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ЗМІСТ/CONTENTS

K. Leshchenko

Current trends in the military-industrial integration
of the EU countries and implications for Ukraine8

К. Лещенко

Сучасні тенденції військово-промислової інтеграції країн ЄС
та наслідки для України.8

S. Stróż, Z. Kieliszek, O. Yaroshenko

European protection of Ukrainians during the martial law:
The experience of Poland22

С. Строщ, З. Келішек, О. Ярошенко

Європейський захист українців на період воєнного стану:
досвід Польщі.....22

B. Kakeshov, A. Adilov

Experience in the fight against separatism in Belgium.....33

Б. Какешов, А. Аділов

Досвід боротьби із сепаратизмом у Бельгії33

J.-K. Chung, O. Falova

The transition from the Ukrainian orthodox church of the Moscow patriarchate
to the Ukrainian orthodox church of the Kyiv patriarchate: History, causes, consequences41

Дж.-К. Чунг, О. Фальова

Перехід від Української Православної Церкви Московського Патріархату
до Української Православної Церкви Київського Патріархату: Історія, причини, наслідки41

T. Perga, Iu. Perga

Regional histories of climate mobility: Oceania49

Т. Перга, Ю. Перга

Регіональні історії кліматичної мобільності: Океанія49

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Current trends in the military-industrial integration of the EU countries and implications for Ukraine

Abstract. In the face of common security challenges, the issue of protecting civilised countries from external military aggression is of utmost importance for the entire European continent. The research aims to analyse the existing integration processes in Europe and extrapolate them to the military-industrial complex of Ukraine since the Ukrainian state is an outpost of the European Union, where the entire range of modern military technologies is used. The objectives of the study are to identify trends in the military industries of the leading European countries and to assess the prospects for their further integration in the context of the current external military aggression. The key indicators were collected and analysed using statistical and regression analysis, as well as the longitudinal method. The study provided results on the development of defence spending in individual countries, data on the participation of EU countries in joint projects, the scope of sanctions imposed on the aggressor country, indicators of Ukraine's participation in the common customs area, and the volume of military assistance from partner countries. The analysis of the data led to the conclusion that the defence capability of both Ukraine and the entire European Union has significantly improved. It was also found that the replacement of outdated Soviet standards with modern Western ones has led to a significant increase in defence capabilities. In addition, the study found that the unjustified armed aggression against Ukraine strengthened relations between the countries of the European Defence Agency and gave them an impetus to develop collective defence capabilities and conclude joint agreements involving military-industrial complexes. From a practical point of view, the obtained indicators of changes on the continent made it possible to draw conclusions about the directions of further integration and to correct the identified shortcomings

Keywords: weapons; war; weapons standards; re-equipment; defence technology; security strategy

Introduction

For centuries, the concept of common security has been one of the ideas underpinning the worldview of a united Europe. After the Second World War, in addition to purely economic and political factors, the governments and peoples of post-war Europe needed a guarantee to prevent another war and to some extent to “bind” the countries together through a series of strong economic, trade, cultural and educational relations, the breakdown of which would be a much greater loss for the participant than the potential benefits of new conquests. That is why, along with the signing of the Treaty on the European Union (EU) in Maastricht in 1992, the concept of a common foreign and security policy for the new political entity was also enshrined (Treaty No. 994_017..., 1992).

However, as of 2023, the issue of security on the European continent is more urgent than even on the eve of the Second World War, as the threat from the aggressor

country, Russia is no longer potential or possible, but real. Ukraine has managed to keep the enemy from direct aggression in the EU with great effort, but the risk of terrorist acts remains high.

Accordingly, the importance of military integration is growing. In particular, K. Kyzymenko & M. Kravchenko (2021), analysing the experience of leading European countries in ensuring efficiency in the field of military-industrial policy, concluded that for the practical implementation of security programmes, it is necessary to introduce innovative technologies in the defence sector, create special independent funds for advanced research, and introduce military innovation technological policies.

T. Kim & Yu. Ukrainets (2022) concluded that the military-industrial complexes, due to their specificity, should be artificially restrained from uncontrolled development and not turn from a deterrent into a threat. The authors

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compared the key economic indicators of several countries with the dynamics of their militarisation and called for additional control over the development of the military-industrial complex by reputable international organisations.

Participation in the European Defence Agency (EDA) is an important and relevant aspect of the mutual military-industrial integration of European countries. To O. Vojtech & K. Vojtech (2022), the urgent need to strengthen cooperation has become more acute due to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Due to the previous preparatory work towards integration with Ukraine, the EDA, as an institution that manages the level of logistics in the defence sector, promptly resumed its coordination and facilitated further cooperation between the military-industrial enterprises.

The United Kingdom, a country with centuries-old traditions of military leadership, remains an important factor in influencing the security of the EU and the entire continent even after its withdrawal from the European Union in 2020. As Yu. Stuzhuk (2022), the UK is one of Ukraine's key partners in helping to counteract aggression and taking the most steadfast, uncompromising, and unequivocal position. It was the UK that initiated the transfer of fundamentally new types of weapons to Ukraine several times, without having to coordinate such decisions with the rest of the EU after Brexit.

In addition to the purely European dimension of the issue, consideration should also be given to the impact on continental security of the world's largest defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter – NATO). K. Kulahin *et al.* (2022) in their study of the life cycles of sophisticated weapons in NATO countries found out the availability and sufficiency of the necessary prerequisites for the implementation of these technologies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – AFU) and proposed a corresponding Roadmap, considering NATO policies and standards.

A somewhat unusual, but no less important dimension of combining the standards of the defence industry of different countries is the issue of terminology. O. Kruglii (2022) studied this issue on the example of problems with the adaptation of foreign military terms into Ukrainian and formed three key principles for translating military terminology into another language: accurate translation of individual military terms; verification of each term in terms of the terminology system it is part of in the original language, as well as taking into account the differences in terms due to the specifics of each language.

At the same time, despite the extensive study of various aspects of the topic of military technology integration, there is no updated comprehensive data yet, and the study aims to fill this gap. The research aims to analyse updated indicators in such areas as defence industry financing, economic security, and economic diplomacy and to understand current trends in the development of a united Europe in the realities of a full-scale war.

Materials and Methods

Methods such as statistical analysis and forecasting were used in the study. The study also analysed the dynamics of

indicators over a certain period to identify trends, and for some indicators, the materials allowed the use of a longitudinal method, when the analysis period covered up to 17 years, from 2005 to 2021.

To understand the integration of the EU defence industries, the statistics of the European Defence Agency (2021) were used up to 2021, as the last year for which the final report was compiled. To understand the overall picture, 12 representative countries were randomly selected from four conventional EU regions – Western Europe, the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic States. These countries were analysed for such key indicators as total defence spending, total defence investment and defence spending as a percentage of GDP. The Agency's aggregate statistics were also compiled and visualised in a line graph format.

To better understand the innovation processes occurring in the EU defence structures, an empirical study was conducted and the correlation between GDP and defence spending of the studied countries was estimated using regression analysis. Also, based on the processed data, a theoretical model of integration for Ukraine was developed.

The study also examined the integration of countries in the defence sector within the European Union, where the European Cooperation Index was used to obtain the volume of agreements concluded between at least two EU member states' ministries of defence-on-defence projects.

As part of the study of the impact of the EU's military integration on Ukraine, the amount of assistance received by the country since the beginning of the full-scale military aggression was studied based on data obtained from open sources. In particular, two areas were analysed – on the one hand, financial assistance provided by partners to compensate for military expenditures and purchase necessary military equipment, and on the other hand, direct transfers of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and machinery.

For a more objective understanding of the assistance processes, statistics for the period from January 2022 to February 2023 were studied. The amount of aid transferred for each EU country was also compared with the national GDP, from which the corresponding percentage was calculated, which made it possible to perceive the support of partners not only in absolute terms but also following the actual capabilities of a particular economy. In this way, the countries whose contribution is the largest in terms of economic size were identified.

The data obtained were analysed, systematised, and compared, which allowed us to conclude the degree of military integration of Europe, the impact of the beginning of military aggression against Ukraine on this process, and changes in aid policy.

Results

To understand the participation of each EU country in the common defence policy, the contribution of each country was examined in terms of three key parameters: total direct defence spending in absolute terms (EUR); total defence investment in absolute terms (EUR); and the percentage of defence spending as a share of GDP.

To obtain objective information without having to reload data from all 27 countries of the European Defence Agency, it was decided to randomly select three representative countries from each conventional EU area. The powerful economies of Western Europe were represented by Germany, France and Belgium, the indicators of Southern Europe were assessed for Greece, Italy and

Spain, Eastern Europe was represented by the defence spending of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, and the countries of the former Soviet Union were represented by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Thus, information from 12 different economies was processed, and then the total data of the entire EDA was analysed. The data for Germany is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Key indicators of German defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	40265	42127	46936	51392	52431
Total defence investments, EUR million	4886	5373	7113	8969	9350
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.23%	1.25%	1.35%	1.53%	1.47%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

As can be seen from Table 1, total defence investment in Germany has been growing steadily and has doubled in the last five years. The same can be said for direct defence spending, although the growth rate is not as intense. As for the percentage of expenditures relative to the country's GDP, there was a slight increase in 2020, although there were no radical jumps in spending.

Accordingly, such an increase in the relative value can only be justified by a decline in GDP itself. There is every reason to believe that in 2020, this economic decline was due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but it did not affect defence spending. France's figures are slightly different from the previous ones. They are shown in detail in Table 2.

Table 2. Key indicators of French defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	40852	42748	44361	46000	47900
Total defence investments, EUR million	9873	10116	10846	12200	13300
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.78%	1.81%	1.82%	2.00%	1.93%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

Despite a slightly lower defence budget, France invests more resources in development, which is a positive sign in terms of innovation. In terms of percentage, there was also a slight increase in 2020, with an increase

in spending in euros. As for Belgium, its defence spending as a share of GDP has remained almost unchanged over the last two years of data. For more information, see Table 3.

Table 3. Key indicators of Belgium's defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	3932	4101	4303	4808	5358
Total defence investments, EUR million	263	424	471	550	920
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	0.88%	0.89%	0.90%	1.05%	1.06%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

As shown in Table 3, investments in the development of new technologies are growing at a high rate and have increased 3.5 times in the previous 5 years. At the same time, in the case of Belgium, it is also possible to observe an increase in defence spending in 2020 as a percentage of

GDP, while the absolute figure is growing, which is a common trend in developed European economies. The analysis of countries in the Southern and Mediterranean region begins with Greece. Its key defence spending indicators are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Key indicators of Greece's defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	4208	4560	4320	4837	6578
Total defence investments, EUR million	485	518	533	535	2542
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	2.38%	2.54%	2.36%	2.93%	3.60%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

Of the data shown in Table 4, the most remarkable is the significant increase in investment in the country's military-industrial complex in 2021 – after several years of almost unchanged levels. In the same year, direct defence spending also increased significantly.

Such changes are likely to be due to the intensification of the permanent Aegean conflict between Greece and Turkey, which escalated several times in 2020-2021. As for Italy, its military indicators are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Key indicators of Italy's defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	21166	21702	21143	22844	27365
Total defence investments, EUR million	4378	4152	4235	5618	5969
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.22%	1.23%	1.18%	1.38%	1.54%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

In 2021, there was a significant increase in defence spending compared to previous years, but not a significant

one. The situation is somewhat different in Spain, whose key indicators are shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Key indicators of Spain's defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	10528	11172	11281	11240	12546
Total defence investments, EUR million	2218	2545	2443	2252	2882
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	0.91%	0.93%	0.91%	1.00%	1.04%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

Based on Table 6, the percentage of GDP spent on defence declined in 2019, before the pandemic. This indicates a certain crisis in the country's economy that occurred during this period, as in absolute terms, defence spending in 2018 and 2019 was almost unchanged. The next block of countries is Eastern Europe, which in the

twentieth century was in the orbit of influence of the Soviet Union. Consequently, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact defence bloc, it was particularly difficult for these countries to transition to the European defence standard. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 7, the Czech Republic has managed to accomplish this task.

Table 7. Key indicators of Czech defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	1944	2298	2586	2809	3331
Total defence investments, EUR million	304	302	392	469	667
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.00%	1.09%	1.15%	1.30%	1.39%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

Although in absolute terms the Czech Republic still lags behind Old Europe, the percentage of defence spending as a percentage of GDP is at a decent European average. The volume of investment in defence, which

has doubled since 2017, is also worth noting. Another former socialist country, Poland, is also successfully integrating into the renewed European defence system, as shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Key indicators of Poland's defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	8821	10047	10559	11724	12765
Total defence investments, EUR million	2002	2764	2651	3436	4405
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.89%	2.02%	1.98%	2.23%	2.22%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

Particular attention is drawn to the relatively large investments in the defence sector – unlike other countries, they reach up to a third of defence spending in Poland. This is caused by the fact that during the preparation of military aggression against Ukraine in 2021, Poland, as

the country closest to the potential theatre of war, was also preparing for defence, which is reflected in the indicators. The last Eastern European country analysed, Hungary, also has its defence integration scenario. It is shown in Table 9.

Table 9. Key indicators of Hungarian defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	1516	1369	1832	2427	2591
Total defence investments, EUR million	282	174	441	1106	963
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.19%	1.01%	1.25%	1.77%	1.68%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

When analysing the data in Table 9, the relatively large investments in the development of the defence industry that took place in the country in the previous two years are the first to catch the eye.

The last block of analysis of the military integration of European countries is the former republics of the

USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), which not only managed to fully join the common European community but also demonstrated their readiness to defend their independence from the revanchism of the aggressor country. The indicators of the Estonian MIC are shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Key indicators of Estonian defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	479	514	556	615	647
Total defence investments, EUR million	95	89	81	156	185
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	2.01%	1.99%	2.01%	2.29%	2.11%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

Comparatively, the euro-denominated figures are offset by Estonia's sufficient attention to future challenges and relatively strong investment in technology and

research. The data for Latvia are shown in Table 11 and demonstrate that the percentage of GDP spent on defence has remained almost constant over the years.

Table 11. Key indicators of Latvian defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	430	613	634	651	696
Total defence investments, EUR million	65	192	154	136	204
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.59%	2.10%	2.07%	2.21%	2.12%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

According to Table 11, this Baltic country also pays sufficient attention to security investments – in 2021, the volume of investments in innovation reached more

than a third of direct defence spending. The key indicators of Lithuania's military-industrial complex are shown in Table 12.

Table 12. Key indicators of Lithuania's defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	724	895	979	1028	1105
Total defence investments, EUR million	229	331	291	362	248
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.71%	1.97%	2.00%	2.08%	2.00%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

Lithuania's indicators in Table 12 are in line with the trend shared by the other Baltic states, as the proximity to the aggressor country forces them to keep investments in defence research and development at a high level. In

general, for the 27 countries of the European Defence Association, the three key indicators of defence industry development over the previous 5 years are as follows (Table 13).

Table 13. Key indicators of EDA defence spending in the period from 2017 to 2021

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total defence spending, EUR million	164431	173516	185943	197785	214309
Total defence investments, EUR million	30601	34303	41441	43991	52247
Total defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, %.	1.29%	1.31%	1.36%	1.51%	1.52%

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

As can be seen from Table 13, the overall picture is generally in line with the trends of the individual countries studied, which means that military integration in Europe is proceeding smoothly and harmoniously. Con-

sidering the defence integration of European countries, it is important to model Ukraine's place in the continent's common security. Table 14 shows the key parameters of the countries under study.

Table 14. Key country indicators for 2021

Country	GDP-2021, million euros	Total defence expenditures in 2021, million euros
Belgium	425009	6278
Germany	3047462	61781
France	2116000	61200
Italy	1507803	33334
Greece	153715	9120
Spain	1021116	15428
Czech Republic	201577	3998
Poland	486059	17170
Hungary	130090	3554
Lithuania	47533	1353
Latvia	28510	900
Estonia	26606	832

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA (Defence data..., 2021) portal and World Bank (2021) research

To calculate the relationship between these indicators and to model Ukraine's needs, a regression analysis of the data was conducted, the results of

which are presented in Table 15. The regression visualisation as a dot plot and a trend line can be seen in Figure 1.

Table 15. Regression statistics

R multiplier	0.96646484
R-square	0.934054288
Normalized R-square	0.927459717
Standard error	6028.289456
Observations	12
Y-intersection	987.4624531
X 1 variable	0.022096383

Source: compiled by the author




Figure 1. Dependence of defence spending on GDP

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA (Defence data..., 2021) portal and World Bank (2021) research

Based on the data obtained and the analysis of the determination coefficient R^2 , which is 0.934, it is possible to assume a strong dependence between the parameters under study. With a certain margin of error, it can also be argued that the relationship between the GDP of European countries and their defence spending is calculated by formula (1):

$$U_m = 987.46 + 0.022 * GDP, \quad (1)$$

where: U_m – the amount of recommended investment in the defence industry, and GDP is the gross domestic

product of the state. According to this model, to be in line with the European average, Ukraine's defence spending in 2021 should be (2):

$$U_m = 987.46 + 0.022 * 143279 = 4153 \text{ million euros.} \quad (2)$$

This calculation approach is relevant for peacetime, so it should be used as a benchmark after the victory. For better visualisation, the theoretical model of Ukraine's integration into the European military-industrial complex can be presented in the form of a flowchart (Fig. 2).




Figure 2. A theoretical model of Ukraine's military integration

Source: compiled by the author

Defence research and development is also an important overall indicator of development and integration. In 2021, the European community allocated more than €3.5 billion to defence research and technology (R&T), a new record. Compared to the historic low of 2016, defence R&D spending has almost tripled. See Figure 3 for more information on the entire period of research.

However, the most telling indicator of the integration of the European defence industry is joint contracts for the purchase of defence equipment. In 2021, this figure reached a powerful €8 billion, as can be seen in Figure 4.

The graph in Figure 4 is highly non-linear, reflecting how a period of interest in joint projects in the mid-2000s gave way to a period of disbelief in the need for a common

defence policy in 2013. However, after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the threat became real, and Europe began to prepare for a joint response to the aggressor. This integration has been given a special impetus by the enemy's apparent preparations for aggression in 2021, which is also reflected in the timeline.

An analysis of the dynamics of the EU's defence spending in 2022, after the outbreak of full-scale aggression, could be very revealing, but as of 2023, these figures have not yet been processed and systematised.

