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Swedish Policy of Countering the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract. Statement and relevance of the problem. In early 2020, the outbreak of coronavirus disease came as a surprise to the whole world. The need for effective counteraction at the global and regional levels required decisive action from international organisations and state governments. The World Health Organization has announced the pandemic and the need for a thorough and urgent fight against it. European countries have introduced strict restrictive measures, in particular, mass self-isolation, restrictions on economic and trade activities, termination of the educational process with its subsequent transfer to distance learning, etc. Sweden was the only EU member state to pursue a much softer and more liberal policy in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. The purpose of the study is primarily to investigate features of the Swedish model of countering the spread of COVID-19. Scientific research is based on the use of comparative historical and statistical methods, and elements of retrospective and prospective factor analysis. Conclusions and prospects of the study. Based on the investigation of the Swedish government's policy on the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of features of the measures applied were highlighted. The Swedish model was based on the principle of public responsibility and reliance on a highly developed national health system. The basic course was to develop collective immunity in society. An important role was played by the principle of voluntariness, which did not provide for the introduction of a nationwide quarantine. Therefore, (especially at the initial stage) restrictive measures in Sweden were mild and mostly advisory in nature. Additionally, the need to maintain social distance and personal hygiene was emphasised. No strict measures or restrictions were introduced for the economy; businesses and institutions were advised to switch to remote work. Sweden has become the only EU country that has not implemented a lockdown in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. Swedish counteraction policy, as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, was based on the principle of situational response: the authorities implemented certain measures in accordance with their timeliness and effectiveness. All this suggests a special Swedish model of state policy aimed at effectively overcoming the manifestations and consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. The generalisation of Sweden's experience would allow developing approaches for creating effective measures to prevent and quickly counter such threats

Keywords: Sweden, coronavirus, restrictive measures, lockdown, vaccination, public responsibility, collective immunity

Introduction

Epidemics and pandemics have accompanied humanity throughout its history, influencing the development of civilisation to a greater or lesser extent [1]. However, at the beginning of 2020, the world community, including all its regional cross-sections, faced an unprecedented challenge for modern times. First in China, and then in other countries, the coronavirus disease began to spread, which was commonly called COVID-19. It refers, as the American analyst F. Zakaria rightly pointed out, to asymmetric shocks, that is, events that "start small and then sweep over the world like seismic waves" [2]. The coronavirus threat immediately became so dangerous that since March 2020 it has received the official status of a global pandemic from the World Health Organization (WHO). In the absence of a vaccine, strict logistical,

economic, and medical restrictions were recommended. The relevance and originality of the study is conditioned upon the fact that in the 21st century, humanity for the first time faced a global threat of a pandemic nature and researchers, including representatives of the humanities and social sciences, seek to summarise the existing experience of countering such a challenge, in particular, to minimise the risks of the occurrence and spread of such epidemics in the future.

In the context of the spread of coronavirus disease in the spring of 2020, European countries mainly introduced strict mass self-isolation. However, Sweden decided to try a different strategy to counter the pandemic. In general, the measures introduced at the level of state policy indicate the peculiarities of the Swedish way of combating the COVID-19 pandemic.

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The purpose of the study is to investigate the content and specifics of the Swedish policy of countering the spread of coronavirus disease. This study is in fact pioneering in the Ukrainian scientific discourse on comprehension of peculiarities of different national policies in terms of counteracting the coronavirus pandemic (using the Swedish example). The research methodology is based on the use of a set of principles (scientific, historicism, objectivity, polyfactoricity, etc.) and methods of scientific search, in particular, comparative and historical, statistical, and partially retrospective and prospective factor analysis, etc.

