UDC: 327.73:339.5
DOI: 10.59214/ua.fa/6.2025.65

Volodymyr Yurchenko*
Research Fellow
V.M. Koretsky Institute of State and Law
02000, 4B Triokhsviatytelska Str., Kyiv, Ukraine
https://orcid.org/0009-0001-3177-467X

Tariff diplomacy and sanctions policy of the Trump administration: Economic nationalism as a foreign policy tool

Abstract. The study aimed to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the transformations in the foreign policy of the United States of America during the presidency of Donald Trump, with an emphasis on the role of trade and sanctions instruments in the implementation of foreign policy strategy. The methodological basis of the study was an interdisciplinary approach that combined comparative conceptual analysis, content analysis of official documents, and legal analysis of the Trump administration's trade and sanctions mechanisms. To assess the impact of tariff and sanctions policies on international relations and the global economy, cases from China, Iran, Ukraine, Canada, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia were analysed. The results of the study showed that the foreign policy of the United States of America in 2017-2021 was characterised by a shift towards economic nationalism, protectionism and unilateral actions. Tariff policy was used as an instrument of coercive diplomacy to achieve trade concessions, while having a controversial impact on the domestic economy of the United States and global markets. The study established that the Trump administration's sanctions policy functioned as part of a comprehensive foreign policy management strategy, combined with military aid, trade restrictions and investment controls, and its application was primarily determined by geopolitical interests. The study proved that sanctions often did not lead to a change in the behaviour of target states but instead stimulated the convergence of alternative centres of power and the development of mechanisms to circumvent restrictions. The sanctions diplomacy of the United States of America during the period in question demonstrated limited coercive effectiveness and contributed to the fragmentation of the international system and the weakening of multilateral formats of global regulation. The practical significance of the results is determined by the possibility of their use to further analyse modern trends in global development, as well as to improve and adapt international cooperation mechanisms in the context of the spread of economic nationalism and protectionism

Keywords: protectionism; trade wars; bilateral cooperation; international tensions; multipolar world order; national security

Introduction

The research relevance of the tariff diplomacy and sanctions policy of the Trump administration is determined by changes in international economic relations that shape global trade dynamics and geopolitical configuration in a multipolar world. Economic nationalism, manifested in the prioritisation of national interests and protectionist measures, has a significant impact on international relations and global economic processes. Trump's foreign policy was characterised by contradictory rhetoric that combined elements of interventionism and isolationism, as evidenced by the conclusions of I.D. Dudko (2023). The application of the doctrine of "escalation for the sake of de-escalation", in which public statements were used as a tool for demonstrating power and domestic political mobilisation, contributed to the transformation of the role of the United States as a global leader with an emphasis on the priority of national interests. At the same time, the author notes a tendency to avoid direct military intervention in external conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. According to a study by I.A. Jasmin & I. Hosen (2025), the foreign policy course of the Trump administration formed a unique model based on the priority of national interests and the "America First" doctrine, accompanied by a narrowing of US participation in multilateral mechanisms of international cooperation. I.A. Jasmin & I. Hosen emphasised that the active use of social media as a tool for diplomatic communication has transformed established practices of inter-state communication and weakened institutionalised diplomatic norms. In this context, the strategy of "maximum pressure" on Iran and North Korea

Received: 01.07.2025, Revised: 15.11.2025, Accepted: 26.12.2025

Suggested Citation:
Yurchenko, V. (2025). Tariff diplomacy and sanctions policy of the Trump administration: Economic nationalism as a foreign policy tool. *Foreign Affairs*, 35(6), 65-76. doi: 10.59214/ua.fa/6.2025.65.

**Corresponding author*

has failed to achieve its stated strategic goals and has contributed to increased tension and instability in the respective regions. According to H. Gültekin (2025), D. Trump's populist rhetoric proved to be effective in electoral mobilisation, as it appealed to the economic difficulties of broad segments of the population and exploited cultural and identity images. The implementation of the "America First" doctrine led to a review of US participation in multilateral economic initiatives, which was reflected in the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the transformation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This strategy was aimed at reducing dependence on foreign countries and strengthening national sovereignty. In the context of network communication, S. Fedoniuk (2025) found that the active use of digital platforms Truth Social, X and Twitch with emotional content and algorithmic targeting contributed to a significant mobilisation of the electorate. However, this strategy of direct interaction exacerbated political polarisation and the formation of "information bubbles". The study established a correlation between Donald Trump's digital communication and the decline in trust in state institutions, which exacerbated internal tensions and international instability. According to the findings of A. Bobroske (2025), in the field of economic diplomacy, has seen an increase in the role of the executive branch in regulating foreign trade through both the delegation of powers and the independent expansion of control. Business groups, trade unions and consumer organisations acted as "shadow principals", influencing political decisions through formal and informal channels. The author demonstrated deviations from the formal constitutional powers of Congress in trade policy. V. Faraponov's (2024) analysis showed that the introduction of tariffs stimulated domestic production but provoked retaliatory measures from trading partners, especially China. The rejection of traditional international alliances in favour of a nationalist doctrine led to trade wars. V. Faraponov concluded that the results of protectionist policies were contradictory.

The strategy of "maximum pressure" on Venezuela, which included economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, aggravated the humanitarian crisis and provoked social unrest, as demonstrated by R. Mahabir & K. Ganpat (2025). Despite the stated goal of promoting democracy, these measures did not weaken the Maduro regime. Tensions were revealed in relations with Caribbean Community states, many of which took a neutral position. During the first 100 days of the second term, there was a shift from value-based multilateral cooperation to a pragmatic bilateral approach, as established by I. Todorov & N. Todorova (2025). The reduction in military aid to Ukraine and the revision of the sanctions policy towards Russia affected the dynamics of the Russian-Ukrainian war. These changes stimulated the strengthening of autonomous initiatives by the European Union (EU) and contributed to the transition to multipolar global security with a weakening of the role of the United States. Despite growing academic interest in the foreign policy of the Trump administration, a comprehensive analysis of tariff diplomacy and sanctions policy as interrelated instruments of economic nationalism remains fragmented. Existing studies emphasise individual cases and short-term consequences, without integrating the results into a general theoretical framework of analysis. The study aimed to examine the impact of the Donald Trump administration's tariff and sanctions policies on global economic processes and international relations. The objectives of the study were to identify and analyse the conceptual foundations of economic nationalism as the ideological basis of Donald D. Trump's administration's foreign policy; to examine the manifestations of this nationalism in US tariff and sanctions policies and to assess how they have transformed traditional approaches to foreign policy; to analyse the mechanisms for the practical implementation of "maximum pressure" and "trade war" strategies as instruments of coercive diplomacy that reflected the ideological priorities of the administration.