Nevertheless, the Annual Report provides general information on the strengthening of the organisation's position in 2022. In particular, it announced a paradigm shift in security and defence in Europe and an increase

in defence spending by member states (EDA annual report, 2022). In total, in 2022, the Agency managed 97 joint special projects and programmes in areas such as research and training with a total estimated value of €672 million. Also in November 2022, Defence Ministers launched a new EDA project, the Military Computer Emergency Response Network (MICNET), which will

significantly enhance EU defence cooperation in cyberspace. Another important event in terms of European defence integration was the strengthening of the coordination of the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force project, which is responsible for the rapid replenishment of weapons stocks, including for Ukraine (European defence in..., 2023).




Figure 3. Total spending by EDA member countries on defence research and technology

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)




Figure 4. Budgets of joint EU contracts for the purchase of military products

Source: compiled by the author based on EDA portal research (Defence data..., 2021)

In addition to purely military and defence measures, economic diplomacy plays an important role in the integration of countries, as it helps to find a compromise faster and preserve the financial interests of the parties to the maximum extent possible. It is through economic diplomacy that states manage to make foreign markets more receptive to their products and reduce the influence of competitors.

At the same time, such diplomacy has another aspect: if a member of the community violates the rules of peaceful coexistence, it is possible to activate sanctions mechanisms and deprive the aggressor of certain goods or technologies. In particular, since the beginning of full-scale military operations by Russia, 11 packages of economic sanctions have been applied to the aggressor country in

the banking, defence, energy sectors, etc. In addition to sectoral restrictions, sanctions were imposed on specific companies and organisations.

Along with such a powerful lever as economic diplomacy, it is worth considering the impact of economic security. In general, economic security is a guarantee of the existence of economic sovereignty and national security of a country, as well as a guarantee of sustainable development of citizens, but in the context of military aggression, this concept takes on more fundamental features. While economic security is manifested in the form of an embargo concerning the aggressor country, for partner countries, on the contrary, it is a source of additional integration processes. In particular, on 1 October 2022, Ukraine joined the NCTS Common European Transit

Regime (the so-called “customs visa-free regime”), which greatly simplifies the transport of goods on the continent and works on the principle of one transport – one declaration – one guarantee. According to the official portal of the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (“Customs visa-free”..., 2023), 4474 declarations were issued under this project in just 7 months, including 3276 for departure from Ukraine and 1198 for receipt by Ukraine. Another dimension of European defence and industrial integration is military

assistance to Ukraine, especially after the start of the large-scale invasion in February 2022. This assistance should be viewed in two ways: a) financing the Ukrainian defence industry and providing it with funds to purchase weapons and ammunition from private entities, and b) centralised in-kind transfers of weapons and military equipment on behalf of states. The total military and financial assistance to Ukraine from European countries in the period from January 2022 to February 2023 is shown in Table 16.

Table 16. Total military and financial assistance to Ukraine from European countries

Country	Financial assistance, billion euros	Military assistance, billion euros	Total, billion euros
Germany	1.30	3.57	4.87
Poland	0.93	2.42	3.36
Great Britain	2.94	6.63	0.58
Netherlands	0.99	2.36	3.35
Czech Republic	-	0.57	0.57
France	0.70	0.65	1.35
Spain	0.35	0.32	0.67
Norway	0.96	1.26	2.22
Italy	0.31	0.66	0.97
Sweden	0.17	1.13	1.30
Austria	0.04	-	0.04
Switzerland	0.06	-	0.06
Denmark	0.06	0.80	0.86
Romania	-	-	0.00
Belgium	0.01	0.24	0.25
Finland	0.08	0.77	0.85
Bulgaria	-	0.24	0.24
Slovakia	-	0.21	0.21
Lithuania	0.02	0.41	0.43
Portugal	0.25	0.07	0.32
Ireland	0.03	-	0.03
Latvia	0.02	0.37	0.39
Estonia	-	0.31	0.31
Greece	-	0.19	0.19
Croatia	-	0.12	0.12
Luxemburg	-	0.09	0.09
Slovenia	-	0.06	0.06
Total	9.23	23.45	32.68

Source: compiled by the author based on Kiel Institute of World Economics portal data (Ukraine support tracker, 2023)

To better understand the contribution of each partner to the common security on the continent through military support to Ukraine, two separate line charts were created – one for financial (Fig. 5) and one for military (Fig. 6) assistance. The sequence of countries was ranked according to the absolute amount of their contributions.

According to the graph above, the leading donors of military aid to Ukraine are the United Kingdom and Germany, while the contribution of, for example, Lithuania and Latvia is almost invisible. However, such an assessment is not completely objective, as the size of the economy of the country that shares the aid should also be considered. Accordingly, Figure 7 shows the ranking of

countries by the share of their GDP that they were able to help Ukraine defend itself against the aggressor country of Russia.

After analysing the available data, it appears that the contribution of the Baltic states is much greater than it seems at first glance, as they have donated about one per cent of their GDP to Ukraine's defence. Even though these amounts are not very large in absolute terms compared to such giants of the European economy as Germany and the UK, the Baltic states' assistance should be valued the most, as their investment in the security of their neighbouring country is almost identical to the cost of defending their own country.




Figure 5. Financial assistance from European countries for Ukraine's military needs, billion euros

Source: compiled by the author based on Kiel Institute of World Economics portal data (Ukraine support tracker, 2023)




Figure 6. European military assistance to Ukraine with weapons and equipment, billion euros

Source: compiled by the author based on Kiel Institute of World Economics portal data (Ukraine support tracker, 2023)




Figure 7. Military aid to Ukraine from European countries, % of GDP

Source: compiled by the author based on Kiel Institute of World Economics portal data (Ukraine support tracker, 2023)

Thus, the integration of the military complexes of European countries – at the level of technology, standards, and knowledge exchange – is quite high. The armed aggression against Ukraine gave an additional impetus to this integration, forcing the EU to unite more closely in the face of a common challenge.

It is worth mentioning an additional advantage of joint continental defence, such as the standardisation of weapons. Although many developed countries in Europe have their production of, for example, tanks, the many years of joint work on security policy have led to the fact that all major tank models have a single and interchangeable standard of shells, which means that different national defence industries can produce them in the same format without fear of logistical problems. In practice, this has helped Ukraine, while receiving assistance from different countries, not to be distracted by additional control over the flow of equipment and ammunition.

Discussion

When analysing the results of this study, it is worth paying attention to previous works on assessing the integration of the European military-industrial complex, as this issue has been studied before. According to the observations of B. Martins & J. Mawdsley (2021), back in the 1970s, the continent developed a common view of collective security, which, on the one hand, was driven by transatlantic military competition with the United States, and on the

other hand, was a guarantor of innovation in the civilian sphere. This idea was translated into a project of the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2017, which manages joint defence-industrial projects and supports military research in the EU in an autonomous manner. Accordingly, the authors argued that independent technologies and innovations play a key role in the EU's vision of its secure future, which was reflected in such 2020 documents as the updated cybersecurity strategy and the EU digitalisation strategy.

In 2020, J. Shea (2020), analysing Brexit in terms of changing security balances, stressed that it is in the pragmatic mutual interest of the EU and the UK to find ways to continue working together in the field of security and defence, as the UK's exit from the EU in 2020 looked like an institutional crisis and a blow to collective security. However, as demonstrated in this paper, such a "split", on the contrary, has led to increased security for the UK, its neighbours, and Ukraine, as the UK has lost its obligations to coordinate its actions collectively and gained greater manoeuvrability and independence, including in terms of transferring its weapons to other countries.

With the outbreak of full-scale military aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, theoretical issues of military integration within Europe received a new impetus and moved into the practical plane. P. Genschel *et al.* (2023) examined the EU's institutional development through the prism of the outbreak of war and identified two main conditions for military integration: the "functional"

condition refers to increasing the efficiency of centralisation (no federation without functional benefits), and the “political” condition refers to the forced alignment of interests and identities (no federation without public support). After assessing the realities of the first months of the war in Ukraine, they concluded that a temporary “stress” decentralisation of the European military alliance was necessary.

A similar dynamic of public opinion reactions to the invasion – from despair at the beginning to confidence over time – was noted by O. Fernández *et al.* (2023), who examined the sentiments of news sources, reflecting the widely accepted link between media coverage and public opinion. The authors conclude that the EU’s contributions to security and defence are increasingly perceived favourably by the public and suggest that “mass politicisation” in this area could improve the prospects for European defence integration. Another indicator of the “initial shock” caused by the attack on Ukraine in 2022 is a survey conducted among EU students by N. Steiner *et al.* (2023). It was a coincidence that the research team received some of the respondents’ answers before 22 February, and the rest shortly after. After analysing the answers to the same questions regarding deeper integration within the EU, the authors came up with a clear result: the outbreak of war in Europe increased students’ interest in EU policies and strengthened their commitment to common values. A similar surge in awareness and rethinking in the spring of 2022, but on the part of institutions, was identified in the current study.

A crisis of this magnitude, such as military aggression, affected not only citizens but also the political elite of European countries. Germany, which had been pursuing an emphatically inactive military policy after the Second World War, was forced to break the usual order. V. Handl *et al.* (2023) studied the impact of Chancellor O. Scholz’s declaration of full-scale war a few days after the outbreak of the war and found that Germany was ready to take a leading role in the defence of Europe, despite its guilt complex. The increase in military assistance noted in the current paper is a confirmation of the new Zeitenwende policy and a significant contribution to the military integration of the continent.

O. Ditrych & T. Kucera (2022) also devoted their study to the general situation with the balance of power in Europe and the world. Their analysis shows that economic rather than political factors remain the key driver of defence integration, as traced by social network analysis (SNA), and for a long time, before the emergence of formal institutions, they ensured European military balances.

The topic of economic sanctions against the aggressor, mentioned in this study, was also studied by A. Gaur *et al.* (2023). Their conclusion at this stage is the lack of effectiveness and the need for greater control over sanctions circumvention. Another topic that was investigated in this paper in the context of economic integration – “customs visa-free travel” – was studied by D.T. Ünal (2023). Having analysed the effect of the introduction of electronic customs using the method of fuzzy analytical hierarchy, he concluded that the most important factor in the NCTS system is the time factor.

Discussing European security, NATO cannot be ignored, as the North Atlantic Alliance is the most powerful defence bloc in the world. Accordingly, European policy-makers need to constantly maintain a balance between pursuing their interests and working together as a team with the defence industries of the United States, Canada, and Turkey. L. Ratti and A. Leonardi (2023) traced the relationship between NATO and European defence cooperation from the end of World War II to the beginning of the war in Ukraine and noted that while Western European defence initiatives during the Cold War were aimed at securing US support, in the twenty-first century the Alliance began to lose its role. Paradoxically, it was the war in Ukraine that drove NATO’s expansion and strengthening. The expansion of the defence capabilities of European countries, which has been documented in this paper, also illustrates this observation.

At the same time, the impact on a country after joining NATO is not only in the military sphere – according to A. Mayberry (2022), even obtaining a Membership Action Plan (MAP) has a positive impact on the country’s economic situation. Bypassing the methodological difficulties caused by the heterogeneity of countries, the author proved that in each of the NATO countries, without North Atlantic defence integration, per capita income would be, on average, about 15% lower than it is now. Given the prospects of Ukraine’s membership, which follows from the results of this paper, this statement is a relevant additional argument.

R. Alcaro (2022) suggests considering the current crisis in European security from the perspective of new opportunities. After analysing the state of EU defence integration and how supranational and intergovernmental institutions have responded to the current crisis, the author concludes that EU countries have received an additional incentive to further military and economic integration to jointly counter the economic consequences of the war, finance Ukraine’s reconstruction and support the enlargement process.

However, the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the future of the continent remains unpredictable. The more casualties the aggressor suffers on the battlefield, the more conventional weapons it loses, and the more often concerns are raised about the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Having examined this possibility, A. Bollfrass & S. Herzog (2022), M. Smetana & M. Onderco (2023) state that a hypothetical victory of the aggressor would advertise the coercive power of nuclear weapons and the vulnerability of non-nuclear-weapon states, which would significantly affect military integration within the EU. Accordingly, the strengthening of integration processes reflected in the results of this paper aimed at preventing the aggressor’s victory gains additional motivation.

Conclusions

The idea of a united Europe, known since the Middle Ages, is being finalised in the twenty-first century with the creation of the EU as a new full-fledged subject of international relations. Although with the development of technology, each country and each nation have more opportunities

to exist autonomously, only by combining their efforts and resources, using the mental characteristics of different peoples, will the European continent be able to achieve sustainable development. A special aspect of such an association is common security. This study has shown that each European country makes its contribution to the development of a common defence system.

Every year not only are the overall budgets for military needs increasing but also investments in the development of innovative products that also strengthen common European security. Another important indicator of military integration is the volume of contracts concluded jointly by the Ministries of Defence. In 2021, it reached a record high, almost tripling the value of 2013.

Back in the early 2000s, new armed aggression on the continent was considered impossible, and the activities of European defence structures became more formal over the years, with budgeting for these needs based on the final principle. However, the annexation of territories in the heart of

Europe in 2014 demonstrated the reality of war, and before the outbreak of full-scale aggression in 2022, the European Defence Agency managed to regain its potential and strengthen the military integration of its member states.

Another marker of the increased interaction of European defence complexes is assistance to Ukraine. This study has provided convincing evidence of strong support, both in terms of financing military needs and in terms of the transfer of modern weapons, equipment, and ammunition.

It would be even more informative to understand the coordination of military assistance to Ukraine between Europe, the United States and Canada. Such a study could form the basis for further work on military integration.

Acknowledgements

None.

Conflict of Interest

None.

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Сучасні тенденції військово-промислової інтеграції країн ЄС та наслідки для України

Анотація. У час спільних безпекових викликів, для усього європейського континенту найактуальнішим постає питання захисту цивілізованих країн від зовнішньої військової агресії. Мета роботи – проаналізувати існуючі інтеграційні процеси в Європі та екстраполювати їх на військово-промисловий комплекс України, оскільки саме вона зараз є аванпостом Євросоюзу, де використовується весь спектр сучасних військових технологій. Завданнями дослідження, у свою чергу, є визначення тенденцій, що відбувались у військовій промисловості передових країн Європи, та оцінка перспектив їх подальшої інтеграції у контексті наявної зовнішньої військової агресії. За допомогою методів статистичного та регресивного аналізу, а також лонгitudного метода були зібрані та проаналізовані ключові показники. У процесі дослідження були отримані результати щодо розвитку оборонних витрат окремих країн, дані щодо участі країн ЄС у спільних проектах, обсяг санкцій, застосованих до країни-агресора, показники участі України у спільному митному просторі, а також обсяги військової допомоги від країн-партнерів. Аналіз отриманих даних привів до висновків про суттєве покращення обороноздатності як України, так і усього Європейського Союзу. Також було виявлено, що заміна застарілих радянських стандартів на сучасні західні призвели до суттєвого збільшення оборонного потенціалу. Крім того, у процесі дослідження вдалося з'ясувати, що невинуватна збройна агресія проти України зміцнила відносини і між країнами Європейського оборонного агентства та дала їм поштовх щодо розвитку колективних оборонних спроможностей та укладення спільних угод за участю військово-промислових комплексів. З практичної точки зору, отримані індикатори змін на континенті дали змогу зробити висновки щодо напрямків подальшої інтеграції, а також виправити виявлені недоліки

Ключові слова: зброя; війна; стандарти озброєння; переоснащення; оборонні технології; безпекова стратегія

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European protection of Ukrainians during the martial law: The experience of Poland

Abstract. The relevance of the study is due to the need to find ways to improve the temporary protection of Ukrainians in Europe during the hostilities in Ukraine. The purpose of the work is to analyze the norms of European legislation on the protection of Ukrainians and identify directions of improvement. The following methods make a basis of methodological approach: analysis of statistical data; comparison method; graphic method; generalization method. It was identified the countries of Europe to which more people applied for protection during the war in Ukraine. Shortcomings in the Polish legislation on the organization of temporary protection were revealed; in particular, in terms of confirming the registration of the place of Ukrainians' stay, which allows them to move within Europe. It was made an assessment of ensuring the rights to temporary protection for Ukrainians, in particular, the employment and residence, and the feasibility and benefits of changes in Polish legislation that provide for optimization of assistance for displaced persons. According to the Polish citizens' results of assessment of the support level for Ukrainians, it has been revealed a tendency of decline of support due to an increase in the violation of rules of conduct by Ukrainians. Directions for improving the organization of temporary protection of Ukrainians in Poland are outlined, which consist in stimulating immigrants to learn the Polish language and get a more qualified job. It is proposed to strengthen the Polish authorities' control over the receipt of social assistance by displaced persons, to prevent the misuse of such assistance and to direct it to the necessary needs for health, education and full life of people under temporary protection in Europe. The results and conclusions are of practical importance for the authorities in the EU countries when improving the policy of temporary protection of migrants and the heads of migration and social services – when assigning social benefits

Keywords: displaced persons; the right to employment; social assistance; confirmation of registered status; European legislation

Introduction

The start of a full-scale military invasion by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022 forced a large number of Ukrainians to leave their homes due to dangers to their lives and health and go to other countries that can guarantee

protection for their families, especially children. The vast majority of people in search of a safe place migrated to the countries of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU); due to this Europe has faced an important issue

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regarding the acceptance of migrants and provision them with necessary protection that guarantees the observance of human rights and freedoms. Given the fact that migration of the population from Ukraine in 2022 turned out to be the largest one since the Second World War in terms of volume, the Governments of the EU countries faced the task of normative regulation of temporary protection for Ukrainians, providing them with all necessary for life and maintaining health (Vishnevskaya & Petrenko, 2022). This actualized the need for scientific study of the process of providing temporary protection for Ukrainians in European countries in order to develop a proposal for its improvement, considering the interests and capabilities of European countries and the real needs of temporary migrants.

Due to the fact that aggravation of the problem under study has occurred only at the beginning of 2022, the number of studies in this area is insignificant; however, Ukrainian and Polish scientists from other countries paid attention to the issue of protecting Ukrainians in Europe.

The Ukrainian scientist T. Drakohrust (2022) considered the problem of availability of documentary evidence of persons crossing the European border. The author emphasizes that documents are important for further provision of temporary protection to people and he recommends resolving this task by means of issuing such documents immediately at the border that such persons cross.

A. Sokar *et al.* (2022) carried out a study of adaptation of Ukrainians seeking protection in the EU countries. The authors described the package of social assistance for such persons; she conducted a comparative analysis of the Ukrainian and international legislation on the protection of refugees, and noted the importance of restoring the psychological state of persons displaced from Ukraine.

