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Solving the Border Issues of the USA and Canada in the Field of Joint Use of Water Resources

Abstract. The relevance of the research topic is justified by the fact that the USA and Canada have significant fresh water reserves, but they also experience a shortage of this resource, despite the fact that they are among the top five countries with the richest water resources in the world. In order to ensure the water security of the region and preserve the Great Lakes in a favorable condition, the United States and Canada have worked closely together for many years and share the fresh water resources of the Great Lakes, which is an example for other countries of the world. Based on relevance, the main goal of the article is the analysis of urgent border issues of the USA and Canada in the field of joint use of water resources. It is shown that the USA and Canada have adopted 21 legally binding documents, which recognize that these countries have a responsibility to all people currently living on our planet and to future generations to ensure the safety of this water source in the interests of all mankind, and that a balanced ecosystem approach is used in these countries as part of the climate change adaptation measures. It has been found that since the 1980s, concern has arisen in both countries that the diversion of Great Lakes water outside the basin area may impose negative consequences for the ecosystem and limit the possibilities of using these water reserves in the future. It has been proven that the effectiveness of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement has decreased in the conditions of increasing competition for water resources in North America. The fact is substantiated that the current management and control system of the Great Lakes waters under the 1909 Treaty is the best of all existing systems, although it requires improvement. On the one hand, the USA and Canada become increasingly aware of the value of their wealth called the "Great Lakes", but on the other hand, many trends indicate that the goal of states becomes joint cooperation for the purpose of preserving and enriching water resources as well as privatization and ensuring control over territories, including water, to meet their own needs. Besides the irrational use of water, which is observed both in water-poor regions of the United States and in water-rich regions of Canada, both sides of the border lack of vision for a unified water pricing policy. The article has practical significance for Ukraine, since the experience of the USA and Canada can be useful as an example of solving urgent problems in the field of providing our country with fresh water and preserving water resources

Keywords: cooperation, irrational use of water, Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, border issues, environmental problems, international agreements

Introduction

Water is the most important life support resource on Earth. The economic development of both individual countries and regions depends on its availability. The uneven distribution of fresh water reserves on the continents often became the cause of political, economic and social conflicts.

The main problematic issues include the fact that interstate water relations were previously limited to the shipping and trade matters. As from the middle of the 19th century, the aspects of water quality, water intake, transboundary impact of pollution and other issues requiring legal regulation become relevant. Since then and as of now, the situation regarding the water quality of the Great Lakes basin has been continuously monitored.

The article is primarily aimed at the analysis of pressing border issues of the USA and Canada in the field of joint use of water resources.

The topic of border issues of the USA and Canada in the field of joint use of water resources requires more attention of researchers and is not sufficiently researched. The authors who stand out among those investigating problematic issues in the field of joint use of water resources in the USA and Canada include the scientific works of P. Gleick "Global freshwater resources: Soft-Path solutions for the 21st century" [8], J. Linton and N. Hall "The Great Lakes: A model of trans-boundary cooperation" [12], S. Harry "Water in Canada: Myths and realities" [6] and

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A. Kataeva “Interaction between the USA and Canada regarding the exploitation of the Great Lakes water resources” [13], etc.

Today, due to the population growth and the increase in the water needs of industry and agriculture, the problem of water supply and preservation of water reserves is becoming more acute. As of now, countries with different political and economic development levels are vulnerable to the scarcity of such a resource as fresh water. The USA and Canada experience a shortage of this resource, despite the fact that they are among the top five countries with the richest water resources in the world [1]. The USA and Canada have been working together for many years to ensure the region's water security and preserve the Great Lakes in proper condition.

Various water consumption organizations in the USA and Canada explain that the issues related to the prevention of pollution of water resources are caused by intensity of consumption, depletion and reproduction of water resources. Massive consumption of fresh water in Canada is primarily related to energy production and industry, while the main consumers in the USA are industry and agriculture. In this context, not only the lack of drinking water is noted, but also its pollution. Indigenous communities in Canada have struggled for decades with poor and unsafe water, affecting tens of thousands of people. Despite government promises to improve water treatment facilities, dozens of local reserves across Canada still lack clean drinking water. In December 2021, the Canadian government allocated 8 billion Canadian dollars (5.6 billion euros) after several First Nations communities filed class action lawsuits seeking damages for decades of poor water quality. The Canadian government is also trying to replace existing water laws to create more equitable management of the country's drinking water systems [2]. In general, the causes of issues related to drinking water can be both economic and political in nature. The expansion of production requires actions aimed at preserving water resources, but most often it occurs without implementing systems for further conservation and limiting water consumption.

The Great Lakes Basin of North America is one of the largest water reservoirs in the world containing 21% of the world's fresh water reserves [3]. The Great Lakes are home to US metropolitan areas: Chicago, Milwaukee, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit. This region is also home to Toronto, Canada's second largest city. The Great Lakes are connected to the Mississippi River basins by a system of navigable canals that begins at Lake Erie (Chicago area) and runs through the Hudson River. More than 150 rivers and lakes, including the Great Lakes, are located along the common border between the USA and Canada.

Problems and Prospects of Cooperation in the Field of Protection and Maintenance of Water Quality

For the most effective cooperation in the field of protection and maintenance of water quality, the Framework Boundary Waters Treaty was signed between the USA and Great Britain in 1909, since Canada remained a British dominion at that time [4]. The most important factor in the

signing of the treaty was the diversion of the Chicago River made by the Americans. It was aimed at preventing sewage from the city of Chicago, which could not be treated at that time, from entering Lake Michigan, which was the source of drinking water for this city. In 1990, the construction of a new canal was completed, thanks to which the Chicago River began to flow in the opposite direction: from Lake Michigan through the Chicago and Illinois rivers to the Mississippi River and further south to the Gulf of Mexico. On the one hand, this made it possible to reduce the epidemic threat in Chicago, where 90 thousand people, which was almost 10% of the city's population, died of cholera in 1885 due to the fact that water intake was carried out from the same source where untreated sewage was discharged. On the other hand, as a result of the diversion of the Chicago River, the level of Lake Michigan decreased by almost 15 cm, which led to the deterioration of water supply to settlements along the shores of the Great Lakes, including those in Canada [5].

Many controversial situations have arisen over time, which cannot be resolved solely by this document. To resolve disputes, the International Joint Commission (IJC) was created, which is empowered to resolve conflicts. This body has the right to make decisions regardless of the state's position. States are obliged to implement the decisions made by the Commission. The 1944 Treaty states that “boundary waters are an invaluable resource belonging to the peoples of Canada and the United States” and that the governments of both countries “are responsible for managing these resources and ensuring a safe and abundant supply of clean water” [6].

The US economy began to develop especially intensively after the Second World War, when an unprecedented growth of industry was observed. Industrial, household and other sewage flowed into water bodies without any treatment. The oxygen content in the lakes decreased significantly, fish began to die [7]. The concentration of mercury, pesticides and other pollutants many times exceeded the permissible norm. The use and discharge of toxic chlorine-containing compounds (DDT, PCBs) and synthetic fertilizers into water systems led to their introduction into food chains.

In the late 1960s, 40% of the US water system could not be used for fishing or swimming due to water pollution. At the same time, large volumes of pollutants were discharged into the Great Lakes. In particular, in the early 1970s, Lake Erie became practically “dead” due to intense pollution. Until the beginning of 1970, the lakes were polluted with harmful substances due to insufficient treatment of industrial wastewater as well as fertilizer and waste present in surface runoff. Thus, during this period, the waters of Lake Erie had excess phosphorus, algae blooms and decreased fish population. Local aquatic species were particularly affected [7].

Adopted in 1909, the Treaty provides for a system of joint management of divided waters, in which one cannot obtain a unilateral advantage, since decisions are made by voting of the Specially Authorized Parties to the Treaty, which are represented in the IJC on a parity basis. Actions that may cause adverse consequences are blocked by the voting mechanism, which is the indisputable advantage

of decisions of the IJC over federal court decisions [8]. The Commission intensified its consideration of environmental protection issues after World War II, as public concern grew in both countries about the Great Lakes water quality. In 1964, the governments of the USA and Canada addressed the Commission with a request on this issue. The 1970 IJC final report prepared in response to a request contained a comprehensive assessment of pollution in Lakes Erie and Ontario as well as specific recommendations for achieving “water quality improvement goals” [9].

In 1972, the Agreement on the quality of waters in the Great Lakes and joint actions for their improvement was signed [10]. The USA and Canada decided to conduct joint work on treating the Great Lakes, which resulted not only in water quality improvement, but also sharply reduced the discharge of pollutants. In 1978, amendments were introduced to the Agreement, which requires applying an ecosystem approach in the implementation of environmental protection measures and fight against persistent chemical pollutants. The Protocol to the 1987 Agreement [11] defines that the priorities of the environmental protection policy include the reduction of phosphate load, pollution coming from the air and from land, as well as the prevention of bottom pollution in order to prevent secondary pollution of groundwater. The planned measures resulted in a reduction in the discharge of toxic chemicals into the lake. At the end of the 1980s, the content of toxic substances in water was reduced by 82%. But in 1990, the situation worsened again. Acid rain has been recognized as a factor that constantly negatively affects the quality of water in the Great Lakes. It was found out that up to 96% of chlorine enters the water from the atmosphere. According to Noah Hall, the relevance of transboundary water cooperation between the USA and Canada is obvious. The Agreement should be preserved and revised, as the Commission does not have sufficient leverage to resolve disputes in this area between states [12].

In the early 1990s, the USA and Canada, continuing their cooperation to preserve the water resources of the Great Lakes, formed the Great Lakes Binational Toxics Strategy. This project envisages the implementation of joint measures to replace highly toxic chemicals in industrial cycles with low-toxic ones, with the gradual abandonment of substances dangerous to human health and the environment. Many experts highly appreciate the cooperation between the USA and Canada on the issue of preserving the Great Lakes, however, despite a number of joint measures aimed at implementing plans to prevent pollution and depletion of water resources, there are still serious differences in the process of implementing the joint Strategy. The main reason for such disagreements is the different interests of the states. The issue of water export and import is acute. Canada is the owner of territories where problems with water supply are minimal, while the USA is interested in ensuring that water is constantly supplied to arid areas, such as the west and southwest of the country [13].

In September 2012, the USA and Canada agreed to introduce further amendments to the bilateral 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement [14]; previous amendments to this Agreement were adopted in 1983 and 1987. On the one hand, the adoption of such amendments meant

a significant change in the environmental dimension of US foreign policy. After all, for the first time an agreement of this kind included a requirement to correlate the water management measures with the goals and objectives of international cooperation on the climate change issue. Before the administration of B. Obama came to power, the USA refused to include theses on climate change in international agreements on environmental protection issues. However, just as in previous editions of the Agreement, the new edition does not contain specific obligations of the parties to reduce water pollution, such as norms for the maximum content of mercury in water. As a result, as stated by J. Bruce and K. Wood, the quality of water in the Great Lakes continues to decrease [15].

In 2004, the International Law Association (Water Resources Committee) summarized the international experience on the use of transboundary water bodies in a new document called the “Berlin Rules on Water Resources” [16]. Most of its provisions can be applied to both surface and underground waters, with the exception of sea waters. These rules express both the legal norms currently in force and the trends of their development. They indicate that “Basin states shall cooperate in good faith in the management of waters of the international drainage basin for mutual benefit” [17, p. 11], “states within their territory manage the waters of the international drainage basin in a fair and reasonable manner, with due consideration of the obligation not to cause significant harm to other basin states” [16, p. 12]. The list of factors that are taken into account when determining the fair and reasonable use of a watercourse [16, p. 13] was supplemented by the sustainability of planned or existing uses and minimization of damage to the environment.

Modern international water relations law is based on the common interests of the states of the transboundary water body. When using it, the basin approach should be applied, i.e. the water system is considered as a whole for the neighboring (coastal) states, while preserving their national sovereignty. Any interaction between states that share water resources should be peaceful and should be carried out on the principles of reciprocity, recognition of the integrity of the basin of the transboundary water body and the most rational use of water resources for the common good of these states. States should exchange relevant information, notify each other of planned activities capable of causing significant damage, and resolve disputes peacefully. Neighboring states conclude agreements in the field of water cooperation, develop and implement measures aimed at using and protecting transboundary water bodies (according to the basin principle) [18].

Solving Urgent Issues of Conserving the Great Lakes Water Reserves

In the context of the restrictive policies of the International Joint Commission governing the Great Lakes of the United States and Canada, there were two important transboundary studies on adaptation to climate change. These are the “Great Lakes St. Lawrence River basin sustainable water resources agreement (1999-2005)” [19] and the “International Upper Great Lakes study (2007-2012)” [20]. Both comprehensive studies were carried out by an independent binational

Scientific Research Council with the participation of the Advisory Group comprising interested public representatives and technical support groups, each of which included about 200 scientists, engineers, ecologists and economists.

Both studies were aimed at improving the rules of regulation and rational use of lake resources in the interests of more effective execution of the tasks established in the 1909 Treaty (ensuring navigation, generation of hydroelectric power, municipal water supply and irrigation). In addition, it was envisaged to improve the functioning of the ecosystem, the movement of recreational vessels and recreation, the reduction of erosion and damage caused by natural disasters. This requires improving management, taking into account historical data on the water level in the lakes and inflows of water into them, developing climate change scenarios. Specific tasks are set in the prescriptions of the Scientific and Research Council concerning both studies: to ensure the maximum economic and ecological sustainability of the system, to improve its socially significant characteristics and to develop different measures for fair distribution of benefits (the benefits of one sector should not be achieved at the expense of another sector). In particular, it was established that all recommended solutions had to be effective under several climate change scenarios, and the proposed management solutions should include adaptation mechanisms capable of responding to short-term unexpected situations and being flexible in order to quickly adapt to changing water and climate regimes [21].

The proposed solutions made it possible to improve key indicators of the state of the ecosystem, expand the possibilities of recreational shipping (a multibillion-dollar business) and reduce coast damage caused by floods. Tangible results were achieved thanks to the use of flexible rules for the operational regulation of water resources in combination with a comprehensive adaptive plan, the central elements of which included measures aimed at regulating the situation on land, such as new floodplain zoning rules, flood warning mechanisms and a number of other management measures on the level of local authorities [21].

Finally, long-term adaptation plans were developed that take into account the consequences of unforeseen climate changes, which cannot be eliminated by water level regulation alone and in connection with which the participation of authorities at other levels is required in the implementation of adaptation options related to land infrastructure (land use regulations, land zoning criteria, rules for conducting construction works on flooded lands, evacuation plans in case of emergency situations, etc.). Each of the mentioned plans was approved and adopted by the International Joint Commission that manages the Great Lakes water resources, as well as the governments of Canada and the USA [21].

Since the 1980s, concern has arisen in both countries that the diversion of Great Lakes water beyond their basin territory may have negative consequences for the ecosystem and limit the possibilities of using the corresponding water in the future [18]. An urgent border issue in the relations between the USA and Canada has become the fact that the large-scale use of water resources in the

USA and the inhabited part of Canada has led to serious environmental and socio-economic problems, primarily the pollution of surface and underground waters. There are discussions about the possibility of transferring water resources from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River to meet the needs during the hot period of the year in the USA. At the same time, the intensification of agriculture and the growth of urban settlements and the population in general have led to a large-scale increase in diffused pollution as a result of stormwater runoff from urban areas, the washing off excess fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides and other chemical from agricultural fields, pastures and livestock complexes. According to experts, this type of diffused pollution has become a new challenge in the last two decades for the North American continent [19].

In the period between 2001 and 2005, eight US states within the Great Lakes basin negotiated and signed an innovative document – Great Lakes St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement. According to it, the possibilities of water diversion outside the Great Lakes basin are significantly limited. Even smaller communities located in the area between the Great Lakes and other river drainage basins are required to adhere to high standards of water protection in order to access water sources that are located only a few kilometers from the territory of the respective communities [19]. The important factors during these negotiations included climate change, which the Agreement proponents used to justify their proposal to limit the range of users of the basin waters, which contain one fifth of all the world's fresh water resources, only to users within this basin. Agreement proponents have used the support of a binational body (the International Joint Commission (IJC)) created on the basis of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the USA and Canada to advocate for a balanced, ecosystem-based water management approach. Based on requests from the governments of the countries participating in the Agreement, the IJC is empowered to conduct investigations and make recommendations on cross-border issues. To prepare relevant recommendations, the IJC appoints an expert council with an equal number of participants from each country participating in the Agreement. In 1999, the governments of the USA and Canada agreed to the development of an arbitration decision of the IJC on the issue of water withdrawal from the Great Lakes basin. In the 2000 IJC report on the said appeal, experts concluded that the Lakes are “highly sensitive to climate variability” and, referring to global climate change, recommended a restrictive, weighted approach to water withdrawal from the Lakes basin [23].

The Treaty on the Columbia River, the length of which is approximately 2,000 km, turned out to be important; the height difference between the source of the river in Lake Columbia and its mouth is 820 meters. The rivers mainly flow from Canada to the USA. However, the Kootenay River first flows south to the United States, then returns to the territory of Canada and flows into the main channel of the Columbia River. The main channel of the Columbia River system and the Kootenay River system account for less than 15% of the total area of the Columbia River basin. However, these rivers account for approximately

35% of the total water flow in the Portland area, which becomes up to 50% during flood periods. The waters of the Canadian part of this basin directly flow into Roosevelt Lake, a reservoir near the Grand Coulee Dam, and decisively influence electricity generation at the large power plant of the same name. The upper Columbia River system and the Kootenay River system have a high variability of seasonal water flow: in the period of maximum water level (in June), water flow is more than 40 times greater than the volume of flow during the low water season (in January). The annual runoff volume is subject to significant (up to fourfold) changes [21]. The Columbia River Treaty (negotiations for its conclusion continued from 1961 to 1964) focused on flood control, power generation in the Canadian part of the Columbia River basin and four “treaty dams” managed on the basis of intra-basin decisions. According to the said Treaty, Canada provides reservoir capacity of 15.5 million acre feet, and the United States paid Canada 64.4 million dollars for half the previous flood damage avoided over 60 years (until 2024) under “guaranteed annual flood action plans”. It is envisaged that the USA may request Canada to take additional urgent flood control measures with the payment of additional compensation to Canada for the relevant services, but no such requests have been received so far [22].