Materials and Methods

The study was theoretical and analytical in nature and was based on an interdisciplinary approach combining comparative conceptual analysis, content analysis of official documents and scientific publications, as well as legal analysis of key trade and sanctions mechanisms of the relevant period. The source base consisted of summarised and systematised data from previously published scientific works and analytical reviews devoted to the impact of tariff policy and sanctions on international trade. The effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade dispute settlement system in the context of US-China conflicts was assessed based on data from X. Li & X. Zhang (2022). An analysis of publications by C. Dueck (2021), A. Taim (2024) and Y. Abukari & R. Saluja (2025) identified the key features of economic nationalism as represented in the "America First" policy. The examination of trade flows, tariff rates and sanctions was based on materials by D.D. Ramírez Ortiz (2021), O.A. Obasun (2025) and P.K. Gorrela & G. Pavani (2025), which traced the dynamics of US trade relations with key partners, including China, the EU and Mexico.

As part of the description of the Trump administration's tariff and sanctions policy, key regions and countries affected by this policy were examined. The analysis of the policy towards China was based on the findings of E. Hanada (2020) and L. Dumitrescu (2025), who highlighted trade pressure measures, tariffs and export controls. US-Iranian relations after the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and sanctions in the oil sector were examined in accordance with data from N. Hogic (2022), S. Khan (2024) and R. Baydemir (2025). The review of the U.S. Department of State (2018) revealed the peculiarities of the US sanctions policy towards individual countries. The work also included the study of cases of India, Turkey, China and North Korea based on publications by E. Chanlett-Avery *et al.* (2018), A. Giovanzanti (2021) and K.A. Kronstadt (2022), which demonstrated the varying impact of sanctions depending on the timing and conditions of their implementation. When considering Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, information from the study by U. Jayadi & M.R.H.P. Pratama (2023) was considered. Sanctions policy towards Russia and Ukraine was considered using data from V. Pashkov (2024) and B. Kerry (2025), which highlighted the issues of military aid, blocking strategic agreements and implementing sanctions under the Countering

America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Publications by E.O. Stober (2025) and J. Oche (2025) were used to assess the impact on the EU and NATO. To form a comprehensive picture, methods of systematic and comparative analysis were used, which integrated fragmented data and identified key trends, strategic motives and consequences of the Trump administration's tariff and sanctions policy for international relations and the economies of individual regions.

Results

The theoretical foundations of economic nationalism and US foreign policy. The main approaches to analysis of economic nationalism and US foreign policy towards China are based on the concepts of realism, idealism and power transition theory, which view China's rise as a challenge to US hegemony. In 2019, US GDP was 21.4 trillion USD compared to 14.1 trillion USD in China, but when adjusted for purchasing power parity, China's economy exceeded that of the US by approximately one-sixth, reflecting a shift in the balance of power in Beijing's favour and reinforcing the relevance of the "Thucydides trap", which has often led to armed conflict (Holland, 2024). Despite this, the presence of nuclear arsenals in both countries acts as a deterrent to escalation. The emphasis on economic nationalism and realistic doctrine, expressed in the introduction of tariffs on steel and aluminium from China and the rejection of multilateral agreements such as the Iran nuclear deal, has led to an increase in domestic production, but at the same time has provoked corresponding measures by China and disruptions in global supply chains. As highlighted by A. Taim (2024), this approach, prioritising unilateral actions and bilateral negotiations, has been criticised for its lack of long-term strategic vision and weakening of relations with traditional allies. The US transition from liberal globalisation to economic nationalism continued after Trump, including the Biden administration, which was reflected in tariffs on Chinese goods totalling up to 370 billion USD and the revision of trade agreements. Trump, including the Biden administration, as evidenced by tariffs on Chinese goods totalling up to 370 billion USD and the revision of trade agreements, such as the renewal of NAFTA to USMCA with stricter requirements for regional content in automobiles (Abukari & Saluja, 2025). Although such measures are aimed at protecting domestic production and sovereignty, they have had a negative impact on consumers and export-oriented industries. According to O.A. Obasun (2025), US economic nationalism was also expressed in the application of export controls and sanctions, including an increase in tariffs on Chinese goods to 145% in 2025, which, despite reducing dependence on China, led to a loss of revenue for American companies of more than 100 billion USD and a deepening of the trade imbalance. At the same time, the US retains a competitive advantage in services, with a trade surplus in this sector of 296 billion USD in 2023, which partially offsets the deficit in goods trade (Obasun, 2025). This has shown that a unilateral focus on reducing the goods deficit may ignore the structural advantages of the economy.

The ideological basis of economic nationalism, especially during the Trump era, is linked to the revival of conservative American nationalism and the "America First" doctrine, which reinterprets international institutions and trade agreements. Trump is linked to the revival of conservative American nationalism and the "America First" doctrine, which reinterprets international institutions and trade agreements as a threat to national interests and sovereignty, demanding that allies increase their contribution to the common burden (Dueck, 2021). This doctrine reflects disappointment with traditional foreign policy paradigms of the 21st century and the desire to restore the US industrial base (van Apeldoorn *et al.*, 2023). The foreign economic policy of the Trump administration demonstrated a shift from liberal globalism to neo-mercantilism, expressed in unprecedented tariff measures and attempts to redistribute trade benefits in favour of national capital. Protectionist policies, as emphasised by A. Bimantara (2019), were accompanied by trade wars with several democratic countries and relied on the support of white voters with medium and low incomes, reflecting populist sentiments associated with the loss of the "American dream". In addition, the "America First" policy is a departure from liberal internationalism towards neo-isolationism and realism, with a priority on national interests, which has raised doubts about the US's commitment to multilateral agreements and contributed to the weakening of collective security (Abukari & Saluja, 2025). Key events demonstrating the development of economic nationalism policy during Trump's presidency are presented in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Key events in US economic nationalism
Source: compiled by the author based on J. Klomp (2025)

As shown in Figure 1, the distribution of key events between January 2017 and December 2020 reflects the implementation of economic nationalism policies under the Trump administration. The largest number of events (18) relates to the announcement of corresponding measures by trading partners, which emphasises the confrontational nature of trade policy. The second most significant peak (6 events) relates to the continuation of trade procedures, demonstrating consistency in the application of policy. The Department of Commerce launched investigations to justify the introduction of tariffs in three cases, indicating a systematic approach to protecting domestic production. Other key steps include the official announcement of tariffs (1 event), their implementation (1 event) and the publication of results (2 events). At the same time, the diagram reflects attempts at settlement and dialogue: negotiations (2 events), granting of concessions (8 events) and failure of concessions (4 events), which occur less frequently than the announcement of tariffs and related measures. This confirms the overall orientation of the policy towards decisive unilateral action, while including limited elements of flexibility and negotiation. Thus, US foreign policy reflects a significant shift towards economic nationalism and protectionism, accompanied by both a strengthening of domestic industry and sovereignty, and an increase in international tensions, fragmentation of global institutions and greater challenges to maintaining global stability.