Given the short-term, insider, and incomplete current nature of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, special and generalising studies of a scientific and theoretical, and applied nature are just beginning to appear. The historiographical sources include interviews, essays, and studies by the Italian philosopher and one of the co-creators of the concept of biopolitics Giorgio Agamben [3], the papers by the British historian, writer, and journalist Neil Ferguson [4], the Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari [5], the researcher of global problems and urbanism Saskia Sassen [6], CNN expert and political analyst Farid Zakaria [2], the American political philosopher and international scholar Francis Fukuyama [7], the British historian Mark Honigsbom [8], and studies by such Ukrainian researchers as N. Nechaeva-Yuriychuk and S. Troyan [9], N. Chernysh [10], S. Shergina [11] et al. Scientific reflections of these and other researchers of historical and social processes of our time are of great importance for understanding both the general context of the pandemic, its manifestations and consequences, and understanding national strategies for countering COVID-19. In particular, F. Fukuyama's position is fully reasonable in the context of the subject matter, that it is important to consider not only general approaches to combating the coronavirus pandemic, but also the features of national and state practices [7]. An example of this practice is the Swedish model of countering COVID-19.

The Beginning of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Basic Principles Swedish Counteraction Policy

December 31, 2019 WHO was informed about the first cases of infection with the dangerous disease pneumonia of unknown origin in the Chinese city of Wuhan (one of the largest international airports). January 10-11, 2020 WHO warned about the threat of spreading the virus outside of China and published a set of recommendations on coronavirus. In January of the same year, the onset of coronavirus disease occurred in Europe. The first country to record a case of coronavirus outside of Asia was France: on January 24 – the first patient, and on February 14 – the first death from COVID-19 [12]. Over the following months, the infection spread to almost all European countries and caused the introduction of a number of restrictive measures. Since March, this has resulted in the introduction of strict restrictions on border crossing, on conducting business activities, on carrying out the educational and work process and transferring it to remote forms of activity, etc.

The first case of infection in Sweden was detected on February 15, 2020. In early March, the number of patients began to increase. The first person in Sweden died on March 11, 2020 (at that time there were 460 cases of infection). The main distribution centres are Stockholm and Len Emtland in the north of the country, where ski resorts that were open until April 2 are located. Infection also occurred in 100 nursing homes (more than 400 cases were recorded in Stockholm alone). About half of the dead were residents of nursing homes. The average age of patients exceeded 50 years, most of them were men from Stockholm. Almost 1,000 people were in intensive care at the end of April 2020. The Swedish Department of Health estimates that the inevitable death rate is about 330 people per 1 million inhabitants [13]. As of April 20, 2020, 12,385 cases of coronavirus infection were registered in Sweden, 1,540 people died, and 550 were cured. The mortality rate was 10.7%. Sweden ranked 21st in the world in terms of the number of cases of infection and 14th in terms of the number of deaths [14]. The situation developed relatively steadily and without sharp spikes.

The Swedish government called on citizens to act responsibly, but all the appeals of the authorities were advisory in nature and did not provide for any penalties. For example, throughout the spring of 2020, at a time when most Europeans could not leave their homes without a valid reason, in Sweden it was possible to gather in groups of up to 50 people. Only closer to winter, the maximum number of participants in the meeting was reduced to eight (although not for long). The Swedes received an official recommendation to wear masks only in January 2021. Before that, the mask was mostly worn with surprised looks, and sometimes disapproving comments. If most countries first closed educational institutions to fight the virus, then Swedish schools continued to operate as usual. Special attention was paid to the elderly: they were encouraged to stay at home, residents over the age of 70 were advised to reduce their contacts [13; 14], and young people were advised to help them buy food or other urgent needs. Any infected person (in accordance with WHO recommendations and national sanitary requirements) was isolated from other citizens, and those who came into contact with them were tested.

The main goals of state policy were recognised by all leading political forces and focused on:

- limiting the spread of infection in the country;
- ensuring the availability of health resources;
- minimising impact on key institutions and services;
- anticipating and mitigating consequences for people and businesses;
- reducing anxiety (in particular by providing information).

The set of measures taken in response to the coronavirus pandemic by Sweden was based on the principle of situational timeliness (different measures for different situations). The principle of voluntariness turned out to be influential. The Swedish authorities also focused on a high public level of understanding of personal and collective security. As noted by J. Agamben, first of all, security reasons will allow citizens to accept restrictions, creating

a new model of “social distancing” [3]. The main difference between the Swedish model was the absence of prohibitive restrictions on the economy. The population was advised to switch to remote work if possible. It was still possible to move or travel within the country (trains were running). The authorities only called on the population to abandon unnecessary travel, but did not impose strict restrictions or bans on movement in general.