The USA and Canada share the benefits of the implementation of estimated energy opportunities in the USA on an equal basis, which are associated with flow regulation at the projects located in Canada that are covered by the Columbia River Treaty. Benefits in the form of increased electricity generation are calculated based on forecasts of optimal, not actual, electricity generation. Therefore, regardless of how the USA decides to actually operate its dams, Canada will receive 50% of the projected agreed electricity and reservoir volumes. The USA has undertaken to annually provide Canada with half of the electricity, which, according to calculations, can be conducted by using the capacity of the reservoir provided for by the Treaty on the territory of Canada; the value of such supplies currently amounts to approximately \$250-350 million per year [22].

According to the Treaty, the USA was allowed to build the Libby Dam, which was constructed in 1973 and the reservoir of which (Koocanoosa) extends 67 km into the territory of the British Columbia province in Canada. No direct compensation has been provided to Canada, but it benefits from the regulated flow of water from the Libby Dam, which feeds Canadian HPPs along the Kootenay River in British Columbia and helps control flooding of the Kootenay and Columbia Rivers [22].

Conclusions

Thus, the Great Lakes are one of the largest sources of fresh water in the world, supplying millions of people and accounting for half of the trade between the USA and Canada. Therefore, there is a threat of conflicts provoked by the water issue between the two countries. In particular, new hydroelectric plants in the James Bay that were designed to supply water to the northeastern part of the United States create an environmental threat to the population of Canada. Large amounts of sulfur and nitrogen still enter

Canada's fresh waters and soils from the American industrial centers. Although emissions of pollutants have decreased over time, the waters of the Lakes still contain large amounts of harmful substances and may continue to have an oxidizing effect. The surrounding soil becomes unsuitable for the growth of forests due to the high alkali level, which, in turn, inhibits the process of water purification from oxidation.

In 2006, the United States organized an armed guard of the Great Lakes, justifying its actions by the fact that water is a resource of the future and that further lowering of the water level in the Great Lakes threatens the national security of the United States. Canada condemns such unilateral actions because existing treaties provide for joint solutions to any issues related to the Great Lakes security. The governors of several northern US states ignored the IJC principles, which controls the water quality of the Great Lakes, by adopting an amendment to the agreement on the diversion of water for new US settlements.

The effectiveness of the 1909 Treaty and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement is declining under conditions of competition for water resources in North America. Against this background, it must be recognized that the Great Lakes water management and control system of 1909 is the best of all known joint projects, although it requires improvement. The current demands create a need to develop new programs and review policy priorities to improve water quality. The establishment of numerous institutions, organizations and communities that govern the Great Lakes adversely affect the implementation of the agreed principles. Even members of the US Congress and the Canadian Parliament hesitate to answer the question of what is the difference in the competence of these or other organizations operating in the field of exploitation and conservation of water resources of the Great Lakes?

Therefore, the USA and Canada are becoming increasingly aware of the value of their common wealth called the “Great Lakes”, and there are a number of trends that indicate that the goal of the states is cooperation aimed at preserving and enriching water resources, while privatization and ensuring control over territories, in particular, water ones, have to satisfy their own, separate needs at the same time. The problem of irrational water use is observed both in the water-poor regions of the USA and in the water-rich regions of Canada. Both sides of the border lack of vision for a unified water pricing policy. At the current stage, consideration of the issue of improving the joint water use regime in the region has been delayed. After the 2015 Canada elections and 2016 USA elections, the following rounds of negotiations on the water issue did not take place. Canada's environmental policy has maintained its focus on energy imperatives since the Liberal administration came to power. The US Republican administration of D. Trump and the activities of his Environmental Protection Agency did not provide positive signals in the field of environmental protection and natural resources depletion prevention. The current progress on the important issue of shared use of water resources is associated with the position of the J. Biden administration, which is expected to take active actions in this area.

The main directions for further development include studying the conflict of interests of countries that own transboundary water resources. In this context, the USA and Canada created and support the mechanism of the Boundary Waters Treaty, which, subject to the necessary periodic updates, quite effectively allows settling

the economic and political contradictions of these states in modern conditions based on the coinciding ecological interests of both parties. In the future, the militarization of the Great Lakes region may become one of the factors complicating the relations between the two countries on water resources issues.

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Вирішення прикордонних проблем США і Канади в сфері спільного використання водних ресурсів

Анотація. Показано, що такі країни як США і Канада забезпечені значними запасами прісної води, однак і вони відчувають дефіцит цього ресурсу, незважаючи на те, що вони входять в першу п'ятірку найбагатших водними ресурсами країн світу. З метою забезпечення водної безпеки регіону, збереження Великих озер в сприятливому стані США і Канада тісно співпрацюють протягом багатьох років. Запасами прісної води Великих озер Канада і США користуються спільно. У цих двох країнах прийняті юридично обов'язкові 21 документи, в яких визнається, що на цих країнах лежить відповідальність перед усіма людьми, що нині живуть на нашій планеті і перед майбутніми поколіннями за забезпечення схоронності цього джерела води в інтересах всього людства, і в цих країнах в рамках заходів адаптації до зміни клімату застосовується зважений екосистемний підхід. Починаючи з 1980-х рр. в обох країнах виникла стурбованість з приводу того, що відведення води Великих озер за межі території басейну цих озер може мати негативні наслідки для екосистеми і обмежити можливості використання відповідних вод в майбутньому. Доведено, що, в умовах конкуренції, що загострюється за водні ресурси в Північній Америці ефективність Договору 1909 р. і Угоди з якості вод Великих озер знижується. На цьому тлі необхідно визнати той факт, що на сьогоднішній день система управління і контролювання вод Великих Озер 1909 р. є найкращою з усіх діючих, хоча і потребує вдосконалення. З одного боку, сьогодні США і Канада все більше усвідомлюють цінність свого багатства під назвою «Великі озера», з іншого боку, багато тенденцій говорять про те, що метою держав стає спільне співробітництво з метою збереження і збагачення водних ресурсів, а приватизація та забезпечення контролю над територіями, в тому числі водними, для задоволення власних потреб. Крім нераціонального використання води, яке спостерігається як в бідних водою регіонах США, так і в забезпечених водними ресурсами регіонах Канади, по обидва боки кордону констатується відсутність бачення єдиної політики ціноутворення на воду

Ключові слова: США, Канада, водні ресурси, проблеми прикордоння, екологічні проблеми, міжнародні договори

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Cross-Border Regionalism in European Integration Strategies: A Conceptual Dimension

Abstract. At the turn of the millennium, the issues of borders and border territories that arose as a result of the reinterpretation of the place and role of national states and supranational entities became the focus of social analysis. Scientific attention to cross-border strategies of European integration processes is determined both by a new vision of the phenomenon of regionalism and the characteristic features of territorial identities. The relevance of the study of cross-border regionalism lies in the awareness of the increasing specific weight of territoriality in the modern world system and the need to find algorithms to answer the challenges of our time, which are marked by “binding to the territory”. The purpose of the article is the theoretical and methodological study of models and concepts of cross-border cooperation, which are formed under the influence of interconnected processes of globalization and regionalization within the European space. The current conditions of functioning of countries in the context of cross-border cooperation necessitate the substantiation of conceptual approaches to uncovering the essence of the cross-border region as a methodological construct. The application of geopolitical and geohistorical methodology determines the representation of the essential characteristics of cross-border regionalism as well as the determination of the role and place of border regions in European integration strategies. As a result of the study, it was proven that the effectiveness of cross-border cooperation depends on the extent, to which the historical traditions, mentality and social attitudes of the population of the border areas are taken into account in the process of creating Euroregions. It has been found that the minimization of risks caused by the long-term development of societies within various state organizations directly depend on the degree of scientific understanding of the specifics, potential and opportunities of cross-border regions, as well as the variability of value orientations and behavioral stereotypes. It was determined that the “transparency” of borders is a powerful resource for the balanced development of states, increasing the role of cross-border dynamics in the sphere of economy, culture, and ecology. The practical significance of the study is determined by the representation of spatial trends in the coordination of European integration strategies, the development of regional identity, and the decentralization of decision-making. Increasing scientific knowledge about cross-border regionalism will help to better understand the role and place of Ukraine in the modern world and bring it closer to entering the European political space

Key words: borders, regionalization, cross-border cooperation, Euroregion, regional integration, European space, identity

Introduction

The structure and dynamics of the modern global space largely depends on the competent use of the contact and barrier potential of borders. Their “transparency”, being one of the preconditions and consequences of globalization processes, should still have its limits, however, abuse of the border’s barrier function can become an obstacle to the formation of a transport corridor necessary for international exchanges. Each state must strive to maintain an optimal balance that ensures its inclusion in the system of international relations and protects from unwanted interventions at the same time. Mobility and transparency of borders is a requirement dictated by the laws of modern political development and the realities of international cooperation. It is obvious that border regions are characterized by many specific features, which

is why they deserve special attention in the theory and practice of regionalism.

Regionalism has now become a brand that at the same time reflects the division of social space into various socio-cultural organizations and acts as a key tool for structuring social relations on the basis of networks. In this context, there are processes of formation of multi-level identities, including those related to the subnational and supranational levels and not necessarily included in the clear spatial framework of administrative-territorial organizations and states. The growing political activity of regional actors sharply increases the “innovative capacity” of the relevant bodies, primarily those embodying the “upward” regionalization, but also traditionally associated with the “downward” type to a large extent. However, only the near future will show to what extent the network type

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of regional interaction is more effective compared to the hierarchical one.

It is very problematic to unequivocally assess modern global transformational trends. On the one hand, there is a powerful integration strategy, the most striking manifestation of which was the creation of the European Union, the development of transnational cooperation networks, and the growth of information and cultural exchanges. From the other hand, the deepening of global differentiation in consumption levels and signs of a lack of resources provoked a distinct “logic of negativity” – increased aggressiveness, destructive bursts of religious fundamentalism, xenophobia, etc. It is only possible to approach the understanding of the prospects of these transformational processes on the basis of updated cognitive approaches, which are focused on the inclusion of the complex dynamics of centripetal and centrifugal processes, tracing the formation of hybrid identities, management and communication networks. Interstate borders, ethnic and other boundaries will structure the space for a long time, but their role will transform (hopefully synchronously) with global changes in the economic, social, and communicative areas of human interaction.

Meanwhile, we have to state that a modern person has found themselves in a situation where all space-time boundaries become conditional and blurred. Technological overcoming of space-time distances sharply differentiates the conditions of existence of local societies; for some of them, the inability to adapt to the realities of the globalized world becomes “a sign of poverty and degradation” [1, p. 18]. At the same time, the very concept of the border has undergone significant transformations. D. Zamyatin draws attention to the openness of the very image of Europe, which is inevitably “creeping” towards the East and “shifting” to Eurasia. Therefore, the European continent becomes not so much a geographical unit as an intellectual construct, a political and ideological project, which, according to O. Hnatiuk, “can mean absolutely everything and nothing.” Linguistic, historical and cultural criteria, by which the Europe is usually defined are becoming equally problematic. The linguistic criterion is related to the linguistic heterogeneity of European countries, the cultural one is related to the lack of homogeneous cultural identity even within the borders of one nation-state, and the historical one is related to differences in historical memory [2, pp. 139-147]. Such conditions no longer enable to “catch” and record the essence of these changes, relying only on traditional social analysis methods. More and more often, experts alarmingly note the uncertain state of the “diffuse” world system, the elusive elements of “fluid cross-border geography”, the disintegration of the former West-East and North-South formats of relations [3, pp. 70-84].

According to W. Beck, Modern European reality is characterized by hybrid forms of “new territory defined by political, ethnic and traditional cultural boundaries, but not tied to the land” [4, p. 289]. The process of its formation is closely related to the establishment of regionalism, the implementation of processes of regionalization of space and the strengthening of European integration. Regionalization occurs as ideologically legitimized integration, which is understood as a “return” to the historical concept

of Europe, according to which regions were political subjects, unlike modern states [5, pp. 7-28]. Regionalization strategies are being approved as a result of strengthening regional and local claims to subjectivity, as well as weakening the role of state institutions in the organization of administration, social and cultural development, and identity formation. Cross-border regionalism is seen as an effective tool for increasing regional subjectivity, stability and strengthening the identity, establishing integration relations with related spaces separated by political borders.

The purpose of the research is the theoretical and methodological study of models and concepts of cross-border cooperation, which are formed under the influence of interconnected processes of globalization and regionalization within the European space. The current conditions of functioning of countries in the context of cross-border cooperation necessitate the substantiation of conceptual approaches to uncovering the essence of the cross-border region as a methodological construct. The application of geopolitical and geohistorical methodology determines the representation of the essential characteristics of cross-border regionalism as well as the determination of the role and place of border regions in European integration strategies.

Dynamics of Integration Processes

Integration sentiments in Europe had the idea of Europeanism as their initial foundation, which is based on the myths about the civilizational superiority of Western European peoples, inherited from antiquity and established in the practices of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment. But the realization that the experience of the restoration of the Holy Roman Empire was far from positive in any way forced to look for other integration pillars. One of them was the idea of “PanEurope”, actively developed in the 1920s and 1930s by R. von Coudenhove-Kalergi, A. Brian and others. In the post-war context, it was replaced by three different versions of the idea of federalism. “Federalism by installment” by J. Monnet was based on the ideas of gradually carried out economic integration. In the 1980s, it was supplanted by the radical federalism of A. Spinelli with an emphasis on political integration and the personalist federalism of R. Aron, U. Mounier, and D. Rops. Collectively, they pioneered a neo-federalist approach. At the same time, the search for integration projects was conducted along economic lines. In the late 1930s, German economists began to lay the theoretical foundation for the corresponding strategy; it was a long-term integration project under the banner of “economic community”. But opportunities for its implementation arose only after the defeat of the Third Reich within the context of the implementation of the “Marshall Plan”. US aid in restoring the economic potential of Europe was also intended for the Soviet Union, but the USSR refused it, as it had its own plans for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, the “Marshall Plan” became a factor in the European split.

Beginning in 1951, the outlines of the “European House” gradually began to emerge – four decades passed from the signing of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community to the Maastricht Agreement in 1992. During this time, the concept and practice

of EU integration construction was based on three fundamental principles: “integration is a tool, not a goal”, “integration should be done gradually”, “integration requires an adequate mechanism” [6, p. 437]. The fundamentally new system of European law created in accordance with these conceptual guidelines is subject to the task of a gradual transition from supranational entities to the Europe of regions. A special intergovernmental organization, the Council of Europe, founded in 1949, performs the role of a kind of “school of democracy”. Its main tasks are the struggle for human rights, strengthening pluralistic democracy, environmental protection, etc. One of the priority tasks can be described by the formula “Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe”. Not everyone agrees that the term “Europeanization” is the best in this case, as there can be seen the signs of Eurocentrism or “colonial power”. Although many people think that the term “EU-ization” would be more adequate to denote the influence of the EU on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it has not taken root yet [7, pp. 5-7].

The theoretical foundation of European integration is provided by the concept of “Europe of Regions”. The term was coined by the Swiss writer and public figure D. de Rougemont, who advocated the decentralization of management functions on a European scale. In order to strengthen the role of regions in integration processes, the European Regional Development Fund was created in 1975, which aimed at minimizing differences in the levels of development of countries and the development of regional infrastructure. The Assembly of European Regions, which has been operating since 1985, united 300 territorial communities with a population of about 400 million people at the end of the century. The “Declaration on Regionalism” adopted by it is based on the principles of capital concentration, joint financing of targeted programs, priority of individual rights over the rights of the community. One of the main principles was the principle of subsidiarity that lies in the transfer of specific management decisions to the level closest to the person. It actually reoriented the solution of social problems to the regional level. The regions were recognized as active subjects of EU policy and had the right to independently enter the international arena. The budget policy was formed “upwards”, from the region to the state. At the same time, the regions had different statuses, which were determined independently. The Committee of the Regions, established in 1994 under the Maastricht Agreement, was a consultative body comprising representatives of European regional and local authorities. The main attention was paid to problematic regions, which are taken care of by the European Regional Development Fund.

Since the second half of 2011, the European Union is going through hard times – the financial crisis is deepening and expanding, but not all states are ready to implement austerity measures to overcome it. There are insurmountable institutional and political differences between the federal core and the countries that refuse to join the euro zone. As F. Heissburg noted in the pages of the “Le Monde” newspaper, “those who closely followed the decline in the 1980s, and then the collapse of the Soviet empire, cannot help but draw some striking analogies to the current

situation in the European Union. In both cases, we observe a loss of economic viability and an erosion of economic growth, despite all the differences between these two systems” [8]. T. Snyder quite precisely defined the role of the EU and its prospects in 2003. “The European Union, he noted, is attractive not because of its common achievements (acquis communautaire), but because of the way of life it offers (savoir-faire). That is why it was convinced that the significance of this attractive ideal for Ukrainians will only grow” [9, p. 366].

Features and Forms of Cross-Border Regionalism

Regardless of the fate of the European Community in the future, we can confidently say that its contribution to the modern world structure and to the search for new forms of integration is incomparable. After all, new forms of integration and new models of movement of goods, services, capital and people have emerged and established themselves on the EU soil. This is where cross-border regions appeared, which are border territories with economic, cultural, transport, ecological cooperation, which embodied the thousand-year experience of “free cities” on a large territory from Italy to the Netherlands. And although the legal forms of cross-border cooperation are not clearly established and properly regulated, varying from a “joint partnership agreement” to a “partnership with the legal entity rights”, one cannot help but see as an effective form of cooperation “across borders” was born before our eyes. Cross-border regions are represented as a “further improvement” of new economic development indicators. Their boundaries are determined by modern practices of regionalism, and their emergence is connected with the desire of regional elites to focus on their economic and political interests. A noticeable reorientation towards transnational projects is gradually taking place in some state strategies.

Experts derive the idea of cross-border regionalism from the end of the 19th century. In 1875, France and Spain first created a bilateral commission for cooperation in the Pyrenees region [10, p. 158]. During the time that has passed since then, the forms of cooperation have changed and diversified many times. Three stages usually stand out in the history of European cross-border cooperation. The first began with the establishment of the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) in 1969, within the framework of which the process of coordinating the activities of the authorities of these regions and their official recognition by the bodies of the European Union began. The starting point of the second stage was the signing by the member states of the Council of Europe of the 1980 Madrid Framework Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation between Territories. In 1984, in accordance with this convention, the status of AEBR was revised. The third stage is associated with the adoption of the European Charter of Local Self-Government and the Community Charter on Regionalization in 1985-1986. These documents initiated the reform of the European structural funds, which included special measures for the development of cross-border regions. The reform entered the stage of practical implementation in January 1989. The INTERREG regional programs were adopted in the following year [11, pp. 150-151].

