

Фактор націоналізму у розпаді Югославії

Анотація

Стаття присвячена аналізу відродження націоналізму та розпаду Югославії. Ця федеральна держава провокувала «культурну війну» і трансформувала балканську ідентичність. Аналіз розпаду Югославії дозволяє зробити загальний висновок щодо важливості взаємного культурного співробітництва.

Основою цього дослідження є огляд унікальної бібліографії, зібраної дослідниками, до якої належать джерела, присвячені вивченню націоналізму, культурної війни та пропаганди, конфліктів у полікультурному суспільстві. Гіпотеза дослідження полягає в тому, що існує кілька груп факторів, які впливають на розпад націоналізму в Югославії на основі питань національної ідентичності та пропаганди як методу відродження націоналізму в Югославії. Аналіз дозволяє визначити внутрішні та зовнішні фактори, що впливають на відродження націоналізму в Югославії. Суттєвим фактором розмиття полікультурної ідентичності стало відродження економічного націоналізму. В основі цих політичних подій лежить економічний націоналізм, який є доктриною, заснованою на схильностях та політиці, що надають пріоритет підтримці та розвитку вітчизняної економіки, адаптації політичних партій та систем до мінливої ситуації в ЄС, країні та суспільстві.

Ключові слова: *Югославія, націоналізм, полікультурна ідентичність, економіка*

FACTOR OF NATIONALISM IN THE BREKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA

SUMMSRY

Purpose of the study: The article is devoted to the analysis of the resurgence of nationalism and the breakup of Yugoslavia. This federal-state was breaking the "cultural war" and transformed of Balkan identity. Its collision of cultural identity in a multicultural society. These concepts and analysis of breakup of Yugoslavia allow making a general conclusion regarding the importance of reciprocal cultural cooperation.

Methodology:

The research basis of this study is an overview of the unique bibliography collected by the researchers, which includes sources devoted to the study of nationalism, cultural war and propaganda, conflicts in a multicultural society. The research hypothesis is that there are several groups of factors that affect nationalism breakup in Yugoslavia based on national identity issues and propaganda as a method to resurge nationalism in Yugoslavia.

Results: The analysis allows to specify internal and external factors that influence the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia. An essential factor in blurring multicultural identity was the revival of economic nationalism. At the heart of these political developments is economic nationalism which is the doctrine based on predispositions and policies which prioritize the maintenance and development of the domestic economy, adaptation of the political parties and systems to the changing situation in the EU, country and society.

Applications of this study: The obtained results have verified the research hypothesis. There is a set of general and particular factors that affect the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia and provoke the civil conflict in the country which resulted in the breakup of Yugoslavia based on the use of Balkan nationalism and the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia as propaganda tools.

Novelty/Originality of this study: This study highlighted the set of the factors contributing to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the primary use of informational warfare technologies based on nationalism and historical memory to provoke the events in the former republic.

Keywords: Balkan, identity, cultural war, multicultural society, nationalism, propaganda, historical memory, Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION

Of all the explosive issues that confronted Europe after the downfall of communism, nationalism proved the most intractable. When boundaries were redrawn after the upheavals of the Second World War, sizable minorities remained within the borders of many states, as the accompanying map shows. National ambitions, suppressed or permitted only cultural expression during the decades of Communist rule, quickly resurfaced in Central and Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia, as we have seen, divided peacefully in 1993 in response to Slovak pressures. Nevertheless, in Yugoslavia centuries-old national and religious tensions, kept in check under previous regimes, tore the state apart. Boundaries and names are essential as they were from the end of

the Second World War until 1990-1991. Ethnic differences in these countries made democratization and economic renewal difficult and even threatened their existence as viable states. In what was Yugoslavia, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were inextricably intermixed, about 2 million Slavic-speaking Muslims have also long-lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there are many Albanians, not Slavs and mostly Muslim in Kosovo and Macedonia.

When analyzing the discrete components of the conflict, it is evident that the informational strategies and propaganda used by the actors on both sides of the conflict played a significant role in the war, and were an effective means of shaping public opinion. One of the most unusual ways of conditioning public opinion was through the repeated invocation of "national identity", or "identity" as a whole.