In addition, in the work by I. Gerlach & O. Ryndzak (2022), it is reflected a comparison of the standards for providing temporary protection to displaced persons in the EU countries. Author notes the possibility of negative consequences for the economy of Ukraine from the mass movement of citizens abroad. The author emphasizes that the following moments will be of great importance: the duration of hostilities, the state of economy and the effectiveness of reforms for its post-war recovery; she also offers incentives for the return of citizens to Ukraine.

S. Chorna (2022) noted the existence of danger of the migration phenomenon both in Ukraine and in the host countries. The author emphasized an increase in the financial burden on the economic security of the EU countries.

Noting the legal norms that regulate the provision of protection for Ukrainians in the European countries, it is necessary to separate two types of protection, which are considered in the work by A. Gachkevich (2022). The first one is the legal status of a refugee, which can be obtained by persons who have moved to the EU from any country because of danger to their life. The second one is temporary protection for displaced persons, which has been introduced for Ukrainians. The author describes this issue through the concept of “double standards”, which are manifested in the EU policy regarding asylum seekers and protection from different countries.

Regarding the legislation that regulates the provision of temporary protection for Ukrainians, the Italian scientist D. Vitiello (2022) conducted the study and pointed out the inconsistency of legislation of the long-term non-enforcement. Analyzing the significance of refugee status, the author explored the impact of current situation on the eastern borders of Europe on the ability of EU countries to provide shelter to refugees.

However, despite previous studies of this issue, the problem of providing protection for citizens of Ukraine in Europe, determination of necessary needs and normative regulation of such protection requires further study.

The main goal of this scientific work is to analyze the migration flow from Ukraine to the EU countries during the period of hostilities in Ukraine and the norms of European legislation on providing temporary protection in Europe for displaced persons from Ukraine. The aim of the study is to assess the provision of rights guaranteed by the procedure of temporary protection in the EU, in particular on the example of Poland; and the level of support by Polish citizens for the provision of temporary protection to Ukrainians, as well as the provision of proposals for improving the procedures for protecting Ukrainians.

Materials and Methods

This is a basis of methodological approach in this work: combination of the method of statistical data analysis, the method of comparison, the graphical method and the method of generalization.

The scientific study provides for the analysis of application of the legislation on providing temporary protection, the identification of shortcomings for Ukrainians who receive temporary protection in Europe and the identification of directions for its improvement in order to ensure conditions necessary for the life and health of people who are fleeing the war.

The theoretical basis of this research work is based on the work of Ukrainian, Polish, American, Dutch, Finnish and German scientists, as well as scientists from other countries of Europe and world, who have considered the problem of providing temporary protection status to persons displaced from Ukraine to Europe due to the hostilities in Ukraine.

The use of the method of statistical data analysis made it possible to study the volume of displaced persons from Ukraine to Europe who took part in the national programs of temporary protection and support, and their distribution between the countries based on information received from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter – UNHCR UN) (Refugees from Ukraine..., 2023).

The study of content of the norms of legislation on providing temporary protection in European countries to displaced persons who left Ukraine due to hostilities was carried out based on the Directive on temporary protection No. 2001/55/EC of July 20, 2001 (hereinafter – Directive 2001/55/EC) (Council Implementing Decision..., 2022), and the EU Council Implementing Decision No. 2022/382 of 4 March, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the Implementing Decision) (Council Directive..., 2001), which activated the provision of mentioned Directive 2001/55/EC.

Analysis of the Polish legislation (that regulates the establishment of duration of stay of temporarily displaced persons in Poland, providing them with rights to housing, employment, medical services, etc.) was carried out on the basis of norms of the Polish Law “On Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens in Connection with the Armed Conflict on the Territory of the Country of Ukraine” adopted on March 12, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the Law on Assistance) (Law of the Republic..., 2022). The use of method of comparison made it possible to compare the number of persons displaced from Ukraine to Poland during the period from April 2022 to February 2023 based on the UNHCR data. The study of the volume of expenditures from the state budget of Poland aimed at the education and medical care of Ukrainians who received temporary protection in Poland was carried out on the basis of data from the National Bank of Ukraine (Impact of Ukrainian..., 2022). Analysis of the number of employed Ukrainians in Poland with their distribution by occupation was carried out on the basis of data from the EWL migration platform (Employees from Ukraine..., 2022).

Using the graphical method, the following data are reflected in the form of graphs and diagrams: the number of displaced persons from Ukraine to European countries as of January 2023; dynamics of changes in the number of Ukrainians registered for temporary protection in Poland from April 2022 to February 2023; change in the level of support by Polish citizens for Ukrainians who have applied for temporary asylum during March–November 2022.

The use of method of generalization made it possible to summarize the results obtained in the course of the study of the volume of Ukrainian migration to Europe and the application of status of temporary protection for Ukrainians who arrived in Europe after the start of hostilities in Ukraine. In addition, using the above-mentioned method, it has been formulated the conclusions that are the final display of these results.

Results

Starting from February 24, 2022, when the Russian Federation launched an armed aggression against Ukraine, many residents of the country (mostly women and children) fleeing from the rocket attacks and escaping the occupation of enemy decided to travel to European countries in order to receive protection. In this regard, the EU countries opened the borders for Ukrainians fleeing the military events.

As of the beginning of March 2022, according to the forecasts of the European Commission, it was expected that the number of Ukrainians who would seek protection in the EU countries would amount from 2.5 million people to 6.5 million people (Council Directive..., 2001). However, in fact, during February–November 2022, more than 17 million people left Ukraine, and about 9 million of them returned home (Refugees from Ukraine..., 2023).

In order to resolve the issue of international protection of foreign citizens in Europe, it was adopted the Directive 2001/55/EC (Council Implementing Decision ..., 2022) in 2001; however, its provision was put into effect

(i.e. activated) only by the Implementing Decision (Council Directive..., 2001). Temporary protection (within the meaning of the Directive 2001/55/EC) is a procedure for providing immediate protection in case of a mass influx of displaced persons from other countries who are unable to return to their country of origin.

According to the Implementing Decision, temporary protection for Ukrainians was provided for a period of 1 year with the condition of automatic prolongation for the next year, depending on the situation in Ukraine (Council Directive..., 2001).

In October 2022, the temporary protection for Ukrainians in the EU was prolonged until March 2024 by the decision of the Ministers of Internal Affairs of the EU Member States (The European Union extends..., 2022).

The temporary protection procedure does not mean the provision of refugee status to the persons displaced from another country. At the same time, persons who have received the temporary protection in the EU have the right to submit documents for refugee status at any time.

Among the list of basic rights provided to citizens of Ukraine in the EU in case of registration of temporary protection, there are residence permit for the period of temporary protection; official employment; education for children and teenagers; provision of housing; access to social security and health care; opportunity to obtain refugee status or return to the country of citizenship. As of 02/07/2023, according to the UNHCR in Europe, about 4.8 million internally displaced persons (which is about 1% of the population of the EU countries) are participating in the programs of national temporary protection and support in other countries (Refugees from Ukraine..., 2023).

The distribution of people displaced from Ukraine across the European countries (registered under the temporary protection program) allows analyzing which countries have received the most part of such people (Fig. 1) (Refugees from Ukraine..., 2023).

Data in the Figure 1 show that since the beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, Poland (32.2%), Germany (21.3%) and the Czech Republic (9.9%) received the most Ukrainians from the total number of persons registered for temporary protection (Refugees from Ukraine..., 2023).

Analysis of the provision of temporary protection for Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war should be carried out on the example of Poland, which received the largest number of Ukrainians. During the period from April 2022 to February 2023, the number of registered Ukrainians for temporary protection in Poland gradually increased (Fig. 2) (Refugees from Ukraine..., 2023).

As it can be seen from the Figure 2, the number of Ukrainians (who expressed a desire to ask for temporary protection in Poland during the war) increased by 47% during the analyzed period (Refugees from Ukraine..., 2023). This indicates a high level of Ukrainians' trust in Poland as a country, which can guarantee their protection. In November 2022, the number of Ukrainians who received temporary protection in Poland began to grow due to the intensification of Russia's terrorist aggression against Ukraine's critical infrastructure.




Figure 1. Number of persons displaced from Ukraine to the European countries as of January 2023

Source: compiled on the basis of data (refugees from Ukraine..., 2023)




Figure 2. Dynamics of the number of Ukrainians registered for temporary protection in Poland from April 2022 to February 2023

Source: compiled on the basis of data (refugees from Ukraine..., 2023)

In Poland, the Law on Assistance is the main regulatory document regulating the provision of the right to citizens of Ukraine to temporary protection. As for the normative regulation of the issue of providing citizens of

Ukraine with the right to temporary protection and issuing a document confirming it, the chronology of events regulating this in the legislation can be considered in the Table 1 (Law of the Republic..., 2022; Jablonska-Bonsa, 2022).

Table 1. Regulatory support for determining the terms of temporary protection of Ukrainians in Poland and obtaining documents confirming such status

Date	Document (event)	Basic provisions
12.03.2022	Law is adopted	1. The stay of citizens of Ukraine in Poland for 18 months, starting from February 24, 2022, is considered legal if such citizens: a) legally entered the territory of Poland after February 24, 2022, and b) declare their intention to stay in Poland. 2. Registration of persons no later than 60 days from the date of entry into the territory of Poland and obtaining a PESEL number (in Polish Powszechny Elektroniczny System Ewidencji Ludności) with a UKR mark. 3. Obtaining PESEL numbers is necessary to exercise the right to health care, education, social security, etc. However, registration for PESEL is not mandatory. At the same time, it was not supposed to issue a certificate confirming the status of a registered person.
12.07.2022	The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration has submitted an application to the European Commission for obtaining a temporary document Diia.pl, which will confirm the legality of stay of Ukrainians in Poland. A similar message was sent simultaneously to the EU member states and associated countries of the Schengen area	From July 23, 2022, the presence of the Diia.pl electronic document, together with a valid identity document in the mobile application of a citizen of Ukraine gives the right to cross the borders of Poland, the EU and move within the Schengen zone for 90 days during each 180-day period.
25.01.2023	Amendments to the Law on Assistance	1. Mandatory receipt of PESEL has been introduced and the registration period for PESEL has been reduced to 30 days. The termination of social payments to citizens of Ukraine temporarily leaving the territory of Poland has been introduced. If such an absence exceeds 30 days, a citizen of Ukraine loses the status and right to social assistance. 2. The changes introduced guarantee the legal stay in Poland for citizens of Ukraine from February 24, 2022 to August 24, 2023.

Source: compiled on the basis of data (Law of the Republic..., 2022; Jablonska-Bonsa, 2022)

As it can be seen from the Table 1, since the beginning of March 2022, the Law on Assistance (Law of the Republic..., 2022) did not provide for issuance of documents to registered citizens of Ukraine confirming the status of temporary protection and provision of the right to move throughout Europe. However, later, in July 2022, the electronic document "Diia.pl" has been introduced, which confirms the status of a person registered for temporary protection and gives the right to move within the Schengen area, including crossing the borders of Poland (Jablonska-Bonsa, 2022).

It should be noted the following: the absence of a norm in Polish legislation in the first half of 2022 regulating the EU countries to provide Ukrainians (who have received temporary protection) with documents confirming this status created certain difficulties for such Ukrainians. Thus, according to the Directive 2001/55/EC, the European countries are required to provide persons (using temporary protection) with an appropriate document that confirms their rights throughout Europe (except for states that did not participate in the adoption of the Directive 2001/55/EC) (Council Implementing Decision..., 2022).

In addition, among the rules established in the Directive 2001/55/EC and the Implementing Decision (Council Directive..., 2001; Council Implementing Decision...,

2022) on crossing the border by Ukrainians who have received temporary protection, there are:

- ◆ persons displaced from Ukraine should get the right to go to the EU country they have chosen to register for temporary protection. In this case, after entering the country, there is a 90-day period of free movement introduced for Ukrainian citizens in 2017;

- ◆ in case of receiving a document confirming the right to temporary protection in the country (to which the displaced person has applied), the rule of 90-day period of stay in the EU disappears; in turn, the right to a long stay and free movement within the EU appears. However, the only requirement is to spend more time in the state in which the person is registered, rather than in other countries;

- ◆ person who has received temporary protection in the EU is given the right to travel to Ukraine for a short time to resolve domestic or personal issues. After returning to the EU country, the right to temporary protection remains.

Thus, if a person displaced to Europe does not have a document confirming the right to temporary protection, after the expiration of 90 days, such persons lose their legal right to stay in the EU with all the subsequent consequences, including the fines and deportation to the country of citizenship. Some Ukrainians found themselves in this situation, who registered for temporary protection in

Poland, but received only a *PESEL* number without supporting documents; and after the expiration of 90 days in Poland, they lost their right to move freely within the borders of the EU. However, since July 2022, Poland has introduced an electronic document *Diia.pl*, which confirms the identity and gives the right to persons displaced from Ukraine to cross the EU borders.

It is worth noting that the goodwill, humanity, readiness and desire to provide assistance (which the Poles showed towards the Ukrainians who asked for temporary protection in Poland and those who remain in Ukraine) deserves great respect and gratitude. The Polish government provides great support to Ukrainians, providing them with housing, social benefits, medical and other services necessary for human existence. According to the National Bank of Ukraine, education costs for about 560.000 Ukrainian children registered in Poland in 2022 amounted to 2.2 billion euros, and the cost of their med-

ical care – 1.5 billion euros (Impact of Ukrainian..., 2022).

The study conducted in 2022 by the *EWL* migration platform shows that 70% of the citizens of Ukraine (who received temporary protection in Poland) were employed, and more specifically: 29% – in the gastronomy and hotel industries, 18% – in the service sector, 14% – in the industrial production and trade, 7% – in agriculture and logistics (Employees from Ukraine..., 2022). The Polish government makes efforts to accelerate the integration of Ukrainians in order to increase the employment of qualified personnel (teachers, doctors, programmers, and others), which will contribute to GDP growth from 0.2% to 3.5% (Poles about the..., 2022). The integration of Ukrainians in Poland is also facilitated by the organization of free courses for learning the Polish language. At the same time, there is a decrease in the level of support for Ukrainians among Polish citizens (Fig. 3) (Poles about the..., 2022).




Figure 3. The level of support by Polish citizens to Ukrainians who applied for temporary asylum during March-November 2022

Source: poles about the war in Ukraine (2022)

As it can be seen from the Figure 3, in October compared to March 2022, the level of support for Ukrainian migrants decreased by 18%, but in November it increased by 7%; but in general, there is a downward trend (Poles about the..., 2022). In general, the majority of Poles (about 61%) consider the assistance of Poland to Ukrainian migrants as sufficient. The part of Polish citizens who consider this assistance too large is constantly growing: in October, compared to September – by 3%, and compared to April – by 12% (Poles about the..., 2022).

Such an attitude of the Poles is due to an increase in crime among Ukrainians in Poland, a violation of the culture of behavior operating in Polish society, as well as the abuse of social assistance. Thus, for example, Poles assess the payment of material assistance for Ukrainian children by 5% worse, and by 16% – free accommodation for Ukrainians who received temporary protection. In this regard, the Government of Poland in January 2023 has adopted amendments to the Law on Assistance, which provide for increased control and, in some cases, a decrease in the level of material assistance to immigrants from Ukraine (Table 2) (Law of the Republic..., 2022).

Data in the Table 2 shows that the Polish Government tries to reduce the Ukrainians' abuse of receiving social benefits funded by Polish taxpayers through the amendments to the Law on Assistance (Law of the Republic..., 2022) in January 2023. In addition, Poland's social security institutions are faced with the task of verifying the actual presence in Poland of migrants from Ukraine receiving payments.

Based on the above-mentioned, the Government of Poland and its citizens are doing everything possible to support and provide the necessary assistance to persons who have left Ukraine as a result of Russia's armed aggression and who have asked for protection in Poland. However, it should be noted the need to strengthen control over the receipt of social payments by migrants from Ukraine and optimize the volume of assistance for residence, measures that have already begun to be implemented by amending the Law on Assistance (Law of the Republic..., 2022).

Therefore, it is necessary to determine the directions according to which it will be expedient to improve the provision of temporary protection to Ukrainians in Poland and in Europe as a whole. Among these directions, there

are the main ones: encouraging Ukrainians to learn the language of country in which they have received temporary protection, which will allow them to gain access to more qualified and paid jobs; stimulate to get a job; reduce the level of state assistance to persons who have not expressed a desire for a long period to find a job. The proposed solutions will reduce the burden on the state budget

of the country that provides assistance to persons who have requested temporary protection, strengthen control over the areas of assistance to displaced persons and simulate them to work and fill the budget of the country that has provided this person with everything necessary for living, maintaining a satisfactory state of health, children's education and other needs.

Table 2. Main amendments to the Law on Assistance that came into force on January 28, 2023

The essence of changes	Explanation
Termination of social payments for the period of departure from Poland	Social benefits are suspended for the duration of travel outside Poland. If such a departure exceeds 30 days, the person completely loses the right to social assistance and the status of temporary protection. In case of departure from Poland for up to 30 days, it is necessary to inform the Polish border guard about the intention to enter using the PESEL UKR document, which is valid only in Poland.
Conditions for providing free accommodation for displaced persons are limited	1. After 120 days from the date of the first entry into the territory of Poland, a citizen of Ukraine with a PESEL number should cover 50% of the cost of accommodation and meals, but not more than PLN 40 per person per day. 2. After 180 days from the date of entry, Ukrainians with a PESEL number will cover 75% of the cost of accommodation and meals, but not more than PLN 60 per person per day. 3. Mandatory payment for accommodation will not apply to: people with disabilities; young children; pregnant women or persons raising a child under the age of 12 months; pensioners; persons who independently care for three or more children.
The conditions for financing educational institutions have been changed	A requirement has been added to apply a formula according to which the amount of funding for educational institutions is calculated in 2023. Among the indicators considered when determining the amount of funding, there are current expenses for the maintenance of schools attended by children of Ukrainian citizens (whose stay in Poland is legal).

Source: compiled on the basis of data (Law of the Republic..., 2022)

Discussion

Providing temporary protection for the population of Ukraine in other countries is extremely important and necessary during a period of military threat to the health and life of Ukrainians in their native country. Analysis of the conditions and features of the organization of temporary protection in the EU made it possible to identify problematic issues that arose during a large influx of migrants from Ukraine in early 2022, to assess the sufficiency of protecting their rights in another country and material support. The results obtained during the study have shown the need to improve the provision of temporary protection in the EU, in particular, on the example of Poland, by introducing measures that will reduce the burden on the budget of the host country and encourage them to integrate into the environment in which they are temporarily located.