International scientists distinguish three “floors” of cross-border regionalism. The first includes cross-border regional associations, natural economic territories, “triangles (zones) of growth”. Starting from the middle of the 20th century, cooperation at this level has evolved from the joint use of resources or the construction of infrastructure facilities to the integration of production capacities, albeit within spatially limited frameworks. The second “floor” of cross-border regionalism is the most common and most massive category of regional integration associations – subregional unions. Such associations provide a higher level of institutionalization, a wider scope of goals, tasks and spheres of cooperation. The highest “floor” of regionalism is represented by transnational associations, the organizational framework of which covers parts of neighboring macro-regions. Since the process of large-scale transregional cooperation takes place on all continents, the conclusion about the transformation of modern regionalism into a coherent system that provides stability to the development of the entire world society is no longer disputed [12, pp. 168-177].

R. Kalitchak defines cross-border regionalism as an integrated form of coordination of cooperation between neighboring states implemented in compliance with national legislation and relevant international agreements. The motivational drivers of such cooperation are: economic – the search for additional investment resources, latest technologies, sales markets, capable of improving the economic situation of the region; historical and cultural – joint actions regarding the preservation and spread of minority languages, cultural assets, historical heritage; political – enabling autonomous actions of the regions in the international arena; public – aimed at establishing closer ties between residents of border regions and active implementation of various exchange programs [13, p. 76]. Cross-border regionalism can manifest itself in various forms – localism and provincialism, subculturalism and traditionalism, ethno-national communication and cultural interaction, transnational integration and economic cooperation.

Cross-border regionalism is able to influence the activities of states and become an effective factor in the formation of internal regional policy at the expense of external cooperation. It is also a kind of “subnational diplomacy” as a reaction to drastic changes in the modern world, as it is obvious that national states do not have mechanisms for solving global problems. The cross-border space is characterized by a state of “fluidity”, which is manifested in the flexibility of rules and narratives, as well as the mobility of center-periphery forms of interaction. The regions are regarded in the discourse of cross-border regionalization as “spaces of contact”, spatial structures with higher priority than states, “exemplary forms of state cross-border intervention”, “institutionalized entrepreneurs”, “self-governing political subjects that retain the potential for independence, democracy and rescaling” [14, pp. 77-91].

In the vision of D. de Rougemont, the author of the “Europe of Regions” concept, cross-border regionalism acts as an integrative form of spatial cooperation, which aims at creating a sense of connectedness, interdependence and common interests of societies on different sides of the borders. Such a conceptual definition formulated back in the

70s of the last century has already become largely outdated. Emphasis was placed on the unity of the potential region “from the point of view of geography, history, ecology, ethnic groups and economic opportunities”, which is hindered by state sovereignties [15, p. 35]. In practice, however, it turned out that the cross-border cooperation level is affected not so much by the inhibiting influence of the sovereignties of the states along both sides of the borders, as by the historically formed inequality of economic opportunities. “The more modern is the representation of the cross-border region as a contact space divided by the sovereignties of neighboring countries, which has a historical and cultural affinity, a complex of national, regional, social elements that contribute to its interaction with the border regions to preserve and develop its living space” [16, pp. 130-137].

The concept of “cross-border region” unites three components: the space bounded by the peripheries of the regions, the subjects of integration strategies, and the contacts that are established as a result of their local practices. Cross-border regions can be functional and territorial. The first exists on the basis of labor, cooperative and other relations between economic subjects; this type also includes “working communities” and regional councils (regionalrat), which are popular in the West. Euroregions are an example of territorial cooperation. Thanks to the experience of cross-border cooperation and regulatory coherence at the level of international conventions, Euroregions are characterized by the presence of institutionalized cooperation between adjacent national authorities, represent national associations or coalitions of municipalities and regions. Organizationally, Euroregions usually have a council, a presidency, specialized working groups and a secretariat. Institutionally, they represent “active enterprises”, which naturally combine macro-objective and micro-subjective functions and processes [17, pp. 389-397].

The Euroregion is considered a form of international integration and cross-border relations, which ensures the joint development of economic, cultural and humanitarian cooperation, the implementation of cross-border economic projects, addressing employment, infrastructure and environmental issues. V. Dergachev defines Euroregions as border communities of international cross-border cooperation of European countries in the sphere of economy, culture, education, transport, ecology, which are established on the basis of the subsidiarity principles. Euroregions operate as a result of the redistribution of power between the central government and border communities, which are empowered to independently regulate their activities and conclude interregional cross-border agreements in accordance with national legislation [18].

It is obvious that Euroregions, despite all the issues associated with their formation along the post-Soviet borders, represent an innovative form of regional development management, attractive for attracting investments and therefore more effective compared to traditional ones. Its demonstrative and educational effects are not in dispute, as well as its ability to propose fundamentally new models within the framework of regionalism theories. It is no coincidence that the concept of “invention” of new forms of regionalism appeared in the West in connection with cross-border constants, in which the attention is focused

on the search for non-traditional forms of cooperation with neighbors. The instrumental function of Euroregions is especially important for the establishment of effective cooperation: after all, fundamentally new bodies have appeared for the settlement of possible territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts, etc. In the end, the Euroregions are able to answer the important question: are the legal systems and legislation of countries on different sides of the border compatible enough for cooperation to be productive.

Cross-border regions are now a sufficiently established form of integrative interstate interaction and, at the same time, a model of a new territorial, to some extent "suprastate", level of governance. The appearance of "large regions" marks a significant change in the traditional roles of states. Of course, they remain key players on the political scene, but lose their monopoly as almost the only bearers of legitimacy. "Centers of power" are shifting both downward, to the level of regions, communes and municipal entities, and upward and outward, to the level of cross-border relations. This entails the emergence of new forms of multi-layered diplomacy, multi-level governance and corresponding identity. The politics undergoes international legalization at all levels with the emergence of modern forms of interaction, coordination and representation. At the same time, politics itself is undergoing active regionalization. New social movements with regionalist and locally oriented guidelines are emerging. Party structures are formed according to the regional principle. At first glance, these processes are clearly positive, because they are accompanied by the formation of territorial forms of network democracy. But issues emerge at the organizational level – the public capriciously intertwines with the private, the number of new political actors grows uncontrollably. After all, the very existence of the EU – a multi-layered network structure – creates the problem of coordinating actions, with no shortage of pessimistic expectations about its future.

Although the practice of cross-border cooperation has a rather long history, not all of its theoretical parameters are adequately defined. The content of this term varies from a set of projects designed to implement the joint development of territories adjacent to each other, to the sum of already adjusted coordination mechanisms of multi-level cooperation in the economic, political, and cultural areas. As for the concept of "cross-border region", it can mean either: 1) the territory of border or cross-border cooperation between parts of several states; 2) a specific form of such a community with its own infrastructural, ecological and humanitarian interaction mechanisms; 3) a tool for the integration of a particular country into supranational structures; 4) a training ground for testing the possibilities of cross-border cooperation; 5) a kind of "umbrella project" for the implementation of bilateral or multilateral sectoral agreements, etc. V. Kolosov defines the main features of the cross-border region as follows: a) administrative and socio-economic integrity of territorial units along each side of the border; b) commonality and complementarity of the main and jointly solved socio-economic problems [19, p. 74].

Three different, although not clearly defined, terms for cross-border cooperation have taken root in the Western

European tradition. The most frequently used term "cross-border cooperation" refers to direct cross-border cooperation of regional and local authorities along both sides of borders. The concept of "interregional/transborder cooperation" has broader meaning, which is cross-border (interregional) cooperation, the purpose of which is to spread integration processes to large groups of regions, not necessarily territorially connected. The term "transnational cooperation" is also used as a neutral and polysemantic term, most often in relation to countries or large interconnected territories.

The Place of Ukraine in the Pan-European Space

In July 1993, Ukraine joined the "European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities", which now part of the country's legislation. The concepts of "Euroregion" and "cross-border region" have been defined in the thesaurus of socio-humanitarian studies in their own way. The Law of Ukraine on Cross-Border Cooperation (June 2004) enshrines the definition of the Euroregion as "an organizational form of cooperation between administrative and territorial units of European states, carried out in accordance with bilateral or multilateral agreements on cross-border cooperation" [20]. The concepts of "Euroregion" and "cross-border region" are often equated. This is not entirely correct, although the Euroregion is the most common form of cross-border cooperation. According to I. Stundennikov, the concept of "Euroregion" is dominated by the political and legal component, while the main categorization factor for the cross-border region is the presence of homogeneous natural and geographical conditions, as well as common historical and ethnocultural development of the local community within spatial and temporal boundaries. In other words, the cross-border region is a historical-geographical and geopolitical phenomenon, while the Euroregion is an institutional form of cross-border cooperation [21, p. 116]. And although this distinction criterion is quite blurred (because the Euroregion is also a historical-geographical phenomenon in the spatial sense), one can agree with the emphasis on the political and legal constant in the definition of the Euroregion. It is obvious that the concept of "cross-border region" is broader in meaning, because cross-border cooperation can be carried out outside the Euroregions.

According to experts, "Euroregions have become a specific territorial tool for implementing the principles of European integration and at the same time evidence of a return to the ideal of "local societies" claiming full independence" [22, p. 123]. The relations of states in the field of cross-border cooperation are most often conveyed by the terms "interpenetration", "intertwining of interests", "complex interdependence", etc. With the emergence of Euroregions, the perspective of the study of migration processes changed: transborder nature became a special research object with an emphasis on the study of the interaction of flows of people, goods, ideas, cross-border networks, mutual influence of borders and elements of the social landscape. A kind of "consolidation" of cross-border regions, which complements the process of expanding their

competences, creates new channels of influence on authorities “from below”, at the level of territorial communities. At the same time, new forms of “horizontal” interaction are emerging, resulting in additional opportunities for resource accumulation. A specific form of vertical “political interlocking” based on network interaction is being developed, which involves the creation of a multi-level management system and new “coordinating systems”. As for network structures, they act in this system both as a management tool and as a public control lever, contributing to democratization processes at all officially recognized levels, be it European, national, regional or municipal.

The purpose of cross-border cooperation is to reduce the “barrier functions” of borders in favor of contact functions. The “opening” of borders is a powerful lever for mutual coordination of state policies, a tool of increasing the role of consultations and joint actions in the fields of economy, culture and ecology, as well as expanding the possibilities of service infrastructure. Ultimately, this gives the effect of spatial coordination of strategies, development of the regions’ identity and use of the advantages of diversity, decentralization of decision-making, as well as strengthening of local democracy. This minimizes the consequences of the “closedness” of interstate borders implemented by totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, as well as the artificial “marginalization” of certain territories. The priorities of cross-border cooperation within the Euroregions include the creation of an effective economic and socio-cultural space, ensuring national security in the face of globalization, maintaining the transparency of borders in the context of investment development, as well as establishing migration control.

Euroregions play a significant role in bringing Ukraine closer to the integrated European space. Fulfilling the requirements of the *acquis communautaire* (EU legal system) is a direct path to the establishment of a stable democracy, the creation of a competitive market economy, and the formation of effectively functioning civil society structures. The movement of Ukraine towards the EU cannot but be a long process, and the experience gained in the cross-border cooperation regions is truly invaluable. With the emergence of Euroregions, the concept of political and cultural neighborhood acquires a new meaning. Public institutions that justify the concepts of a special kind of local neighborhood (Parisian “Culture”, Polish “*Borussia*”) introduced the concept of “open regionalism”, within the framework of which the local and universal are juxtaposed, and the rules of intercultural dialogue are developed. Nostalgic historical and cultural versions of “neighborhood” are based on, in particular, in Poland, as an expression of para-imperial aspirations “to return to one’s borders” and “supremacy” over the former “*kresy*” [23, pp. 75-82].

Ukraine widely uses the cross-border international cooperation mechanism to deepen the integration process, particularly, participation in the development of European regions [24, p. 634]. As of 2018, the European “Association of European Border Regions” network (AEBR) has more than 200 border structures. The “Buh”, “Upper Prut”, “Dnipro”, “Donbas”, “Carpathian”, “Slobozhanshchyna”, “Black Sea”, “Yaroslavl” Euroregions have been established along the Ukrainian border. The association is focused on establishing “partner networks”, unification of border regions with

similar problems and interests. This positive trend should be further developed and deepened in every way. Euroregions as international integration structures can be established both within the EU, at the EU borders and beyond them.

Russian aggression significantly influenced the trend of events in Europe and the world, forcing EU politicians to think seriously about the prospects of the European Union and the possibilities of its expansion. In a political and ideological sense, the West entirely supports Ukraine in the ongoing conflict. “The UN General Assembly clearly expressed its position on March 27, 2014, declaring support for the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” This resolution was supported by 100 states, 58 abstained and only 11 voted against. The joint statements of the members of the G7 repeatedly condemned the annexation of Crimea and stated that the actions of the Russian Federation aimed at destabilizing the situation in Eastern Ukraine are “unacceptable and must be stopped.” Similar resolutions were adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the governing structures of the European Union – the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. At the G20 summit (November 2014), the leaders of the USA, Japan and Australia decided to join their efforts in solving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict [25, pp. 15-16].

Ukraine, however, is vitally interested in materializing declarations of support to a greater extent in concrete actions, and most importantly, accompanying them by guarantees of Ukraine’s acceptance into the EU, at least in the distant future. The German political scientist S. Meister quite frankly sheds light on the reasons for the absence of the latter. He believes that the European Union is currently experiencing the biggest crisis since its creation – nationalist views are growing in the member states, populist groups are gaining support with anti-European slogans. There is a clear consensus among the German elites and in German society that EU enlargement is impossible today. The Union is overburdened by recent enlargement, has internal integration issues, which makes many influential people say: “We don’t want another problem inside the European Union.” Many representatives of German enterprises cooperate with Russia, and the latter skillfully manipulates discourses to create a “fifth column” in Germany. After all, the image of Ukraine in Europe is very bad. The Ukrainian elite has not yet demonstrated the ability and desire to reform the country. As a result, there is growing skepticism whether the country really has the potential for change. On the other hand, S. Meister argues that Ukrainian society has already done a lot to show its commitment to European norms and principles, and expects solidarity from the European Union in a critical situation. “If we do not support Ukraine enough, if it does not succeed, it will be the end of the EU as a reliable foreign policy player attractive to other states. Ukraine is really a litmus test for the European Union in terms of adherence to its principles, values and norms, as well as the possibility of exporting them to stabilize its own region” [26].

The main problem of Ukraine today is the lack of a unifying doctrine, a set of ideas acceptable not only as a platform for a lasting consensus for at least 5-10 years, but

also for a temporary compromise. It is unrealistic to hope that Ukraine will be united by right-wing radical slogans with a clear anti-Russian undertone. It is also unrealistic to hope that a certain “renovation of the facade” will make it possible to preserve the customary system of priorities and the hierarchy of power in the country that has been formed for 30 years. Ukraine is no longer the same, and it was not so much the Maidans and anti-Maidans that changed it, as the armed confrontation in the East. Stresses of this scale do not go away leaving no trace. But an unquestionably positive factor is the clear awareness by Ukrainian society that “the policy of European integration and the development of bilateral relations with the European Union remains a key foreign policy priority for Ukraine.” As noted in the National Report of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine “Euro-Atlantic vector of Ukraine”, the course towards European integration “represents the realization of the civilizational choice of our state – breaking with the Soviet past and entering the European democratic community. The EU remains our important ally and partner in the fight against Russian aggression and a partner in the development of the regional security system” [27, p. 8].

As a system of socio-political relations and the outcome of globalization of modern nations, the cross-border cooperation stands out not only as an area of interaction between different cultures, searches for ethnic and cultural self-identification. It is also a sphere of conflict of interests of state structures, church institutions, national movements, political parties and public associations. The struggle of ideas at this level is inevitable, and it determines the competitive atmosphere between national projects, political and scientific discourses, and cultural memory models. A complex palette of mutual influences and “mutual repulsion” can provoke conflicts of values, distorted heterostereotypes, as well as generate antinomanism as a form of social consciousness. In the work “Nationalism Reframed” (1996), the outstanding theoretician of nationalism R. Brubaker proved that the “nationalizing state” creates a potentially conflictual “triadic configuration” – a field of constant sharp struggle, which involves external interested political actors. And then it is not so important whether the dividing lines are drawn by a sincere selective perception of otherness or by cynical distortions [28, pp. 149-173]. As Ya. Hrytsak showed, the Brubaker model explains what is happening in Ukraine much more accurately than any other. “We have a Russian and Russian-speaking population in the South and East of Ukraine, which resists Kyiv’s nationalistic policy and strives to be as close as possible to Moscow. As a result, we have a rather paradoxical phenomenon: despite significant linguistic, regional and other differences, Ukraine is divided, but does not split” [29].

According to O. Pakhliovska, “this Manichean approach to reality, this rigorous dualism of the division into “West” and “East” was among the reasons for the failure of the Russian strategy in Ukraine. Kremlin political technologists worked to divide Ukraine into the allegedly Orthodox Russian-speaking “East” and the allegedly Catholic Ukrainian-speaking “West” without understanding elementary things: Ukraine is indeed divided, but in a different way. There are two Ukraines – European and Soviet. The first

is a European multi-confessional, albeit Orthodox, multi-cultural universe, while the second is a mono-confessional and mono-cultural Soviet model. Moreover, in both realities, we find citizens of Ukraine of different nationalities, primarily Ukrainians, Russians and Jews, but they form two directly opposite worlds.” After all, just as it was a century ago, Ukraine finds itself at the center of this planetary conflict between the West and the East, the terrain of endless dialogue between them. The confrontation with Russia is where a rupture of civilizations occurs, a permanent process of their convergence and their divergence [30, pp. 358, 364].