In the post-Soviet academic tradition, the term "nation" and its derivative concept "national identity" has a strong "ethnic" connotation. The interpretation of the concept of "national identity" is not just limited to the political approach; it is also defined by cultural and social components which unite nation based on the ethnicity. The civil-political and ethnocultural conception of identity is more often considered in modern academic literature. Cross-cultural interactions and the convergence of close ethnicities, combined with a lack of a clear official standardization of ethnicity, has resulted in the populace of the former Yugoslavia increasingly turning towards ethnic identity as an organizational focal point. Ashmore, Doe and McLaughlin-Volpe generally define identity as an aggregate of categorical accessories, i.e. several characteristics inherent to a person, which are (or implied) also shared by a group of people (Ashmore et al., 2004).

According to Nagorna, identity is the most effective social organizer because it organically unites political, cultural, and religious spheres. Identity is a determinant of the networks that connect humans with a group, or an institution, or to an idea. Thus, the term "identity" covers a complex of different meanings, expectations, political preferences, and commitments to a particular system of the worldview (Nagorna, 2008).

There are many different types of identity, such as national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious. All of them are based on similar cultural classification criteria and often overlap and reinforce one another. The phenomenon of national identity can perform the function to construct social unity, but at the same time, national identity can be used to carry out propaganda. The core place of national identity in information warfare arises from the capacity "to effectively distil and actualize issues related to language, culture, history, and values" (Pakhomenko & Tryma, 2016). Thus, it is a powerful tool that can be used to facilitate communicational processes between social communities further, mainly if the communities have been already divided by different identity markers.

During conflict on each phase of it, national identity can serve as a propaganda tool to mark each of the opposing parties to construct a new set of socio-cultural values and preferences. The process of using national identity as a propaganda tool can result in the creation of new, alternative identities for the population.

The peculiarity of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the resurgence of nationalism in the country was based on the large-scale use of various information and propaganda

tools. Historical memory – as part of a complex set of collective representations that form national identity – was used here as an instrument of the propaganda to construct the conflict. Moreover, it is the Yugoslavia case is a shred of evidence that the media attention given to historical memory as a part of the national identity and its use to achieve utilitarian purposes is not a unique case in the modern history.

The rising popularity of the national-populist projects around the world; the crisis of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology; the return to the traditional values; and the transformation in domestic policy to seek to strengthen the importance of national, ethnic, and religious identity are the main factors influencing the ideology to find one's historical roots. N, those factors played a crucial role in the value-shaping of the conflict parties in Yugoslavia.

Recognizing the fact that historical propaganda takes an essential place in the overall context of modern society, specific questions must be addressed to determine the features of the Yugoslavian case.

Historical memory is a phenomenon of social consciousness, includes physical remains of the past, and the corresponding images, symbols, myths, rituals and historiographical representation (Nagorna, 2012). The content of historical memory does not contain much objective information about the events of the past; however, it contains the events of the past presented in a certain way according to subjective perceptions and evaluations. The subjectivity of historical memory, specifically, its role in the formation of the national identity is highlighted by Yakovenko who distinguishes a fictional image of the past and "collective experience", which united society into a coherent unit through joint "memories" of an alleged common ancestor, joint development of the conquered territory, or experiences of collective victories and defeats. (Yakovenko, 2007).

This form of social determinism of memory was first noted by Halbwachs, who introduced the notion of "frameworks of the collective memory": the society using its values, attitudes and dominant worldviews, imposes limits– what and in what way the people have to remember.

The conceptions of "politics of memory" or "historical policy" are closely correlated with historical memory, emphasizing its instrumentalist function. More so, in and of itself, the practice of ideological interference in the interpretation of historical events is as old as time. However, it has become systemic during the formation of national states and the formation of national historiography and school systems. Terminologically, conceptually, and organizationally (in the form of Institutes of National Remembrance), the politics of memory (or historical policy) was formed not so long ago, at the turn of 20th-21st centuries primarily in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, its formation of politics of memory was influenced through an ideological transformation in the region, based on the public's understanding fashioned through a recent totalitarian past (Miller and Lipman, 2012).