The results of the study indicate that the Polish legislation initially had certain shortcomings, because it did not contain requirements for the mandatory issuance of a document confirming the registration of the right to temporary residence of Ukrainians. The Polish scientist J. Jablonska-Bonsa (2022) made a similar conclusion in her work; she also analyzed the Law on Assistance, highlighted its main provisions from a practical point of view and the potential of application for Ukrainian citizens who came to Poland escaping from the military events in Ukraine.

The Polish scientists K. Sobczak-Szelc *et al.* (2022) made a valuable research based on the results of the interviews with Ukrainian migrants. With the help of multidimensional analysis, they highlighted in their work the processes of reception and integration of migrants in Poland.

The scientists have proved that the difficulty of finding appropriate housing is one of the important reasons why some Ukrainian migrants who have received protection in Poland decide to move further to Western Europe, because the international support may be better in those countries.

However, the studies by the Polish author A. Chłóń-Domińczak (2020) indicate both the problems with housing in Poland and getting a job. The scientist argues that a significant scale of migration has led to a labor market deficit in Poland. In addition, the scientist appropriately emphasizes that a large number of foreigners in Poland creates a complication for functioning of the social protection system.

Large flows of Ukrainian migrants were also unexpected for other countries and they showed the main strengths and weaknesses of temporary protection as a legal instrument in Europe. Thus, the scientists K. Bakhtina (2022) and R. Damen *et al.* (2022) considered the features and problems of temporary protection, using the example of the Netherlands. In particular, author notes the need to check persons fleeing the war in Ukraine and provide protection only to those persons who permanently resided in Ukraine; and the persons who lived on the basis of a temporary certificate, they may return to their country of origin. R. Damen *et al.* (2022) reviewed the study regarding the understanding of refugees who arrived in the Netherlands and the essence of integration into the local politics. The authors notes that such persons become independent through getting a job, knowing the language, social connections, etc. At the same time, the author emphasizes the importance of broad, practical and person-oriented support.

The Finnish scientist L. Näre *et al.* (2022) studied the research of migratory flow of Ukrainians in the Scandinavian countries. Author noted that the acceptance of immigrants from Ukraine did not cause moral panic among local residents, but she emphasized the imperfection of procedures for providing temporary protection. It is worth agreeing with the results of research by the Dutch scientist G. Bosse (2022). She emphasizes that military operations in Ukraine also pose a threat to European countries; they should be aware of this and take on greater responsibility for protecting Ukrainians. In the work, it has been noted the too long-term introduction of provisions of the Directive 2001/55/ EC regarding the implementation of temporary protection of persons arriving in the EU countries. The Turkish scientist H.D. Genç (2019) adheres to similar conclusion; he has argued that the real concern of the EU Member States must lie in balancing of their efforts to provide temporary protection.

Based on the results of the study, it was analyzed certain provisions of legislation in force in Europe on temporary protection. It was concluded that the Polish legislation did not contain requirements for the issuance of a document confirming the legal stay of Ukrainians in Poland (at the beginning of hostilities in Ukraine), which caused some inconvenience for migrants. The Turkish scientists D. Zenginkuzucu (2021) and E.E. Yılmaz (2019) made similar studies, which examined the Turkish regime of temporary protection in comparison with international protection standards and human rights law, as well as the conditions for terminating the regime of temporary protection in Turkey. It is worth agreeing with E.E. Yılmaz (2019), who notes that temporary migrants cannot return to their home country in a short period of time after a long armed conflict (as it happened, for example, in Syria (7 years)); therefore, the countries that provide temporary protection should unite and develop their own strategies to support migrants from affected countries.

The Finnish scientist J. Jauhiainen *et al.* (2022) has made efficient research on the example of Estonia that will help to develop further strategy of support for Ukrainians. The scientist examined the issue of physical mobility of Ukrainians who fled the consequences of war, analyzed the compliance of aspects of the Directive 2001/55/EC with the needs of Ukrainians in Estonia, and also studied the level of availability of housing, employment, education for children, medical and social services for them. Agreeing with the author, it should be noted that not all Ukrainians were aware of the services or had access to them; so in the future, more attention should be paid to ways to involve them in the development and implementation of provisions of the Directive 2001/55/EC (Council Directive..., 2001).

Considering the state and needs of Ukrainians for temporary protection in the European countries, the American scientist A. Javanbakhtet (2022) rightly notes the need to pay attention to the mental state of people arriving in another country. Thus, if such people have come from a zone of active hostilities, they are most likely to be in a state of anxiety, depression, etc. The importance of improving their mental health is explained by the fact that they will be able to quickly adapt and return to a full life

for temporarily living in another country. The Swiss author S. Mesa-Vieira *et al.* (2022) shares the same opinion; she argues that displaced persons (affected by the armed conflict) are very prone to mental health disorders and need psychiatric care, especially for young people. Comprehensive approaches to solving the living conditions of displaced persons contribute to the physical and mental recovery from the psychological trauma received by migrants, and it is worth agreeing with it.

In addition to the mental health of Ukrainian immigrants, many scientists have studied the likelihood of aggravation of the coronavirus pandemic in European countries due to an increase in the number of migrants. In particular, the Italian scientist A. Perciaccante *et al.* (2022) paid attention to this issue; he noted the relationship between the war and pandemic, as well as noted the need to strengthen measures to vaccinate the population. The Chinese scientist J. Su *et al.* (2022) also paid attention to the above-mentioned issue; he studied the problems with which the health professionals faced by meeting the health needs of refugees.

The Canadian scientist H. Greenaway *et al.* (2022) considered the issue of overloading the healthcare institutions in other countries with immigrants from Ukraine. She noted that coordinated actions are needed from politicians, hospital managers and doctors to strengthen their healthcare systems and increase their readiness to accept temporarily displaced people.

It is worth agreeing with the German scientist A. Aslund (2022) who considers that the predominant concentration of migrants from Ukraine in the European countries leads to additional costs that impose a financial burden on these countries. Therefore, it is important to find a solution for equitable distribution of refugees among the EU Member States, which will ensure the improvement of the EU migration policy.

Consequently, the analysis of results of the scientists' research on the implementation of temporary protection in the European countries for population of Ukraine (who leave their homes due to the war) indicates that this problem is being considered in different directions. They provide for consideration of the following questions: to what extent the legislation on temporary protection in the host country meets the requirements of the Directive 2001/55/EC; the adequacy of organization of health care for migrants, the provision of housing needs, etc. The measures proposed in the work to reduce the financial burden on the countries hosting the largest number of migrants meet the proposals of the above-mentioned scientists regarding the need to distribute responsibility for providing temporary protection between the European countries, which will improve the availability and quality of protection services.

Conclusions

The study shows that providing protection in the European countries for people (who try to escape the war in Ukraine) is of great importance for saving their life and health.

The goal set in this work and the analysis of main problems (that arise in the process of providing temporary protection to Ukrainians in Europe) made it possible

to formulate the following conclusions. It was proven that since February 2022, due to the hostilities, a number of people left Ukraine in search of safety was much more than it was predicted by the authorities of European countries; most of migrants asked for temporary protection in Poland. It was substantiated that certain provisions of the Law on assistance in force in Poland (from the beginning of its implementation) did not meet the requirements of Directive 2001/55/EC in terms of providing Ukrainians with documents confirming their stay in Europe. It has been revealed that the majority of Ukrainians who received temporary protection in Poland are employed, learn the Polish language and receive social assistance, medical services and education for children; thus, the Polish state spends significant amounts of funding from its budget for above-mentioned services.

The Polish citizens' analysis of the assessment of the level of support for Ukrainians testified to its decline due to an increase in crime among Ukrainians. It is proposed to improve the provision of temporary protection of Ukrainians in Poland by stimulating migrants from Ukraine to learn the Polish language and get a qualified job, optimize

and strengthen control over the social payments to temporary migrants from Ukraine, which will reduce the burden on the budget of host country and direct funds only to the urgent needs of Ukrainians.

This proposition is of practical importance for the Governments of the EU countries in developing policies regarding the main directions of temporary protection of migrants from other countries, as well as heads of migration and social services – in exercising control over the movement of migrants and the payment of state assistance to them.

The following directions will become the main ones for further research: the study and evaluation of the effectiveness of application of the provisions of Directive 2001/55/EC in terms of determining the fullness of the use of rights and freedoms by persons who are provided with temporary protection in the European countries.

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Conflict of Interest

None.

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Європейський захист українців на період воєнного стану: досвід Польщі

Анотація. Актуальність дослідження зумовлена необхідністю пошуку шляхів удосконалення тимчасового захисту українців в Європі під час воєнних дій в Україні. Метою роботи є аналіз норм європейського законодавства щодо захисту українців та визначення напрямів удосконалення. Основу методологічного підходу складає: аналіз статистичних даних; метод порівняння; графічний метод; метод узагальнення. Визначено країни Європи, до яких звернулося найбільше осіб за отриманням захисту на період війни в Україні. Виявлено недоліки в польському законодавстві щодо організації тимчасового захисту, зокрема в частині підтвердження реєстрації місця перебування українців, що дозволяє їм пересуватися в межах Європи. Було проведено оцінку забезпечення прав на тимчасовий захист для українців, зокрема працевлаштування і проживання та доцільності й переваг від внесених до польського законодавства змін, які передбачають оптимізацію допомоги для переселенців. За результатами оцінки рівня підтримки українців громадянами Польщі виявлено тенденцію до її спаду з причини збільшення порушення українцями правил поведінки. Окреслено напрямки удосконалення організації тимчасового захисту українців в Польщі, які полягають у стимулюванні переселенців вивчати польську мову та влаштовуватись на більш кваліфіковану роботу. Запропоновано посилення контролю владою Польщі за отриманням соціальної допомоги переселенцями, запобігання зловживанням такою допомогою та спрямуванню її на найнеобхідніші потреби для здоров'я, освіти та повноцінного життя людей, які перебувають під тимчасовим захистом в Європі. Результати та висновки мають практичну значимість для представників влади в країнах ЄС при удосконаленні політики тимчасового захисту мігрантів, та керівників міграційних і соціальних служб – при призначенні соціальних виплат

Ключові слова: переселенці; право на працевлаштування; соціальна допомога; підтвердження статусу зареєстрованого; європейське законодавство

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Experience in the fight against separatism in Belgium

Abstract. Many countries in the modern world have faced with the problem of separatism, which can threaten not only the well-being of one individual state, but also the world order as a whole. Thus, it is necessary to study and use the experience of countering this phenomenon on the example of other countries, in particular, Belgium. In this country, there were social contradictions, and eventually the separatist sentiments throughout the entire period of independence. The purpose of this research is to study the methods of combating separatism in the history of Belgium and to analyze the possible use of these methods to counter separatist sentiments at the present stage of development of this country. In the course of this study, a number of methods of theoretical knowledge were used: analysis, synthesis, abstraction, concretization and generalization. As a result of the study, it was determined that different ethnic groups were formed on this territory due to the events unfolded on the territory of modern Belgium, back in the days of ancient history. In the course of the study, it was stated that after gaining independence, two mature national communities were combined in one state. The domination of Wallonia over Flanders was the cause of social contradictions. It has been determined that reaching a compromise is the main method of counteracting social protests and separatism, which manifested in many historical events. It is substantiated that the use of forceful methods of struggle was ineffective. Simultaneously with the use of method of compromise decisions, the principle of balance in the federal authorities is important for Belgium. The results made it possible to note that many decisions (although they were able to preserve the unity of Belgium) increased social contradictions between ethnic groups. This study puts into science a new perspective on the issues of combating separatism in Belgium, and also provides an analysis of how these methods affect the modernity and what variants are possible for the solution of modern problems

Keywords: Flanders; Wallonia; social contradictions; ethnic groups; compromise

Introduction

The problem of separatism is quite relevant in the modern world, since many countries of the world have faced with it. Belgium is one of these countries; however, it is worth understanding that the formation and activities of separatist groups are typical of the entire existence of this country. Thus, it is necessary to study Belgium's fight against separatism in the past and the methods used for this in order to apply this experience in other countries, including Kyrgyzstan.

The study of this topic is quite difficult due to the following reason: when studying the experience of combating separatism, it is necessary to consider a large number of interrelated aspects related to various areas of scientific

knowledge. In particular, these scientific fields include: history, law, political science, economics and sociology. It is also necessary to understand the very specifics of the Belgian state, namely: there are two regions in it – Flanders and Wallonia, and the confrontation between them lasted throughout the history. Thus, one of the problems of this study lies in the fact that the issues of separatism should be considered not only in the national Belgian discourse, but also from the point of view of representatives of individual forces. Another problem is making the general conclusions, because it is necessary to be precise in statements and consider a certain issue as widely as possible.

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In particular, there are a number of radical parties in Flanders to date, which advocate secession from Belgium and have representation in parliaments; however, they do not constitute a majority, so it is impossible to speak of the dominance of separatist sentiments in this region (Van Erkel & Turkenburg, 2022).

A number of scientists from all over the world have been studying this topic. The study by A. Khevturiani & G. Chkhikvishvili (2020) became important for this article, in which the author outlined the main theoretical materials regarding the spread of separatism in the modern world, but this was done in a global context, and the Belgian case was almost not considered.

L. Essen (2012) considered in his book the history of Belgium from ancient times. The feature of this work lies in the fact that the author focuses on the formation of differences between the Flemings and the Walloons in a historical context. However, the topic of separatism almost was not considered in this book.

Researcher E. Witte (2020) also studied the topic of the history of Belgium, and he considered in his book the period after the country gained independence in 1830, focusing on the political events, in particular, in the context of fight against separatism. The scientific article by L. Hugle (2019) became another important study, in which the author considered the theme of federalization of Belgium and its impact on the development of social relations. However, the researcher has studied this topic within a narrow time frame, so this article does not cover the general situation. The scientist R. Mnookin (2009) studied in his work the unifying factors for Belgium, in the context of which he managed to describe the role of royal family in this; however, the researcher considered the role of foreign states somewhat inaccurately. In particular, the author claims that European countries have always stood for the integrity of Belgium.

A. Kruk (2015) in her study studied the topic of development of separatism in the future and she was able to outline the main ways for the future of Belgium. However, the researcher did not provide her own opinions regarding the most probable way out of the outlined ones.

The purpose of this study is to identify methods of combating separatism throughout the history of Belgium and to consider the prospects for using these methods to counter separatist sentiments at the present stage of development of this country. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to perform a number of the following tasks: to consider the theoretical aspects of the phenomenon of separatism; analyze the history of Belgium and determine what factors became the key ones to the split of society and the formation of separatist sentiments. It is necessary to determine the cases of social contradictions during the period of existence of independent Belgium and how they have been resolved; consider how the methods of combating separatism in the past influenced the current situation in Belgium. In addition, it is necessary to determine the current state of separatism in this country and the prospects for solving this problem.

Methodology

First of all, it should be noted that the study of methods of combating separatism in Belgium requires not only a

detailed study of history, but also considering many aspects. In particular, it is necessary to pay attention to the peculiarities of the country's natural conditions, economic activities, influence and attitudes from foreign countries, etc.

The method of analysis is the main method used in this study. Its use has allowed conducting a detailed study of each source and selecting the relevant information relating to each of the aspects of the study. In addition, this method was used in the course of reviewing the history of Belgium. It was important not only to carry out a description of the past of this country, but also to identify the key aspects of activities in the past that contributed to the development of separatist sentiments. In addition, it should be understood that the methods of combating this phenomenon in different time periods gave different results. Therefore, it was important to analyze the achievements through the use of these methods and the conditions in society of that time. In addition, this method was necessary at the stage of analysis of statistical data.

The method of synthesis became the next method. Due to this method, in the course of the study, all the information obtained during the analysis was combined into single results. In particular, this method was having been used to consider what conditions of social activity of the Belgian state correspond to the previously determined general conditions for the development of separatism in any country. In addition, the method of synthesis allowed considering the current state of separatist sentiments in Belgium, since it was necessary to consider various aspects, in particular: the current economic situation, the influence of federalism, the political environment, statistical data and historical conditions.

The method of abstraction was another method used in this study. With its help, the socio-political situation was studied, if it concerns the issues of opinions of certain separatist groups. Thus, the study of this topic requires the maximum objectivity and detachment from any political or social views in order to present accurate and reliable information.

In addition, the methods of concretization and generalization became important ones for the implementation of this study. The first of the mentioned methods has been used to focus on certain aspects and information that are significant in the context of study of the article's topic. In particular, in the course of considering the history of Belgium, it is important to pay attention to the conditions that contributed to the development and strengthening of separatist ideas through the use of method of concretization. Generalization was used to draw the main conclusions at each of the individual stages of the study. In particular, using this method, it was determined the consequences of the federalization process, as well as factors that most contribute to the development of separatism in modern Belgium.

Results

For a broader understanding of the concept of separatism, it is worth referring to the work of A. Khevturiani (2020), who has determined the main conditions for development of separatism in the modern world. These factors include: the ethnic heterogeneity of the country's population, the

uneven national development among these groups, historical factors, irrational policies towards the national minorities, as well as foreign influence, suggesting the incitement of separatist sentiments of one country among the population of another state.

Speaking about the development of separatism in Belgium, it is necessary foremost to consider the ancient and medieval periods of the history of mentioned country, since during these time periods, the processes that influenced the development of separatist sentiments in the modern world took place on the territory of Belgium. In the 3rd century, the tribes of the Franks invaded the territory of Belgium (within the boundaries of modern Flanders), which were able to assimilate the local population. However, they failed to capture the entire territory of modern Belgium, since there is the Sonian Forest in the southern part of Belgium that is now located on the territory of Wallonia. The terrain of this forest is quite difficult for fast movement. Due to this, it was possible to preserve the Romanesque population in the territory of Wallonia. In the medieval times, the territory of modern Belgium was divided along a conditional border that ran along the Scheldt River, due to which these parts passed to different states. Subsequently, the northern part of the modern territory of this country was part of the Holy Roman Empire, and the southern part was an integral part of the French kingdom (Essen, 2012).

The signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 became an important milestone in the history of mankind and Belgium. Due to the Peace of Westphalia, the modern type of international relations was formed, and many states gained independence. In the context of Belgian history, this was not true, since Flanders was able to gain wide autonomy within the Netherlands, while Wallonia remained part of the French state (Essen, 2012).