Therefore, the cross-border space requires increased attention in the context of the formation of marginal, hybrid identity and culture, the presence of asymmetry in the demographic, economic, and political spheres. This is a dualistic phenomenon, which is characterized both as a contact zone between several border regions and as a mental construction resulted from the transformation of global integration processes and the destruction of the modern idea of the “state-nation-territory” triad. “The cross-border area appears as a contact, network space, where social and cultural-political mobility sets the rhythm for political processes” [31, p. 44]. In a modern hybrid situation, in which the processes of globalization and integration are not only accompanied by the same powerful manifestations of regionalization and localization, but also intertwine with them in a way, establishing new networks and problematic areas, the attention to the cross-border should double up. Essentially, all the states of the modern world were caught between these two poles of civilizational progress, and none of them today can form national interests without taking into account the complex interaction of global centripetal and regional centrifugal processes.

Conclusions

The issue of the stability of the pan-European regional space, which Ukraine aspires to enter, sets particularly high demands on the development of a universal theory of regionalism and its modified versions taking into account local features. This applies to cross-border cooperation to a great extent, because the movement towards multi-regionalization of the world has started in its direction, real opportunities are being created to equalize the living standards of the population to the average European indicators, mobilize local resources and jointly solve problems by states, on which national security directly depends. In the end, kind of “training grounds” of adaptation of European legislation and state support mechanisms to the realities of those countries outside the European Union are formed in the common cross-border space. However, the pace and efficiency of movement in the European direction will depend to a decisive extent on how ready each of the participating states is to go “their part of the way”.

Ukraine has taken many steps towards integration into the European and world space. However, the process of its entry into Europe was not as simple as it seemed. Its success and effectiveness are largely determined by how quickly our people will be able to get rid of the syndrome of lack of confidence in their own abilities and learn new priorities of political, scientific, cultural and educational life in the European space. The course of integration into

European structures imposes serious obligations on us, requires the development and consistent implementation of policies that would meet European standards. Identification processes are too complex and ambiguous in the modern world. Separatist sentiments are spreading,

increasingly reaching the level of outright terrorism. Under these conditions, the entire thinking population of the planet should be guided by the logic of the “do no harm” principle. Every nation has the right to self-determination, but every nation is fully responsible for its conscious choices.

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Транскордонний регіоналізм в євроінтеграційних стратегіях: концептуальний вимір

Анотація. На рубежі тисячоліть проблеми кордонів та прикордонних територій у зв'язку з переосмисленням місця і ролі національних держав та наддержавних утворень опинилися у фокусі соціального аналізу. Наукова увага до транскордонних стратегій євроінтеграційних процесів обумовлюється як новим баченням феномена регіоналізму, так і особливостями територіальних ідентичностей. Актуальність дослідження транскордонного регіоналізму полягає в усвідомленні підвищення питомої ваги територіальності у сучасному світоустрої та необхідності знаходження алгоритмів відповідей на виклики нашого часу, які позначені «прив'язкою до території». Метою статті є теоретико-методологічне дослідження моделей та концепцій транскордонного співробітництва, які формуються під впливом взаємопов'язаних процесів глобалізації й регіоналізації в європейському просторі. Сучасні умови функціонування країн в контексті прикордонної співпраці зумовлюють потребу обґрунтування концептуальних підходів до розкриття сутності транскордонного регіону як методологічного конструкту. Застосування геополітичної та геоісторичної методології обумовлює репрезентацію сутнісних характеристик транскордонного регіоналізму, визначення ролі і місця прикордонних регіонів в євроінтеграційних стратегіях. В результаті дослідження доведено, що ефективність транскордонного співробітництва залежить від того, якою мірою в процесі створення єврорегіонів враховуються історичні традиції, ментальність та суспільні настрої населення прикордонних ареалів. З'ясовано, що мінімізація ризиків, зумовлених тривалим розвитком соціумів у складі різних державних організацій, перебуває у прямій залежності від ступеня наукового осмислення специфіки, потенціалу та можливостей транскордонних регіонів, варіативності ціннісних орієнтацій та поведінкових стереотипів. Визначено, що «прозорість» кордонів – потужний ресурс для збалансованого розвитку держав, збільшення ролі транскордонної динаміки у сфері економіки, культури, екології. Практична значимість дослідження обумовлюється репрезентацією просторових тенденцій узгодження євроінтеграційних стратегій, розвитку самобутності регіонів, децентралізації прийняття рішень. Примноження наукових знань про транскордонний регіоналізм допоможе краще усвідомити роль і місце України в сучасному світі і наблизити її до входження у європейський політичний простір

Ключові слова: кордони, регіоналізація, транскордонне співробітництво, єврорегіон, регіональна інтеграція, європейський простір, ідентичність

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International Cooperation Between Thailand and Democratic Kampuchea

Abstract. This article discusses the cooperation between the Kingdom of Thailand and Democratic Kampuchea in the military, political and economic spheres. Contrary to the popular myth that Democratic Kampuchea was an isolationist country, in reality the country was quite open to the world. Thailand became the first country with which Democratic Kampuchea began to cooperate. Cooperation between the two states began in April 1975, immediately after the victory of the Khmer Rouge over the Khmer Blue regime (better known as the previous ruler Lon Nol), and lasted until the final fall of Democratic Kampuchea under the pressure of the Vietnamese troops in 1979. It can be confidently said that the aspirations of the Thais and Khmers in developing relations were sincere. Thailand has sought to improve relations with its neighbours, and in particular with Kampuchea, undertaking various initiatives even during the standoff from October 1976 to October 1977, not to mention agreeing to border revisions or the joint exploitation of resources along the blurred water border. Democratic Kampuchea also took the initiative and went for rapprochement, and this was especially evident at the eighth Asian Olympic Games, when Kampuchea took part in them only for the sake of Thailand. The period of 1979 was the culmination of the development of friendly relations: from a simply friendly country, Kampuchea became an ally of Thailand. True, in the future, after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, Thailand will begin to rapidly move away from the Khmer Rouge, who have become increasingly associated with the “bloody genocide of their people”. Then, Thailand, which went out into the world and joined the global system, wanted to have a good reputation and for this broke with the Khmer Rouge

Key words: khmers, government, army, war, coup

Introduction

Initially, the Khmer Rouge did not count on good-neighbourly relations with Thailand and were hostile to it. Being the same centuries-old enemy for Cambodia as Vietnam, Thailand was assigned the role of a dangerous enemy in the eyes of the top leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (that is, the Khmer Rouge). There were two reasons for this attitude. Firstly, Thailand, long before the civil war in Cambodia, established itself in Southeast Asia as a malleable puppet of the United States of America (USA), providing them with political and military support in the form of military bases and airfields. Actually, it was from the airfields of Thailand that Cambodia was bombed before and after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreements of 1973, and from its airfields the support of the Blue Khmer regime was carried out. The Americans

in their documents generally noted Thailand as the most important ally in the region [1]. Secondly, hundreds of thousands of Khmers, known as Northern Khmers, have lived and still live in Thailand, who live in the territory referred to in Cambodian as Kampuchea-Khangchung – Northern Kampuchea (Fig. 1). This territory was seized by Thailand between the XV-XVIII centuries and it, like Kampuchea-Krom, was claimed by the Khmer Rouge. However, from the very beginning, Thailand went to a meeting: immediately after the end of the civil war, in the border town of Poipet, the local reds offered border trade to the Thais and they agreed, after that Thailand condemned the aggressive actions of the remnants of the Blue Khmer army and the American operation to liberate the cargo ship “Mayaguez”, and then Thailand agreed to a revision at all borders.

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However, after the war, on April 24, 1975, the population of the city was evacuated to the countryside, under the pretext of a hypothetical attack by the Thai army on the city. The infrastructure of the city, most likely, remained untouched, and local functionaries decided the next day to resume old contacts with Thai merchants. It was an unofficial (or rather the same contraband) trade that the Thai government, and probably Kampuchea, turned a blind eye to, since local border guards on both sides did not interfere with border trade. In the future, a division of the Ministry of Commerce of Democratic Kampuchea will be created, which will be responsible for trade with Thailand – the Khmer Rouge themselves called it the “Poipet Gate” [7].

The Beginning of Relations and Cooperation Between Countries

Relations between the two countries were improving in parallel with tensions on the Cambodian-Thai border. At this time, the first military clashes took place on the Cambodian-Thai land and water borders: in early May, on the southwestern border, Red troops attacked the territory of two Thai coastal provinces of Trat and Chantaburi, and in the Gulf of Thailand, meanwhile, Red boats attacked Thai cargo and fishing ships that sailed in the Gulf [3]. Accusing Thailand of occupying a number of border territories during the civil war, the Red troops launched offensive operations on the territory of Thailand. Apparently, the Reds did not achieve much success, since there are no reports that the Reds staged anything on Thai territory. With the maritime space, everything was more complicated – the Reds officially declared that Thai fishing and cargo ships violated the maritime borders of Kampuchea and for this they were “detained”, but in fact they were captured. Thailand negotiated the release of sailors and fishermen, but many fishermen were still shot [8-11]. Notably, most likely these clashes were the initiative of local Communist Party functionaries from the South-western Zone, since at the same time, in the north-west, local functionaries invited Thai officials to the celebrations for the liberation of Poipet, held from 7 to 9 May 1975 [4].

Anyway, despite the border clashes, with the support of China [12], relations between Thailand and the Khmer Rouge developed very well, since on April 18, the then Prime Minister of Thailand, Kikrit Pramot, put forward an initiative to recognize the Khmer Rouge government and in the same month Thailand became the first country to recognise their government [13]. At the end of October, after a delegation led by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Kampuchea, Ieng Sary, paid a five-day visit to Thailand, diplomatic relations were finally established between the two countries. The meeting of officials of Cambodia and Thailand in Bangkok ended with the release of a joint communique in which the parties promised to exchange ambassadors, create joint communication groups at the border and committed to mutual respect for the borders. The delegation also stated the need to start official trade between the two countries, since Cambodia is facing a shortage of food. The liaison teams were located in the border provinces along the entire Thai-Cambodian border and were engaged in maintaining contacts between the two sides at the local level.

Their responsibilities included resolving local problems and conflicts at the border, such as fighting, problems with refugees and “illegal immigrants”, and negotiations on trade and other things. After that, official trade began between Bangkok and Phnom Penh: by supplying the same rice, Kampuchea also began to buy sugar, refined oil and salt. The latter was the largest amount, since Thailand was to become the main supplier of salt – the Reds wanted to buy ten thousand tons of salt every month [3], for their fish processing enterprises [8]. The profit for the purchase of salt was planned to be earned on the supply of wood and smoked fish to Thailand.

After the meeting in Poipet of the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Cambodia – Chatichai Choonhavan and Ieng Sary, respectively, on November 17, a joint Liaison Committee on border issues was established, which was supposed to review the existing border. This was extremely relevant, since there was no demarcation of the border at that time – Thailand did not agree with the border defined back in 1907 between France and Siam, and the territories along the entire Northern Kampuchea-Thailand border remained disputed. Despite the fact that at the end of 1975, the activities of this committee were actually frozen indefinitely (the committee only managed to place border signs in some disputed areas), the consent to the creation of such a committee was a significant step on the part of Thailand. Thanks to this step, relations between the two countries will rapidly improve and eventually become friendly. By the way, Vietnam, on the contrary, refused any border revisions and thereby laid the foundation for enmity between the two countries, although similar initiatives were also taken by local Communist Party functionaries in the Eastern Zone. By the end of the year, the issue of returning refugees back to Cambodia began to be discussed, about 22 thousand of whom had gathered in Thailand by that time, and in early 1976 Thailand began to catch refugees who had fled from Kampuchea and return them back [3; 4; 8].

In 1976, relations continued to improve. In mid-June, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand Bhichai Rattakul and his delegation made a secret trip across the border to the then North-Western Zone, to the territory of the modern province of Banteay Meanchey, where he met with Ieng Sary to discuss numerous issues, including the exchange of ambassadors, international trade, border demarcation, and in particular, the release of Thai fishermen, some of whom were shot by the Reds long before [3]. In the same month, a summit took place on the Kampuchea-Thailand border, after which a trade agreement was concluded in July [4]. After the conclusion of the contract, the flow of goods increased: now flour, potatoes, carrots, soybeans, peanuts, lettuce, cabbage and lettuce seeds, clothing, raincoats, knives, axes, sickles, charcoal, penicillin, quinine, vitamins, petroleum products, sulfuric acid began to be transported from Thailand to Kampuchea, mechanical equipment, machine parts and oils, paints, fabrics, nylon bags and other goods. In turn, Kampuchea supplied rice and rubber, including various types of wood and various fish [8]. Goods from Thailand went directly to Phnom Penh, dozens of trains and heavy trucks. In September 1976, Thai Foreign Minister Bhichai Rattakul discussed with the Government of Democratic Kampuchea

the prospect of extraditing several high-ranking officials of the Lon Nol (Blue Khmer) regime to Kampuchea, in particular the former governor of Battambang and General Sek Sam Iet, whose militants were actively fighting against the Reds and from time to time entered the territory of Kampuchea [3]. A year earlier, in December 1975, the Thai authorities had already expelled several Blue Khmer leaders from their country to Western Europe (including the former Prime Minister of the Khmer Republic In Tam), and the extradition of the remaining high-ranking officials was only a matter of time [8]. But in October 1976, a coup d'état took place in Thailand.

Reasons for Sudden Confrontation

The coup began with unrest caused by the internal split in the country at that time. The unrest began with the arrival in Thailand on September 19, 1976 of former Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, who ruled by authoritarian methods from 1958 to 1973. His reign was marked by extreme nationalist and anti-communist policies, mass corruption and suppression of democratic freedoms, as well as the enormous influence of the military – Tan himself was a field marshal, he held a number of military government posts and in general, his rule is usually characterized as a military dictatorship. During the Uprising on October 14, raised by activists, workers and students, the Thanom regime was overthrown, after which a turning point occurred in the history of Thailand – traditionally and rather even historically, the military who held power lost it from that moment, and all their subsequent attempts to regain power will be unsuccessful and subsequent military regimes will not exist for a long time. The return of Thanom Kittikachorn caused mass protests, the largest of which was a rally of left-wing students of Thammasat University. The rally continued until October 6, when the police and far-right activists with militants, with the support of the government, did not arrive at the scene and dispersed it. The crackdown turned into a massacre, in which approximately 7 thousand people participated in total, and as a result of which about 100 protesters were lynched, shot or burned [14].

In the evening of the same day, the far-right militants, with the support of the police, went to the government residence and demanded the resignation of the incumbent Prime Minister Seni Pramoj, after which, taking advantage of the situation, the military, led by Admiral Sangad Chaloryu, took power into their own hands and proclaimed the creation of the “National Council for Administrative Reform”. Two days later, the military junta appointed Supreme Court judge and ultraconservative Thanin Kraivichien as head of government. It is worth noting that the Thai population in the majority did not resist or even supported the coup, fearing civil war and the “red threat”, which manifested itself in strengthening the underground Communist Party of Thailand and the entire communist Indochina. The new regime returned to the old policy of pro-Americanism and anti-communism, which dramatically affected relations between Thailand and Democratic Kampuchea.

The new Thai military government immediately began to exert aggressive pressure on Kampuchea. Despite the fact that Thai officials often complained that the Cambodian

authorities did not go to the meeting, the Thai government itself preferred to act from a position of strength. So, in January 1977, the Thai government imposed a ban on official visits to socialist countries and, in particular, to the countries of Indochina [3], and in February of the same year actually imposed an embargo against Kampuchea [8]. Democratic Kampuchea really did not go to the meeting and ignored Thai appeals, and this was a typical policy of the Kampuchea leadership – they also behaved towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other countries that were considered hostile [5]. However, the attitude of the communist leadership of Kampuchea to the Thai military government can be traced in a memorandum set out in the memorandum of the directory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Democratic Kampuchea, written on February 4, 1977, in which the Ministry's employees were reminded of the “Thai essence”: *“An extremely sad past, for which the fascist government of Thailand, a lackey the American imperialists are responsible for participating in the destructive aggressive war of the American imperialists against the nation and people of Kampuchea. At that time, the reactionary government of Thailand, headed by Thanom-Prapas, handed over Thailand to the American imperialists to create many important military bases for their air, naval and ground forces. Troops, planes of all kinds and the most modern weapons were assembled there, which were used to destroy Kampuchea and exterminate its people”* [5].

Already in early November 1976, fighting resumed between Thai and Kampuchea troops on the border [3]. If from April 1975 to October 1976, an estimated several dozen clashes took place on the Thai-Kampuchea border, then after that, during the period from October 1976 to October 1977, when the military regime of Thanin Kraivichien was overthrown, more than four hundred clashes took place on the border, which were much larger and in which sometimes took part up to six or eight hundred soldiers on both sides. Most of the clashes before the coup took place not with the Thai army, but with former soldiers of the army of the Khmer Republic (Blue Khmer). Now, all the clashes took place with the Thai military or with peasant “self-defense” detachments armed by them. The Thai military government, in addition to interrupting diplomatic relations and trade, also took a number of other actions that increased the discord between the two countries. So, Thailand has actually closed the borders with Kampuchea: by the end of 1975, the land border between the two countries became open and accessible for ordinary Thais and Khmer to cross, but since the beginning of 1977, additional troops were sent to the border and border patrols were strengthened to block all land communication [4]. The fleet was also strengthened in the border waters of the Gulf of Thailand, which regularly violated the border and clashed with Kampuchea ships: the first clash between the Revolutionary Naval Forces of Kampuchea and the Royal Thai Navy occurred on February 22, 1976, when six Thai ships invaded the waters of Kampuchea and opened fire on Khmer patrol boats, sinking one of them [15; 16].

Thai aviation also participated in the border war between Thailand and Kampuchea, which bombed the camps of the Communist Party of Thailand located on the

territory of Kampuchea [8]. In many ways, the reason for such activity of this border war was inaccurate borders: the lack of a clear demarcation of borders made a big contribution and military units of both countries could fight for the same piece of territory for a very long time. One of the most striking examples of the scale of clashes on the border are the two worst incidents of all time. The first such incident occurred on the night of January 28, 1977, when about 300 Cambodian soldiers carried out a three-way attack on the Thai villages of Ban Nong Do, Ban Klong Ho and Ban Noi Parai, in Sa Kaeu Province, Aranyaprathet district. Twenty-one Thai villagers, including women and children, were killed in the attack. In the village of Ban Nong Do, all the houses were set on fire. When Thailand sent a protest note to the Kampuchea Government, it replied that those villages were on the territory of Kampuchea, implying that they could do whatever they wanted there. The second incident occurred in August in the same province, in the Tafrai district: soldiers attacked the villages of Ban Sanlo Changane, Ban Sangay and Ban Kasange, twenty-nine Thai peasants were killed during the attack, and according to eyewitnesses, Cambodian soldiers looted houses [3]. Over time, all the attacks of the Kampuchean soldiers began to be accompanied by looting, which was caused by an unusual move of the Kampuchean commanders – they deliberately relaxed discipline in their ranks and allowed their soldiers to rob. Thus, they increased the ferocity of their fighters.