This choice of Sweden was motivated by several reasons: low density and isolation of the population, restraint and unsociability of Swedes, their restriction of close contacts and close communication, law-abiding, high level of trust in the authorities, and accurate compliance with their instructions. In the country, it is customary not to hide from colds, but simply to harden up or get over them (to develop immunity). In general, all this is a worthy example of illustrating an effective society with a relatively low indicator of inequality and a large weight of social capital, the main element of which is a high level of trust and understanding of the fundamental (in a moral sense) equality of all people.

Features of Lifting Restrictions During Vaccination

In Sweden, vaccination against COVID-19 began in December 2020. According to statistics, in December 2021, about 7.3 million people were fully vaccinated (with two doses), which is almost 72% of the population [15]. On September 16, 2021, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven announced the start of vaccination against COVID-19 for teenagers from 12 to 15 years old. “This will reduce the risk of severe illness and the fact that you will miss school,” [16] the head of the Swedish government said at a press conference.

Since January 10, 2021, a new law has been in force in Sweden [17], which gave the Swedish government more authority to take measures to limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This applies, in particular, to the right to limit the number of visitors, and the opening hours of establishments. The law was supposed to be valid until January 31, 2022 [17]. But given the level of vaccination in the country, the burden on the health system, the death rate, and the assessment of the epidemiological situation, the Swedish government decided on September 29, 2021 to lift most of the restrictions associated with the pandemic, in particular:

- of the number of visitors to public events;
- of the number of visitors to private events, such as parties in rented premises;
- for restaurants, including the number of people at one table and the distance between them [18].

According to the Swedish State Health Administration, a high level of vaccination is the most important condition for lifting most restrictions. The State Health Administration continued to inform Swedes about the benefits of vaccination and closely monitored the spread of infection to take new measures if necessary [19]. This was especially relevant for the ambiguous rates of excess mortality (the number of deaths exceeding the annual average) in Sweden. In 2020, it was higher than in most Nordic countries. This is evidenced, in particular, by the materials of researchers Ariel Karlinski from the Department of Statistics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Dmitry Kobak from the University of Tübingen in Germany, who

collected the largest database of excess mortality worldwide since the beginning of the pandemic [14]. According to these data, the excess mortality rate in Sweden for March 2020 – May 2021 was 10% and at the same time remained lower than in many other EU countries, with the exception of Denmark (-1%), Norway (0%), Finland (1%), Cyprus and Luxembourg (5% each), Germany, Ireland, and Greece (4% each), Latvia (9%) [14]. Therefore, it can hardly be stated that the strategy of the Swedish authorities – the bet on collective immunity and public responsibility – failed.

The recommendation for employees to work from home was cancelled in September 2021. But in December of that year, the State Health Administration returned a recommendation to work from home and advised employers to give employees such an opportunity. If symptoms appear, employees should stay at home and get tested for coronavirus infection. It was assumed that large public events might require special rules. Since December 1, 2021, Sweden has introduced a vaccination passport [20] for attending events for more than 100 people. At the same time, according to the law of January 10, 2021, the following restrictions continued to apply at the beginning of 2022:

- foreign citizens – with the exception of those who arrived from the Nordic countries, when travelling to Sweden, must have an EU COVID certificate, a negative test for COVID-19 no more than 72 hours ago, or a certificate of recovery;
- ban on entry to Sweden unnecessarily from countries outside the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA) [17].

However, on February 10, 2022 Sweden has lifted all coronavirus restrictions due to the announced end of the pandemic [21]. In fact, at the power level, it was stated that in the future, based on the progress made in counteracting COVID-19, the main task will be to maintain a balance between maintaining positive dynamics of socio-economic and IT development and the overall security of society and each of its members in particular.

State Policy and the Principle of Public Responsibility

Crisis management in Sweden is based on the principle of responsibility and trust of citizens in the state. This means that the government agency responsible for any issue in normal circumstances is also responsible for it in a crisis situation. Decision-making is up to the government. Relevant departments can make some decisions in the field of infection control independently. Society as a whole, and individual citizens and organisations, as a rule, follow the advice of relevant departments.