During the period of the Great French Revolution, another important event took place, which went down in history as the Brabant Revolution. During this event, the Belgians united with the goal of gaining independence. It is important to note that the Belgians were not a separate nation, and this term was used to refer to certain provinces of France. Thus, their unification was not due to the ethnic kinship, but purely utilitarian aspects, since it was more profitable and easier for these provinces to fight for their independence together. As a result of their struggle, it was possible to create the Belgian United States. Although this country was able to exist for only two months, however, this event became important enough for the spread of independent sentiments among the inhabitants of the mentioned provinces (Witte, 2020).

Forty years after the Brabant Revolution, the Belgian Revolution began in 1830. The participants and activists of this revolution were dissatisfied with the policy of the Netherlands in this region and they wanted independence. As a result of these events, major European states gathered at the Belgian Congress in November 1830. Among these states, there were Great Britain, France, Prussia and Russia. Upon completion of this meeting, it was decided to create the state of Belgium, which consisted of many regions, as well as to establish a monarchy headed by the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha dynasty. At the congress, many

delegates from different countries doubted that Belgium would be able to exist for a long time, since heterogeneous regions inhabited by representatives of separate ethnic groups were united in this country (Witte, 2020).

As it can be seen, at the very beginning of Belgium existence, there were contradictions between ethnic groups, which subsequently began to intensify. From the very beginning, there were three communities in Belgium, in particular, Flanders (its inhabitants communicate in Dutch), Wallonia (its inhabitants communicate in French), and the German-speaking community in the east of the country. Despite the fact that Flemish (Flanders) community was the most numerous one among these communities, the Walloons played a leading role in society; thus, the frenchification of the entire Belgium started (Witte, 2020).

Along with the creation of the state of Belgium, the constitution of this country was adopted. It can be argued that this document is quite successful and carefully worked out. In particular, this document qualitatively regulated the restriction of royal power on the part of state institutions, due to which it was possible to combine the positive features of monarchical and republican systems. The success of this document lies in the fact that other countries in the region took it as a basis for writing their constitutions. In Belgium, the constitution has not undergone significant changes, except for individual amendments, which will be mentioned below. However, this document had significant flaws. In particular, only the French-speaking bourgeoisie had the right to vote in the parliamentary elections. In addition, the French language has become the leading language in all spheres of public life. For example, the court cases were resolved only in French in Belgium at that time, without interpreters. In addition, officers in the army used only French, which caused a number of inconveniences and misunderstandings (Witte, 2020). It should be noted that the Flemings (who communicated in Dutch) made up the majority of the population.

The economic development is the next important aspect to consider in the context of emerging conflicts between social groups in Belgium. In the first half of the XIX century, the first industrial revolution took place in the world, and Belgium became the second country affected by influence. However, not all territory of the country began to develop rapidly according to the new trends; because only in Wallonia, there were significant deposits of coal and iron ore, and due to the extraction of these natural resources, the region achieved significant economic success. At the same time, Flanders remained a purely agrarian region (Zhang *et al.*, 2021).

Thus, the political and economic pressure from the French-speaking population of Wallonia became the reason of dissatisfaction of the Flemings, as a result of which the latter ones launched their own movement. It should be noted that the goal of rebels was not to separate Flanders from Belgium, but they fought for their own rights and equality; however, during this period, separatist ideas were formed (Witte, 2020).

In 1893, there was an intensification of the struggle for the right to vote in elections; in particular, many Flemings came out to express a note of protest, but the government sent an army to fight rebels in response to

their struggle. In turn, the workers of many factories went on strike, which was the first workers' strike in history that included political goals. In the same year, the Law on introduction of the universal suffrage was adopted, due to which the majority of Belgian population was able to participate in elections (Dawood, 2022). In addition, in 1898, it was adopted the Equality Act, which provided for equality between the Dutch and French languages. Although the Dutch language began to penetrate into many areas of public life, however, the absolute equality was not achieved. In particular, legal proceedings continued to be conducted in French (Witte, 2020).

Thus, it can be argued that the Belgian government tried to fight the Flemings by force; but later, it was decided to counter by means of agreements and concessions.

After the Second World War, an active economic recovery of Flanders began (since its territory is coastal); therefore, trading ports began to be created within its borders. In addition, the Flemings began to establish businesses specialized in the processing and producing of finished products from raw materials (Fabbriatti *et al.*, 2020). Given these factors, Flanders quickly got ahead of Wallonia, which specialized in coal and iron mining. It is worth focusing on this aspect, because the economic growth of Flanders contributed to the strengthening of separatist sentiments.

It should be noted that economic growth of Flanders, combined with the demographic position of Belgium (out of 10 million people in Belgium, 5.5 were Flemish), contributed to the fact that delegates from Flanders began to occupy a majority in the country's parliament (Witte, 2020). Thus, at the end of the 1960s, the classical three-party system collapsed, due to which many Flemish parties began to gain more and more force in parliaments. At this time, a number of institutions were created, in particular the Flemish Nationalist Party, which aimed at the federalization of the country, and subsequently the radical Flemish Bloc, which sought to separate Flanders from Belgium (Akkerman *et al.*, 2016).

The Belgian central government understood that it could not fight such a large Flemish group, so the preparations for transition from a unitary form of government to a federal one began in the 1970s. First, the existence of three communities in Belgium was determined at the legislative

level: Flemish, Walloon and German-speaking. This division was made on the basis of ethnic and linguistic factors, due to which each of these languages got a status of state language. In addition, it was made a division into regions: Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels; but their boundaries were not clearly defined (Hossaine, 2019).

In the 1980s, it was possible to determine the boundaries of the regions of Flanders and Wallonia and consolidate their autonomy. The issues regarding the future status of Brussels remain important for a long time. On the one hand, this city is located on the territory of Flanders, but on the other hand, it is the capital of the entire state. As a result of the discussion, it was decided to give Brussels the status of a separate region and make it bilingual (Hooghe, 2019).

Thus, the first article of the Belgian Constitution is currently as follows: "Belgium is a federal state consisting of communities and regions" (The Belgian Constitution, 2021). Based on this, it is possible to argue that economic and cultural aspects underlie the federal division of the mentioned country.

In addition, when creating a federal system in the context of the formation of a united government, it has been considered that demographic situation (Flemings are the majority of the country's population) can influence the distribution of seats in the parliament and government. Thus, in the Article 67 of the Constitution, it is stated that the Belgian Senate consists of sixty deputies, as well as how many seats are given to the representatives from different regions. The 99th article of the Belgian Constitution describes the composition of the country's highest executive authority – the Council of Ministers, consisting of 15 members, one of which – the prime minister, and the remaining 14 seats are distributed equally among the representatives of Flanders and Wallonia (The Belgian Constitution, 2021).

As it can be seen, over a long period of Belgian history, the opposition to separatism and social uprisings (that arose from Flanders) took place not in the context of a struggle and tough confrontation, but due to finding compromise solutions.

At this stage, it is worth mentioning those conditions for the spread of separatism in the modern world, which have been outlined above, and determine which of them are characteristic of Belgium.

Table 1. The relevance of conditions for the spread of separatism in Belgium

Condition for the spread of separatism	Relevance in Belgian discourse
Ethnic heterogeneity of the country	Relevant
Uneven economic development among national groups	Relevant
Historical factors	Relevant
Irrational policy towards national minorities	Not relevant
Inciting sentiment from foreign countries	Not relevant

Source: Developed by the author

As it can be seen from the table, most of the conditions for the spread of separatism are relevant for Belgium; however, it is the rational policy of the state (that has been described above) that makes it possible to restrain separatist sentiments among the population. It should also be noted

that a unified Belgium is important not only for the federal government, but for the entire European Union, since the secession of Flanders and the formation of independent state will set a precedent for other separatist movements in Europe, in particular in Spain (Drieskens, 2019).

It is also worth considering what results have been obtained due to such compromise solutions. First, in fact, there are now two separate states in Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia, which have their own governments and parliaments, as well as all other characteristic state institutions, in particular the police (Wouters & Andrienne-Moylan, 2021). Thus, these states have broad powers except the conduct of foreign policy, military administration, and other functions performed by the federal government.

The crisis of 2008 became an important event of our time, which led to the strengthening of separatist sentiments in Flanders. The problem lies in the Belgian tax system, according to which taxes fill the central budget, and then these funds are distributed to the regions. Thus, most of the federal budget is filled by taxpayers from the more numerous and developed Flanders; due to this, the rhetoric of the Flemish radicals takes on the appearance that Wallonia is unprofitable region (Wouters & Andrienne-Moylan, 2021). Due to this, in the second decade of the 21st century, the popularity of the right-wing Flemish parties increased; in particular, the New Flemish Alliance party was able to get the 1 place in the Brussels Parliament in the 2009 elections, and the 3 place out of 89 ones in 2019. In the Flemish Parliament, this party managed to get 16 and 35 places in 2009 and 2019 respectively (European election results, 2019). As for the surveys of the Flemings, 22% of the Flemish population supported the idea of independence in 2011, and in 2019, this indicator increased to 40% (Fabbricatti *et al.*, 2020). Certainly, these indicators do not make up the majority, but they are clear evidence of the spread of separatist ideas.

Given the information presented, the Belgian government should look for new compromise solutions, in particular in the context of tax issue, in order to counteract the spread of separatist sentiments.

Discussion

The issue of the development of Belgian separatism and the fight against it is relevant not only for this country, but also for many other states. Given this, this topic is quite popular and it has been the subject of consideration by many scientists.

R. Dendoy (2021), in the course of studying the current state of development of separatist sentiments in Belgium, drew attention to a rather important aspect. The author argues that the secularization of social life in Belgium (which is one of the global trends in the modern world) contributes to the strengthening of the ideological split between different groups of the population. In particular, this is clearly seen in the differences of opinion and the lack of consensus in the Belgian Parliament. It is worth agreeing with this opinion, since (as it was stated in the results of this study) from the very beginning of Belgium existence, there were few ideological factors that contributed to the unity of various groups in the state. Thus, with the weakening of the role of religious factor, new ideas should be found that unite all Belgians.

R. Mnookin (2009) is another researcher who has studied the factors that act as unifying elements of Belgian society. In the course of his research, the author was able to analyze the history of development of contradictions

between the social groups and separatism in Belgium. Thus, the researcher was able to determine what factors were decisive ones for consolidation of all groups in the country throughout history. As a result, it has been determined that the Belgian monarchy is the main one among them, and accordingly, the central government, as well as the European countries. It is worth agreeing with this opinion, since the central government of Belgium has indeed acted in all periods of history to preserve the unity of the country. However, as for the second factor, the remark should be made, since the European countries advocated for the integrity of Belgium only at the present stage of history. In other periods, except the moment of state's formation, it cannot be said that the Europeans played an important role in maintaining the unity of Belgium.

Exploring the history of social contradictions in Belgium, M. Ginderachten (2012) considered the theme of national movements in Flanders and Wallonia. As a result of studying the history of these events, the author claims that separatist sentiments were strongly developed not only in Flanders, but also in Wallonia. However, this opinion is erroneous. First, it should be emphasized that the national movements, which is noted in the study by M. Ginderachten (2012), do not always pursue the aim of achieving the separatist goals. The national movements of Wallonia often arose in response to the rise of national movements in Flanders – this is another important aspect that should be understood in this context. The significant factor is that as a result of the 2019 survey, only 14% among all the Walloon citizens spoke in favor of the independence of Flanders (Fabbricatti *et al.*, 2020).

Polish researcher E. Kuzelewska (2015) also studied the theme of countering separatism in Belgium. The following issue became the object of her research: the problem of language in the historical discourse of confrontation between the Flemings and the Walloons, as well as the solution of this problem by means of establishing a language boundary. The author argues that this method of countering public sentiment is not entirely appropriate, although it has managed to reduce tension between the communities. It is worth disagreeing with this thesis of E. Kuzelewska (2015), since the issue of creating the mentioned border has been made not only to solve the problem of linguistic separation. The decision to establish this boundary should be considered in a global context. In particular, as it was mentioned in the results of the study, this decision was made during the process of federalization of Belgium, so the decision to create a language border was appropriate, given the circumstances of that time.

Ukrainian researcher A. Kruk (2015), in the context of studying Belgian separatism, managed to make predictions about the future existence and development of Belgium. Thus, four possible scenarios for the development of events were determined: the disintegration of Belgium into parts, as a result of which some territories will become independent, while others will become a part of certain states; reforming the existing political system and creating a Belgian unifying movement; finding a compromise and turning Belgium from a federation into a confederation with a corresponding strengthening of the rights of individual regions; preservation of the modern

type of relations and freezing of the conflict. Based on the above-mentioned information expressed in the results, it can be argued that the 3rd variant is the most likely option of development, since the Belgian authorities have always tried to reach a compromise solution in all confrontations. The first option is possible due to the inaction of central government, due to which the separatist sentiments will intensify and lead to the collapse of the state. The second option out of the listed ways is less likely, because (analyzing the history of Belgium and the experience of confronting separatist movements) this way was almost never used, and accordingly, it did not give results.

In the study by D. Wouters & A. Andrione-Moylan (2021), the researcher studied the topic of the state structure of Belgium. The author analyzed in his article the federal structure of mentioned country and the history of formation of this structure. During this work authors also touched on the topic of separatist tendencies at the present stage of Belgium's existence. He also argues that this country will inevitably collapse in the near future. Such an opinion is quite radical and erroneous. Firstly, based on the statistics presented in the results of this study, it is possible to talk about strengthening of the ideas of separatism and separation of certain regions of the Belgian state. However, such opinions do not prevail and do not cover the majority of population. In addition, author argues in his study that the choice of a compromise solution by the central government of the country (which resulted in federalization) will lead to the fact that the Flemings will only increase their demands over time, which will contribute to even greater split in society. However, it should be understood that there was no social unity from the very beginning of Belgium creation, and the use of force to combat social discontent proved to be ineffective. Thus, the compromise is the main effective way to counter separatism in Belgium.

J. Hoj (2009) is the author of a study in which it was examined the Belgian tax system and proposed the ways to develop it. As a result, the author argues that it is necessary to keep the tax system in its present form, namely: all funds go to the federal budget, and this money is distributed among the regions. However, this opinion is erroneous, because at the present stage of Belgium development, the tax issue is one of the main factors contributing to the spread of separatist sentiments in this country. In general, since the second half of the 20th century, when Flanders achieved rapid economic development, the economic aspect became an important issue in the context of the spread of separatist ideas. Thus, it is important to stimulate economic situation in Wallonia in order to get rid of controversy caused by this factor.

Generally speaking, it should be noted that separatist ideas in Belgium have developed throughout the history of existence of this country; so today, the Belgians have considerable experience in the context of countering this phenomenon. Achieving compromise between different social groups is the most important method of this opposition, but it is worth understanding that this method should be

used carefully and rationally in order to curb the integrity of Belgium.

Conclusions

As a result of the study, it was determined the historical factors that contributed to the spread of separatism in Belgium. In particular, these are: the aggressive policy of the Germanic tribes and the division of lands of modern Belgium among various state entities during the Middle Ages and Modern History, due to which a national difference was formed between the population groups living in modern Belgium. From the very beginning of existence of independent Belgium, two mature ethnic groups were combined in this country, and there was no single Belgian nation. After gaining independence, the dominance and discrimination by Walloon of Flanders' inhabitants became an important factor in the formation of separatist ideas.

Countering separatism in Belgium throughout the history of independence was carried out by means of reaching a compromise between ethnic communities. In particular, this manifested in the following cases:

- ◆ Granting the general right to vote in 1893.
- ◆ Approval of equality of the Dutch and French languages in 1898.
- ◆ Federalization of the country in the second half of the 20th century, which provided for the formation of economic and cultural regions and the granting of broad rights to these regions.

The principle of balancing the federal authorities is an important principle that Belgium uses in order to ensure stability in the state. It consists in ensuring a proportional number of deputies in the Senate, as well as an equal number of ministers in the highest executive authority.

The experience of combating separatism in Belgium shows that forceful methods are ineffective in the context of countering separatism, but it is necessary to implement a rational diplomatic policy.

In the last decade, separatist sentiments have increased among the inhabitants of Flanders, which is caused primarily by the economic factors. Given this, the Belgian government needs to find new compromise ways to solve it.

Compromise decisions made it possible to preserve Belgium as a single country, but they led to a number of negative consequences. In particular, the confrontation between ethnic groups is one of such consequences. Thus, it is necessary to investigate the negative results of Belgium's fight against separatism in the past, and suggest the ways to solve them. In addition, the economic gap between the regions and tax system is an urgent problem; in this context, it is necessary to explore possible directions for resolving these issues in order to counteract separatist sentiments.

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Conflict of Interest

None.

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Досвiд боротьби iз сепаратизмом у Бельгiї

Анотацiя. Багато країн у сучасному свiтi зiткнулись iз проблемою сепаратизму, яка може загрожувати не лише добробуту однiєї окремої держави, а й свiтовому порядку загалом. Таким чином, необхідно дослiджувати та використовувати досвiд протидiї цього явища на прикладi iнших країн, зокрема, Бельгiї, у якiй протягом усього перiоду незалежностi iснували соцiальнi протирiччя, а згодом i сепаратистськi настрої. Метою цього дослiдження є вивчення методiв боротьби iз сепаратизмом в iсторiї Бельгiї, та аналiз можливого використання цих методiв для протидiї сепаратистським настроям на сучасному етапi розвитку цiєї країн. У ходi проведення цього дослiдження було використано ряд методiв теоретичного пiзнання, якими є: аналiз, синтез, абстрагування, конкретизацiя та узагальнення. У результатi проведення дослiдження було визначено, що подiї, якi розгортались на територiї сучасної Бельгiї, ще за часiв давньої iсторiї, складались так, що на цiй територiї формувались рiзнi етнiчнi групи. У ходi дослiдження було стверджено, що пiсля отримання незалежностi в однiй державi було поєднано двi зрiлi нацiональнi спiльноти. Панування Валлонiї на Фландрiєю було причиною соцiальних протирiч. Визначено, що основним методом протидiї соцiальним виступам та сепаратизму є досягнення компромiсу, що проявилось у багатьох iсторичних подiях. Обґрунтовано, що використання силових методiв боротьби було неефективним. На рiвнi з використанням методу компромiсних рiшень важливим для Бельгiї є принцип збалансованостi в органах федеральної влади. Результати дали змогу зазначити, що багато рiшень хоч i змогли зберегти єднiсть Бельгiї, проте посилю соцiальнi протирiччя мiж етнiчними групами. Це дослiдження вкладає у науку новий погляд на питання боротьби iз сепаратизмом в Бельгiї, а також дає аналiз того, як цi методи впливають на сучаснiсть та якi є можливі варiанти вирiшення сучасних проблем

Ключовi слова: Фландрiя; Валлонiя; соцiальнi протирiччя; етнiчнi групи; компромiс

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The transition from the Ukrainian orthodox church of the Moscow patriarchate to the Ukrainian orthodox church of the Kyiv patriarchate: History, causes, consequences

Abstract. The process of transition and eradication of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is actively continuing in our time, which is why this study is relevant. The article is devoted to the history of the origin of the Ukrainian religion and church, namely the transition from the Moscow Patriarchate to the Kyiv one. The main purpose of this work is to study the prerequisites for the transition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The study was carried out using several methods, including: the historical method – it describes the main phenomena and events; the historical-chronological method – it is used to establish the correct order of development of events; the comparative-historical method – it is usually necessary for comparing the studied historical phenomena; the logical method – it describes the historical phenomena on every stage of development. In the article, it is noted the history of the Ukrainian religion, from the beginning of its formation to gaining independence, considering the main events that have influenced the future of the church. The types of church organizations have also been analyzed, and the approximate number of their parishes throughout the country has been noted. Particular attention is paid to the pressure from the leaders of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on other churches in Ukraine, the unwillingness to grant autonomy to the Ukrainian church in order to divide the Ukrainian people and have an impact on society. The prerequisites and reasons for the transition to the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate are determined and the consequences of this event are noted. The practical significance of the work lies in the fact that the results of the work can be used for further research of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and it is aimed at researchers and historians involved in the study of this issue

Keywords: religion; Christianity; religious processes; temple; schism

Introduction

Religion has long been considered an integral part of the life of Ukrainians; with its advent, other areas of everyday life began to develop. Due to religion, hundreds of new churches and temples began to appear. Religion gave impetus to the writing of books and the creation of other works of art related specifically to religion. New traditions and holidays arose, which influenced the culture of the Ukrainian people. Due to the numerous wars, conflicts, revolutions, and other factors, the part of heritage has been lost, but new temples and others related to religion have appeared.