The tariff policy of the Trump administration and its impact. The tariff policy of D. Trump's administration functioned not as a classic instrument of protectionism aimed at protecting domestic production, but as an institutionalised mechanism of coercive diplomacy aimed at obtaining favourable trade concessions from partners. The tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 were formally justified on national security grounds, but in practice, they created artificial trade barriers that the US used as leverage in bilateral negotiations with its trading partners (Kitamura, 2025). E. Hanada (2020) found that the tariffs on steel and aluminium in 2018 (25% and 10%, respectively) significantly exceeded the recommendations of the US Department of Commerce, indicating political motivations that exceed the scope of economic logic. Tariffs became a tool of political pressure on global trading partners rather than economic protection. Despite the focus on combating China as a source of overproduction, Canada remained the largest supplier of aluminium to the United States, accounting for 40% of imports, while China's share was only 10%. In addition, military consumption of steel in the US did not exceed 4% of total production, calling into question the stated national interests as the main reason for imposing tariffs (Hanada, 2020). This indicates that the declared national security served more as a formal cover for the implementation of a geo-economic strategy. The reaction of the financial market reflected internal policy contradictions: investors perceived the tariffs as a negative factor for defence companies that are active in the international market and account for two-thirds of global arms sales. Even before the official announcement of the tariffs, there was a fall in share prices, which intensified after the publication of the actual tariff rates, which exceeded expectations (Klomp, 2025). This compromise between protecting the steel industry and harming steel consumers in the defence sector demonstrates the complexity and ambiguity of the consequences of this policy. Thus, the economic benefits of protecting the metallurgical industry were partially offset by losses in the defence sector. A substantial aspect was the increased use of national security laws, in particular Section 232 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), not only against adversaries, but also against traditional allies such as Canada and Mexico. The Trump administration initiated 16% of all historical Section 232 investigations, resulting in 25% of all sanctions. Similarly, 38% of all executive orders based on the IEEPA were issued between 2016 and 2025, indicating a trend towards expanding the use of these instruments to achieve economic and political goals (Ramírez Ortiz, 2021; Kitamura, 2025). Thus, national security legislation has become a universal lever of influence for the United States, going beyond the classic protection of national interests.

The introduction of tariffs and the threat of applying the IEEPA significant concessions for the US in the negotiations on the new USMCA trade agreement, given the vulnerability of Canada and Mexico, 93% and 76% of whose steel and aluminium exports are oriented towards the American market, respectively, as noted by D.D. Ramírez Ortiz (2021). This proves the effectiveness of tariff policy as a tool for negotiating pressure in the US geo-economic strategy. The economic effects of tariff policy have been twofold. On the one hand, the steel industry saw a short-term price increase to a decade high (920 USD per metric tonne of flat steel) and an increase in employment of 6,000 jobs. On the other hand, by the end of 2019, prices had fallen, and production capacity had declined to 56%, which, according to L. Palmbach & K.G. Kulkarni (2022), indicates that the positive effect was limited. The increase in steel prices had a negative impact on consumer industries with a total employment of over 12 million people, resulting in the loss of about 75,000 jobs. Corresponding tariffs imposed by other countries resulted in losses of approximately 2.4 billion USD per month for American exporters (Palmbach & Kulkarni, 2022). This indicates that the benefits to the steel industry were offset by significant losses in related sectors and external markets. The political component was also evident in the procedure for granting tariff exemptions: companies located in states with high support for Donald Trump received preferences in 80% of cases, while in other states, only 60% did, with less efficient companies more often winning in regions with high support. These data indicate the presence of political bias unrelated to economic or industry characteristics (Kim & Yoon, 2020). To illustrate the results presented, Table 1 below shows the main estimates of the regression analysis, which demonstrated the impact of key factors on the probability of tariff exemptions being approved.

Table 1. The impact of the Trump administration's tariff policy on trade indicators

	Basic	**Linear IV**	**SPE decile**	**Rust Belt**	**Unemployment**	**Industry GDP**
	Entire sample	sales<95%	Entire sample	sales<95%	Entire sample	sales<95%
Trump dummy	0.603 (3.93)**	0.683 (4.20)**	0.763 (1.97)*	0.595 (4.02)**	0.674 (4.29)**	0.642 (4.08)**
SER	0.068 (4.18)**	0.074 (4.75)**		0.067 (4.19)**	0.073 (4.67)**	0.088 (4.56)**

Table 1. Continued

	Basic	Linear IV	SPE decile	Rust Belt	Unemployment	Industry GDP
SER x Trump	−0.095 (−3.42)**	−0.110 (−3.68)**		−0.094 (−3.48)**	−0.109 (−3.74)**	−0.101 (−3.58)**
In(age)	−0.039 (−1.92)*	−0.040 (−2.04)*	−0.048 (−1.99)*	−0.041 (−2.10)*	−0.040 (−2.12)*	−0.039 (−1.90)+
Obj	−0.225 (−5.82)**	−0.214 (−5.26)**	−0.204 (−13.39)**	−0.226 (−6.01)**	−0.215 (−5.46)**	−0.226 (−5.74)**

Note: Rust Belt – a region in the north-eastern and mid-western United States; IV (Instrumental Variables) – a method of instrumental variables in econometrics; SPE (Special Purpose Entities) – special purpose companies/structures used to redistribute trade flows; SER (State Export Ratio) – the share of exports of a state or sector in total production/sales; In(age) – natural logarithm of the age variable of a company/industry; Obj (Objective function variable) – an objective indicator or control variable that reflects a key economic result; GDP – Gross domestic product
Source: compiled by the author based on W. Kim & Y.J. Yoon (2020)

Table 1 shows that the Trump administration's tariff policy had a noticeable and statistically significant positive impact on companies. The Trump dummy coefficient is positive in all models (0.603 in the base model), confirming the stimulating effect of the introduction of tariffs and accompanying measures for certain segments of the economy. The SER indicator, which reflects the industry's dependence on imports, also has a positive value, indicating gains for industries that have received additional protection from foreign competition. At the same time, the SER × Trump interaction is negative in all specifications (around −0.10), which means that the negative impact of tariffs on more import-dependent industries intensified during Trump's presidency. This effect could have been caused by rising prices for raw materials and components, as well as the introduction of corresponding trade restrictions. The most vulnerable were companies with lower sales volumes, where political indicators had a higher impact coefficient, and regions with a high export orientation experienced greater negative effects from protectionist measures. At the same time, older companies showed a tendency to weaken the political effect, which may indicate their accumulated experience in adaptation. The systemic inverse relationship between economic activity indicators and overall economic performance highlights structural imbalances that have been exacerbated by the new tariffs. These conclusions collectively demonstrated that trade wars were used not as a universal protectionist mechanism, but as a targeted tool to support politically prioritised sectors, which, despite the declared goal of supporting domestic production, increased regional and sectoral asymmetries in the economy.