Basically, they robbed food, livestock, and jewelry that could be exchanged at underground markets that were located all over the country. However, it was not only the Cambodian soldiers who attacked the Thais: in the last days of January 1977, Thai soldiers attacked the Khmers, and with the loss of thirty dead Thais, inflicted losses of four hundred Khmers on the Kampucheans. This incident was so impressive that Vietnam made an official statement that it would defend Kampuchea from “Thai armed provocations” [6]. Kampuchea increased the concentration of troops on the Thai border, despite the fact that most of the troops of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea had to concentrate on the eastern border with Vietnam, and strengthened its naval presence in the Gulf of Thailand. Thanks to Chinese support, which was expressed in the provision, in particular, of weapons and military specialists, the Khmer Rouge managed to create an impressive defense strip and deter Thai aggression. In 1976 alone, China delivered one thousand tons of military equipment, ammunition, communications equipment and others to Kampuchea [7], and in the meantime, Chinese specialists were reorganizing the army and repairing military facilities. At one of these, at a renovated naval base in the city of Koh Kong, trawlers and other fishing vessels were converted into various patrol boats, and about twenty vessels were converted there in total [15; 16]. The Thai military leadership had nothing to answer with except arming Thai peasants at the border, thereby creating a kind of “self-defense units” with minimal military training, but this was probably not enough [3].

In many ways, the Thai far-right military government went to a confrontation with Kampuchea because of fear of the theory of the “Domino Effect”, which consisted

in the fact that after the victory of the communist movements in Indochina, communism would spread further, and thus conquer the whole of Asia. And it is worth pointing out that the Thais had reasons for fear: firstly, Thailand actually found itself in a red environment – Kampuchea with the Khmer Rouge was located to the southeast, Laos with Pathet Lao to the east, Burma with Lanzin to the west; secondly, in Thailand itself since the mid-1960s The Communist Party of Thailand conducted underground guerrilla activities, which was also supported by Kampuchea, Vietnam, China and a number of other countries. In particular, Kampuchea allowed the Communist Party of Thailand to place on its territory twelve bases and training centers for its fighters, which included various special schools: military-political, medical, intelligence, sabotage. For example, the women's school “The Eighth of March” taught its students to create bombs and mines from improvised materials [8]. After the October 6 coup in Thailand, the military junta began repressions against the radical left student movement, after which five thousand students fled to the territories controlled by the Communist Party to join them [13]. The Khmer Rouge created a school for them “On the Sixth of October”, where they were trained in various disciplines [4]. In December 1977, a secret agreement was concluded between the Khmer and Thai Communists, which provided for the creation of mixed Kampuchea-Thai detachments for operations in the northeastern part of Thailand, as well as, in case of a particularly good moment, a possible invasion of Kampuchea into Thailand to support the Communist Party of Thailand [8].

The agreement was concluded between the Secretary of the Northwest Zone Ros Nhim and representatives of the Northeast Committee of the Communist Party of Thailand. The Northeast Committee of the Communist Party of Thailand was distinguished by the fact that it was located on the territory of Kampuchea-Khang Cheung and mainly consisted of local Khmer-Khang Cheung. Also, almost all the Communist Party guerrilla units in the northeast of Thailand consisted of local Khmers. With the support of the Khmer Rouge, the Northeast Committee became a de facto autonomous structure, which even took its own separate name for itself – “Angka Siam”, which translates from Khmer as “Organization of Siam”. The Khmer Rouge had such a great influence on the Northeast Committee that it caused concern not only to the Thai far-right military government, but also to the Communist Party of Thailand itself, which led to restrictive measures against Angka Siam by the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of Thailand in mid-1978 [8]. However, this did not significantly shake the position of the Communist Party itself – at that time it controlled almost one tenth of the country's territory and their positions would only be shaken when China stopped supporting them in 1979 [6]. Northeast Thailand as a whole differs from the rest of Thailand in that there is a much larger non-Thai population, primarily Khmers, followed by Laotians, Vietnamese and various tribal nationalities – in the 70s they collectively formed a significant counterweight to the local Thai population. The Khmer population of Thailand was located in addition to the southern part of the Northeastern region of Thailand – Kampuchea-Khang Cheung, also in the central part of the northeast and in the eastern

part of the eastern region of Thailand (Fig. 3). It is estimated that in total, at the time of January 1975, about 400 thousand

Khmers lived in Thailand, 95% of whom lived in the east and northeast.



Figure 3. Kampuchea-Khang Cheung – Northern Kampuchea, mid-1970s

Note: Kampuchea-Khang Cheung – Northern Kampuchea is highlighted in dark red; the rest of the Khmer territories are highlighted with a red stripe

In total, the military government of Thanin Kraivichien only aggravated the situation in Thailand, bringing the country to a cliff and turning the threat of civil war into a real scenario. Moreover, it created the risk of war with Kampuchea and turned the possibility of war with Vietnam into a reality. Instead of containing the “red threat”, Thailand received paramilitary Kampuchea and Vietnamese troops on the border with Laos, which in June 1977 allowed Vietnam to keep its troops on Lao territory [17]; the repressive policy of the government led to the strengthening and strengthening of the positions of the

Communist Party of Thailand. The Communist Party became so strong that it could afford to attack the inviolable persons of the royal family. So, two attacks were committed – an unsuccessful attack on the king, and a successful attack on the queen’s secretary with a fatal outcome [3]. By the mid-1970s, multi-faceted insurgency movements had become part of the life of the Thai kingdom. The rule of the ultra-right government of Tanin caused great discontent among Thais, including among other military. During Tanin’s reign, there were two attempts to overthrow his regime: the first occurred in March 1977, led by General

Chalard Hiranyasiri, but the attempt was unsuccessful and on Thanin's orders, Chalard Hiranyasiri was executed; the second occurred in October 1977, when on the 20th a faction of officers in the Armed Forces, called the "Young Turks" together with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kriangsak Chamanan, with the support of Sangad Chaloyu, a successful coup was carried out, and the ultra-right government was overthrown. Kriangsak Chamanan became prime minister, far-right officers were replaced by officers of the left-wing Young Turks faction, and the leader of the last coup, Admiral Sangad Chaloyu, did not receive a single post in the government.

Resumption of Cooperation and New Development of Relations Between the Countries

The Kampuchea government still had distrust of the already new Thai junta. So, on the night of November 1-2, 1977, Red soldiers crossed the border and attacked several Thai villages in Sa Kaeu, in mid-December, more than two hundred soldiers of the combined forces of the Khmer Rouge and Angka Siam attacked two Thai border villages in the same province, and at the end of January 1978, two villages were attacked in the same province and an outpost in the Sangha district of Surin province. However, despite this, already in January 1978, contacts between Thailand and Kampuchea resumed. During the reign of Thanin, Kriangsak Chamanan put forward initiatives to normalise relations with Kampuchea and at the same time with Laos, offering to provide them with humanitarian assistance [3]. Shortly after the coup, the Thai Foreign Ministry announced a new policy to improve relations with the countries of Indochina. Back on October 12, 1977, Thai Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun held a meeting at the United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York with Ieng Sary, during which both ministers agreed to end the confrontation and establish cooperation "for the sake of peace in Indochina" [8]. A few days after the coup, the Democratic Kampuchea government issued a cautious and conciliatory statement about "a cordial meeting between Thai Foreign Minister Upadit and Ieng Sary in New York on October 12." Two weeks later, in early November, the capital's radio station Radio Phnom Penh sent a message to Bangkok that it wanted to hold talks to resolve border disputes, and despite the attacks a few days before, Bangkok reciprocated [3].

Most likely, the Khmer Rouge was pushed to these actions not so much by the desire to normalise relations, but by the border war with Vietnam that had lasted for ten months and the need to enlist support and secure the rear. Anyway, once again with the support of China, relations between the two countries began to normalise. By the way, Thailand has also improved relations with Laos and Vietnam. Immediately after the coup, the new Prime Minister of Thailand, Kriangsak, sought rapprochement with the countries of Indochina. Back in the same New York, on October 12, 1977, Upadit held talks with Vietnamese representatives – with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam Nguyen Duy Trinh about establishing friendly relations, and there about establishing friendly relations with the Deputy Prime Minister of Laos

Phun Sipaseut. Continuing the planned course, on December 2 of the same year, Thailand and Vietnam issued a joint communique in which both countries expressed their desire for immediate normalisation of relations [3]. Vietnam saw great prospects in developing friendly relations with Thailand, hoping to benefit from the country's further recovery from the Vietnam War and enlist Thailand's support in the confrontation with Democratic Kampuchea and China, which began on its own initiative when it carried out an attack on Kampuchea in December 1977 [6]. In 1978, Thailand signed a number of trade agreements and a transit agreement with Laos. In September of the same year, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong visited Thailand and assured the Thai leadership during the negotiations that Vietnam would not support the communist uprising if it happened [13]. Shortly before that, Vietnam had stopped supporting the Communist Party of Thailand, so the Thai leadership had reason to trust the Vietnamese.

In late January 1978, Uppadit visited Phnom Penh, where he discussed with the Kampuchea government the possibility of ending border clashes, and prospects for the development of political and trade relations, including: issues of the exchange of ambassadors, the opening of a fish market on one of the coastal islands and the opening of a checkpoint on the border [4]. During the negotiations, Upadit personally met with the Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea, Pol Pot's, and in particular, gave him a letter from Kriangsak with assurances of Thailand's desire to establish friendly relations with Democratic Kampuchea [8]. Immediately after the negotiations, the Thai government announced a plan to open the entire border with Kampuchea and Laos, to resume cross-border trade and the flow of goods they need [3]. The recent clashes on the Kampuchea-Thailand border were blamed on an unspecified "third force", as Upadit stated at the talks: "We deeply regret that a misunderstanding caused by a third party took place and caused a number of actions during the last period" [18]. Despite the ongoing clashes throughout 1978, although not comparable to the clashes before that, relations continued to improve. In July 1978, Ieng Sary paid another friendly visit to Thailand, during which, in Bangkok, the Foreign Minister of Kampuchea was granted an audience with the then King of Thailand Bhumibol Adulyadej and Crown Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn. The visit ended with the signing of agreements in Bangkok [8], which provided for the final opening of embassies, the further development of trade and further visits of trade delegations, the establishment of cooperation in scientific and technical fields, the introduction of direct telegraphic communication between Bangkok and Phnom Penh.

In addition, an agreement was also signed on the joint exploitation of resources along the entire disputed water border between the Thai and Kampuchea maritime economic zones in the Gulf of Thailand. Most likely, in the future, a joint Thai-Kampuchea economic zone would be created to exploit resources along the entire maritime border, as was done with the maritime border of Thailand and Malaysia in June 1979. An agreement was also signed on the opening of passenger airlines between Bangkok and Phnom Penh, and the opening, most likely, of a separate tourist airline between Bangkok and Siem Reap. For the

latter, the Kampuchea government conducted separate negotiations with Thai private travel companies, and in November allowed one of the Thai travel companies to organise one-day tourist visits to Angkor Wat by tourists [19]. By the way, tourism was of great importance in the plans of the Khmer Rouge in general, as was written in the “Party four-year plan for the construction of socialism in all spheres” and subsequent documents. The pinnacle of good-neighborly relations between the two countries was the participation of the sports delegation of Democratic Kampuchea in the opening of the eighth Asian Olympic Games, held on the eve of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea – from December 9 to December 20, 1978 in Bangkok. According to the Kampuchea newsletter for November-December 1978, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea – “Democratic Kampuchea News Bulletin”, the Kampuchea delegation arrived in Bangkok on December 6 and stayed there until December 13, after which it left the game for unknown reasons.

Most likely, Kampuchea took part in the Games only for the sake of further development of good-neighborly relations with Thailand, since Kampuchea had never been eager to participate in various Asian events and organisations before. Thus, Kampuchea openly refused the offer to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) when this issue was raised at the talks of the Foreign Ministers of Malaysia and Kampuchea in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, in March 1977 [5]. Cambodia actually left the Asian Games Federation in the mid-1960s and a number of other sports organizations, such as the Southeast Asian Games Federation, and did not participate in the subsequent 1966 Games, citing political considerations. Cambodia briefly resumed its membership in sports federations during the Khmer Republic, but left them again in 1975. Kampuchea's participation in the 1978 Asian Olympic Games was the first such event for the Khmer Rouge, and they continued to participate in them in the future. So, for example, Cambodia returned to the Southeast Asian Games Federation after the occupation of Cambodia by the Vietnamese army in 1983, in the form of a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and continued to be a member of it until leaving it in 1989 [20].

Thailand and the Khmer Rouge are the Ultimate Allies

At the end of 1978, on December 25, the Vietnamese People's Army, with the forces of 12 divisions, numbering 200 thousand people, invaded Democratic Kampuchea. They were opposed by units of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, totaling about 80 thousand soldiers. Despite the total size of the army of 200-250 thousand, the army at that time was engaged in suppressing the internal resistance of various anti-Coup movements, including the pro-Vietnamese “United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea”, created with the support of the Vietnamese government from the pro-Vietnamese Khmer Communists. Unable to stop the Vietnamese offensive, on January 7, 1979, Vietnamese troops entered Phnom Penh, left without a fight, the next day the People's Republic of Kampuchea was proclaimed the Salvation Front (in fact, the front and the newly formed government were subordinate to the

Vietnamese command), and on January 12, the last stronghold of the integral resistance of the Vietnamese army, the Kampong Chnang Air base, fell. After that, the Vietnamese-Kampuchea front collapsed, and the Vietnamese army began a rapid advance to the west – on January 14, the advanced Vietnamese units entered Siem Reap, which was engulfed by the anti-Polish uprising, and on January 20, Vietnamese troops reached the border. As a result, the Kampuchea government and the 50,000 remnants of the Kampuchea army were pressed against the Thai border, and Vietnamese troops now stood along the entire eastern border of Thailand [3].

This state of affairs did not suit Thailand at all: Thai politicians were absolutely not ready to put up with the “communist threat” in the form of Vietnamese troops right at the borders, and the Thai army was not at all ready to resist the Vietnamese army. Since the end of World War II, the Royal Thai Army has gradually begun to shift priorities from protecting the country from external aggression to fighting internal insurgents, considering a foreign invasion unlikely. In view of this, the Thai army began to gradually lose its defense capability, and the concentration of troops to fight the rebels with subsequent dispersal throughout the country negated their ability to repel foreign aggression. The invasion of the Vietnamese army into Kampuchea with its subsequent occupation changed the whole situation – along the entire eastern border of Thailand there was a huge Vietnamese group with a total of 190 thousand soldiers (140 thousand in Cambodia [13], and 50 thousand in Laos [17]), supported by troops of the Lao People's Army of about 10 thousand soldiers and formations The People's Republic of Kampuchea, which in the first half of the 80s will reach the number of 30 thousand soldiers [13]. Thailand on the Thai-Kampuchea border, in addition to those already present, was able to oppose only individual units of several divisions, with a total strength of no more than 5-10 thousand soldiers. The Thais tried their best to protect the southeastern border, constantly increasing their troops and trying to supply them with the necessary weapons, but it soon became obvious that it was simply impossible for the Thai army alone to secure the border. Needing a buffer between Thais and Vietnamese as a vital shield, Thailand began to fully support the Khmer Rouge.

The day after the fall of Phnom Penh, on January 8, 1979, Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak and two high-ranking members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China secretly met at the Thai U-Tapao Air Base to develop a policy of Thai-Chinese cooperation in the fight against the Vietnamese threat. At the meeting, a secret agreement was concluded, according to which an operational center for coordinating the activities of Chinese special services in Southeast Asia was created at the former American Takhli airbase. The parties also agreed to provide Chinese military and civilian cargo planes with access to Thai military airfields to supply the Khmer Rouge with weapons, and China also undertook to supply the Thai army with modern weapons and take direct part in the event that Vietnam attacks Thailand [4]. The Chinese supplied the Thais in an unusual way – the Thai army, by prior agreement, appropriated part of the Chinese weapons supplied to the Khmer Rouge, and thus

was regularly supplied by China. In addition to this, in February 1979, Kriangsak went to Washington to enlist the support of the United States in the modernization of the Thai army, to which the United States of America responded favorably [13]. Thus, Thailand enlisted international support, which reduced the fear of the Vietnamese.

Next, on January 21, 1979, Thailand recognized the Government of the Communist Party of Kampuchea as the only legitimate and legitimate government of Kampuchea, thereby publicly announcing the non-recognition of the pro-Vietnamese People's Republic of Kampuchea [8]. Representatives and leaders of the Communist Party received the right of residence and free movement in Thailand, and unhindered departure and return to the country. Then, Thailand allowed the Khmer Rouge to establish their military bases and camps on its territory, and later, on June 27, 1979, the Thai government allocated the territory near the city of Trat for a special zone for the political leadership of the Khmer Rouge. In the future, Bureau 87 will be founded there – the informal headquarters of the Khmer Rouge [4]. In fact, from that moment on, the Khmer Rouge began to be considered by the Thai government as allies: the Kampuchean army was freely located on the territory of Thailand, the de facto Kampuchean government in exile was freely located on its territory, and in addition to everything, Thailand began to promote the recognition and support of the Khmer Rouge. First, Singapore joined Thailand, with which the Khmers had built good relations long before the overthrow, and then all the ASEAN countries, with the exception of two Muslim countries – Malaysia and Indonesia, consistently took their side. The Khmer Rouge pursued a repressive policy towards Muslims and other religious representatives, which even then spoiled relations between the countries, despite the established diplomatic relations [5]. However, thanks to the efforts of Thailand, they formally sided with the Khmer Rouge.