In general, the problem of the study of religion lies in a large number of faiths around the world. Speaking about the Orthodox Church, it is possible to understand that it has many branches, and through the adaptation to the culture (in which it is located), the traditions of the church also differ. That is why it is problematic to give an exact definition of the Orthodox Church, to determine its traditions and features, differences from other churches. The study of the church in Ukraine is complicated by the fact that parts of Ukrainian lands passed under the control of other states for many centuries. Due to the frequent

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change of power, the dominance of a particular church changed accordingly. For example, in the western regions of Ukraine, the Catholic Church was predominant, while in the rest ones – Orthodox. Therefore, the investigations of issues of the Ukrainian church cause problems.

Many works are devoted to the study of religion and church: books, monographs, articles, and dissertations. It is possible to single out many historians who have interested in this topic. Among the Ukrainian researchers, it is worth distinguishing V.Ye. Yelenskyi (2021). Among the non-Ukrainian researchers who study the topic of religion, there are many scientists from Poland, and some of them – are from the USA: P.J. Best (2021), R. Loney (2021), and I. Kaminis (2021).

The author F. Barniske (2021) studied the relationship between religion and state institutions. T. Bremer (2020a) has identified the problems of the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as analyzed the actions of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) during the conflict over Ukrainian autocephaly and the possible ways to resolve the situation, which continues to influence the Church in Ukraine and around the world.

In the article by B. Admiraal (2022), it is argued that religion is closely linked to the politics and state, so it is not surprising that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has a significant impact on the church. In the heart of the religious conflict, there is the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on the one hand and the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine – on the other hand. In this work, it is also noted that the Ukrainian church has been forced to come under the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate as early as 1686 and from that moment until 2019.

The article by M.R. Elliot (2022) describes the connection between the church and the war in Ukraine. When the part of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions were occupied by the Russian invaders, the leaders of the Russian church began to impose the principles of the “Russian world” and the desire to unite the Eastern Slavs. Seeing a threat to Russian Orthodoxy in Catholicism and Protestantism, the oppression of all churches began, except for the UOC-MP (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate). The author of this work also notes terror in the temporarily occupied territories; in addition to the prohibition on activities of the Catholic and other churches, there is the closure of church orphanages, charitable organizations, and seminaries.

In his work by V.Ye. Yelenskyi (2021), the author assures that Eastern Orthodoxy has provided a common basis for post-communist states. Orthodoxy has become the main means of awakening a collective identity. This was manifested in some moments that took place in the first post-communist decade. Due to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in the North Caucasus, and in Transcaucasia, religion quickly changed due to politics.

The purpose of this article is to study the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, to identify the causes and prerequisites for the transition from the Moscow Patriarchate to the Kyiv one.

Materials and Methods

During the study of this article, several methods were used: historical, historical-chronological, logical, and

comparative-historical. The historical method helps to understand events, phenomena, and social life in certain periods. In this work, the historical method is used to better understand the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In addition, with the help of the above-mentioned method, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its origin is considered in terms of earlier phases, and the history of development is traced. The historical method includes techniques, according to which the historians use research evidence and then for writing history in the form of reports about the past.

The historical-chronological method helps in studying history or a period in history from one moment to another one. This article is used to denote the emergence and development of the Ukrainian church and all the main events associated with it, in chronological order – from the beginning of its formation to the present day. Chronology plays an important role in this study because it allows tracing the pace of development of religion, the church, and changes in human society that occur through religion. Since the main events in the history of the Ukrainian church are described and shown in chronological order, it is easier to perceive information and it becomes clearer because different periods are visible. In this article, the chronological method helps to order events from the beginning to the end, but there are cases when it is needed to do the opposite.

The logical method of research is used to reproduce a historically developing object. This method is used in this study to briefly describe important events in the history of the Ukrainian church without unnecessary details. In other words, this method is used to theoretically reproduce the historical object in all its essential properties; in this work, the Orthodox Church – is the historical object. Using the logical method of research, it was possible to highlight the most important things. The true story is logically reproduced, but it is generalized without details. In the process of applying the logical method, phenomena or events are presented in a form freed from details. For the logical reproduction of events, the main element was highlighted.

In this study, the comparative-historical method made it possible to compare historical events and phenomena using identifying similarities and differences. With the help of this method, attention was paid to different historical stages in the development of the same phenomenon or several different ones. Using this method, attention was focused on the contrast between historical objects; the similarities between them were determined. This means that the number of churches located on the territory of Ukraine (belonging to the different branches of Christianity) was compared. The comparative-historical method was useful in the study of this article; with its help, the two branches of the Orthodox Church (the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates) were compared.

Results

According to J. William (2013), religion is the feelings, actions, and experiences of individuals, and their fears about the fact of what exactly they can consider a divine one. E. Durkheim (2001) provides another definition; the author argues that religion is a single system of beliefs regarding sacred things, that is, things that are united into one single moral community called the Church.

The origin of the Christian faith in the Ukrainian lands dates back to 988 when Volodymyr the Great consecrated Kyivan Rus. Accordingly, this event became the birth of Christianity and the beginning of the formation of the church. There are many ancient mentions of the Christianization of Rus by Duke Vladimir; in fact, they can be found in the works such as: "The Tale of Bygone Years", "Word of Law and Grace", "Reading about the Dukes Boris and Gleb". Already in those days, religion had a direct connection with the state-building process, because the adoption of Christianity helped to form a strong state and unite society, as well as positively influenced international authority. The new faith changed the worldview of people and laid the foundation for the development of writing, art, and literature. However initially, the people living in the territories remote from Kyiv reacted badly to the new faith for a long time. Christian preachers often witnessed people's dissatisfaction (Motsya & Rychka, 1996).

The year 1054 became the turning point for all Christians when the church was divided into the Eastern (Orthodox) and Western (Catholic). The process of separation started even before 1054 due to disagreements in church ceremonies. These disagreements and disputes became one of the weighty reasons for the split of the church. In the IX-XI centuries, the conflicts between the Latins and the Byzantines escalated, and church unity was broken forever (Meyendorff, 1982). Thus, the Christians of Rus received the name – Orthodox.

In 1439, the leaders of both branches decided to sign the union of unification, which was later called "Florentine". However, not everyone liked this idea, because one of the union's conditions was the recognition of the superiority of the popes, who did not want to recognize the leaders of the church in Muscovy. Before the signing of the Florentine Union, the Metropolitan of Kyiv was the head of the territory of the former Kyivan Rus. Since Muscovy refused to accept the union's terms, the duke approved his own metropolitan, thus forming a new branch of the Orthodox Church – the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. According to H.M. Bobrzyński (1927), the union did not lead to religious unification, on the contrary, it led to a split and made the society (which remained faithful to Orthodoxy) hostile.

In the XIII century, the Orthodox Church was under conditions of the Lithuanian-Polish statehood and it was the basis for preservation of the Ukrainian religious traditions, culture, and nationality. The signing of the Union of Brest (which took place in 1596) led to many conflicts, both religious and political ones, and it influenced the state-building process on Ukrainian lands. As a result of the signing of this union, the Greek Catholic Church was formed. The end of the 18th century became favorable for the development of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia.

The liquidation of the Kyiv Metropolis took place in 1686, namely, the transition under the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. This happened for several reasons; one of them lies in the following: for a long period, there was one common metropolis. Another important reason – is the partial origin of our dukes from the Rurik dynasty and the common name of the state – Rus, which originally belonged only to Ukrainians. In any case, the Kyiv

Metropolis did not have the same rights, but it was subordinate. This event was the reason for the lack of the state's unity because there was no own church (Blazheyovskiy, 2010; Launay, 2022).

The Ukrainian Church was under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate until 1920 when the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was established. The movement for the autonomy of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine began in 1917. The believers liked the principles of democracy and other foundations of the new church life. M. Mikhnovsky was one of the supporters of the creation of an independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and the patriarch would become its head. In the spring of the same year, eparchial congresses were held in the country, where the issues of the church were raised. In 1918, a Church Council was held in Kyiv; the believers had high hopes for it. However, the issue of autocephaly was almost not considered. Several more attempts were made to achieve the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, but they failed because not everyone supported this initiative. As a result of the civil war, there were abrupt changes in power, and the lack of a stable situation in the state complicated the process of separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate.

However, already in 1919, there were the first divine services in the Ukrainian language; the autocephalous parishes were formed at some cathedrals. In 1920, the creation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was announced at a congress in Kyiv. However, the UAOC (Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church) was not recognized by some believers, and it was subjected to pressure from the new Soviet government (Potsulko, 2008). Based on the above-mentioned, the failures in the formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church were mostly associated with repression by the authorities. There were other obstacles: the lack of parishes, religious literature, and educational institutions. Due to the lack of discipline, bishops did not stay long in power. There were cases when the clergymen were not paid a salary and were forced to move to state institutions. There were no religious texts in the Ukrainian language, so the priests were forced to translate on their own.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church continued its activities under the German occupation from 1941-1944. Since the new occupying power tried to increase anti-Russian sentiment, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church experienced a crisis, which made it difficult to continue its activities. After all, the harassment, persecution, prohibitions, and intimidation of clergy began. According to V.M. Lytvyn (2012), the Ukrainian people were already divided before the war; the problem lies in the generations because older and middle-aged people were under the repressions of the Soviet authorities. Moreover, the youth (who had already grown up during the Soviet era) was not ready for a decisive struggle and resistance. During World War II, many church officials suffered from the German authorities for participating in the revival of the UAOC. Trying to make the split of the Ukrainian people even stronger, the occupying authorities of Germany gave priority to the UAOC. However, after the return of Ukrainian lands under Soviet rule, the Ukrainian Autocephalous

Orthodox Church finally ceased to exist until the proclamation of Ukraine's independence.

With the support of the authorities, the UOC-KP (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate) was formed in 1992. The Supreme Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the creation of the UOC-KP. Orthodoxy is leading in more than 12 European countries and almost all of them are post-communist ones. All Orthodox churches (although they have different branches) have a common basis, and they differ only in the sacramental-cultic sphere; it means that the customs and traditions of the local culture are added to the religion. The concept of "Ukrainian Orthodoxy" appeared in the 90s of the 20th century. According to O.N. Sagan (2001), there are four periods of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The first period was approximately in the XII-XIV centuries; the researcher calls it the period of formation. The second period – the 15th -17th centuries, is considered the period of completion of the formation and prosperity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. During this period, the Kyiv Metropolis actively developed and had influence and favor among the believers. That is why the first and second periods can be called the periods of Kievan Orthodoxy. During the third period, the characteristic features of Ukrainian Orthodoxy were assimilated; during the fourth period, the activity of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church started.

In today's Ukraine, there are many different church organizations, but Christianity can be considered the dominant religion. Approximately 95% of the religious communities in the country are Christian ones. There are more than 12.800 parishes of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine. Neither the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate nor the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is recognized by the world as "canonical"; however, there are 5.300 and 1.200 parishes in Ukraine, respectively. Protestantism is another direction that is quite common in the country. This direction is considered the second one in terms of the number of communities, with about 6.500 parishes. According to the same criterion, Catholicism is in third place (5.000 Catholic churches). The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was prohibited in the post-war Soviet times; but in recent decades, it has rapidly begun to revive and gain popularity, it amounts to 3.800 religious communities, located mainly in the western part of Ukraine. Catholicism of the Latin rite, which has already begun to develop in the years of independence, has about 1000 parishes (Ivchenko, 2018).

Since the beginning of 2014, due to hostilities in the eastern regions of Ukraine, the religious environment has been under the pressure. The long-term war in Ukraine contributes to the aggravation of religious feelings among people (The silence of..., 2015). The abbots of the Cathedrals claim that the number of people attending services both on holidays and on ordinary days has increased. The ministering in most churches began to cover the following topics: the war, the military, their families, and helping the victims of the war. Religious leaders condemn the invaders and call to lay down their arms, as well as raise the issues of violation of the rights of people living in the temporarily occupied territories. Experts critically assess the

current state of inter-church relations in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian philosopher V.A. Voinalovich (2018), the situation (in which the churches found themselves after the Revolution of Dignity) is a crisis one. For example, even during the revolution, the heads of the UOC-MP tried to unite the country, calling on the authorities and the people to negotiate. However, since the beginning of the war, not a single call for negotiations has been heard from the UOC-MP; there is tangible preservation of neutrality, or even support for the enemy. Speaking about the Greek Catholic Church, its leaders said during the revolution: "There is nothing more important than upholding human dignity"; and they supported the European standards. However, after the revolution, no ideas for the defense of democracy are presented. The same situation is observed with the Protestants: activity during the revolution, and calm – after it.

In most churches, temples, and cathedrals (but not in all ones), the calls for peace and help to Ukrainians began to appear, which caused the transition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate began to create and spread various myths. For example, it was claimed that the UOC (Ukrainian Orthodox Church) together with the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate aimed to unite the whole country, but their actions contradicted this (Voinalovich, 2018). The change of the head of the UOC became another reason. In 2014, Metropolitan Onuphry Berezovsky was elected to the above-mentioned position, they assured in several interviews that all the activities of the church should be limited only to social life, thus refusing to call people to pray for Ukraine in such a difficult time. That is, the spiritual leaders of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not condemn Russia's invasion of the territory of Ukraine and at the same time the murders of many civilians and military personnel. In the territories temporarily occupied by the Russian invaders, the persecution of believers who did not belong to the church of the Moscow Patriarchate (classifying them as "sectarians") started.

Captured buildings and religious structures became places of detention (Voinalovich, 2018). Even during the Peaceful Procession of the Cross, which took place in 2016, there were no calls to the aggressor country to stop the war or stop the shelling. In addition, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate made the Ukrainian authorities the main culprit of the Russian-Ukrainian war, while not condemning the authorities of the aggressor country and their actions.

As a result of supporting the actions of invaders, after the death of Metropolitan Volodymyr, some Orthodox churches began to transfer to the Kyiv Patriarchate. At the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the transition took place mainly in the western and central regions of the country; but later it began to cover the south. This process shows the position of people against those who support the policy of the aggressor country. The transition to the UOC-KP received favor from the population. In those churches that have moved to the Kyiv Patriarchate, divine services are conducted in the Ukrainian language and it begins with a call for support for Ukraine in difficult times.

Discussion

The history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as well as the church as a whole, is quite interesting and it is full of various events related to the change of power and harassment, which has repeatedly attracted the attention of both Ukrainian and foreign scientists; this indicates an interest in this topic. This article has been analyzed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of two patriarchates: Moscow and Kyiv; it has been clarified the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as well as defined the features of the dominance of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine and the reasons for the transition to the Kyiv Patriarchate. It has been also investigated that there are many different churches in Ukraine at the time of the study, which has several branches. It was revealed that the Catholic Church is also popular in Ukraine in addition to the Orthodox one. The state plays an important role. Since the Ukrainian territories were divided and subject to other states in different periods of the state's creation, the influence on the church changed accordingly. It was also noted the factors that were key ones in the decision to move to the Kyiv Patriarchate.

The article published by A. Kilp & J.G. Pankhurst (2022) is one of the works that reveal the theme of religion during the Russian-Ukrainian war. It refers to the release of Metropolitan Hilarion (who headed the Russian Orthodox Church) for his silence about the aggressor's invasion of the territory of Ukraine. The article notes that Metropolitan headed the position within 104 days during the war, his personality, and position are also examined. The support of Ukraine, its territories, and its population should be the key factor, rather than the support of the aggressor, which Metropolitan Hilarion has shown with his silence and actions. That is, in the article by A. Kilp & J.G. Pankhurst (2022), in contrast to this one, more attention is focused on a specific metropolitan; however, there is a common thing: in both articles, the suspicions about the support of the aggressor from the heads of the UOC-MP are mentioned.

The article by I.M. Morariu (2020), which is very similar to this work, is another study related to the Ukrainian church. However, it differs only in the fact that it shows the problems of people associated with the church. The recognition of the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became an important factor in history, and it influenced the development of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian lands. Before achieving recognition, the autocephalous Ukrainian church went through many trials, negotiations, and meetings of the church leaders; it always experienced controversy and was approved by some believers and condemned by others ones. The separation between churches always has an impact on the state-building process and society, because people are divided into those who support, those who condemn, and those who adhere to neutrality. The main purpose of this article is to show the problems of the Ukrainian people regarding the church, the position of the Russian Orthodox Church after the granting of autonomy to the Ukrainian church, and the relationship between churches.

According to T. Bremer (2020a), the Russian Orthodox Church had a significant impact on the crisis of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox

Church (ROC) has terminated any relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate because they contributed to the granting of autonomy to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Actually, in the article, the attention is focused not only on the actions of the ROC about the Ukrainian autocephalous church but also on their influence on Orthodoxy in general, throughout the world.