The tariff policy was part of a broader geo-economic strategy to curb China's growth, aimed at countering the Made in China 2025 programme, which doubled the production capacity of the PRC and achieved technological superiority in key industries. In addition, the annual losses of American companies from intellectual property theft in China were estimated at approximately 600 billion USD. The imposition of sanctions against technology giants such as ZTE and Huawei demonstrated the preservation of the US's structural power in the global market and its ability to influence global economic processes (Dumitrescu, 2025). The revision of NAFTA and the conclusion of USMCA were motivated by the need to reduce the trade deficit with Canada and Mexico of 89.6 billion USD and to compensate for the loss of nearly one million jobs related to offshoring and competition. The new agreement tightened regional content requirements for cars from 62.5% to 75% and introduced an obligation to produce 40-45% of components at plants with a minimum wage of 16 USD per hour. In addition, the US gained expanded access to the Canadian dairy market, and a "sunset clause" was introduced after 16 years, with the possibility of review every 6 years (Ardhana & Daniah, 2023). This demonstrated the administration's desire to protect domestic markets and stimulate production while tightening control over the terms of agreements. The stricter requirements also affected the automotive industry as a whole: 70% of steel and aluminium must be produced in North America, and wage requirements for auto parts manufacturers have increased. These measures are expected to lead to a 1.61% increase in the price of small passenger cars and a 0.37% increase in the price of pick-up trucks, which in turn will reduce overall passenger car consumption by 1.25%. Despite the targeted restrictions, foreign direct investment inflows to Mexico reached a record 21.7 billion USD in the first quarter of 2020, raising doubts on the effectiveness of Trump's tariff policy as a tool for a massive return of production and jobs to the US (Blecker, 2021). In other words, the Trump administration's tariff policy reflected a significant shift towards economic nationalism and protectionism, accompanied by both increased control over domestic industries and the promotion of national interests, as well as growing international tensions, corresponding trade restrictions and the complication of global trade relations.

The Trump administration's sanctions strategy and geopolitical goals. The Trump administration's sanctions policy towards Ukraine was accompanied by a significant increase in military aid, which rose from 262 million USD in 2017 to 398 million USD in 2019, with total aid for the period 2017-2020 amounting to 2.6 billion USD, almost double the figures for previous years (Kerry, 2025). At the same time, political dialogue between the US and Ukraine emphasised four key areas: political dialogue, security, energy and the fight against corruption. Sanctions were used as a tool to block strategic deals, such as the sale of the Ukrainian company Motor Sich to Chinese companies, which served to limit China's technological and military influence. V. Pashkov (2024) determined that despite public support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, the US focused on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied territories of Donbas and non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea, while considering the conflict frozen and not expecting full implementation of the Minsk agreements. The influence of US diplomacy on Ukrainian processes declined after 2017, accompanied by a reduction in the role of the embassy and a strengthening of the positions of representatives of the Trump administration in Kyiv. These data demonstrate the strategic use of sanctions for political pressure and maintaining control over key foreign policy directions. As of March 2025, the Trump administration had maintained the imposed sanctions against Russia without introducing new measures on the anniversary of the military action, which was a novelty compared to previous years. At the same time, the national emergency regarding Ukraine was extended until March 2026, based on which most of the sanctions programmes are implemented. New developments included the disbanding of the KleptoCapture task force, which seized the assets of Russian oligarchs, while maintaining criminal prosecution for export control violations, as well as the expansion of sanctions lists to include individuals involved in cybersecurity and support for the Houthis (Kerry, 2025). This approach indicates a reorientation of policy towards more targeted measures while maintaining the overall severity of the sanctions regime. In 2017, the US Congress passed the CAATSA law, which provides for sanctions against Russia. This law was also used as leverage against India over its purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft systems worth 5 billion USD (Askari & Mushtaq, 2025). Despite the threat of sanctions, India went ahead with the purchase, which complicated its strategic partnership with the US and called into question the country's foreign policy autonomy. These events contributed to a rapprochement between Russia and China, which resulted in a 400 billion USD gas deal and joint military exercises (Verma, 2023). This demonstrated that the sanctions policy had ambiguous geopolitical consequences, strengthening blocs against the US.

Trade restrictions under the sanctions policy included Trump imposing tariffs on Chinese goods worth over 360 billion USD, in response to which China imposed duties on American products worth over 110 billion USD. The main goal was to reduce the US trade deficit, which fell from 375.6 billion USD in 2017 to 345.6 billion USD in 2019. However, these measures had a negative impact on American farmers, whose exports to China fell from 15.9 billion USD to 5.9 billion USD in one year. At the same time, US imports from China reached a record 539.5 billion USD in 2018, reflecting the complexity of a complete breakdown in trade relations between the two economies (Gorrela & Pavani, 2025). These facts highlighted the controversial and limited effect of trade sanctions. In 2025, the administration tightened restrictions on Chinese investment in strategic US industries, citing threats to national security and the possible use of American technology to modernise Chinese military and intelligence structures. The volume of Chinese investment declined from 46 billion USD in 2016 to less than 5 billion USD in 2022. The new rules restricted investor access to the semiconductor, artificial intelligence, quantum technology and biotechnology sectors, as well as control over the acquisition of agricultural land. At the same time, repeated cyberattacks by Chinese hackers on US agencies have led to tougher measures (Holland, 2025). The Trump administration pursued a policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran, which was manifested in unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018 and the reimposition of sanctions (Baydemir, 2025). These measures led to an escalation of tensions in the region, which peaked after the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. At the same time, the US provided almost unlimited support to Israel, recognising Jerusalem as its capital in 2017 and the Golan Heights as Israeli territory in March 2019. The administration also cut economic aid to the Palestinian Authority and facilitated the Abraham Accords, which normalised Israel's relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco (Baydemir, 2025). However, the policy of "maximum pressure" did not achieve its goals: it did not force Iran to return to negotiations on a new agreement, but, on the contrary, provoked other international players, including the European Union, to seek means of circumventing the sanctions. Threats of military force did not change Iran's regional policy, and unilateral sanctions weakened the US's negotiating position, as Iran, while formally remaining within the JCPOA, was able to strengthen its position (Hogic, 2022). As part of this policy, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Chinese refineries and companies that purchased Iranian oil, which was part of the sixth round of sanctions targeting Iran's oil sector (Psaledakis, 2025). Table 2 demonstrates the differentiated nature of the impact of US sanctions imposed under CAATSA, which varies from country to country, ranging from preventive sanctions threats to comprehensive restrictive measures.