In mid-1979, full-scale military cooperation between the Thai and Kampuchea armies began: the Thai military command began to cooperate with the Khmer military command, Thai officers assisted in training and instructing Khmer fighters, the Thai army began to supply the Khmer with weapons, supplies, and also to build infrastructure [8]. In particular, the Thai military built camps for Cambodian refugees, in which the Khmer Rouge and their allies recruited recruits. The first camps opened in November 1979, and over the next two months, a total of 298 thousand refugees gathered in them, and the Thai military took responsibility for another 149 thousand refugees [13]. There were so many refugees that in June Thailand had to return more than 40 thousand refugees to Cambodia, which attracted the attention of the world community. From that moment on, international organisations and other countries began to assist Thailand in maintaining these camps, and they continued to function until 1993. Thai businessmen also provided support to the Khmer Rouge, together with Chinese ones: the Khmers smuggled various types of wood of different values and precious stones from Kampuchea, in particular sapphires, which were then resold to the international market – one of the largest sapphire deposits in the world was located in the Khmer Rouge-controlled Pailin. The annual income

from the smuggling trade was up to \$100 million [8]. In an effort to provide all possible support to the Khmer Rouge and at the same time strengthen its southeastern border, Thailand began to look for red allies in the face of other Cambodians. Shortly after the forces of the Vietnamese army entered Phnom Penh, the Thai government turned to one of the informal leaders of the Cambodian anti-communist political emigration – Son Sann's [3]. Shortly before the fall of Phnom Penh, on January 5, 1979, Son Sann and his supporters established the "Committee for a Neutral and Peaceful Cambodia". Thailand approached the Committee with a proposal to organise its resistance to the Vietnamese occupation, but assuming that they would have to act together with the Khmer Rouge, they refused Thailand. However, soon, on February 1, 1979, a representative of the Committee, a former general of the Khmer Republic, Dien Del, arrived in Thailand, who began forming the anti-communist "Armed Forces of the National Liberation of the Khmer People" (KPNLAF) – an alternative anti-communist resistance movement to the Vietnamese occupation. In the future, on the basis of the Committee, the "National Front for the Liberation of the Khmer People" "Armed Forces of the National Liberation of the Khmer People" (KPNLF) will be founded, which will actually become the reincarnation of the then dying Blue Khmer movement.

On the other hand, the United States exerted pressure on the ruler of Cambodia during the monarchy – Prince Norodom Sihanouk [3], who did not create his own parties and organisations at that time, but to whom a number of organisations and associations expressed loyalty, the first of which was the militant organisation "Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea" (MOLINAKA), part of a more global White Khmer movement. This organisation was one of the first to launch armed resistance to the Vietnamese occupation and expressed pro-monarchist, anti-communist and anti-republican positions, that is, opposed everyone. In the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pyongyang, on March 21, 1981, Norodom Sihanouk created his own party – the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful Cambodia (FUNSIPEK), which positioned itself as the supreme organisation uniting all pro-monarchical structures. With the support of Thailand, the United States and China, all three movements were united into a single government in exile – the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which jointly resisted the Vietnamese occupation until the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989, and then will cease to exist after the 1993 constituent elections under the auspices of the UN.

Conclusions

In this research paper, the qualitative growth of relations between Thailand and Democratic Kampuchea was analyzed. From the very beginning, Thailand went to meet the Kampucheans, which laid the foundation for a strong relationship. The Thais were pushed to such a step by the then completely new policy of democracy and openness to other countries for Thailand. Prior to that, Thailand professed a policy of pro-Americanism and dictatorial militarism, which was led by the military, and in general, as time and further recognition of Thai politicians show, it

was an unsuccessful policy. There were many problems in the relations between Kampuchea and Thailand, so Thailand, despite all intentions and efforts, still did not open its embassy in Phnom Penh, and in many ways, the Cambodian leaders were moving closer to Thailand because of the threat from Vietnam. Perhaps if the Vietnamese had also gone to meet the Kampucheans, everything would have turned in the other direction – Vietnam would have become a “comrade” of Kampuchea, and Thailand would have become an enemy. Anyway, despite the obstacles, relations between the two countries have developed very well, and have developed in a positive way.

Of course, it is necessary to say about the role of China in the relations between the two countries: at first, Cambodian and Thai diplomats contacted through the Chinese embassy or crossed paths in Beijing, and China

also did a lot to bring the two countries closer. For example, for the first time Ieng Sary visited Bangkok, arriving on a Chinese plane. And later, after the coup of October 20, 1977, China pushed the Kampucheans to resume and improve relations with Thailand. From the very beginning, trade began to unfold between the two countries, and then cooperation between the two countries will gradually reach the international level, and eventually reach a frankly allied character when the Vietnamese troops occupy the country. However, in the future, after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, Thailand will begin to rapidly move away from the Khmer Rouge, who have increasingly become associated with the “bloody genocide of their people.” Then, Thailand, which was entering the world and joining the global system, wanted to have a good reputation and broke with the Khmer Rouge for this.

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Міжнародне співробітництво Таїланду та Демократичної Кампучії

Анотація. У цій статті розглядається співпраця Королівства Таїланд та Демократичної Кампучії у військовій, політичній та економічній сферах. Попри поширений міф про те, що Демократична Кампучія була ізоляційною країною, насправді країна була досить відкритою світу. Таїланд став першою країною, з якою Демократична Кампучія почала співпрацювати. Співробітництво між двома державами почалося у квітні 1975 року, відразу після перемоги Червоних кхмерів над режимом Синіх кхмерів (більше відомий під ім'ям попереднього правителя Лон Нола), і тривало аж до остаточного падіння Демократичної Кампучії під напором в'єтнамських військ. Можна впевнено сказати, що прагнення тайців та кхмерів у розвитку відносин були щирими. Таїланд прагнув поліпшити стосунки з сусідами, і зокрема з Кампучією, вживаючи різні ініціативи навіть у часи протистояння з жовтня 1976 по жовтень 1977 року, не кажучи вже про згоду на перегляд кордонів або спільну експлуатацію ресурсів уздовж розмитого водного кордону. Демократична Кампучія також виявляла ініціативи і йшла на зближення, і особливо це виявилось на восьми Азіатських олімпійських іграх, коли Кампучія взяла в них участь лише заради Таїланду. Період 1979 став кульмінацією розвитку дружніх відносин: з просто дружньої країни Кампучія стала союзником Таїланду. Щоправда, надалі, після виведення в'єтнамських військ із Камбоджі, Таїланд почне стрімко віддалятися від Червоних кхмерів, які дедалі більше стали асоціюватись із «кривавим геноцидом свого народу». Тоді Таїланд, який виходив у світ і вливався в глобальну систему, хотів мати гарну репутацію і заради цього порвав із Червоними кхмерами

Ключові слова: кхмери, уряд, армія, війна, переворот

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Political Neo-Rusynism as an Element of the Russian Hybrid War Against Ukraine and the Countries of Eastern Europe

Abstract. The beginning of the 21st century supplemented the list of modern challenges and threats with a new concept of “hybrid war”. As stated by the author of the article, hybrid war uses all types of state power and tools available to it, including disinformation, to impose its will on another state, attacking the weakest points of society’s development, and, accordingly, to achieve its results. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially with the beginning of Russian aggression against the Ukrainian state, the issue of “political rusynism” as an element of hybrid war has today become an effective tool for Russia to blackmail many countries of Central and Eastern Europe. According to the author of the article, this applies not only to Ukraine, but also to Slovakia, Poland, Romania as well as Moldova, where a large Ukrainian-Rusyn community lives. The issue of countering modern challenges and threats, including political rusynism, requires a more careful study of this problem. The purpose of the presented article is to briefly highlight the main reasons for the revival of political rusynism on the territory of Ukraine, to clarify modern neo-rusynism movements and their leaders of thought, as well as to outline the main measures to institutionalize the basic ideas of neo-rusynism in Ukraine as elements of a massive Russian hybrid war. The author shows the historical connection between Russia’s use of rusynism and the current situation in the region. The author’s opinion is that deep understanding of the nature of political rusynism will allow various interested institutions of Ukraine, in particular state bodies, to effectively neutralize and prevent, including within the framework of multi-format international platforms, the attempts of certain neighboring states, primarily Russia, to destabilize the situation in Ukraine using this phenomenon as one of the effective tools of hybrid warfare

Keywords: disinformation, political rusynism, “Russian peace”, Subcarpathian Rus, Carpathian Ukraine, Transcarpathia, national identity

“After the liberation of Transcarpathia by the Soviet troops, the congress of the Orthodox population of the region spoke in favor of the inclusion of Subcarpathian Rus into the RSFSR or directly into the USSR with the rights of a separate Carpathian Rusyn Republic. But this opinion of the people was ignored.”

Vladimir Putin

Introduction

The beginning of the current century added a new concept of “hybrid war” to the list of such modern challenges and threats as “information war”, “nuclear war”, “cold war”, “cyber war”, etc. Today, this concept is understood by many as a synthetic, integrative definition, which includes, on the one hand, active military actions aimed at the physical destruction of the enemy and his manpower, and on the other hand, a complex of certain actions of the aggressor in relation to the victim, the purpose of which is to discredit the latter in the eyes of the world community and its own people as well as to split the political elite and society in general. Such actions can deliver a much stronger blow than a military invasion, since they are aimed at the formation of certain stereotypes and attitudes in the mass consciousness through manipulative influence [1].

Hybrid war uses all types of state power and tools available to it, including disinformation, to impose its will on another state, attacking the weakest points of society’s development, and, accordingly, to achieve its results. The vast majority of authors agree that information warfare is the leading component of hybrid warfare. One of the most powerful tools of hybrid warfare remains systematic disinformation [2].

Researchers of hybrid warfare, particularly, V. Petryk in his article “The essence of information security of the state, society and the individual” [3], note that disinformation and manipulation of information can be achieved through: 1) tendentious presentation of facts (informing, which consists in biased coverage of facts or other information about events with the help of specially selected true data; this method usually involves presenting specially formed information in doses to an ever-increasing

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tension); 2) “reverse” disinformation (provision of true information in a distorted form or in such a situation where it is perceived by the target as false; as a result, a situation arises when the target actually knows true information on the intentions or specific actions of the opposite side, but perceives it inadequately and is not ready to resist negative influence); 3) terminological “mining” (distortion of the primary correct essence of fundamentally important basic terms and interpretations of a global and operational application nature); 4) “gray” disinformation (implies the use of a synthesis of true information with disinformation); 5) “black” disinformation (use of mostly false information)” [3].

It is quite obvious that various means of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine includes the theme of “political rusynism” or “neo-rusynism”, the purpose of which is to destabilize the political, national-ethnic and territorial situation in our country, weakening the Ukrainian ethnic group in particular, and the Ukrainian political nation in general, imposing on Ukrainian society the idea of a single or, at least, a triune Russian people, in which the place of Ukrainians should be taken by the Little Russians-Rusyns. The leading place in this destructive process is given to the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine with its historical, linguistic, linguistic and cultural development features.

According to the researchers of rusynism, in particular the historian V. Fenych, “the entire “Transcarpathian history” in intellectual discourses about Ukraine after 1991 is presented in the concepts and methodologies of three historiographical schemes. Two of them are exclusivist or ethnocentric, which are Ukrainian and Ruthenian interpretations, and the other one is an inclusivist or multi-ethnic historiography, which tries to combine different concepts of a multicultural region with “many names” (Transcarpathia, Transcarpathian Rus, Transcarpathian Ukraine, Subcarpathia, Subcarpathian Rus, Upper Hungary, Ruszka Krajna)” [4, p. 70].

According to another Ukrainian researcher, M. Zan, if we take the Ukrainian concept of rusynism into account, we will mainly receive criticism and construction of the newest “meme” called “political rusynism”. On the other hand, he continues, the Rusyn scientific paradigm justifies the ethno-renaissance of its own identity in the new geopolitical situation of Central-Eastern Europe at the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century [5, p. 83].

Therefore, the knowledge and understanding of political rusynism, the scale of its possible influence both at the regional and international levels will practically allow, according to the author of this article, various interested structures of Ukraine, including state bodies, to more effectively neutralize and prevent the attempts of some neighboring states, primarily Russia, to destabilize the situation in Ukraine. Actually, this is why the article is relevant to the reader.

The goal of the article is to highlight a series of events that were used and continue to be used by the puppet “leaders” of rusynism and their Russian curators in the direction of the “practical revival of the Rusyn nation” with all the resulting consequences on the territory of

the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. In a broader sense, the author attempts to show the danger that “marginal” neo-rusynism potentially poses for the Ukrainian state and its neighboring countries, which has essentially turned into one of the important tools of Russia's hybrid war against the democratic countries of Eastern Europe.

Achieving the goal is possible provided that at least three such tasks are solved: 1) clarification of the reasons for the resuscitation of political rusynism on the territory of Ukraine; 2) clarification of the main neo-rusynism movements and their leaders of thought; 3) outlining the main measures to institutionalize the basic ideas of neo-rusynism in Ukraine as elements of a massive Russian hybrid war. Research timeline: 1991-2021.

Formation of Modern Neo-Rusynism in Transcarpathia

The question of Carpathian rusynism or political rusynism does not fit into the framework of some local and temporary phenomenon. This is a long chain of consistent policies of the authorities of various states and politicians regarding the Transcarpathian branch of the Ukrainian nation, which extends from the middle of the 19th century, reaches its peak in the 20s and 30s of the 20th century, and recovers at the end of the last century. Having arisen in the middle of the 19th century in the wake of the “Spring Revolution” in Europe as a result of the political split of Ukrainians in Galicia, political rusynism soon turned into an instrument of ethnic division and territorial fragmentation of the Ukrainian nation and, accordingly, the inclusion of Ukrainian ethnic territories in different historical periods, at least as part of the Austrian and Russian empires, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the leaders of neo-rusynism, taking advantage of the favorable political situation in Eastern Europe (the collapse of the Eastern bloc), obtained from the Slovakian government tacit recognition of the Rusyns as a people separate from Ukrainians in exchange for the integrity of this country. Thanks to the financial assistance of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic, the first so-called World Congress of Rusyns was held in March 1991 in Medzilaborce. This is where the inspired initiative to create a new nation of “Rusyns” came from. Slovakia and its real financial support then also played a leading role in the creation of the so-called “Rusyn language” (international seminar in Bardejovské Kúpele at the end of 1992, codification in Bratislava) [6].

The relay of the official Bratislava, which either naively believed that by dividing Ukrainians and Ruthenians and inventing a “Rusyn language” for the latter forever solved the “Ukrainian question” on its territories and saved the Rusyn-Ukrainian Prešov region from separatism and thereby ensured the inviolability of its borders, was picked up directly by Moscow. The Rusyn map is being reinvented in a hurry by the party-state leadership of the Soviet Union, again with the aim of keeping Ukraine in the “updated” Union of the SSR, which, in the end, did not save it from collapse.

On December 1, 1991, as part of the 1991 Ukrainian independence referendum, according to “official” statistics,

78% of the population of Zakarpattia Oblast allegedly positively supported the question “On the status of Transcarpathia as part of Ukraine” as its autonomous part. The people of Transcarpathia really answered “yes” to the question on the ballot: “Do you want Transcarpathia to be enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine as a special self-governing territory as a subject within independent Ukraine and not included in any other administrative-territorial entities?”. But at the same time, the survey did not mention any “autonomous territory”. On the contrary, the referendum removed all reservations regarding the liquidation of the Zakarpattia Oblast and the unification of the territory of the region with other western regions of Ukraine into a new entity, provided that administrative and territorial reform will be carried out in the future [7, p. 525].

The results of the referendum soon began to be actively interpreted in their own way by various anti-Ukrainian political forces. Few people today will deny that the main interpreters here were the Transcarpathian party and KGB nomenclature, on the one hand, and the “enlighteners” of the newly formed “Rusyn government” in Slovakia who controlled the Slovak state mass media and Radio Prešov that is geographically close to Uzhhorod, on the other hand. Of course, this coordinated company was conducted by Moscow. The goal of Gorbachev’s USSR that was living its last days was obvious – to show Ukraine and, eventually, Georgia (Abkhazia, Adjara, South Ossetia), Moldova (Transnistria), Uzbekistan (Fergana) and even Yeltsin’s Russia itself (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan) that these republics will not be able to exist outside the USSR. They will simply crumble to pieces, and only the Soviet Union was and can continue to be the guarantor of their integrity and prosperity. Czechoslovakia, for its part, also sought to protect itself from possible steps taken by the Rusyn Prešov region aimed at leaving Slovakia. Therefore, the idea of the autonomy of Transcarpathia, but necessarily within Ukraine, completely satisfied it.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s “democratic” Russia, weakened at the time, “forgot” about rusynism for a while. As a prototype of the future “Russian world”, the Russian Federation, at the turn of the century tried through the structures of the CIS to push the so-called single humanitarian space that would ensure the supremacy of the Russian language, literature, culture, and through them the political dominance of the Kremlin on the entire territory of the former Soviet Union. Having strengthened itself, now Putin’s Russia, following the best KGB traditions, launched an open attack on everything non-Russian in the post-Soviet countries by implementing the “Russian world” political project based on the experience of centuries of Russian expansion. The purpose of this project was very successfully and succinctly characterized by Lyudmila Putina, the then-wife of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin: “Russia ends where Russian language ends” [8]. V. Putin himself, during the awarding ceremony of the “Russian Geographical Society” in November 2016 unceremoniously and programmatically declared that “the border of Russia does not end anywhere” [9]. In Zakarpattia, Rusyn separatists, local Hungarians and the so-called Russian-speaking population of the region became a strong support for Moscow in the implementation of its plans.

It should be noted that Transcarpathian “political rusynism” was not a single movement from the very beginning, which allows us to understand why the “Rusyn leadership” easily switches its orientation towards different states. Historically, four movements stood out in it: Muscophilic, Magyaronian, Subcarpathian Rusyn (local) and Czechophilic. With the exception of the Czechophile movement, these movements will continue to be represented in the region. In the 2000s, the Muscophile wing was headed by Father Dymytriy (Sydor), a priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the local wing was headed by Yevhen Zhupan, and the Magyar wing, according to some researchers, was led by Hungarian political parties. “Rusynism” was supported by the local regional government, the Society of Hungarian Culture in Transcarpathia, the bishopric of the UOC-MP in Transcarpathia, as well as part of the leadership of the Mukacheve Greek Catholic Diocese led by Bishop Ordinary Ivan Semedi [10].