Sweden did not introduce strict restrictive measures in the context of the search for effective counteraction to coronavirus disease. In an interview with the British Financial Times [22] and the American TV channel CNBC [13], the chief Swedish epidemiologist once again defended Sweden's tactics in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the correctness of the actions of the country, which did not introduce strict quarantine and forced self-isolation measures as part of the fight against COVID-19 [22]. According to A. Tegnella, it would take one to two years to understand whose strategy to fight the virus was ultimately more successful. He suggests that Sweden's

approach focuses on a “broader view of public health”, in which the important point is that “people should be able to continue their normal lives within reasonable limits” [22]. The chief Swedish epidemiologist insists that “so far there is no scientific substantiation for the benefits of strict quarantines”, in particular, the closure of schools. In his opinion, many leaders of European countries began to copy Chinese methods of control, fearing that the infection would unnecessarily burden their health systems [22].

“We had additional places in hospitals, and everyone who needed medical care received this care. Even patients who did not have coronavirus received medical care. We can keep our society open within reasonable limits and not suffer much harm”, Tegnell said on CNBC. A. Tegnell expressed great regret over the fatal outcome in his country. However, he is not sure that all these cases could have been avoided, especially with the old ones. “We know that in such cases there are much greater risks. But we are not sure that if we had behaved differently, the situation would have developed differently,” said the chief Swedish epidemiologist [13].

He also acknowledged that more could have been done when working with the country's older people. According to him, in Sweden, as in other Nordic countries, there are “very old and very sick” people in nursing homes, and most of the elderly live at home. A. Tegnell remarked that many nursing homes are operated in Sweden by private companies, and noted that “quality problems” of service were found in the work of these companies. This has already led to the launch of several investigations. “Now we know that we could have done more, of course. But in general, I think we would follow the same tactics” [13], – summed up the Chief Epidemiologist of Sweden.

In the long run, the Swedish model may be suitable for implementation in other countries with the next wave of the disease, since the endless movement in a circle (first get out of quarantine, and then close again) is exhausting and unproductive. At the same time, it is necessary to consider the character, mentality, organisation of society, and behavioural characteristics of the population of each country. Moreover, the success and organicity of a number of measures within the Swedish COVID-19 counteraction policy can contribute to consolidation processes and deepening integration within the European Community.

Conclusions

In general, the measures introduced in Sweden to overcome the threat of coronavirus disease differ significantly from

those introduced in most EU member states. The reaction of European governments was based primarily on the introduction of strict sanitary and restrictive measures related to freedom of movement and border crossing, a sharp decrease in business and economic activity, the transfer of the working and educational process to a remote form of activity, the mandatory wearing of masks in public places.

The Swedish state model of behaviour to counteract the negative manifestations of COVID-19 was based on a number of distinctive principles and norms. First of all, they are not so rigid and proceed from a high level of discipline of citizens, their understanding and awareness of public responsibility. In order to minimise the inevitable economic damage caused by the shutdown of industry and the closure of the service sector, Stockholm relied on the development of collective immunity in society. The restrictive measures were much milder than in neighbouring countries and were mostly advisory in nature. A set of measures taken by Sweden was based on the principle of timeliness: different measures were effective at different points in time.

In Sweden, citizens traditionally trust the authorities, so they demonstrate a high level of self-discipline and adhere to even optional recommendations. In this sense, the internal and organisational readiness of the Swedes to comply with the principle of voluntariness was important. In addition, at the beginning of the pandemic, there was also a favourable political situation in Sweden. The proposed strategy to combat COVID-19 did not raise any fundamental objections from any political party. In fact, the country has developed a political consensus on the nature and specifics of the implementation of the government's anti-COVID policy. It is also necessary to highlight the high quality of medical services and the capacity of the Swedish National Health System.

However, Sweden's policy of countering the COVID-19 pandemic should not be overly idealised. Sweden was unable to avoid a decline in business activity and an increase in the death rate, although the situation in the context of the pandemic remained under the control of the government and the National Health Service. At the same time, a comprehensive nature of the pandemic crisis encourages the search for new effective trajectories not only to overcome it, but also to anticipate it in order to avoid risks that are critical for society. In the future, it is important to continue further in-depth analysis of national policies to counter COVID-19, in particular, in the historical and comparative context of various temporal and territorial (states, sub-regions, and regions) cross-sections.