Table 2. Examples of US sanctions under CAATSA and their consequences for target countries

Country	Sanction description	Result	Notes
India	The US applied CAATSA policy in response to India's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system	India avoids CAATSA sanctions	Diplomatic pressure from the US was ineffective due to India's strategic interests and the incompatibility of American weapons with its needs
Indonesia	In 2019, Indonesia faced the threat of CAATSA sanctions for the possible purchase of Russian Su-35 fighter jets	Indonesia has refused to purchase Su-35s and switched to French weapons	The threat of sanctions influenced the Indonesian decision
Turkey	Turkey acquired the Russian S-400 air defence system despite warnings from the United States	The US imposed CAATSA sanctions, excluding Turkey from the F-35 programme	The sanctions were applied in full
China	China has purchased 10 Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 systems from Russia	China was subject to CAATSA sanctions	The sanctions were applied in full
North Korea	North Korea is subject to US sanctions for its nuclear programme	US sanctions against North Korea remain in force	North Korea continues to develop nuclear and missile technologies despite sanctions

Source: compiled by the author based on U. Jayadi & M.R.H.P. Pratama (2023)

Table 2 showed that the application of US sanctions under CAATSA had varying effects depending on the target country and the timing of the restrictions. India faced threats of sanctions after signing an agreement with Russia in 2018 to purchase S-400 air defence systems, but despite the start of deliveries in 2021, sanctions were never imposed, as confirmed by K.A. Kronstadt (2022). In 2019, Indonesia was at risk of sanctions due to its intention to purchase Russian Su-35 fighter jets, but it abandoned the deal, as recorded by A. Giovanzanti (2021), and switched to French equipment. After acquiring the S-400 system in 2017, Turkey received a full package of CAATSA sanctions in 2020, including exclusion from the F-35 fighter programme, as officially announced by M.R. Pompeo (2020). China faced sanctions in 2018 after acquiring ten Su-35s (2017) and S-400 systems (2018), and restrictions were imposed on the Equipment Development Department and its head, L. Shangfu, as confirmed by the U.S. Department of State (2018). North Korea has been a traditional target of U.S. sanctions for its nuclear programme, including CAATSA, and its consistency is confirmed by E. Chanlett-Avery *et al.* (2018). Together, these examples illustrate that Washington's sanctions policy ranged from preventive threats to full-scale measures, demonstrating both the flexibility and selectivity of the American pressure strategy. Thus, Trump's sanctions diplomacy was targeted and varied depending on the political and strategic context.

Relations with Saudi Arabia were also based on economic benefits, as evidenced by the 110 billion USD arms deal signed in 2017, despite criticism from the international community over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. Overall, Donald Trump's presidency (2017-2021) was characterised by a policy of unconditional support for Riyadh: the administration provided Saudi Arabia with military and political assistance, viewing it as a key ally in containing Iran. Despite the international scandal following Khashoggi's murder, Washington did not impose harsh sanctions, maintaining stable relations and emphasising strategic partnership. R. Baydemir (2025) notes that the US continued to support Saudi Arabia in the war in Yemen, despite sharp criticism from international organisations for human rights violations. Thus, Trump's foreign policy in the Middle East was characterised by a combination of unilateral actions, tough sanctions pressure and pragmatic support for key allies, which led to regional destabilisation and a weakening of the US position in multilateral negotiations. The sanctions policy against Venezuela was aimed at regime change through economic pressure: a ban on new debt and securities transactions by the government and the state oil company PdVSA, the freezing of 7 billion USD in assets, and a ban on oil exports to the US. By September 2019, more than 119 Venezuelan individuals were subject to sanctions. Despite the severity of the measures, they did not lead to the overthrow of Maduro's regime, but contributed to the humanitarian crisis (Puerta Riera, 2020). This case demonstrated the limited effectiveness of sanctions in achieving political goals, while having serious social consequences. In summary, the Trump administration's sanctions policy is characterised by a wide range of goals and instruments, including military support, economic restrictions and diplomatic pressure. At the same time, these measures were accompanied by both a strengthening of the US's strategic position and an increase in international tensions, a complication of global relations and intensified rivalry with major geopolitical players.

The impact of Donald Trump's policies on international relations and the global economy. The foreign policy of the Trump administration has caused considerable tension in relations with European allies. One of the key manifestations of this was the demand that Ukraine sign an agreement on the distribution of natural resources worth 500 billion USD in exchange for American aid, according to which the US would receive 50% of the income from extraction. At the same time, NATO members were asked to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP, a significant increase from 2%. Negotiations with Russia, bypassing European partners, have worsened relations with the EU, prompting Europe to strengthen domestic security and sovereignty, as trust in the US as a guarantor of security for Western democracies has declined significantly, signalling a major reassessment of the US role in the transatlantic security system (Cebotari, 2025). The "America First" ideology has led to a re-evaluation of alliances and caused concern around the world. According to M.D. Ilyas (2024), 67% of Europeans do not trust the American leader, and 62% of respondents globally believe that the US ignores the interests of other countries. Military budget increases in response to doubts about the reliability of the US amounted to 3.9% in NATO in 2021. The US withdrawal from substantial international agreements and the introduction of trade tariffs prompted the EU to take countermeasures worth 2 billion USD, increasing tensions in relations with allies. At the same time, 66% of Americans believe that China's influence is growing and that of the US is declining, highlighting profound changes in the perception and position of the US on the international stage. Trump's trade policy towards China has exacerbated trade disputes and weakened the role of the WTO and its Decision Support System (DSS). Despite Trump's criticism of the WTO as a "disaster", analysis of the disputes between the US and China showed that the WTO DSS maintained balance and adhered to international norms, particularly regarding the definition of a "government entity" in subsidy agreements. It was proposed to reform the WTO instead of ignoring it, as marginalising the organisation could lead to more serious negative consequences for the global economy (Li & Zhang, 2022). According to A. Safavipour & H. Jalalirad (2025), the rise of nativism in the US from 60 in 2016 to 75 in 2020 led to a review of international commitments and the outbreak of a trade war with China. Policies based on realistic principles and the priority of national interests questioned the reliability of the US as a world leader and stimulated the strengthening of isolationist tendencies, which have changed the nature of international relations and reflected a shift from globalism to nationalism.

The introduction of 25% tariffs on steel and 10% on aluminium, as well as other trade barriers, caused commercial disruptions, including billions in losses for companies such as Ford and General Motors (Obukadata, 2025). Attempts to use force majeure to avoid liability for breach of contract have been met with a traditionally narrow legal interpretation, revealing the legal system's lack of adaptability to new economic challenges and sparking debate about the need to revise the concept of force majeure in the context of trade restrictions. This fact highlights the impact of geopolitical factors on legal practice and the economy. Tariff policies directed against China indirectly affected the European economy, causing disruptions in supply chains and a decline in investor confidence. At the same time, tariffs on European steel and aluminium weakened transatlantic ties and made it difficult to form a united front against Chinese trade practices. Although developing countries such as Vietnam, India and Mexico benefited from trade diversion, overall economic uncertainty caused stagnation in investment and industrial production in Europe (Stober, 2025). These processes signalled a transition to a more fragmented and competitive global economic order. Table 3 summarises the main directions of the Trump administration's foreign policy and their impact on relations with key international partners and regional blocs.