Therefore, historical memory, becoming an object of the policy and used in accordance with ideological and political objectives, is being transformed into mass consciousness, creating or adjusting the collective representations of the past.

Similarly, the content of historical memory consists mainly of information constructed by the stakeholders of social and political processes and used in

accordance with the moralist rhetoric. Hence, historical memory is far from rationality. Historical memory is contained in the speeches of politicians, publications, and in the general media discourse. It is also presented as a constant, monumental, and sacral heritage of society, which is obliged to protect historical memory.

As for Yugoslavia case, the use of the abovementioned tools of manipulating with historical memory and national identity also was applied to contribute to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Historians debate the leading causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Ivan Banac believes that the main reason is the historical identity of the Balkan peoples (Banac, 1990).

Brown Joel drew attention to the features of Yugoslav communism (Brown, 1993). These features, according to Mike Glenn, caused the fierce war during the breakup of Yugoslavia (Brown, 1994). John Goldfarb underlines the democratic authority of the Tito regime (Goldfarb, 1992). Ralph Dahrendorf is in solidarity with this view (Dahrendorf, 1991).

British historian Malcolm Noel points out that national problems in Kosovo (Malcolm, 1994) and Bosnia (Malcolm, 1998) have contributed to the destruction of multicultural Yugoslav society. Identity wars have provoked fierce wars in the Balkans (Ramat, 1993). Different Yugoslav identities hampered the emergence of communism (Tismaneanu, 1991). Todorov's Maria believes that the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia has complicated the formation of modern European identity in the Balkans.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The paper aims to study the nationality factor in the breakup of Yugoslavia through the analysis of the background of Balkan nationalism and the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia.

The fundamental basis of this study is an overview of the unique bibliography collected by the researchers, which includes sources devoted to the study of foreign and domestic scientists engaged in the research of this subject area. Based on the study of the classic literature and new researches as well as materials of the individual politicians, activists and contemporaries, the factors that stimulate the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia are investigated.

These features of the study of the nationalism and issues of the national identity are associated with the deep attachment of scientists to the formal-descriptive traditions of the social sciences. Such a traditional formal institutional approach justifies itself while describing institutional transformations.

The research hypothesis is that there are several general and particular factors that affect the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia and provoke the civil conflict in the country. Content analysis and benchmarking were used to work out the collected data.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Background of Balkan nationalism

The entire large area of the Balkan Peninsula in south-eastern Europe, including the once-powerful medieval kingdom of Serbia, had been conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth century and brought under Muslim rule; some parts of the area were gradually reconquered by the Habsburg. When the Ottoman Empire decayed in the nineteenth century, Serbia, after 500 years of Muslim rule, regained its status as an independent kingdom. In the late nineteenth century, it found a patron in tsarist Russia, with which it shared its Eastern Orthodox Christianity. With Russian encouragement, the Serbs agitated for an enlarged South Slav or Yugoslav state for all people speaking the Serbo-Croatian language, which is including themselves and the Croats, Slovenes and Bosnians then living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That agitation, because it became entangled with the pre-1914 alliance systems of the great powers, led to the First World War. The assassination at Sarajevo of the heir to the Austrian throne kindled the great conflagration in 1914 (Banac, 1990).