In the article by I.N. Grigoriadis (2022), the author touched on the topic of the crisis of the Ukrainian church. According to the researcher, the Ecumenical Patriarchate (despite all the difficulties) tried to stay in the Turkish Republic after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Ecumenical Patriarchate did not have confidence in the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church due to interference in the affairs of other Orthodox Churches. Misunderstanding between the Ecumenical and Moscow Patriarchates was formed as a result of the church crisis in Ukraine. In the article, the history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the level of Russian influence on Orthodox churches are also described.

The articles by T. Bremer (2020b) and I.N. Grigoriadis (2022) touch on the topic of a crisis of the UOC, thus differing from this work. However, all three works have common features – they describe the influence of the ROC on other churches in Ukraine.

The feature of the work by F.C. Mureșan (2018) lies in the following: it talks about the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the consequences of granting autonomy to it, which is partially similar to this article. The article mentions the event that has taken place in August 2018 in the capital of the country – an interreligious prayer for peace in Ukraine. The heads of all branches of the Orthodox and Catholic churches, as well as Protestant, Jewish and Muslim ones, took part in the prayer. In the same year, the issue of autocephaly was raised, supported by the bishops of the UOC-KP and the UAOC, but the heads of the UOC-MP opposed it.

In another work that reveals the topic of the Orthodox Church, U. Serce (2022) examines the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on the Orthodox world. To prevent the Orthodox Church from being under the Moscow Patriarchate, US leaders decided to strengthen the Istanbul Patriarchate by electing Athenagoras (Bishop of South and North America) as Patriarch. Resistance to the Moscow Patriarchate was expected from him. Despite some difficulties that arose during this process, Athenagoras was nevertheless elected as Patriarch. In his position, Athenagoras met the expectations of others and showed that he was worthy of his position. The main idea of the work by A. Serce (2022) – the influence of the MP on other Orthodox churches is similar to the idea of this article; however, the history of the Orthodox Church and the transition from the MP to the KP are described here to a greater extent.

S. Vaupot (2019) wrote about the church and its relationship with the state. According to her opinion, religion played an important role in the history of state-building. In her work, the researcher focuses on the development of the Catholic Church in Vietnam from the 17th to the 20th century. The article also focuses on the relations between states that have played a special role in the history of the Catholic Church in Vietnam. The activity of Catholics in

Vietnam shows that the adoption of Christianity has been achieved with the help of the population. Although the article by S. Vaupot (2019) touches on the topic of religion, it describes the relationship between church and state to a greater extent, and thus it differs from this research.

There is another article about the UOC, written by the author R. Bordeianu (2020). According to his opinion, the autocephaly of the UOC had four significant consequences outside of Ukraine. The impact on relations between different Orthodox churches was the first of the mentioned consequences, because some recognized autocephaly, while others did not support this idea. Another consequence – is the departure of the Russian delegation from ecumenical dialogues, as well as significant violations of theological issues regarding the eucharistic nature of the Orthodox Church.

In the article by N. Gergało-Dąbek (2022), the author describes the importance of the native language in the state and the role of the Ukrainian language in the Orthodox Church. It is also described by the Ukrainian theologian Ivan Ohienko, that is, Metropolitan Hilarion. He noted the importance of the native language for prayer, faith, and church. It is also noted in the article that according to Ohienko, a church that conducts divine services in another language does not respect and does not care about its language. The very attitude towards the Ukrainian language caused controversy between the Orthodox churches at the end of 2018. Here, it was also mentioned the difference between the patriarchates, because the UOC-KP supported the Ukrainian language, and the UOC-MP supported the Russian language. It was the language issue that caused the separation of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine in the early 1990s; and now, it is hindering the process of unification.

This article differs from others and it is unique because there are many studies related to religion; however, as for the history and reasons for the transition from the Ukrainian church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Kyiv one, such studies have not yet been identified. For a better understanding, the information is provided in chronological order; all the outstanding events in the history of the Ukrainian church are given.

As has already been noted, this article is devoted to the history of the UOC, which is divided into two branches: the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates. Compared to other studies that describe the position of the church in Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian war, pressure from the Russian patriarchate, an attempt to achieve autonomy for the UOC, the impact of the Moscow Patriarchate on the crisis of the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox world in general, this article has a difference with them. Unlike other works, this article does not inform about the domination

of any particular patriarch, it does not indicate the Orthodoxy and churches in other countries, it does not focus on churches located in Ukraine.

Conclusions

Religion and the Orthodox Church in Ukraine have become a subject of interest for many researchers, because many articles, scientific works, and books are devoted to this topic.

In the course of the study, it was found that Ukrainian history had outstanding stages and dates that influenced the fact that the Orthodox Church became the most widespread in Ukraine. It all started in 988 when Duke Vladimir consecrated Kievan Rus. In 1054, the church was divided into Orthodox and Catholic; in 1439, the Union of Florence was signed; in 1596, the Union of Brest was signed. The year 1686 is another important year in history when the transition to the Moscow Patriarchate took place. The granting of autocephaly to the Ukrainian church took place in 1920.

Orthodoxy, like other faiths, has branches; due to such branches, there are disagreements. The UOC-MP and UOC-KP explain the same biblical teaching; the only difference lies in the fact that the leaders of the Kyiv Patriarchate support Ukraine and are concerned about its interests. While the Moscow Patriarchate is trying to impose the opinion that it is necessary to be in the power of the aggressor country, and the leaders of the UOC-MP keep silent about the war in Ukraine and about those who have caused it.

The state influences the church, and according to this, it follows that the war is the main reason for the transition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The lack of desire of the heads of the UOC-MP to talk about the war led to suspicions of supporting the aggressor, thereby causing dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people and becoming the basis for the eradication of the Moscow Patriarchate. As a result, after the transition from the Moscow Patriarchate, the divine services are conducted in the native Ukrainian language, which has caused favor among believers.

Since the transition from the UOC-MP to the UOC-KP has recently begun and continued, future studies can describe in more detail the final result of the transition to the Kyiv Patriarchate.

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Conflict of Interest

None.

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Перехід від Української Православної Церкви Московського Патріархату до Української Православної Церкви Київського Патріархату: Історія, причини, наслідки

Анотація. Процес переходу і викорінення української православної церкви московського патріархату активно триває у наш час, саме тому дане дослідження є актуальним. Стаття присвячена історії зародження української релігії, церкви, а саме переходу від московського патріархату до Київського. Основною метою цієї праці є дослідити передумови переходу української православної церкви московського патріархату до української православної церкви Київського патріархату. Дослідження було здійснено за допомогою декількох методів, серед них: історичний – описує основні явища та події, історично-хронологічний, який використовується для встановлення правильного порядку розвитку подій, порівняльно-історичний, зазвичай потрібний для порівняння досліджуваних історичних явищ та логічний – описує історичні явища на кожному етапі розвитку. У статті зазначено історію української релігії, від початку її становлення і до здобуття незалежності, враховуючи основні події, які вплинули на майбутнє церкви. Також проаналізовано різновиди церковних організацій та зазначено приблизну кількість їхніх приходів по всій території країни. Особливу увагу приділено тиску з боку лідерів православної церкви московського патріархату на інші церкви в Україні, не бажання надавати українській церкві автономності з метою роз'єднати український народ та мати вплив на суспільство. Визначено передумови та причини переходу до православної церкви Київського патріархату та зазначено наслідки цієї події. Практична значущість праці полягає у тому, що результати роботи можна використовувати для подальших досліджень української православної церкви та спрямована на дослідників та істориків, які займаються вивченням цього питання

Ключові слова: релігія; християнство; релігійні процеси; храм; розкол

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Regional histories of climate mobility: Oceania

Abstract. The research relevance is determined by both the growing threats of climate change to Ukraine and Russian military aggression against Ukraine, which increase the number of people changing their place of residence due to the deteriorating environmental situation. The experience of countries that have already faced environmental migration predetermined the study's relevance. The research aims to study and summarise the findings of Western researchers on the consequences of climate change for Oceania, which is seen as a threat to stability, security, and peace in the region and as a factor contributing to the spread of violence and conflict in the region, as well as internal and international population movements. The main methods used to study this issue are analysis, induction, deduction, and synthesis, which allow for describing and highlighting the most important aspects of the problem of environmental migration. The study demonstrates the relationship between climate change and environmental migration and considers its types. The study analyses the role of various actors, regional and national initiatives in improving the efficiency of this process, as well as the case of Tuvalu, which is threatened by flooding and the resettlement of all residents and the government to other countries. The author considers the idea of virtualisation of this state – the creation of its twin in the metaverse in the event of this scenario. Ways to improve climate mobility planning and a set of measures that can contribute to better integration of environmental migrants into host societies are proposed. Potential problems that could lead to conflict situations in the case of environmental displacement are identified. It is concluded that the negative effects of climate change make it important to develop changes in international legislation and to study this aspect in depth by scientists and various international, regional, and local organisations. The author outlines the ways of further research on the problem of environmental migration. The results of the study are of theoretical and practical value for ecologists, historians, sociologists, politicians, and those involved in migration issues

Keywords: climate mobility; environmental migration; climate change; conflict; sustainable development

Introduction

The relationship between climate change, mobility, conflict, security, and peace is gaining growing attention from both academics and politicians. The 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Paris in 2015, stated that "climate change... will lead to an increase in forced internal and cross-border displacement of people" and recommended that different types of displacement be considered as one of the strategies for adapting to this phenomenon. Growing flows of people moving for environmental reasons from the global South to the global North are considered

by some scholars as a threat to national and international security (Human mobility..., 2015).

Research in this area is particularly important for the people of Oceania, as the region is severely affected by the negative effects of climate change. In recent years, tropical cyclones have intensified in the region, the amount and intensity of precipitation, floods and droughts have increased, ecosystem degradation (including coral reefs) has increased, and sea levels have risen (Mycoo *et al.*, 2022). This affects the economic, social, and political stability of the region and harms human health, water, and food

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security, as well as livelihoods and habitats. As a result of climate change, many traditional practices of indigenous peoples are declining and even disappearing as cultural diversity has decreased. Therefore, the main challenges facing Pacific Island countries are to revive traditional elements of food security that will allow the population to adapt to the effects of climate change (Campbell, 2022b).

Environmental change is triggering new conflicts or exacerbating existing ones, posing a challenge to security and peace in Oceania. In this context, the multidirectional displacement of people in vulnerable areas is seen as the greatest threat (Bower & Weerasinghe, 2021; Campbell, 2022a). Climate change is an additional driver of urbanisation, as many population movements are occurring from vulnerable areas along the coastline to cities. Increasing population density with limited land resources gives rise to various conflicts, including domestic violence, and insecurity for such migrants. J.R. Campbell (2022a) believes that their number will continue to grow.

Long-term climate change, such as extreme weather events, droughts, floods, etc., can also directly (Kim *et al.*, 2022) or indirectly affect people's mental health by deteriorating their physical condition and livelihoods, including threatening social processes that affect the well-being of citizens (Palinkas & Wong, 2020; Filho *et al.*, 2023). It can be stated that the negative effects of climate change are turning into an existential threat to the residents and communities of this region.

The research novelty is determined by the analysis of the experience of other regions, which is of practical interest to Ukraine, which suffers more from the negative effects of global warming and may also become a recipient of environmental migrants from other countries.

The research relevance is also determined by the negative environmental consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine, which increased the number of people changing their place of residence due to environmental degradation. In this study, the authors set out to analyse and summarise the achievements of Western scholars on climate mobility in Oceania and to identify ways to further research this scientific problem, considering the situation in Ukraine.

Collected literature analysis

The issue of environmental migration is the subject of extensive scientific debate, although the conceptualisation of this phenomenon faces several challenges. This refers to the lack of consensus among scholars on the terminology that should be used in the study of this issue (Ferris, 2020). Several experts use the term "environmental migration", which is usually understood as a form of forced migration (Hugo, 1996). It is caused by economic, social, and political factors arising from environmental change (Foresight, 2011). The definition of "climate migration" is narrower and is often used synonymously with others, such as "climate-induced migration", "climate displacement", "climate refugee flows", "climate-related displacement" and "climate mobility" (Stojanov *et al.*, 2021). A. De Sherbinin (2020) points out the problematic use of the term "climate migration" since refugee status is granted based on international law and is limited to people who cross international borders and flee persecution

due to clearly defined factors such as race, ethnicity, faith, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Scholars are increasingly using the term "climate mobility" (Baldwin *et al.*, 2019) to describe the diversity of forms and directions of population movement in the context of climate variability and change (Boas *et al.*, 2019).

In-depth research by Western scholars and some international organisations confirms the interconnectedness of climate change, conflict, and security (Adams *et al.*, 2018; Climate risk profile..., 2021). They focus on studying it in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel (Climate change, conflict..., 2022) and the Middle East (Weather and climate extremes..., 2020; Why climate change hits..., 2020). Oceania draws less attention. Empirical research is conducted by some regional institutions, such as Japan's Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Studies (Boege, 2018; Boege, 2022). Some data on the region are included in various international reports, such as the IOM, but there are not enough significant research findings in this area.

The scientific community has generally reached a consensus on the linear relationship between climate change and climate mobility in Oceania and has focused on conceptualising different forms of migration, building local capacity to minimise the negative impacts of climate change on the region or adapt to it, studying the specifics of local policies and approaches and the role of different actors, and developing recommendations for policymakers.

C. Frochlich & S. Klepp (2018) explore the role of climate change on political processes and argue that climate mobility challenges pre-established ideas of citizenship, belonging, and national identity. Using the example of Kiribati, she analyses how the government combines climate change discourses with the struggle for new rights and resources for the country. C. Farbotko *et al.* (2018) argue that governments in countries or regions where Pacific Islanders choose to move should support and enable resettlement, considering the historical development of these territories and the need to promote human rights and socio-political equality.

L. Yamamoto & M. Esteban (2017) describe possible solutions being discussed by governments and civil society in the region's atoll states, which include the development of national policy frameworks, bilateral agreements between different actors, and the development of grassroots initiatives to better integrate climate migrants into local communities. T. Weir *et al.* (2017) point out that climate change exacerbates social and cultural equality issues and is perceived by many climate migrants as a moral challenge that should be considered by governments when developing strategies and specific mechanisms for displacement and adaptation. Among the main types of conflicts that threaten peace and security in the region are conflicts over land and food resources, those related to cultural differences between different population groups, the high expectations of some climate migrants regarding life in new places, and poor access to basic needs (sanitation, quality drinking water, education, healthcare, etc.). The inability of the governments of the territories facing such challenges to address these issues may affect the political situation, undermining public confidence in local political elites.

Given the particular vulnerability of this region to the conflict-related effects of climate change, it is an urgent task to study this issue in depth, as politicians and decision-makers need a thorough contribution from the academic community to develop sound policies, strategies, management, and adaptation measures. This topic has not yet been studied in Ukrainian historical science and political science.

The role of Oceania's geographical features in exacerbating the negative effects of climate change

The nature of climate impacts in Oceania is determined by the region's geographical features. The sinking islands of Oceania have become a symbol of the severe and unprecedented consequences of anthropogenic impact on global warming, demonstrating trends that other regions of the world may soon face. The region has the world's largest concentration of microstates, i.e., countries with a population of less than half a million people. In addition, many Oceania states are located on the territory of dozens of islands. The population of the 22 countries and self-governing territories totals approximately 10 million people, inhabiting approximately 300 islands (out of approximately 7,500 islands in total). Of the 32 million km² of the region's territory, 98% is covered by water. Out of the region's 2% land area, Papua New Guinea alone covers about 95% (Boege, 2018).

Sea level rise and associated island sinking, storm surges, saltwater intrusion, erosion, and other environmental problems along their coasts are degrading fresh groundwater resources and reducing the area of land available for agriculture, human settlements, and infrastructure. Rising surface temperatures of the surrounding seas are leading to increased coral bleaching and reef degradation, resulting in declining fish stocks and an increased risk of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and diarrhoea. As a result of coastal erosion and flooding, the area of fertile soil is shrinking, reducing the livelihoods of local people, including food for both consumption and sale. The threat of this situation is that most people in the region depend on traditional subsistence agriculture, supplemented by commercial farming (Roberts & Andrei, 2015).

The particularly high level of vulnerability of many Oceania islands to climate change is explained by its extreme impact and the rather limited capacity of countries to adapt. This applies to a large extent to states located on atolls, which have extremely low altitudes and often a very limited area. The highest point of the Pacific Island state of Tuvalu is 1.5 m above sea level, Kiribati is 3 m, and the average width of the Kiribati islands is less than 1000 m. As noted by L. Yamamoto & E. Esteban (2010), atoll states are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise "due to their high coastline-to-land area ratio, relatively high population density, and low levels of available resources for adaptation measures". Large islands with higher altitudes and volcanic islands are less exposed, but they also face severe environmental degradation caused by climate change, especially along their coastlines. This creates a range of economic and social problems, including employment and

healthcare, various conflicts in local communities, and an increase in violence.

Types of climate migration

Clearly, in the context of regional security, the most threatening trend is the growth of environmental migration, including climate migration. Expert J.R. Campbell (2022b) believes that mobility in the form of migration caused by climate change is already a reality in Oceania. Moreover, it will expand in the future, causing conflicts of various types. From the methodological point of view, the author has identified several types of climate mobility, including migration, resettlement, and displacement; forced, induced, and voluntary mobility; internal and international mobility; permanent, temporary, or circular mobility. At the same time, the large number of factors affecting climate mobility leads to the expansion of scientific debate on the development of clearer criteria in the above typology, which should be the basis for developing practical solutions.

For example, individual or family migration within a country (mainly from remote islands or rural areas to urban centres) can be caused by certain environmental impacts of climate change. These include coastal erosion or saltwater intrusion, which in turn affects the security of land and water resources. People who decide to move for these reasons expect the situation to worsen in the future. Therefore, they hope for a better life in the city, which also includes expectations of better access to services such as education or healthcare, or employment opportunities in the formal economy. This migration is not forced, but it is not voluntary, as it is pushed by the effects of climate change.

Another case is international labour migration to countries such as New Zealand or Australia, which is temporary or circular. In theory, it can be considered voluntary. However, the deterioration of living conditions at home due to certain effects of climate change may contribute to this decision to move abroad, and remittances can be used to improve life at home and contribute to local climate change adaptation measures (Kelman & West, 2009).

One form of international mobility is permanent migration to another country. It is mostly caused by a combination of different factors that prompt people to make such decisions, but climate change can also be among them. Displacement as a result of extreme weather events, such as after a devastating tropical cyclone, is a completely different case. It is forced, and the displacement is mostly internal and temporary, as people usually return to their place of residence after repairing or rebuilding their homes and infrastructure.