The adoption by the Zakarpattia Oblast Council on March 7, 2007 of the decision to recognize the nationality of “Rusyns” significantly fueled the separatist forces of the region, at the same time causing opposition from the statist elite of Transcarpathia. In particular, attention was drawn to the fact that although there are more supporters of the Hutsul identity in Ukraine (21,400 people) (compared to about 10,000 Rusyns), “political players do not care about them.” In response to the decision of the Oblast Council, the Rakhiv Raion Council adopted a special decision, in which special emphasis was placed on “preventing speculation on Ukrainian ethnonyms” [11].

It should be noted that Ukrainian researchers of rusynism immediately drew attention to the “artificial identity” of the Ukrainian population of Transcarpathia, formed exclusively by external factors of rusynism as an “anti-Ukrainian political movement.” At the same time, many defined the decision of March 7, 2007 to recognize the nationality of “Rusyns” as a “demarche” of the Zakarpattia Oblast Council in the conditions of the all-Ukrainian political crisis [12]. Some researchers of Transcarpathian “rusynism” associated the socio-political activation of Rusyn NGOs in the region, especially in the mid-2000s, with the political initiatives of Viktor Baloha, head of a powerful political and business group in Transcarpathia. According to their belief, V. Baloga actually has been the coordinator of the Rusyn movement in the region since 2005. With his alleged support, the People’s Council of Zakarpattia Rusyns was established with Ye. Zhupan as its head, a decision was made to recognize the nationality of “Rusyns”, and the newspaper “Subcarpathian Rusyn” was financed from the regional budget [13].

Despite everything, the very next year, in 2008, the separatists formed a kind of “parliament” of Subcarpathian Rus – the so-called “Soim of Subcarpathian Rusyns”. Dmytro Sydor, the author, priest of the UOC MP, an active Russophile, supporter of the Third Rome, is mentioned as the head of the Soim. A year earlier, the same “father” Sydor initiated a meeting in Mukacheve called the first “European Congress of Rusyns” held under the watchful eye of the Russian mass media and specifically Moscow television cameras, elected the “prime minister of the

Republic of Subcarpathian Rus" [14]. They chose an unremarkable, familyless and homeless Petro Hetsk, a native of Uzhhorod, who had never heard anything about Rusyns until 1996, worked as a computer technician in one of the libraries. Before that, however, he served in the army, and later graduated from the Moscow Engineering and Technical Institute together with the notorious future "leader of Novorossiya" Oleg Tsaryov. Subsequently, the "prime minister", whom the "ardent Rusyns" themselves perceive as nothing but a buffoon, hid for a while in Moscow, and his "statesmanship" activities were reduced to all kinds of pasquills about Ukraine, which he spread in the Internet [15]. Thanks to "active" search, P. Hetsk managed to find "Rusyns" even in Bukovina.

But in the treacherous year of 2014, namely on March 14, as befits a loyal follower of the "Russian world", he immediately "officially" appealed to the President of Russia V. Putin as the "prime minister of Subcarpathian Rus" to carry out a "peacekeeping operation" in Transcarpathia [16]. According to the plans of D. Sydor, the government of "Subcarpathian Rus" was to be established in Zakarpattia Oblast on April 24, 2014, which the Russian media wrote about at the time. However, the predictions did not come true. In June 2018, in an interview with the Russian "Literaturnaya Gazeta", the "Holy Father" once again called on Moscow to actively reclaim Transcarpathia, "because East Slavic, all-Russian civilization begins from there and extends to Alaska." He urged the Kremlin leaders "Intervene, as this is where Russia's vital interests are" [14].

In 2008, the so-called Soim of Subcarpathian Rusyns and the Council of Zakarpattia Rusyns held the next "European Congress of Rusyns". On October 25 of the same year, the "congressmen" ultimatum stated that if the Ukrainian authorities do not implement the results of the 1991 referendum on the autonomy of Zakarpattia, then the Rusyns will be forced to independently resort to its creation as part of Ukraine. And a year later, at the end of 2009, the poem by the founder of the Transcarpathian Russophile Rusyn movement "Subcarpathian Rusyns" Father Oleksandr Dukhnovych becomes the "official anthem of the "Republic of Subcarpathian Rus" under the name "Long live the Rusyn people!", which at the same time becomes the official anthem of Rusyns of Zakarpattia Oblast approved on December 22 by deputies of the Zakarpattia Oblast Council [17].

We can say that there was the "Rusyns" attempted to create their own, so far virtual, "trained army". On August 23, 2014, the "first national unit" – the Ruthenian battalion named after I.G. Kundri (archimandrite of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Russian Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Jov Ugolsky, a "Carpathian" spiritual missionary). According to "official" Rusyn internet publications, the battalion included volunteers from Zakarpattia Oblast, Prešov Region (Slovakia), Lemko Region (Poland), and Hungary; a total of 337 people under the command of some "commander" Yu.A. Ianzo. The motto of the battalion became "Подкарпатська Русь і Новорусько – навхтема рокаши!", which, translated from another version of the newly born "Rusyn language", which can be seen by this

slogan to "rapidly develop", eloquently means "Subcarpathian Rus and Novorossia – forever together!" [18]. As expected, the battalion turned out to be as fake in reality as the "Republic of Subcarpathian Rus" itself [14].

The so-called "Plan to ensure the federal status of Transcarpathia" developed in Moscow in 2014 was not implemented, and could not be implemented in 2014, according to which on October 15-25, 2014, it was planned to seize administrative buildings, the airport of Uzhhorod, and turn to Kyiv with a proposal to sign a federal agreement. According to the idea of the "prime minister" P. Hetsko, the plan should have been implemented by the "radical units of the Rusyn movement" and the forces of the Hungarian community under the control of the "Movement for a Better Hungary" party. Considerable hopes were placed on the "Rusynska Rudyna" organization ("Rusyn Family"), which was supposed to include about 1,000 people. It was planned to create 4 mobile groups and hold 5-6 protest actions against the policies of the central and local authorities of Ukraine every month [19].

Despite everything, there were still attempts to create paramilitary units, albeit virtual; some experience has been gained. Now the only one thing left is to implement in practice the establishment of the "state of Subcarpathian Rus" or some other "subcarpathian people's republic" proclaimed by a handful of Moscow henchmen. Its political recognition, like the recognition of the "statehood" of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, will obviously not have to wait long, at least from the Kremlin's side. This is clearly evidenced by the personal position of the President of Russia V. Putin. In his "scientific" work "On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians", published in Ukrainian on the website of the Russian president for the first time in history on July 12, 2021, the newly-minted "protector", "father of all peoples and nations" shed a bitter tear regarding the hard fate of Subcarpathian Rusyns. "I will speak separately about the fate of Subcarpathian Rus, which ended up in Czechoslovakia after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. A significant part of local residents were Rusyns. This is rarely mentioned now, but after the liberation of Transcarpathia by the Soviet troops, the congress of the Orthodox population of the region spoke in favor of the inclusion of Subcarpathian Rus into the RSFSR or directly into the USSR with the rights of a separate Carpathian Rusyn Republic. But this opinion of the people was ignored. And in the summer of 1945, it was announced, as the Pravda newspaper wrote, about the historic act of reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine "with its ancient homeland, Ukraine", he writes [20].

V. Putin's article, both in its entirety and in the part concerning Transcarpathia, serves as a classic example of "gray" disinformation, i.e. the use of a synthesis of true information with disinformation used in hybrid warfare. Let's try to prove it.

First of all, V. Putin uses facts that are generally known to the general public and are beyond dispute: 1) he uses the term Subcarpathian Rus that was also used by official Prague in the pre-war years (the term Transcarpathian Ukraine is not used deliberately); 2) he mentions the well-known fact of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary that for a long time included the Transcarpathian region; 3) he

emphasizes that Transcarpathia was liberated from fascist occupation by Soviet troops (although it is not specified that these were troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front staffed mainly by Ukrainian prisoners). These facts create an initial general background that signals in the mind of an average person that this information is trustworthy.

The second set of reliable information includes facts generally known to the public, but the meaning of which is understood by a much smaller number of people. As a rule, it concerns a trained category of specialists, namely: 1) the population of Transcarpathia is identified as “Rusyns”, which for a Russian or a person with a Soviet mentality is consonant with the word “Russian”. At the same time, the fact is omitted that such a definition was imposed by the authorities of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in order to keep Transcarpathia as part of their states (if they would have called the Rusyns Ukrainians, the question of their territorial affiliation would immediately arise) 2) the focus is made on the Orthodox faith of the Rusyns, which the average person associates to a large extent with the Rusyn (Russian) Orthodox Church. But at the same time, there are no mentions of the fact that the pre-war Transcarpathia was canonically subject to the Serbian Orthodox Church (Mukacheve- Prešov eparchy); 3) the “convention” of the population of the region is mentioned, which ordinary citizens know about only in general terms.

This type of information, limited or dosed to a certain extent, is aimed at consolidating the veracity of the information offered in general in the human mind.

And, finally, the third key set is the introduction of outright disinformation, which determines the main goal of V. Putin’s article – to consolidated in people’s minds, in our case regarding Transcarpathia, that this region was unfairly, against the will of its inhabitants, the Rusyns, was included in the territory of Ukraine, and the Rusyns themselves were forced to recognize themselves as Ukrainians. It is about the allegedly ignored decision of the congress to ask the leadership of the USSR to include “Subcarpathian Rus” in the Soviet Union as a union republic, or in the Russian Federation as an autonomous republic. The calculation here was made precisely on the fact that the majority of its population does not know the details of the “congress of the Orthodox population”, and therefore, based on the two previous sets of information, it will believe this set as well.

Of course, real documentary facts are deliberately omitted here. Let’s read an article in the diplomatic dictionary published in Moscow in 1986 in Russian language under the editorship of the world-reputable USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko: “The 1945 Treaty on Carpatho-Ukraine was signed on June 29 in Moscow and entered into force on January 30, 1946. It was concluded in accordance with the general desire of the population of Carpathian Ukraine expressed in the Manifesto of the first Mukacheve Congress of People’s Committees (November 26, 1944). It established that Carpatho-Ukraine (which was mentioned as Subcarpathian Rus in the Czechoslovak constitution), a region that was included in the Czechoslovak Republic as an autonomous unit on the basis of the 1919 Saint-Germain Peace Treaty “reunites in accordance with the

desire expressed by the population of Carpatho-Ukraine, and on the basis of a friendly agreement... of the parties, with its old motherland – Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” [21].

It is hard to believe that the professional intelligence officer V. Putin knew nothing about these historical facts or historical-geographical terms. But, contrary to these realities, at the end of his disinformation throw-in, he makes a true reference to an article in the main Soviet newspaper “Pravda” about the inclusion of Transcarpathia in Ukraine, which only strengthens the feeling of “injustice” regarding this region. Against the background of other “historical” textbooks of the Russian propaganda machine, the average Russian or post-Soviet citizen gets the impression of the existence of an artificial entity – Ukraine, which was created by Russia from Russian Donbas, Russian Novorossiia, the Russian Black Sea Region, Russian Transcarpathia and, in the end, Little Russia, together with Kyiv, which is the “mother of Russian cities.”

So, as the logical conclusion follows, it is necessary to correct these historical mistakes and “satisfy the aspirations of the people” (in fact, V. Putin openly and cynically announced Russia’s new territorial claims to Ukraine). After all, the wider the halo of Russianness in the world, the stronger Russia is, the more it influences world processes, decides the fate of political regimes in neighboring countries, including Slavic countries, among which Russia, according to the Kremlin, has historically played and is obliged to continue to play a key role, the role of patron, liberator and defender from everything “foreign”. Because this is her fate, the fate of the Third Rome.

In Russia itself, Moscow actively uses the “Rusinskiy Mir” information portal in its outreach with people from Zakarpattia. It was created in 2020 specifically for “Rusyns who live and work on the territory of Russia.” Phone numbers and addresses are published for the visiting residents of Zakarpattia to contact if they have problems with the police, migration services, job search, etc. [22].

However, returning to “rusynism” as a definition of “nationality”, Russian masterminds increasingly dislike the word “Rusyn”, since it, although being consonant with the word “Russian”, is already very attached to the word “Ukrainian”. And, as you know, the words “Ukrainian” and “Rusyn” for Ukrainians are synonymous. Hence, the Rusyn puppets of Moscow are beginning to use the term “Rusian” or “Rusyn (Rusian)” more and more often in order to put an end to any Ukrainian associations forever. And this, for its part, should additionally confirm the thesis that Ukraine “occupied” and forcibly “Ukrainized” the entire nation of “Rusians” in Transcarpathia! Therefore, the demand of the “Rusians” to both the Ukrainian government and world leaders to protect it from denationalization, preserve its identity, which can be done at least by granting autonomy to Subcarpathian Rus (at least to begin with), appears to be quite “fair”. As one of the leading “Rusians”, the head of the Rusyn community in Moscow “Karpatskaya Rus” Mikhail Dronov, emphasized, “Thank God some of the Moscow Rusyn priests help us in this” [23].

It should be noted that expectations placed here upon certain political circles in Hungary as well. According

to the words of the “prime minister” mentioned by the author, P. Hetsko: “We will receive help from Hungary. Hungarian nationalists are one of the toughest nationalists in Europe. In all respects. We expect help, including physical and military training... We don't expect it, we are confident in it. Any help: military, material, personal.”

At the same time, the Russian news agency “Anti-fascist” noted that “the words of the political leader of the Rusyns are partly confirmed by the recent statement of the leader of the right-wing radical party “Jobbik” Vona Gábor that the leadership of the Hungarian party held negotiations in Moscow last week with the aim of gaining support for the creation of autonomy (in Ukraine – author) for Hungarians and Rusyns” [15]. P. Hetsko's statement echoed the statements made at the time by the Vice Prime Minister of Hungary, Zsolt Semjén, about the need to create autonomy for local Hungarians in the Zakarpattia Oblast of Ukraine [14]. Perhaps this also explains the stormy negative reaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary and its head Péter Szijjártó in September-October 2017 to the new Law “On Education” approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which, among other things, allows the Hungarians of Zakarpattia Oblast, to learn the Ukrainian language along with their native Hungarian language and to integrate normally into Ukrainian society.

But what about “Great Hungary”? Isn't this why the Hungarian government, in the form of undisguised blackmail, openly declared that it will block (and blocks) all Ukrainian European integration and Euro-Atlantic projects, and will even try to revise the Agreement on the Association of Ukraine with the EU, if Ukraine does not abandon its nationally oriented, state-building Ukrainian educational policy [24]. Everything will now depend on whether Ukraine is ready to defend its national interests, or whether it will once again agree to “sleep through” this region in favor of some one-time benefits, as has already happened with Crimea and the Donetsk region.

Political Rusynism as an Element of the Russian Hybrid War Against the Countries of Eastern Europe

Returning to the question of the “successful solution” of political rusynism in Slovakia, it is quite possible to assert that at one time the Soviet-Russian special services conducted a subtle, essentially jewelry operation to de-Ukrainize the population of Prešov region, executed by the hands of the Slovak special services, brought up in the best traditions of the KGB of the USSR, and former Slovak party officials who hastily shifted their ground towards democrats, nurtured and selected with the consent of the CPSU for the leadership of the Czechoslovak SSR. This was done with the help of old and new, outwardly loyal “Rusyn” leaders.

Did the current Ukraine contribute to such a state? We must state that it did, at least due to misunderstanding and underestimation of the importance of autochthonous Ukrainian identity in neighboring states. At first it was done passively, and later practically. In 2010, immediately after V. Yanukovych's team came to power, state Ukrainian diplomatic institutions accredited in the places

of compact residence of Ukrainians in neighboring countries were liquidated, namely the consulates general in Prešov (Slovakia), Tulcea (Romania), Tyumen (Russia) as well as Varna (Bulgaria). A number of other consular offices were downgraded from the consulate general to the level of a consulate, such as in Brest (Belarus). Hopes that the situation with the Ukrainian presence in these states would be corrected after the Revolution of Dignity did not come true. This is despite the fact that neighboring countries, with the exception of Russia for obvious reasons, are actively expanding their institutional diplomatic presence in Ukraine and, first of all, in the western regions of our country.

However, it seems that the Slovak competent high-ranking officials of that time, as well as the Polish, Romanian and even some of the Ukrainian officials at the time, did not realize enough and continue to be oblivious of who they actually play with. The secret plans of the Rusyn leaders, who speak blasphemously about the so-called “Rusyn people”, the “Rusian” people, or about the realization of Rusyn statehood, even in a limited autonomous form, always concern the most important interests not only of Ukraine, but also of Slovakia (Prešov Region), Poland (Subcarpathian and Lesser Poland Voivodeships) and Romania (Maramureș Region), where Ukrainians-Rusyns-Lemkas historically live on their ethnic lands. All the more so as “faithful” Moscow, as already mentioned, was and remains a reliable ally of the Rusyn leaders in this issue.

The Rusyn leaders also have some support in the current Czech Republic, which obviously has not fully learned the “Rusyn lessons” from its pre-war history. On its territory, the “Russian Prize” foundation with its headquarters in Prague operates quietly funded by the international “Russian world” fund created by the decree of V. Putin's. The “Russian Prize” Foundation is headed by Alexandr Gegalczij, a native of Uzhhorod, who is a “persona non grata” in Ukraine for openly supporting the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of part of Donbas. Until 2014, in the theater hall in Uzhhorod, this “figure” solemnly organized annual prize awarding ceremonies for the prize winners of this fund, which he continued to do in Prague. In 2014, he left Ukraine and settled in Prague, received citizenship of the Czech Republic, and launched active pro-Russian activities funded by the Kremlin. In particular, Mr. Hehalchyi created the “Friends of Russian Crimea” community, whose members attended events in the occupied Crimea and were observers at the pseudo-elections in Luhansk [22].

Oddly enough, the problem of Rusynism in the early 2000s also affected Moldova, where a Ukrainian community of several hundred thousand resides compactly, of whom at least half are autochthonous Ukrainians from Transnistria. It is clear that Russia could not ignore this important fact, which significantly strengthened the role of Ukraine as a state in this strategically important region of Europe, because Moldova is called the gateway to the Balkans not for nothing. It became more and more difficult for the Kremlin to hold Moldova using the separatist regime in Tiraspol, since the Ukrainian community of Transnistria at that time played not the least role in the political life of this region. The same applied to the North

of Moldova, the industrially developed part of the Republic of Moldova, where a large part of the Ukrainian population of Moldova is also concentrated.