Table 3. The main actions of the Trump administration in international relations and their consequences

Country/region	The main actions of D. Trump's policy	Impact on relations
NATO	Criticism of NATO allies for insufficient funding, threats to reduce US participation	Tensions in relations with European allies are undermining trust in transatlantic relations
European Union	Tariffs on steel and aluminium, criticism of EU trade policy	Deterioration of trade relations, tensions in economic ties
China	Trade war, tariff increases, accusations of unfair trade practices	Escalation of trade and economic relations, growing tensions in bilateral relations
North Korea	Meetings with Kim Jong-un, attempts at denuclearisation	Temporary improvement in relations, but no significant changes in North Korea's nuclear policy
Iran	Withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, tightening of sanctions	Escalation of tensions, growing tensions in the region
Canada and Mexico	Revision of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	Conclusion of a new agreement (USMCA), preservation of economic ties, but with new conditions
Saudi Arabia	Support in security matters, arms sales	Strengthening relations despite criticism over human rights
Germany	Criticism of trade policy and insufficient defence funding	Escalation of tensions, particularly in the context of trade relations and security issues
India	Strengthening relations, joint efforts in the field of security	Improvement of bilateral relations, especially in the context of countering China's influence

Source: compiled by the author based on J. Oche (2025)

Table 3 demonstrates the multi-vector nature of the Trump administration's foreign policy, where each direction was accompanied by both specific decisions and tangible consequences for international relations. In the case of NATO, the main source of tension was the constant accusations by allies of insufficient defence funding and threats by the US to reduce its participation in the alliance. Particularly resonant was Trump's speech at NATO headquarters in May 2017, refusing to directly confirm the US commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on collective defence, thereby undermining the trust of European partners. Relations with the European Union deteriorated after the introduction of tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminium (10%) imports in March 2018 based on CAATSA. These steps were formally justified by national security considerations, but in fact reinforced Trump's protectionist rhetoric and prompted retaliatory measures by the EU, including counter-tariffs on American goods. The most significant episode was the trade war with China, where Washington invoked Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. In May 2019, tariffs on Chinese imports worth 200 billion USD were raised from 10% to 25%. In addition, China was accused of intellectual property theft and currency manipulation, and in May 2019, Huawei was added to the Entity List, which restricted its access to American technology. In response, Beijing imposed tariffs on American soybeans, automobiles, and other products, turning trade relations between the two countries into a series of mutual economic retaliations. In the case of North Korea, the Trump administration initiated direct meetings between leaders for the first time. At the summit in Singapore (June 2018), a joint statement was signed on the intention to achieve "complete denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula". However, the lack of specific verification mechanisms and clear deadlines made this document more symbolic. An attempt to reach a more detailed agreement in Hanoi (February 2019) failed due to differences on the issue of sanctions, which demonstrated the limitations of "face-to-face" diplomacy. In the case of Iran, the key decision was the US withdrawal on 8 May 2018 from the JCPOA nuclear agreement, which Trump called "rotten". Sanctions against Tehran were reinstated, including financial and energy restrictions (e.g., CAATSA). The result was a sharp escalation of regional tensions. In relations with Canada and Mexico, the central decision was the revision of NAFTA and the signing in 2020 of the new USMCA agreement, which retained the basic framework for trade but included provisions on the automotive industry, intellectual property and the digital economy. The policy towards Saudi Arabia remained focused on strategic benefits. The most notable example is the 110 billion USD arms deal in 2017. Even after the international scandal surrounding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, Washington did not impose tough sanctions. On the contrary, the US continued to support Riyadh in the war in Yemen, demonstrating the priority of geopolitical interests over human rights considerations. Tensions arose in relations with Germany due to Trump's harsh statements regarding Berlin's trade surplus and insufficient defence spending. Germany became one of the main targets of criticism for its dependence on Russian gas and its unwillingness to meet the "2% of GDP for defence" target. Lastly, relations with India developed in a positive direction: Trump relied on a strategic partnership to counter China. Joint military exercises were held, and cooperation in the field of defence expanded, which contributed to the strengthening of bilateral relations. Thus, Table 3 reflected Trump's policy as a combination of protectionism, unilateralism and the prioritisation of short-term strategic gains over multilateral agreements, which led to systemic tensions in US relations with most key partners, except for those countries that were substantial in containing China and Iran. The "America First" policy of Donald Trump's second administration led to a deterioration in relations with Mexico, which was reflected in stricter migration policies and the mass deportation of more than 4,000 people in January 2025. At the same time, Trump raised tariffs on imports from Mexico by 25%, which led to a reduction in bilateral trade. The US withdrawal from international agreements, including the Paris Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, reflects a protectionist and unilateral approach to foreign policy and the economy (Atmaja, 2025). Thus, the Trump administration's policies have led to a significant redistribution of power in international relations and have had a substantial impact on the global economy. On the one hand, the rise of nationalist and protectionist sentiments has contributed to increased isolationism and reduced trust among allies, while on the other hand, it has led to the fragmentation of the global trading system and a reconsideration of the role of multilateral institutions. These changes pose challenges to the stability of the global economy and require the adaptation of international cooperation mechanisms.

Discussion

An examination of the Trump administration's tariff policy revealed its dual nature: despite its stated protectionist goals, it functioned primarily as an instrument of coercive diplomacy and economic pressure. A comparison of US and Chinese economic indicators across various studies demonstrated a shift in the balance of global economic power. As A. Safavipour & H. Jalalirad (2025) argued, Trump's policy was based on the idea of the exceptional role of the US in the world and the need to actively use military and economic power to maintain global leadership. It prioritised US strategic interests over multilateral agreements, which was consistent with the "America First" approach. In contrast, "conservative American nationalism", according to S. Halaka & O. Kraiev (2024), emphasised domestic national priorities, the protection of jobs and economic sovereignty, while supporting traditional alliances only if national interests were prioritised. A comparison of these concepts showed that both ideologies served as the theoretical basis for the "America First" policy, but differed in their emphasis: the doctrine of "unique realism" emphasised the global uniqueness of the United States, while "conservative American nationalism" emphasised domestic national interests. This emphasised that the ideological basis of Trump's policy combined foreign and domestic political motives, which justified both active actions abroad and pragmatic economic policy at home. B. van Apeldoorn *et al.* (2023) noted the US's transition from liberal globalism to a neo-mercantilist model, which prioritised economic growth and technological self-sufficiency over multilateral cooperation. At the same time, A. Matin & M.E. Yawar (2025) described an approach of neo-isolationism and realism, which prioritised limited participation in global agreements and avoiding commitments that did not directly benefit the national economy. A comparison of these studies showed that both approaches led to a weakening of multilateral agreements, but for different reasons: the neo-mercantilist model through economic pragmatism and neo-mercantilism, and the neo-isolationist and realist approach through strategic self-sufficiency and risk avoidance. This demonstrated a systemic transformation of US international behaviour, with economic and security interests becoming key drivers of foreign policy change. The study demonstrated that the Trump administration's tariff policy reinforced protectionism and triggered trade wars, weakening global institutions and increasing international tensions. M. Parizek *et al.* (2025) made a similar conclusion regarding the undermining of the multilateral trading order, but the emphasis is shifted to the fact that these measures threaten the very viability of the WTO, as they violate the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment and undermine its institutional stability. The study also found that the USMCA revision reflected protectionist logic and the US's desire to reduce its trade deficit, accompanied by price increases and restrictions for partners. N. Valdez (2025), on the contrary, determined that the update of the agreement could become a platform for the creation of a separate section on semiconductors, ensuring the strengthening of US technological leadership and reducing dependence on China. This means that the Trump administration's policy on the USMCA was twofold: on the one hand, it strengthened trade barriers and created tensions for partners, and on the other, it created the prospect of using the agreement as a tool to strengthen the US's strategic and technological advantage. Despite differences in style and methods, both administrations recognise the need to adapt to a changing global landscape, where multipolarity and economic challenges require comprehensive and flexible solutions. The shift from a unilateral to a multilateral approach in Biden's policy, according to many researchers, is aimed at restoring the trust of partners and strengthening the long-term competitiveness of the United States, while Trump's policy has left consequences that still affect the structure of international relations and the economy.