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Шведська політика протидії пандемії COVID-19

Анотація. Постановка і актуальність проблеми. На початку 2020 року спалах коронавірусної хвороби став несподіванкою для всього світу. Необхідність ефективної протидії на глобальному та регіональних рівнях вимагала рішучих дій від міжнародних організацій і урядів держав. Всесвітня організація охорони здоров'я оголосила про пандемію і необхідність ґрунтовної та невідкладної боротьби з нею. Європейські країни запровадили жорсткі обмежувальні заходи, зокрема масову самоізоляцію, обмеження економічної та торговельної діяльності, припинення навчально-освітнього процесу з подальшим переведенням його на дистанційну форму навчання тощо. Швеція була єдиною державою-членом ЄС, яка проводила значно м'якшу і ліберальнішу політику в умовах пандемії коронавірусу. Мета дослідження полягає насамперед у вивченні особливостей шведської моделі протидії і поширенню COVID-19. Наукова розвідка ґрунтується на використанні порівняльно-історичного і статистичного методів дослідження, а також елементів ретроспективного і перспективного факторного аналізу. Висновки і перспективи дослідження. На підставі вивчення урядової політики Швеції щодо пандемії COVID-19 увиразнено низку особливостей застосованих заходів. В основу шведської моделі був покладений принцип суспільної відповідальності та опори на високорозвинену національну систему охорони здоров'я. Базовим став курс на вироблення колективного імунітету в суспільстві. Важливу роль відігравав принцип добровільності, який не передбачав запровадження загальнонаціонального карантину. Тому (особливо на початковому етапі) обмежувальні заходи в Швеції були м'якими і носили переважно рекомендаційний характер. Додатково наголошувалося на необхідності дотримання соціальної дистанції і особистої гігієни. Не впроваджувалося жорстких заходів і обмежень для економіки; підприємствам і установам було рекомендовано перейти на віддалену роботу. Швеція стала єдиною державою Європейського Союзу, що не запровадила локдаун у розпал коронавірусної пандемії. Шведська політика протидії, як відповідь на пандемію COVID-19, ґрунтувалася на принципі ситуативного реагування: влада впроваджувала ті чи інші заходи відповідно до їхньої своєчасності та ефективності. Все це дозволяє говорити про особливу шведську модель державної політики, спрямованої на ефективне подолання проявів і наслідків пандемії коронавірусу. Узагальнення досвіду Швеції уможливить випрацювання підходів для створення дієвих заходів із попередження і швидкої протидії подібним загрозам

Ключові слова: Швеція, коронавірус, обмежувальні заходи, локдаун, вакцинація, суспільна відповідальність, колективний імунітет

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Ukraine and NATO: Problems, Challenges, Prospects

Abstract. Since the beginning of Ukraine's independence, namely on 24 August 1991, there has been a lively debate among social and legal theorists and practitioners alike as to the advisability of Ukraine joining NATO. However, this issue became particularly relevant after February 24 2022, when the Russian Federation launched a full-scale war against Ukraine, and of course, it remains on the agenda until now, as it concerns guarantees of national security and independence of the state. Based on this, the purpose of the study is to identify current problems, challenges, and prospects related to the process of Ukraine's accession to NATO. To achieve this goal, the method of analysis and synthesis, comparison, deduction, and historical methods were used in the study. As a result, it was found that Ukraine's accession to NATO is a priority for its future development and security. The paper managed to analyse the main Euro-Atlantic prospects for Ukraine, the most important of which at the moment is the protection of its territory by other member countries of the alliance. The analysed modern challenges allowed the authors to establish that in the conditions of the current Russian-Ukrainian war, the Ukrainian authorities implemented a number of measures aimed at developing the military-political industry, in particular, they abandoned the non-aligned position, approved the updated national security strategy of Ukraine, and most importantly approved the Euro-Atlantic direction of Ukraine's development in the Constitution of Ukraine. In conclusion, it was possible to reveal not only the priority of Ukraine's accession to NATO, but also to investigate the practical means and tools that are already being used to implement this process. The practical significance of the study lies in the fact that its results can be used both by theorists for an in-depth investigation of this topic, and by practitioners, in particular by legislators, in the development of new laws and regulations related to the Euro-Atlantic process

Keywords: war, legislation, international cooperation, military-political sphere, territorial integrity

Introduction

At the moment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the guarantor of security and independence for its member countries. This is explained by its purpose and specifics of its activities, since they consist in observing the security and protecting the territorial integrity of its participants. In the context of the war unleashed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the issue of the

latter's accession to NATO is of particular importance. This is conditioned by a number of advantages, including the military, which Ukraine needs to win. This is what shows the urgent need to address this problem as soon as possible.