At the collapse of the Habsburg empire in 1918, Serbia, together with likeminded South Slav nationalist, proclaimed the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes' under the Serbian monarchy, which Bosnia-Herzegovina also joined. There were ethnic, religious, and historical differences and populations were mixed throughout the new kingdom. In religion the Serbs were Eastern Orthodox Christians, the Croats and Slovenes were Roman Catholic, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, many Slavs had converted to Islam during the long Ottoman domination. Nevertheless, the differences, it was thought, could be submerged in the new state, which in 1929 was officially renamed Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia was overrun and occupied by Nazi Germany during the Second World War and Croatia for a time was governed as a separate Nazi puppet state. The Yugoslavs forcefully resisted the Nazis but also fought a bitter civil war among themselves, between royalists and Communists led by Marshal Tito. The country emerged under a Communist regime headed by Tito, who in 1946 created a federal Yugoslav republic with six component republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia, there were two autonomous provinces as well. Although himself a Croat, Tito suppressed Croatian and other separatist movements as counterrevolutionary but allowed the component republics various forms of autonomy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, he recognized the Bosnian Muslims as a distinct national group, on equal standing with the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Although the Serbs and Croats together comprised over half the population of Bosnia, the Muslims, as the largest single national group, came to dominate the government (Ramet, 1993). After Tito died in 1980, separatist movements at once emerged. His successors, struggling with many other problems, including a failing economy, tried various solutions, among them a rotating federal presidency, but none worked satisfactorily. When revolutionary changes transformed Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, Yugoslavia's Communist reformers loosened the regime's authoritarian grip, and the separatist pressures exploded.

The Resurgence of Nationalism

Here, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, onetime Communist leaders, seeing power slip away because of the collapse of Communist regimes, placed themselves at the head of nationalist crusades. The Serbian onetime party leader, Slobodan Milosevic, made clear from the late 1980s on his intention to rally Serbs in every one of the Yugoslav republics to his pan-Serb cause. Alarmed by Serb militancy, Croatia and Slovenia held a referendum and in 1991 proclaimed themselves independent states. They received immediate recognition from the international community, which was persuaded by Germany that prompt recognition would forestall Serbian aggression. Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the behest of its Muslim-dominated government but over the opposition of its Serb and Croat populations, soon followed suit. The secession of the three states and their immediate international recognition infuriated Serbia (Malcolm, 1994).

War broke out in mid-1991 when Serbian armed forces proceeded to carve out enclaves in the many areas where Serbian minorities lived, claiming the need to protect fellow Serbs. Serbian guerrilla forces, supported by the Serb-controlled central Yugoslav army, took up arms against Croatia and Slovenia and seized territory in each. After several months of fighting, in which 25000 lives were lost, a cease-fire was arranged. Nevertheless, the worst violence occurred when both Serbs and Croats attempted to create enclaves for themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For years the mixed population, despite ethnic and religious differences, had lived side by side peacefully. In the war that ensued, which included a protracted siege of Sarajevo and other cities, terrible atrocities occurred on all sides. But it was Serbian military units and armed forces that were principally responsible for brutalizing the Muslim population and for acts of cruelty not seen for a generation in Europe. The savage deeds, shamelessly labelled ethnic cleansing included wholesale civilian slaughter, pillage and mass rape. A shocked world could scarcely believe such events were occurring in civilized Europe in the closing decade of the twentieth century. Religion and national fervour made for a toxic brew (Brown, 1993).

International factor in the resolution of the conflict

The international community could not agree on steps to confront the situation. Armed contingents of the UN were unable even to deliver humanitarian relief. The Security Council imposed economic sanctions against the rump state of Yugoslavia, consisting now of only Serbia and its historic ally, Montenegro; embargoed the shipment of arms (which mainly hurt the Muslims); and made plans for war crimes trials. Nevertheless, the fighting and atrocities continued. Given the historical complexity of the Balkans and the memories of earlier ferocious conflicts, neither the European powers, which might have been expected to take the lead nor the United States would intervene at an early stage with any meaningful show of force. Much later, in 1994, to end the brutal siege of Sarajevo the UN, the United States, and NATO mediated a cease-fire and committed themselves to airstrikes if it were violated. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, a diplomatic settlement was being negotiated whereby Croats and Muslims agreed to create a Croat-Muslim federation in what

remained to them of Bosnia after the Serb, who occupied two-thirds of Bosnia and a fourth of Croatia, intending to retain them.

On the other hand, the Russians were now using their influence with the Serbs to bring them to the conference table. Notwithstanding the enormous differences to be resolved, there was some hope that the fighting might end, or taper off. By 1994 200.000 were dead or missing, mostly in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991; there were about 4,4 million displaced persons. Even with some kind of negotiated settlement, grave complications were still likely in the Balkans because of ethnic and religious tensions, ties to the outside world, and the residue of hatred and mistrust.