Conclusions

The study achieved the set goal of conducting a comprehensive analysis of the transformations in US foreign policy during Donald Trump's presidency. The results confirmed that this period was characterised by a significant shift in foreign policy towards economic nationalism and protectionism, which manifested itself in large-scale tariff measures, sanctions policy and the revision of multilateral agreements. The introduction of tariffs on steel and aluminium in 2018 led to an increase in the domestic price of steel to 920 USD per metric tonne, which ensured short-term growth in employment in the metallurgical industry. However, the positive economic effect was partially offset by corresponding measures taken by trading partners. The Trump administration's sanctions policy was multifaceted and affected a wide range of countries and industries. It has been determined that sanctions against Iran, imposed after the withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, contributed to a sharp decline in US agricultural exports to China from 15.9 billion USD in 2017 to 5.9 billion USD in 2018. Measures previously imposed on Russia remained in place, including restrictions in the energy sector and defence industry, accompanied by growing mutual distrust and the strengthening of alternative alliances, primarily the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. In Europe, the level of distrust of the US among the population reached 67%, and among global respondents – 62%. EU countries imposed corresponding tariffs on American products worth 2 billion USD, while simultaneously increasing domestic defence budgets (average growth in NATO spending – 3.9% in 2021). Developing countries such as Vietnam, India and Mexico saw an increase in exports to the US due to the redistribution of trade flows, which was one of the few positive effects for third countries. The impact of tariff and sanctions policies on the global economy has been reflected in increased uncertainty, disruptions in global supply chains and a decline in industrial production in Europe and Asia. At the same time, the US maintained a significant advantage in services, ensuring a surplus of 296 billion USD in 2023, which partially offset the goods deficit. However, the unilateral focus on reducing the foreign trade deficit ignored the structural features of the American economy, creating long-term risks for competitiveness. The need to support and modernise multilateral institutions, including the WTO, has been confirmed, which will mitigate the negative effects of protectionist policies and enable the development of balanced tariff diplomacy instruments that minimise damage to domestic industries that depend on imports and the strengthening of international cooperation mechanisms in the context of increasing fragmentation of the global economy. A comprehensive assessment of the long-term consequences of the US-China trade war for global value chains and the development of adaptive strategies, especially for small and medium-sized economies operating in conditions of growing economic nationalism, remains a relevant area for the future.

Acknowledgements

None.

Funding

None.

Conflict of Interest

None.

References

[1] Abukari, Y., & Saluja, R. (2025). Economic nationalism vs globalization: Analyzing Trump's trade strategy. *Interdisciplinary Journal of the African Alliance for Research, Advocacy and Innovation*, 1(1), 74-92. doi: 10.64261/ijaarai.v1n1.006.

[2] Ardhana, P.F., & Daniah, R. (2023). The shifting of regional regime: Study case of renegotiation NAFTA to USMCA. *Global South Review*, 4(2), 62. doi: 10.22146/globalsouth.83345.

[3] Askari, M.U., & Mushtaq, I. (2025). The United States' free and open Indo-Pacific policy and its implications on China. *Social Sciences Spectrum*, 4(1), 531-543. doi: 10.71085/sss.04.01.236.

[4] Atmaja, S. (2025). The "America First" policy and illegal immigrants: A review of the impact on bilateral cooperation between the United States and Mexico in 2025. *Jurnal Indonesia Sosial Sains*, 6(3), 688-694. doi: 10.59141/jiss.v6i3.1626.

[5] Baydemir, R. (2025). US Middle East policy: A comparison of the Trump and Biden eras. In *Proceeding book of 3rd international conference on trends in advanced research* (pp. 57-66). Konya: ICTAR.

[6] Bimantara, A. (2019). Donald Trump's protectionist trade policy from the perspective of economic nationalism. *Journal of International Relations*, 7(2), 189-204. doi: 10.18196/hi.72132.

[7] Blecker, R.A. (2021). The rebranded NAFTA: Will the USMCA achieve the goals of the Trump administration for North American trade? *North America*, 16(2), 289-315. doi: 10.22201/cisan.24487228e.2021.2.516.

[8] Bobroske, A. (2025). US economic diplomacy. In *The new economic diplomacy* (5th ed.). London: Routledge.

[9] Cebotari, S. (2025). Donald Trump's foreign policy – impact on international relations. *Studies of the University of Moldova: Social Sciences*, 3(183), 210-221. doi: 10.59295/sum3%28183%292025_28.

[10] Chanlett-Avery, E., Manyin, M.E., Nikitin, M.B.D., Campbell, C.E., & Mackey, W. (2018). *North Korea: U.S. relations, nuclear diplomacy, and internal situation*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

[11] Dudko, I.D. (2023). Trump foreign policy course under conditions of the new world order formation. *Political Life*, 1, 62-68. doi: 10.31558/2519-2949.2023.1.8.

[12] Dueck, C. (2021). American nationalism and the future of the Trump doctrine. In S.A. Renshon & P. Suedfeld (Eds.), *The Trump doctrine and the emerging international system* (pp. 355-381). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-45050-2_14.

[13] Dumitrescu, L. (2025). "Trump's Tariffs," a reaction to the made in China 2025 strategy? Strategic capitalism, the new geoeconomy, and the competition for structural power between the United States and China. *Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 22(2), 34-49.

[14] Faraponov, V. (2024). American foreign aid as a component of us foreign policy since 1945. *Scientific Works of Interregional Academy of Personnel Management. Political Sciences and Public Management,* 2(74), 91-95. doi: 10.32689/2523-4625-2024-2%2874%29-14.

[15] Fedoniuk, S. (2025). Donald Trump's network communication through the lens of the VUCA concept. *Modern Historical and Political Issues*, 51, 147-161. doi: 10.31861/mhpi2025.51.147-161.

[16] Giovanzanti, A. (2021). *Indonesia excludes Su-35 from fighter aircraft acquisition plans*. Retrieved from https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/air/indonesia-excludes-su-35-from-fighter-aircraft-acquisition-plans.

[17] Gorrela, P.K., & Pavani, G. (2025). Sanctions, tariffs, and trade wars: The role of geopolitical tensions in global business dynamics. *International Journal of Research in Management*, 7(1), 831-836. doi: 10.33545/26648792.2025.v7.i1i.353.

[18] Gültekin, H. (2025). Sovereignty, identity and populism: Critiques of Brexit and trump in my country and building the wall. *Journal of Theatre Criticism and Dramaturgy*, 40, 90-101. doi: 10.26650/jtcd.2025.1654631.