In addition, it is appropriate to note the problems of the topic of this study are characterised by their duration, since the discussion about Ukraine's accession to NATO has been going on for almost 31 years. Admittedly,

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this factor testifies to its importance for Ukrainian society, and even more so in the conditions of waging war on its territory [1]. In addition, this issue is not one-sided, that is, it does not concern only Ukraine, but also NATO member states. This is conditioned by the fact that not all of them support Ukraine's accession to this organisation, which also indicates that there are urgent problems that need to be solved for the successful implementation and completion of the Euro-Atlantic process.

Since Ukraine is still not a member of NATO, and the issue of its accession is causing more and more discussions and disputes, it can be argued that it is still not resolved, neither in the circles of scientists nor practitioners. At the same time, it is advisable to focus on some of the positions that were put forward by them and relate to the implementation of the Euro-Atlantic process for Ukraine. Thus, T. Meleshchenko, suggested that the prospect of joining NATO was lost by Ukraine in the period 1991–2000. Accordingly, the researcher concludes that at the moment this issue has lost its relevance and does not need to be resolved [2]. In addition, she claims that Ukraine's accession to NATO has a number of risks that concern both one and the other side. This study cannot agree with this statement, because the current dynamic processes in Ukraine caused by European integration only contribute to the implementation of the Euro-Atlantic vector of its development and have high prospects not only for Ukrainian society, but also for NATO member countries. Similarly, M.P. Trebin noted that NATO does not put forward its own initiatives and does not support Ukraine's accession to it at the proper level [3]. His research is based on the study of the main historical events that somehow influenced the course of the Euro-Atlantic process in Ukraine. However, the author believes that this position is not properly proven, since it does not disclose concrete evidence that would provide an opportunity to indicate the lack of feedback from NATO member countries regarding Ukraine. V. Biloshytskyi, on the contrary, claimed that it is joining NATO and the EU that is the only effective step for the successful further development of the state [4]. In addition, the researcher considered the conditions caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war, while analysing them and determining the likely consequences for society. And as a result, he comes to the conclusion that in the period of post-war reconstruction, it is the European standards and NATO security guarantees that will speed up this process and restore Ukraine's status in the international arena. Undoubtedly, the author agreed with him, as he considers such a position justified and promising for Ukrainian society. In addition, the author of this study considers it appropriate to support the conclusions obtained by V. Shypovskiy, since it reveals the algorithm of Ukraine's accession to NATO, while describing the main advantages and disadvantages of this process [5]. Accordingly, it was established that after the completion of the Euro-Atlantic process, Ukraine will be able to form high-quality tools and approaches for the implementation of national security and its independence. It is also worth paying attention to the results of A. Ordynovych, since he investigated the current Ukrainian laws and regulations that need to be finalised and amended [6]. In particular, he

proposed to review some provisions of the law of Ukraine "On National Security" [7], and also formed proposals for the registration of new draft laws.

Thus, the main goal of the study was to establish the readiness of Ukraine to join NATO, in particular, to consider the main advantages and disadvantages of such a process from the standpoint of current socio-political conditions. For this purpose, the following tasks were performed: the goal of NATO and the prospects for Ukraine's accession to it were established; the level of Ukraine's readiness for this process was analysed; the main features and foundations of the Euro-Atlantic process were determined.

The relevance of the study is conditioned by the circumstances in which Ukrainian society is now, namely the war. Joining NATO today is considered by Ukrainian statesmen not only from the standpoint of the defence sector and security preferences, but also from the ideology of society. This is explained by the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian war finally stopped all relations between these countries, and clearly defined the areas of further development for Ukraine, which is conditioned by the European integration and Euro-Atlantic processes. The originality of this study lies in the fact that it considered not only the historical stages and basic principles of interaction between Ukraine and NATO, but also analysed their priority during the Russian-Ukrainian war. In addition, the author designed effective ways for Ukraine to join NATO in the shortest possible time, considering the current socio-political conditions.