In the most difficult situations, the relocation of entire communities or significant parts of communities is planned. Planned resettlement can be seen as a form of climate change adaptation (Yamamoto & Esteban, 2010), which is proactive and avoids forced displacement at a later date. In recent years, there has been a growing number of communities in Oceania that have relocated, are relocating, or are planning to relocate. This type of climate mobility is considered internal, mostly over short distances, to the community's land or neighbouring communities' land, government, or church land. Such relocations can be forced if the area has become uninhabitable, but more often

they are caused by the fact that the community has experienced or is experiencing serious negative effects of climate change and expects problems to worsen in the future.

Therefore, a decision to relocate is made after discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a possible move. Of course, potential relocators must have adequate financial and technical means. If they do not, then communities are forced to stay where they are, despite the dangers associated with climate change. In these cases, we are talking about involuntary immobility. However, it should not be forgotten that immobility can also be voluntary: people do not want to leave their homes even in the face of serious and onerous negative effects of climate change.

Experience of communities that have implemented planned resettlement

The researcher of practical cases of such migrations V. Boege (2018) and S. Klepp (2018) stated that the experience of communities regarding planned relocation is mixed. There may be a discrepancy between the promise of improved environmental security and livelihoods in the new locations and the reality faced by the displaced. They face problems of habitability of new places, housing and infrastructure, loss of traditional economic activities (e.g., fishing when moving from the coast to the interior) and, most importantly, loss of connection to ancestral land. Given these factors, the author found it problematic to present displacement as an adaptation to climate change, even though the documents of international climate summits consider it in this context.

Planned resettlement in response to climate emergencies has become a major concern for several Oceania countries. This is particularly the case in Fiji, where the government has identified 48 communities as being in urgent need of relocation, while 830 communities are considered so vulnerable that they will need to move soon. In 2018, the Fijian government issued Guidelines for Planned Resettlement and is currently developing Standard Operating Procedures for Resettlement (Boege, 2018). Several civil society and peacebuilding organisations in Fiji (Transcend Oceania, Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding, Pacific Conference of Churches, etc.) have worked or are working with communities that have been or are planning to be displaced. “Transcend Oceania has supported the Vunidogoloa, Vunisavisavi and Naviavia communities in this area and, based on its experience, has developed recommendations for decision-makers on how to approach resettlement, together with its partner organisation Conciliation Resources. They concluded that resettlement cannot be viewed and implemented as a one-off event; rather, it is a long-term, non-linear, complex process. To have a chance of success, it must be inclusive and holistic, consider different perspectives and experiences based on gender and age, and include not only material, technical, economic, social, and political aspects but also cultural and spiritual ones. In particular, it is recognised that cultural relevance and the use of traditional local knowledge of indigenous people are crucial to the success of planned community resettlement (Peacebuilding approaches..., 2022). In addition, communities should be widely involved in the planning of this process, as it is

ineffective for governments to impose it from above, without considering the needs and interests of the local population. Undoubtedly, political elites and local governments in many countries facing the negative effects of climate change, and consequently, environmental migration, are trying to find acceptable solutions.

Tuvalu’s ambitious projects to combat the negative effects of climate change

The case of Tuvalu is particularly interesting in this context. In 2022, S. Kofo, the Minister of Justice, Communications and Foreign Affairs of Tuvalu, declared the threatening scale of the emergency for this small island nation and presented several local projects as various models of climate change adaptation (Prime minister of..., 2022). One of the most ambitious is an attempt to physically elevate the islands on which the state is located. This is the so-called “Plan A”. However, he also acknowledged the need for a “Plan B” in case Tuvalu is completely submerged or becomes uninhabitable long before complete flooding, for example, due to lack of food and fresh water. This would mean that all residents of the country would need to move to another, safer place. In this case, Tuvalu would become the first country in the world to lose its physical dimension and its territory with its population and government would cease to exist in the natural environment but would continue to exist as a sovereign state.

The Tuvaluan government’s “Future Now” examines the implications of this worst-case scenario, raising fundamental – and fundamentally new from today’s perspective – legal and policy questions. These include the preservation of the country’s statehood, borders, and maritime laws through flooding or relocation; and the re-establishment of Tuvalu as a “digital nation” without physical territory (Project “Future Now”, 2021).

In any case, for Tuvalu and countries in a similar situation, “the key question is whether there is sufficient political will in the international community to positively interpret existing and any new perspectives, legal principles and concepts for enduring statehood, or at least legal personality, and incorporate them into existing legal norms and action plans” (An entire Pacific..., 2022). The government proposes two ways to address these issues: 1) reinterpreting existing international law and state practice to consider the fundamental climate change caused by the emergency and thus allow for the preservation of statehood and maritime zones, 2) or changing the framework of international law to consider these changes.

The purpose of Plan B is to make sure that Tuvalu can continue to exist as a state and maintain its sovereignty as well as its maritime rights even if it loses its physical territory. For this case, Minister Kofo developed the concept of Tuvalu as a “digital nation” – Tuvalu 2.0 with a digital government administrative system, with digitised historical documents, records of cultural practices, etc. Simon Kofo presented this plan in an address to the leaders of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change COP27 (November 2022) (Prime minister of..., 2022). He emphasised that the plan, which considers the “worst-case scenario”, envisages the creation of a digital twin of Tuvalu in the metaverse to recreate

its beautiful islands and preserve its rich culture. This is the story of a small island nation in the Pacific that faces a threat to its existence and seeks to preserve its sovereignty through technology.

Kofo suggests that three aspects of Tuvalu's national identity can be recreated in the metaverse: Firstly, it is a territory that reflects the natural beauty of Tuvalu, which can be interacted with in various ways (both physically and virtually). Secondly, it is a culture that represents the ability of the people of Tuvalu to interact with each other in a way that allows them to preserve their common language, norms and customs, regardless of where they are located. Thirdly, it is sovereignty - the earth's surface over which the government has sovereignty, and which can be transformed into virtual space.

The idea of virtualisation in Tuvalu

In theory, the idea of combining these technological capabilities with governance features for a "digital twin" of Tuvalu is technically feasible. However, there are significant technological and social challenges associated with connecting and digitising the elements that define an entire nation. For example, Tuvalu has only about 12,000 citizens. Real-time interaction between even such a small number of people, both among themselves and with various government institutions, is a rather difficult problem to solve in terms of practical implementation because their entire lives must be transferred to the real world. Currently, there is no positive experience of transferring an entire state into the virtual world.

Tuvalu's proposal to create a digital twin in the metaverse is a message in a bottle carried by the stormy waves of the oceans, a desperate response to a tragic situation. But there is also a coded message here for those who may see the transition to the virtual world as a response to the losses from climate change (An entire Pacific..., 2022). Even if Tuvalu is a special case, the problems associated with the impact of climate change on the future of some states demonstrate the very serious challenges that humanity will face shortly and for which, in the authors' opinion, it is not yet ready.

Another side of the problem should be considered – whether developed countries, in particular the developed countries of the "Pacific family" (Australia and New Zealand, members of the Pacific Islands Forum), are ready to accept climate migrants from Tuvalu and other Pacific microstates (The Pacific Islands..., 2014). The aspects that require in-depth study include the following: readiness to open their borders to environmental migrants, including the creation of special conditions or preferences under existing labour migration schemes, which are mainly based on the economic interests of Australia and New Zealand.

At a seminar at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand, representatives of the Australian and New Zealand governments and communities pointed to the lack of reliable data on climate mobility and the need to develop a regional approach to addressing the issue. They argued that enabling people to stay with their families and maintain their lifestyles in the community should be a priority. This idea is also reflected in the documents of many international organisations (Human mobility..., 2015).

However, in the context of the specific regional situation, the answer to the question posed has a different connotation – the developed countries of the Pacific are not ready for a massive influx of environmental migrants from neighbouring islands. Thus, the problem of environmental migration has two dimensions: for countries whose residents are forced to move to new places of residence and for recipient countries. Both sides need to prepare for such a scenario.

The state of regional cooperation in the fight against climate change

At present, it is possible to note certain steps being taken in this area at the regional level. For example, climate mobility is increasingly being considered in the context of sustainable development, peace, and stability, and reducing tensions in the region. Several initiatives have already been launched, led by regional organisations such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Forum (The Pacific Islands..., 2014), the Pacific Climate Change Centre (Pacific climate change..., 1993) and regional offices of the United Nations (UN) agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP Pacific Centre, 2023) or the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (IOM's regional office..., n.d.). The challenge is to bring together different approaches that address different policy levels, overlapping themes and time horizons, such as the Forum's long-term "Blue Pacific Strategy 2050" (2050 strategy for..., 2022), the medium-term Framework for Sustainable Development in the Pacific (2016) (2017-2030) and the related "Pacific Resilience Partnership" (2016). With the help of the European Union, which supports the capacity-building initiative through the Pacific Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience Project, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat launched the Climate Resilience for Sustainable Business training programme (Climate resilience..., 2023). In late February 2023, a Joint Regional Training Workshop for Climate Forecasting Services of the Republic of Korea and the Pacific Islands was held (Remarks: Acting SG..., 2023). Such initiatives are complemented by isolated national-level events. For example, in December 2022, the Government of Solomon Islands set out its climate finance priorities and developed a roadmap to improve the country's ability to access external resources for climate and disaster-related investments (Joint release: Solomon..., 2023).

The development of a "Regional Framework for Climate-Related Mobility" is particularly interesting and promising. Its goal is to guide Pacific governments in planning and managing climate mobility and create a broad platform for dialogue and cooperation. The framework being organised by the Pacific Migration and Human Security Programme (2020) concerning climate change involves not only governments but also academics and a wide range of civil society actors, not least churches as the most influential civil society organisations in the Pacific. The intention is to create a platform that will bring together representatives of Pacific Island countries and other stakeholders from civil society, academia, diplomatic missions and development partners. Countries participating in the regional policy dialogue: Cook Islands, Fiji,

Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and partners: UK High Commission Suva, New Zealand High Commission Fiji, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, UN Resident Coordinator's Office, etc. (Pacific climate change..., 2020).

While the programme tries to be as inclusive as possible, the challenge remains to bring together a wide range of actors from different scales, with different histories, interests, and agendas to plan, decide and implement policies and strategies. There is still an urgent need to improve the understanding of the climate-mobility nexus in the region.

Factors contributing to the transformation of climate conflicts from potential to violent

Based on existing observations in the Oceania region, experts suggest that the possibility of climate change-related conflicts turning from potential to actual and violent depends primarily on the four factors. Among them are the following: the severity and urgency of environmental degradation caused by climate change; Vulnerability and adaptive capacity of affected communities; the ability and willingness to use violence as a means of conflict management and problem-solving; fragility or stability of the social and political context (Campbell, 2022b).

While the first factor is beyond the scope of political intervention (at least in the local context), the impact of the others can be addressed through conflict prevention and sensitive policies. Thus, the adaptive capacity of communities should not be viewed as a technical issue, but in political, cultural, and social terms, and as largely dependent on actors and institutions. Of course, this does not mean that governments and public institutions are not important in climate change governance. They have the power to set the framework conditions for climate mitigation and adaptation at the national level and play a major role in linking the needs and interests of local populations to the international level by representing their people in international climate policy and in mechanisms for obtaining international assistance for climate change adaptation measures or directly (e.g. through the Green Climate Fund), or indirectly through development assistance, which increasingly includes climate change-related programmes and projects (The framework for..., 2016).

It is believed that such cooperation should involve a larger part of civil society, in particular those with the greatest influence, namely churches. According to J. Petzold & M.W.R. Beate (2015), the vast majority of Pacific Islanders are Christians. Regional government institutions may not extend far beyond urban centres, but churches exist in all territories. Churches, as well as other local civil society networks and associations, can play a role as a kind of "bridge" connecting the "local" and "external" worlds of the country and international climate change policy in a hybrid political order.

Much of the academic research on Oceania discusses climate mobility as a top-down process initiated by governments or development agencies and thus refers to planned relocation. Case studies from some countries

show that resettlement is more successful when communities are involved in the process (Burton *et al.*, 2002; Veitayaki, 2010). The authors believe that it should be not only about communities that are forced to move to safer areas but also about those who live there. Accordingly, the whole range of issues related to the relocation of climate migrants to new places (social, economic, cultural, land ownership, the capacity of infrastructure, educational and healthcare institutions to serve a larger population) should be discussed in advance with the participation of representatives of both communities. This will allow identifying potential problems and conflicts that may arise after such a move and developing measures to prevent or minimise them in advance. It is appropriate to educate the local population about the reasons for such a move and to form an appropriate perception of outsiders.

The planning, decision-making and implementation of climate policy require the joint efforts of such "connecting links" as churches, non-governmental organisations, business actors, civil society institutions and government agencies. The diaspora can also provide significant assistance. Effective climate change management depends on effective cooperation with these actors.

International donors, international organisations and international non-governmental organisations should support this framework, as integrated and holistic climate change governance based on complementarities and co-operation among all Oceania's actors is essential to prevent violent climate change-induced conflicts and manage climate mobility (Boege, 2022). Accordingly, international institutions wishing to provide financial and technical support should shift from a narrow techno-economic approach to an integrated and holistic approach that pays due attention to governance, culture, and spirituality.

In the case of planned migrations, it is essential to find a suitable location and carefully study the living conditions in the potential destination. In particular, care should be taken to ensure that the community does not end up in an environment with the same or even greater exposure to natural hazards (Stojanov *et al.*, 2021). An environment that contrasts significantly with the previous place of residence can cause problems not only in terms of economic, cultural, and daily life but also in terms of the emotional state of internally displaced persons. In this context, it is worth emphasising the importance of establishing psychological assistance services for such migrants. This issue is especially relevant in cases of unplanned displacement that occur as a result of extreme weather events or natural disasters. In the literature reviewed, the authors did not find any references to the post-traumatic stress disorder of those who faced it and measures of psychological support for environmental refugees.

The authors agree with the statements of scientists and expert opinions on the need to develop national strategies for the development of climate mobility, which should be developed with an integrated approach to many policy sectors and levels of government (Donner & Webber, 2014). The algorithm they contain can be used in cases of threats to environmental problems caused by a wider range of environmental impacts. At the same time, they will be ineffective in the case of spontaneous

environmental migrations caused by unexpected natural disasters. This makes it important to develop models of resettlement in such situations, which requires more research on the affected communities and a thorough study of their experiences. In the context of Russia's war against Ukraine and the growth of its pollution area, this aspect should become relevant in the field of environmental migration research in different regions of the world, including Oceania.

Conclusions

Thus, for several regions of the world, including Oceania, the problem of climate change is existential. It is currently driving the expansion of climate mobility in the region, which is one of the attempts to adapt to the negative effects of climate change. The effectiveness of these attempts depends on various factors and is not always linked to the efforts of governments or local communities. For some Oceania states, such as Tuvalu, the prospects are dramatic, as they threaten their physical disappearance through loss of territory (flooding) and the relocation of the population and government to other locations. Such prospects put on the agenda of the international community the task of revising the existing public law approach to the recognition of states, which is based on such traditional features as permanent population, territory, and government. The project of virtualising the existence of the state, which is being developed by the government of Tuvalu in case of the worst-case scenario due to the negative effects of climate change, is the first, but not the last, case of a new reality that humanity will face shortly. It brings to the fore a broad international debate on how to change international law in response to this trend. An

in-depth study of this aspect is seen as one of the prospects for further research.

Western scholars focused on the practical aspects of climate mobility, in particular planned internal resettlement, which is currently the most common. Based on empirical research, they identified several threats that could potentially provoke conflicts between migrants and the population of the territories where they settle. These include land ownership, access to infrastructure and food, cultural differences and traditions related to food security, the psychological trauma of migrants, and the lack of capacity of governments to cope with these challenges. These issues should be addressed and resolved in advance of planned resettlement, and with the involvement of community representatives from both sides, local authorities, and influential civil society actors. Considering the situation in Ukraine, where both unplanned and planned migration has increased as a result of the war against Russia.

Promising areas of the study include the creation of mechanisms for the psychological rehabilitation of persons and their rapid integration into the communities of their new places of residence. The possibility of creating temporary and permanent jobs for them and involving local business representatives in this process is also highlighted. An important element to study is the ways to modernise and expand the capacity of infrastructure and housing in these areas.

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Conflict of Interest

None.

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Регіональні історії кліматичної мобільності: Океанія

Анотація. Актуальність дослідження зумовлена як зростанням загроз впливу зміни клімату на Україну, так і воєнною агресією росії проти України, унаслідок чого зростає кількість осіб, що змінюють місце проживання унаслідок погіршення екологічної ситуації. Це актуалізує вивчення досвіду країн, що вже зіштовхнулись з екологічною міграцією. Метою статті було вивчення та узагальнення напрацювань західних дослідників щодо наслідків зміни клімату для країн Океанії, які розглядаються як загроза стабільності, безпеці та миру в регіоні та як чинник, що сприяє поширенню насильств і конфліктів у регіоні, а також внутрішнім і міжнародним переміщенням населення. Основними методами дослідження даної проблеми є: аналіз, індукція, дедукція та синтез, які дозволяють описати та висвітлити найважливіші аспекти проблеми екологічної міграції. У статті продемонстровано зв'язок зміни клімату з екологічною міграцією та розглянуто її типи. Проаналізовано роль різних акторів, регіональних та національних ініціатив у підвищенні ефективності цього процесу, а також кейс держави Тувалу, якій загрожує затоплення території й переселення всіх жителів та уряду в інші країни. Розглянуто ідею віртуалізації цієї держави – створення її двійника у метавсесвіті у випадку реалізації цього сценарію. Запропоновано шляхи покращення планування кліматичної мобільності та комплекс заходів, що може сприяти кращій інтеграції екологічних мігрантів до суспільств приймаючих сторін. Виявлено потенційні проблеми, що можуть призвести до конфліктних ситуацій у випадку переміщень з екологічних причин. Зроблено висновок, що негативні наслідки зміни клімату актуалізують розроблення змін у міжнародному законодавстві й глибинне дослідження цього аспекту науковцями та різними міжнародними, регіональними й локальними організаціями. Окреслено шляхи подальших досліджень проблеми екологічної міграції. Результати дослідження мають теоретичну й практичну цінність для екологів, істориків, соціологів, політиків й осіб, що займаються питаннями міграції

Ключові слова: кліматична мобільність; екологічна міграція; зміна клімату; конфлікт; сталий розвиток

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