[19] Halaka, S., & Kraiev, O. (2024). President Donald Trump's security strategy. *Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. International Relations*, 56(2), 16-19. doi: 10.17721/1728-2292.2022/2-56/16-19.

[20] Hanada, E. (2020). Trump vs. China? Tariffs under section 232 of the Trade expansion act of 1962 revisited. *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies*, 12(1), 207-251. doi: 10.2478/vjeas-2020-0008.

[21] Hogic, N. (2022). The International law and politics of the trump administration's Iran policy. *Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs*, 10(2), 59-114.

[22] Holland, K.M. (2024). International relations theory and Canada's response to the US-China strategic rivalry. In *Canada and competing Indo-Pacific visions of China and the US* (pp. 35-83). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-71785-7_2.

[23] Holland, S. (2025). *Trump orders use of CFIUS to restrict Chinese investments in strategic areas.* Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-use-cfius-restrict-chinese-investments-strategic-areas-white-house-2025-02-21/.

[24] Ilyas, M.D. (2024). America's role in a changing world: European concerns over Trump's re-election. *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 12(10), 511-536. doi: 10.4236/jss.2024.1210034.

[25] Jasmin, I.A., & Hosen, I. (2025). Trump 2.0: Redefining America's role in the global order. *Discover Global Society*, 3, article number 140. doi: 10.1007/s44282-025-00281-7.

[26] Jayadi, U., & Pratama, M.R.H.P. (2023). The influence of the United States CAATSA policy on Indonesian defense diplomacy. *Scientific Journal in the Fields of Social, Economic, Cultural, Technological, and Educational Studies*, 2(11), 3683-3696. doi: 10.54443/sibatik.v2i11.1502.

[27] Kerry, B. (2025). *US Russia sanctions under Trump: Current state of play*. Retrieved from https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-russia-sanctions-under-trump-current-state-of-play/.

[28] Khan, S. (2024). US exit from the deal and Tehran's intense proliferation interest. In *The Iran nuclear deal* (pp. 213-261). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-50196-8_10.

[29] Kim, W., & Yoon, Y.J. (2021). Trump tariffs and firm relief: Winners and losers from the steel tariff exclusion request. *Applied Economics Letters*, 28(16), 1357-1362. doi: 10.1080/13504851.2020.1817301.

[30] Kitamura, K.H. (2025). *Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962* (CRS In Focus No. IF13006). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

[31] Klomp, J. (2025). Trump tariffs and the U.S. defense industry. *PLOS One*, 20(1), article number e0313204. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0313204.

[32] Kronstadt, K.A. (2022). *India-Russia relations and implications for U.S. interests*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

[33] Li, X., & Zhang, X. (2022). Is the WTO dispute settlement system a disaster for the U.S.? An evaluation of U.S. – China WTO disputes. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 27(3), 567-584. doi: 10.1007/s11366-021-09776-x.

[34] Mahabir, R., & Ganpat, K. (2025). US foreign policy towards Venezuela and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) under president Trump. *International Relations & Regional Studies*, 59(1), 151-169. doi: 10.48371/ISMO.2025.59.1.010.

[35] Matin, A., & Yawar, M.E. (2025). Donald Trump: International economics and economic globalization (economic policy). *EuroGlobal Journal of Linguistics and Language Education*, 2(4), 4-16. doi: 10.69760/egjlle.2504001.

[36] Obasun, O.A. (2025). Strategic drift and economic coercion: Reassessing U.S. containment policy in a multipolar world. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, 9(7), 1465-1493. doi: 10.47772/IJRISS.2025.907000122.

[37] Obukadata, V.O. (2025). The economic consequences of the US-China trade war on global supply chains. *International Journal of Research Publication and Reviews*, 6(5),12851-12854. doi: 10.55248/gengpi.6.0525.1907.

[38] Palmbach, L., & Kulkarni, K.G. (2022). Investigating economic effects of 2018 steel tariff imposition in USA. *The Journal of Incisive Analysers*, 18(1). doi: 10.21844/mijia.18.1.1.

[39] Parizek, M., Weinhardt, C., & Srivastava, J. (2025). Revitalising and reforming the World Trade Organization in an age of geopolitics. *ENSURED Research Report*, 5.

[40] Pashkov, V. (2024). The Donald Trump factor and US-Ukrainian relations (2017-2020): From strategic friendship to cold partnership. *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, 22(1), 175-202. doi: 10.47459/lasr.2024.22.7.

[41] Pompeo, M.R. (2020). *The United States sanctions Turkey under CAATSA 231.* Retrieved from https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-turkey-under-caatsa-231/.

[42] Psaledakis, D. (2025). *US issues new sanctions targeting Chinese importers of Iranian oil*. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/us-issues-new-sanctions-targeting-chinese-importers-iranian-oil-2025-04-16/.

[43] Puerta Riera, M.I. (2020). Effectiveness of economic sanctions as a strategy for regime change in American foreign policy: Case of Venezuela. *Foro Cubano*, 3(23).

[44] Ramírez Ortiz, D.D. (2021). National security laws as part of U.S. Trade policy toward its North American partners. *Norteamérica*, 16(1), 93-120. doi: 10.22201/cisan.24487228e.2021.1.439.

[45] Safavipour, A., & Jalalirad, H. (2025). The philosophical underpinnings of Trump's foreign policy: Analyzing key influences and implications. *Journal of Humanities and Education Development*, 7(1). doi: 10.22161/jhed.7.1.1.

[46] Stober, E.O. (2025). *President Trump's trade war: the U.S.-China tariffs and global implications*. Retrieved from https://www.themarketforideas.com/president-trumps-trade-war-the-us-china-tariffs-and-global-implications-a1006/.

[47] Taim, A. (2024). The impact of realism on U.S. foreign policy during the Trump presidency. *Journal of International Relations*, 4(2), 14-29. doi: 10.47604/jir.2552.

[48] Todorov, I., & Todorova, N. (2025). The first 100 days of Trump's second term: U.S. foreign policy and the dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine war. *Geopolitics of Ukraine: History and Modern Times,* 1(34), 21-32. doi: 10.24144/2078-1431.2025.1%2834%29.21-32.

[49] U.S. Department of State. (2018). *Sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA).* Retrieved from https://2017-2021.state.gov/sanctions-under-section-231-of-the-countering-americas-adversaries-through-sanctions-act-of-2017-caatsa/.

[50] Valdez, N. (2025). Semiconductor investment revisited: The USMCA, Mexico, and Maquiladoras. *Boston College Law Review*, 66(4), 1485-1522. doi: 10.70167/PGBL7651.

[51] van Apeldoorn, B., Veselinovič, J., & de Graaff, N. (2023). The unmaking of open door globalism and the shift towards economic nationalism. In *Trump and the remaking of American grand strategy* (pp. 107-140). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-34692-7_6.

[52] Verma, R. (2023). India-US-Russia dynamics in the Trump era. *India Review*, 22(2), 172-183. doi: 10.1080/14736489.2023.2180920.