlap and partial competition between defence initiatives of the two institutions. The researcher found that institutional duplication of functions can both complicate coordination and increase the adaptability of the security architecture. The results obtained confirm this ambivalence: the expansion of training programmes, joint arms procurement, and coordination of positions on Ukraine were implemented through mechanisms that formally overlapped in mandates and participants. This indicates that institutional overlap functions as a resource for increasing the overall volume of support and diversifying its instruments.

The trends observed in the study concerning the modernisation of defence infrastructure and the synchronisation of partners' efforts reflect the logic described by D. Fiott (2023), who analysed the use of European Union financial instruments to support NATO infrastructure

needs. In this approach, the coherence of procedures, sources of funding, and institutional coordination was central. Data concerning support for Ukraine showed that arms deliveries, investment in industrial capacities, and the development of logistical routes are implemented as interconnected elements of a single set of decisions. This allows the infrastructural dimension of support to be interpreted as a separate but integrated component of multilateral interaction. The character of coordination of defence-industrial decisions recorded in the study is consistent with the conclusions of N. Heinemann (2025), who studied interaction between government structures, the military, and industry within “iron triangles”. The researcher argued that the institutional design of defence organisations determines the configuration of contractual links and the intensity of cooperation. Empirical data on the production capacities of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Rheinmetall, KNDS, BAE Systems, and MBDA in 2023-2025 demonstrated that the throughput capacity of these manufacturers shaped the time horizons for fulfilling commitments and the limits of expanding deliveries. This supports the conclusion that the defence-industrial segment is a structural determinant of the sustainability of defence support.

The role of institutional design in shaping political and procedural decisions, traced in the study, is consistent with the approach of S.A. Johnston (2023), who analysed the influence of organisational structures of the North Atlantic Alliance on the effectiveness of decision-making processes. The researcher emphasised that the internal architecture of governance, the distribution of powers, and the mode of decision-making determine the speed and consistency of response to external threats. Data on the parameters of support for Ukraine showed that the internal procedures of the United States and the European Union, together with mechanisms for coordinating multi-level decisions, were directly reflected in the pace and rhythm of defence deliveries. This gives grounds to consider institutional design as a key factor in the sustainability and adaptability of defence interaction. The summary of the analysis indicates that the results of the study fit within leading academic approaches to the study of defence interaction, which emphasise the decisive role of institutional coherence, procedural predictability, and industrial capacities in ensuring the sustainability of defence support. Comparison with existing conceptual and empirical findings demonstrates that the dynamics of political cycles, parameters of multi-level governance, and structural overlap between defence formats substantially influence the scale and rhythm of decisions on support for Ukraine. The combination of identified factors allows the effectiveness of defence interaction to be interpreted as the result of the alignment of diplomatic, organisational, and industrial mechanisms, ensuring its adaptability to changes in the security environment.

Conclusions

The study established the structural parameters and internal architecture of diplomatic formats of defence interaction that determined the effectiveness of support for Ukraine in 2021-2025. The analysis showed that

the political cycles of the United States and EU member states created different levels of predictability in defence decisions: in the United States, the four-year presidential and two-year congressional cycles created risks of support delays, whereas in Germany, France, Italy, and Poland, the frequency of elections and coalition parameters influenced the stability of decisions within national models of defence policy governance. The study also demonstrated that the volumes of defence support from the United States and the EU varied substantially from year to year and correlated with political cycles and procedural dynamics of decision-making. In particular, United States financial assistance increased from approximately USD 0.6 billion in 2021 to about USD 45 billion in 2023 and remained above USD 20 billion in 2024-2025. EU financial contributions increased from approximately USD 0.25 billion in 2021 to more than USD 9 billion in 2025, reflecting the gradual institutional expansion of support instruments. Regarding weapons, a transition was recorded from limited deliveries in 2021 to the large-scale deployment of air defence systems, artillery, and armoured vehicles in 2022-2025, which determined the qualitative transformation of the defence capabilities of Ukraine.

The findings indicated that the production capacities of defence companies in the United States and the European Union were a critical limiting factor in planning the pace and range of deliveries. Lockheed Martin could produce up to 500 ATACMS missiles per year, Raytheon approximately 12 Patriot batteries and up to 1,000 AMRAAM missiles, Rheinmetall up to 700,000-800,000 155-mm artillery shells, and KNDS around 60-70 tanks and up to 120 CAESAR systems, whereas BAE Systems and MBDA faced comparable constraints. Partner training missions also had a significant influence: EUMAM Ukraine trained more than 60,000 Ukrainian service personnel, Operation Interflex more than 40,000, and Operation Unifier more than 5,000, while programmes of Germany, the United States, Poland, France, and the Benelux countries provided specialised training for more than 20,000 additional service personnel. This supported the development of a multi-level model of combat training combining basic, specialised, and technical modules. The limitations of the study are related to the uneven availability of official data, different levels of detail in the statistics of partner states, and the absence of complete information on individual defence-industrial contracts. Further studies should focus on quantitative modelling of the relationship between political cycles, production capacities, and the pace of defence support, and on the analysis of scenarios for the development of multilateral formats of interaction under conditions of changes in the strategic environment.

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