National factor in the further development of the region

The Balkan wars of 1991-1999 intensified discussions on the role of the national factor in the further development of this region. The 1991-1995 wars (Serbo-Slovenian, Serbo-Croatian, and Serbo-Bosnian) completed the process of forming the modern Croatian and modern Slovenian nations. Even after joining the European Union (Slovenia in 2004, Croatia in 2013), Slovenes and Croats have retained a national identity based on Europeanness and a radical rejection of the Balkan syndrome (permanent interethnic wars) (Pieter Feith, 2014). In this sense, the Macedonian experience is impressive. In the early 1990s, thanks to preventive actions by the United Nations, the introduction of peacekeeping forces on the Macedonian-Serbian border in late 1992, it was possible to exclude the Republic of Macedonia from the Balkan wars. The European Union and NATO have played a positive role in promoting Macedonia's European identity. Greece, as a member of both unions, has adapted its national policy on the Macedonian issue to the needs of European security (Pal Dunay, Zdzislaw Lachowski, 2015).

Another test for the Balkan region was the pandemic. Sporadic protests against quarantine measures, which negatively affected the state of the national economy, took place in Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The European Union had to urgently allocate 3.3 billion euros to overcome the current security threats in the region (Dusan Peljic, 2020).

The military-political situation around Kosovo has not made it possible to withdraw peacekeepers for 21 years. KFOR troops remain the guarantor of regional stability (21years of KFOR, 2020).

The choice between modern nation-building and integration into supranational European and Euro-Atlantic structures remains a strategic challenge for the Balkan countries. Success in solving this problem of predominantly mono-ethnic Croatia and Slovenia has not yet become a model to follow. Objective reasons can explain this. It is still not possible to resolve, relatively speaking, the Serbian and Albanian national issues. Serbia's defeat in the Balkan wars of 1991-1999 over the creation of a "Greater Serbia" led to the country's territorial fragmentation. Former close ally Montenegro in 2006 withdrew from the "small" Yugoslavia, i.e. the union of Serbia and Montenegro. In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence. It was the Kosovo issue that put the "Albanian dilemma" on the agenda. After all, two Albanian national states have de facto emerged in the Balkans. Attempts to create a union of

Kosovo and Albania could turn the region into a whirlpool of ultra-nationalist contradictions. After all, a potential "Greater Albania" can claim not only Kosovo but also the Albanian-populated territory of the Serbian Sandzak, the Albanian territories of the Republic of Northern Macedonia and even northern Greece. Besides, the Albanian national question keeps the Serbian national question in a state of uncertainty. Serbia's political elites and people must make a strategic choice between not recognizing the existing territorial and political realities in the Balkans and European integration.

In the event of developments under the option of non-recognition of existing realities, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina may worsen. Serbian nationalist circles in this Balkan state insist on the self-determination of the Republika Srpska and its accession to Serbia. However, such a hypothetical fragmentation of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina may override the achievements of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Bosnia and Herzegovina were then formed as a confederate state of three equal national groups: Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Since then, Bosnia and Herzegovina have been the de facto Balkan protectorate of the European Union. In these circumstances, a favourable option for the integration of all Balkan countries into the EU and NATO is possible given Serbia's pragmatic choice of this path. An additional stimulus for Belgrade on this path was the Montenegrin issue. In early 2020, the Montenegrin authorities announced the creation of an autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church, separating it from the Serbian Orthodox Church. This decision once again sharpened national feelings in both Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, the question remains whether the Balkan peoples have overcome all stages of historical development in order to move from the national ideas of the nineteenth century to the modern European national identity.

The European Union has started accession negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. The success of these negotiations depends on the readiness of the EU and the ability of these Balkan states to adopt European norms and rules. During the second half of 2020, the EU plans to approve the Community budget for 2021-2027, and significant expenditures of this budget should be aimed at completing the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU.