And so, as a solution to this inconvenient problem for Russia, the Kremlin proposed a “genius” solution: to convince the Moldovan Ukrainians in various ways that the Ukrainians of Moldova are not Ukrainians at all, but exclusively Rusyns, which is supported by “historical facts.” It should be noted that the active propaganda carried out in Moldova by all possible Russian horns in connection with the Moldavian communists, who were in power at the time, began to give “positive” results [25]. As some heads of state administrations in the northern regions of Moldova testified, a certain number of people believed Russian propaganda, began to renounce their Ukrainian affiliation and consider themselves Rusyns. The goal of the denationalization of Ukrainians was also acceptable to the then official Chişinău (the next step involved further Moldavianization, and ultimately possible Romanianization of the local Ukrainian population). For Russia, the main thing was to turn the Ukrainians of Moldova into a stateless “Russian-speaking” population of mankurts, into its fifth column through political rusynism, in which the Kremlin generally succeeded, as evidenced by the current inert attitude of Moldovan Ukrainians towards Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Maps drawn by political provocateurs, as if it was a joke, always cover a part of “their” Rusyn lands in the modern territories of the mentioned states. Russia plays an important role in this. By encouraging separatism on the “Russian” Zakerzonian, the Kremlin will be able to easily manipulate and often manipulates the governments of these states, offering in exchange its services for the settlement of conflict situations provoked by it, not necessarily involving bloodshed – it is enough to inflate the so-called problem of historical memory, violation of the rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities, etc. As shown by the events of recent decades, Russia has extremely rich experience of “peacemaking”.

Conclusions and Suggestions on Possible Steps for Deactualization of Political Rusynism in Ukraine

Summarizing the information presented, the author thinks it is possible to highlight several main stages of Russia's involvement of the “new rusynism” in a hybrid war against Ukraine, as well as its use of neighboring states for this purpose, namely:

1. The end of the 80s- 1991 – resuscitation of political rusynism by the party leadership of the USSR in order to prevent the Ukrainian SSR from leaving the Soviet Union; establishment and encouragement of the KGB-controlled separatist movement on the territory of Zakarpattia Oblast.
2. 1991-2007 – strengthening the influence of the Russian Federation in Zakarpattia by skillfully encouraging the local political and business elite to use the territorial and ethno-linguistic designation of “rusynism” as a way for them (the elite) to preserve their positions in the region.
3. 2007-2014 – the incorporation of the Rusyn “question” into the Russian concept of the so-called “Russian

world” and the formation under the supervision of Russia of the virtual Rusyn “state of Subcarpathian Rus”; approbation by the Russian special services of actions related to the destabilization of the situation in Zakarpattia Oblast in particular and in Ukraine as a whole by Rusyn “statesmen” subordinate to them.

4. 2014-2021 – public declaration by the top state leadership of Russia of the need for a “fair” solution to the “Rusyn problem” in Ukraine based on the concept of “Russian world”.

And, finally, one more conclusion is that today Russia, through the manipulation of the “Rusyn question”, which is artificially fueled by destructive information on the part of Russian and pro-Russian international propaganda channels, receives additional levers of influence on the situation, and even the support of certain political circles and figures in countries neighboring Ukraine, primarily in Hungary, as well as in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania and Moldova.

The summary of the work and the corresponding conclusions easily bring the author to the question: “Is Ukraine now ready to effectively oppose political rusynism?”. The answer is obvious: “Of course yes, although this will not be easy.” In the opinion of the author, this requires carrying out at least seven steps with consistent persistence:

1. Developing a separate integrated state program for the sustainable development of the Zakarpattia Oblast, taking into account all its local features, which will give the political, security, legal, etc. leveling of rusynism as a political phenomenon a prominent place (currently, the development of Zakarpattia Oblast is provided within the framework of the State Program for the Development of the Ukrainian Carpathian Region for 2020-2022 that is common to the Carpathian regions of Ukraine, and within the framework of the Oblast Regional Strategy for the Development of Zakarpattia Oblast for 2021-2027).

2. Restoring the diplomatic (consular) presence of Ukraine in places with concentrated population of Ukrainians in neighboring states, primarily in Prešov (Slovakia) and Tulcea (Romania); initiating the activity of the “Ukrainian Institute” on these and other historical Ukrainian lands.

3. Developing and adopting a separate state program for the support of autochthonous Ukrainians abroad, where the main emphasis is made not on the traditional financial support of Ukrainian-Rusyn communities, but on the real image component of the political, economic, historical and cultural life of local Rusyns as an autochthonous component of Ukrainians abroad.

4. It is expedient for Ukrainian diplomacy to direct the vector of political rusynism against their own masterminds and preachers, actively using international bilateral and multilateral formats and platforms for this purpose in their national interests. The political statements of the leadership of Russia, Hungary or other countries, as well as the most odious “leaders” of modern neo-rusynism, regarding the situation around the “Rusyns” in Transcarpathia, should become a strong proof of destructive interference, primarily by Russia, in the internal affairs of Ukraine and its neighboring states. Any use of political rusynism by foreign politicians that harm Ukraine should be recorded

and become, along with other crimes against Ukraine, the subject of consideration by international courts.

5. The tragic pages of the history of the Rusyns-Ukrainians, primarily connected in time with Carpatho-Ukraine, should also serve as an obvious argument in favor of Ukraine in the process of settling “sensitive” historical, linguistic, cultural and other issues with Hungary, Poland and Romania.

6. Transcarpathia, as a unique historical and cultural heritage of Ukraine, deserves to occupy one of the central places in the cultural and humanitarian space of Ukraine, along with Transnistria and Galicia (the same applies equally to almost all regions of Ukraine).

7. Ukrainian law enforcement and other competent bodies, if necessary, in cooperation with the relevant bodies of neighboring countries, should prevent and neutralize any manifestations of the activities of the proteges of political rusynism within the framework of the current legislation of Ukraine and international treaties with further reasoned coverage of such activities in the mass media.

Of course, no one in Ukraine, just as in any other civilized state, can forbid a person to define their regional affiliation and, accordingly, to present themselves as a Lemko, Boyko, Hutsul, Dnieprian, Galician, Volyniak, Podolyak,

Rusyn, Poltavian, Polishchuk, Bukovinian, Chornomorets etc., to develop local traditions, to be proud of their small homeland, etc. On the contrary, careful treatment, preservation and development of the cultural, religious, historical and natural heritage of all Ukrainian lands, all ethnic branches of the united Ukrainian people make Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation unique and recognizable in the world with its uniqueness, diversity and originality.

The author also hopes that no one in Ukraine, regardless of nationality, be it Ukrainian, Belarusian, Hungarian, Romanian, Pole or Russian, everyone who perceives Ukrainian land as their native land, who is actually a citizen of Ukraine and is aware of their belonging to the united Ukrainian political nation, will not allow various domestic and foreign politicians, who are being fed from the hands of Ukraine's enemies, to use organic regional differences to the detriment of our state and the Ukrainian people. With this good aim, the author tried to draw the special attention of the Ukrainian public with this article, on the one hand, to Russia's new specific territorial claims against Ukraine (Zakarpattia this time), and on the other hand, to “political rusynism” as a powerful ideological weapon of anti-Ukrainian adherents in achieving the goal set by their curators.

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Політичне неорусинство як елемент російської гібридної війни щодо України та країн Східної Європи

Анотація. Початок XXI століття додав до переліку сучасних викликів та загроз таке нове поняття як «гібридна війна». Гібридна війна, як стверджує автор статті, використовує усі види влади держави та наявні у неї інструменти, серед яких дезінформація, щоб нав’язати свою волю іншій державі, нападаючи на найслабші точки розвитку суспільства, і відповідно, досягти своїх результатів. З розпадом Радянського Союзу, а особливо з початком російської агресії проти Української держави, питання «політичного русинства», як елемента гібридної війни, стало сьогодні дієвим інструментом шантажу з боку Росії багатьох країн Центральної та Східної Європи. За словами автора статті, це окрім України, стосується Словаччини, Польщі, Румунії, а також Молдови, де проживає велика україно-русинська громада. Питання протидії сучасним викликам і загрозам, серед яких політичне русинство, вимагає більш уважного вивчення цієї проблеми. Представлена стаття має на меті коротко висвітлити основні причини реанімації політичного русинства на території України, виявити наявність сучасних неорусинських течій та їх провідних ідеологів, а також викласти основні заходи з інституалізації базових ідей неорусинства в Україні як елементів масованої російської гібридної війни. Автор демонструє історичний зв’язок між використанням Росією русинства та сучасною ситуацією в регіоні. На думку автора, глибоке розуміння природи політичного русинства дозволить різним зацікавленим інституціям України, зокрема державним органам, ефективно нейтралізувати та запобігати, в тому числі в рамках багатоформатних міжнародних платформ, спробам окремих сусідніх держав, насамперед Росії, дестабілізувати ситуацію в Україні, використовуючи це явище як один із ефективних інструментів гібридної війни

Ключові слова гібридна війна, дезінформація, русинство, політичне русинство, «русский мир», Підкарпатська Русь, Карпатська Україна, Закарпаття, національна ідентичність

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Review of Zhvanko Lyubov Mykolaivna's Publication “Diplomatic Missions of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv (1921-1937): Review of Issues and Author's Reflections of Contemporary Polish Historiography”

The current situation of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014-2022 requires Ukraine to concentrate maximum efforts in all spheres of life. Victory requires not only a powerful patriotic, military, or economic component but also an active and convincing diplomatic front. It is he who must and can provide comprehensive international support for Ukraine's fair war for independence and full sovereignty over the entire territory, for freedom, dignity, democracy, and other universal human values, for the European and Euro-Atlantic choices. Most of the countries and peoples of the modern world are our allies in this war, and, first of all, the member states of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. A prominent place among them is occupied by the Republic of Poland, which since the border of the 20th-21st century. received the semi-official honorary status of “advocate” of Ukraine in united Europe. In the conditions of treacherous and brutal total Russian aggression, Poland provides comprehensive support to the Ukrainian state and its citizens, both politically, diplomatically, militarily, and humanitarian. During the four months of the large-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, more than 4.5 million Ukrainians crossed the Polish border as forced emigrants who need and seek protection from the war.

At the same time, Polish diplomacy launched active activities in support of Ukraine in all international spheres, using the potential and opportunities of both traditional classical and public diplomacy. Of course, this is not only a significant factor but also a huge help in raising the international image of Ukraine and conveying the truth about Russian aggression as a threat to peace and security not only in Ukraine but also in Europe and the world. Especially because it was Europe that became the “cradle” of two bloody world wars, the “battle for Ukraine” has not only hybrid signs of a new global conflict but also threatened to turn into a third world war. Hence, additional motivation in the scientific-theoretical and applied interest in the history of Polish diplomacy in Ukraine and Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in this field in the 20th-21st century.

The scientific work of Lyubov Zhvanko, professor, doctor of historical sciences, the leading specialist in the research department of the Kharkiv State Veterinary Academy, and member of the International Association of Humanitarians and the Scientific Society of the History of Diplomacy and International Relations, is dedicated to the activities of diplomatic missions of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv during 1921-2020. The edition was prepared as part of an internship at the Ivan Vyhovsky Award under the patronage of the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda. The scientific internship took place in Lublin at the Maria Skłodowska-Curie University (October-December 2017) and in Krakow at the Jagiellonian University (January-March 2018).

In terms of structure, the book includes an introductory speech by the Consuls General of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv, Piotr Stahanczyk and Janusz Jablonski, the author's foreword, chapters on the origins of diplomatic relations between Poland and Ukraine, the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv in 1921-1924, the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv in 1924-1934, Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv in 1934-1937, Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv in 1995-2020 and cooperation with Polonia, information about Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and employees of diplomatic missions in Kharkiv in 1921-1939, biographical records of the heads of Polish diplomatic missions in Kharkiv in 1921-1937, 1995-2020, a list of used sources, a list of abbreviations and information about the author.

L.M. Zhvanko briefly focused on the origins of Ukrainian-Polish diplomatic relations at the beginning of the 20th century. and the initial stage of activity of diplomatic missions of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv. This is fully justified, as the active foreign policy and diplomatic activities of various Ukrainian states – the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), the Ukrainian State of the Hetmanate era, the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR),

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the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR), as well as the beginning of the creation of foreign diplomatic missions falls on the final period of the First World War and the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921. At the same time, the restoration of Polish statehood was accompanied by the active development of international relations by official Warsaw.

First of all, it should be noted that throughout 1918, the Department of Political Affairs created based on the Decree of the Regent's Council of the Kingdom of Poland operated (since January 23, 1918 – the Department of State). Among his tasks was the study of various topics in the field of foreign policy and consular guardianship. At the same time, the priority task of the State Department was considered to be the creation of a diplomatic mission in the Ukrainian capital. On October 12, 1918, a Polish diplomatic mission headed by Stanislaw Vankovych arrived in Kyiv and held long negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian State, Dmytro Doroshenko. On November 5, 1918, S. Vankovych presented Hetman Pavel Skoropadskyi Virch with a letter expressing hope for the establishment of diplomatic relations as soon as possible. The development of a network of consular institutions, in particular Polish diplomatic missions in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Yelisavetgrad, was declared a priority task. At the beginning of February 1919, the Polish Consular Agency was even functioning in Kharkiv, headed by a lawyer and a well-known figure in the local Polonia, Volodymyr Kwiatkowski. But first, the fall of the Ukrainian State, and then the weakness of the power of the Directory, Bolshevik aggression, and the Polish-Bolshevik war slowed down the development of Ukrainian-Polish diplomatic relations until 1921.

At that time, the victory of the Bolshevik state project on the majority of Ukrainian lands and the relocation of the capital of Ukraine to Kharkiv intensified his involvement in international affairs. It was here that for a long time – from 1921 to 1937 – the Embassy of the Republic of Poland (1921-1924), then the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland (1924-1934), and, finally, the Consulate of the Republic of Poland (1934-1937) operated here.) in the USSR. The peer-reviewed edition presents numerous historically significant data and materials about the nature and forms of work of Polish diplomatic missions, their leaders, and employees in Kharkiv in the 1920s and 1930s in a scientific reference and informational style. In particular, it contains important original information about the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland Republic and employees of diplomatic missions in Kharkiv from 1921-1939, and biographical records of the heads of Polish diplomatic missions.

Of great importance is the appeal to the complex and even tragic aspects of the activity of Polish diplomats in Kharkiv after the transfer of the capital of the USSR to Kyiv (1934), in particular during the period of Bolshevik purges and Stalinist repressions. At that time, the Polish consular institution in Kharkiv was headed by Stanislaw Sosnytskyi and Tadeusz Brzezinskiy. In the end, the Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv was forced to

stop its work as a result of the so-called “Polish operation” – operation No. 00485, which was carried out by the Soviet authorities from August 11, 1937, to November 17, 1938, which was aimed at eliminating Polish sabotage and espionage groups, which allegedly belonged to the phantom Polish military organization. It went far beyond the limits of an anti-diplomatic action, the innocent victims of which were numerous representatives of the Polish minority, Catholic parishioners, leaders of the Roman Catholic clergy (in particular, priest Leonard Gashynsky, who in 1927 replaced the repressed priest Vincent Ilgin, was tortured), former members of the Polish Socialist Party, former Polish prisoners of war and even Soviet citizens who maintained contacts with Polish diplomatic, consular, commercial, and economic representations in the USSR. The Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat, which turned into a tool of Stalinist mass terror, not only limited the practical possibilities and made life difficult for Polish diplomats and consular employees, but also led to the termination of the activities of the Consulates of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv on December 16, 1937.

From the point of view of a comparative-historical approach and the significance of the work of the Polish diplomatic institution in Kharkiv at the current stage of Ukrainian statehood, the peer-reviewed publication contains material on the multifaceted activities of the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv in 1995-2020, as well as information about the leaders and current realities of the Polish diplomatic mission in Kharkiv. After the Republic of Poland recognized independent Ukraine on December 2, 1991, and established interstate diplomatic relations on January 8, 1992, the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Ukraine was opened in Kyiv and a decision was made to establish Consulates General, in particular in Kharkiv (1994). Zdzislaw Nowicki was appointed the first Consul General of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv at the current stage. The book especially noted the role of the Polish Consulate General in Kharkiv not only of a diplomatic and protocol nature but also in participation in public-political, scientific, and cultural-artistic life and the implementation of relevant projects. Thus, it is about his cooperation with local Polonia, involvement in the presentation and exhibition of works of Polish literature and art, participation in popularizing the role and importance of Poles in the historical development of Kharkiv, as well as active assistance in the preparation and publication of ten issues of the “Polish Almanac” (2004-2020), where numerous scientific materials on the Polish history of the Slobozhan region were presented.

We especially want to emphasize that the inclusion in the book of such detailed information about the composition and activities of diplomatic missions of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv was made possible thanks to the author's processing of documents and materials from the funds of the Archive of New Acts and the Central Military Archive in Warsaw, as well as from the repositories of the National Library in Warsaw. The Scientific Library of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, the Scientific Library of the Maria Skłodowska-Curie University in Lublin, and the V.G. Korolenko State Scientific Library in Kharkiv.

The edition is distinguished by a highly artistic design and contains a large number of various photos. In particular, the illustrative material was provided by the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv, borrowed from the collections of the Digital National Museum in Warsaw, published sources, and the Internet. The extensive illustrative base helped, on the one hand, to enrich the content of the reviewed work, and, on the other hand, to raise the level of perception of the original historical materials of a documentary nature presented by the author. At the same time, we note that the pioneering nature of the work and the motivating desire of L.M. Zhvanko to show the common and different in the activities of diplomatic institutions of Poland in Kharkiv in different historical periods prompted

the author to expand the chronological framework of the research subject up to the beginning of the 21st century. However, this was not reflected in the title of the work, where the upper chronological limit is defined as 1937.

In general, the edition, and here we agree with the Consul General of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv (2016-2020) Janusz Jablonski, allowed remembering dozens of diplomats and consular employees who created conditions for a better common future. Prepared by L.M. Zhvanko's book became a new landmark publication on the history of Ukrainian-Polish diplomatic relations, which expands the horizons of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland, and contains new knowledge about its local and regional, in particular, memorial and everyday aspects.

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