The eventual accession of all Balkan nation-states to the European Union must finally close the "Balkan window" of the vulnerability of a united Europe. After all, nation-building in the Balkans based on ethnic nationalism sharply contradicts the purpose and current values of the process of European integration. For more than three decades, the EU has been pursuing a policy of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and economic development in the Balkans. However, the region remains vulnerable to the influence of non-European geopolitical forces: the United States, Russia, Turkey, China.

During 1991-2020, the United States made considerable efforts to help the European Union consolidate its policy in the Balkans. This region has taken an important place in the global strategy of the United States. Kosovo is home to NATO's most extensive Bond-steel base, which plays a crucial logistical role in reaching US military and political forces in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and North Africa.

Russia is trying to maintain its position in the Balkans, citing historical Slavophile sentiments. However, it cannot offer anything alternative to European integration to the Balkan states. However, Serbia is trying to use the Russian factor to blackmail the European Union and the United States. Serbia's nationalist circles see Russia as a guarantor of preventing Serbia from joining the EU and NATO. Nevertheless, Russia's limited influence in the Balkans was demonstrated in 2018, when a Russian private military company failed to carry out an anti-European coup in Montenegro. This fact proved the ineffectiveness of Russia's conservative strategy in the Balkans. For Gazprom, the region remains interesting from the security of the South Stream gas pipeline. Turkey is also interested in the operation of this gas pipeline. However, Turkish interests in the Balkans are much larger than Russia's. The retreat from the Balkans in 1900-1918 ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In the process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the sympathies of Turkey were on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. The former "core" of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans - Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia - remains a priority area of Turkish interest in the region.

At the same time, Turkey is trying to use its influence in the Balkans in its own EU accession talks. Formally, these negotiations began in February 2005 and have not yet progressed to completion. On the contrary, the destabilization of the situation in the Middle East under the influence of the events of the "Arab Spring" in 2011, and then the refugee crisis in 2015, postponed the negotiation process until better times. Under these circumstances, it seems that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is more likely to demonstrate his intention to implement a neo-Ottoman project than a European one. The transformation of Hagia Sophia into a mosque in May 2020 created another reason for tensions between Greece and Turkey. The material basis of the Greek-Turkish contradictions is the division of the gas-bearing shelf in the Aegean Sea and near Cyprus. However, under these circumstances, the Balkan vector of Turkish foreign policy has receded into the background compared to the Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan vectors.

The US's global competitor, China, has its interests in the Balkans. Beijing has been waiting for almost three decades for the end of the hot phase of the Balkan wars of 1991-1999. However, Greece's financial problems in 2008-2012 allowed the Chinese to buy several Greek seaports, which play a significant role in China's "One Belt, One Road" trading strategy. From the point of view of logistics, the Balkans are becoming an important trade route for China to the European Union. The different scenario of the tremendous Balkan geopolitical game depends mainly on the pro-European national consolidation of the Balkan peoples and the effectiveness of the European Union's strategy in the Balkans.

CONCLUSION

From 1993 to 2017 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia tried political and military leaders for a war crime, genocide and other crimes committed those wars. The six constituent republics that made up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were the Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. After the breakup, the Republic of Montenegro and Serbia formed a reduced federative state officially known until 2003

as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This state dissolved when Montenegro and Serbia each became an independent state in 2006, and while Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia in 2008.

An essential factor in blurring multicultural identity was the revival of economic nationalism. At the heart of these political developments is economic nationalism which is the doctrine based on predispositions and policies which prioritize the maintenance and development of the domestic economy. An underlying assumption of economic nationalism is that people forming a nation enclosed within the geographical borders of a state have a common interest which transcends class or other social divisions within that state and takes precedence over linkages between domestic actors and foreign ones. The crucial component of economic nationalism is that national identities should determine economic outcomes. The objective of economic nationalism is to protect home industries and agricultures from foreigners. The promotion of the interest of a nation-state can be achieved by different political forms such as one nation conservatism, autocratic politic system. The state and furthers the power of domestic economic interests. The transnational nature of many modern corporations will significantly modify the promotion of national interest within a nation-state. This collision is functional and mental moor in the process of European integration of Balkan state.

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