Materials and Methods

Based on the method of analysis and synthesis, the main part of the paper was developed, in particular, its results were obtained. Thus, the study analysed such a category as NATO and established its purpose and role, including the essence of Ukraine's accession to it. In addition, the method of analysis allowed considering the main laws and regulations, both international and Ukrainian, concerning the sphere of international military cooperation, including with NATO. Among them are the North Atlantic Treaty of July 4, 1949 [8], the framework document of the NATO "Partnership for Peace" programme of February 8, 1994 [9], "Charter on special partnership between Ukraine and NATO" of July 9, 1997 [10], the Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Challenges and Threats to the National Security of Ukraine in 2011" of 12/10/2010 [11], the Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Measures to Improve the Efficiency of the Military-Industrial Complex of Ukraine" [12], draft law No. 9037 "On Amendments to the Constitution Regarding the Course of Ukraine to Join the EU and NATO" of November 22, 2018 [13], the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" (on the strategic course of the state to acquire full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) of February 7, 2019 [8], the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 307/2021 of June 4, 2021 "On Urgent Measures to Deepen Ukraine's Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" [14]. The synthesis was primarily used as the basis for investigating the problems and main challenges of the Euro-Atlantic process for Ukraine. In particular, on its basis,

it was possible to form the main advantages of Ukraine's accession to NATO and to consider possible social changes that could arise if it was successfully implemented.

Using the comparison method, the current prospects were compared, and the risks that may arise for both NATO and Ukraine as a result of its accession to the alliance. In addition, this method was applied when establishing priority approaches and tools necessary for the successful implementation of the Euro-Atlantic process. In particular, they were compared with each other, and those that need to be implemented at the moment were also identified.

The method of deduction served as the basis for the formation of a logical structure and principles of research. This is revealed in the fact that the results obtained were described from general aspects to specific ones. Thus, at the beginning of the study, the general provisions and characteristics of NATO were established, and the level of readiness of Ukraine to join it was determined. Further, the deduction method was used to narrow down the provisions described above, in particular by studying the current conditions caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war and establishing their impact on the effectiveness of the Euro-Atlantic process for Ukraine.

Since the research topic involves the study of a long historical period, namely from 1991 to the present day, the use of the historical research method was a mandatory methodological tool. In addition, it was necessary to analyse specific historical events that clearly affected the entire Euro-Atlantic process of Ukraine, one of which is the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich, which led to its suspension.

The study was implemented in three stages. At the first stage, the main organisational provisions were established, which include the development of goals, objectives, and a work plan. In addition, the basic principles on which NATO's work is based and the nature and effectiveness of its cooperation with Ukraine were established. At the second stage, the current prospects and main risks for Ukraine from the Euro-Atlantic process were determined. The role of Ukraine's accession to NATO in the Russian-Ukrainian war was also established. It was possible to conduct a discussion based on a comparison of the positions, opinions, and statements of researchers from various fields of science regarding the success and need for Ukraine to implement the Euro-Atlantic process. At the third stage, the results were summarised, in particular, conclusions were formed, which were based on the results obtained by the author both in the course of independent research of the topic and discussion.

Results

First of all, the essence of NATO and its main features were established in order to determine its interaction with Ukraine. NATO – is an international intergovernmental organisation that forms a full-fledged military-political alliance, which includes 30 states of North America and Europe. Their unity is revealed in the observance of the main goal, namely, ensuring the provisions stipulated by the North Atlantic Treaty [8], which was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington. In addition, focusing on the current conditions in which states are developing, it was proved that the goals and mission of the organisation are expanding. This is mainly conditioned by the appearance of new

challenges for states, in particular, in the context of security. That is why NATO's activities are currently focused on combating weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and countries with illegitimate regimes in which there may be a desire to use such weapons or transfer them to terrorists [15]. Thus, describing them, it was noted that the purpose of NATO is to prevent military conflicts, and protect the territorial integrity and independence of the organisation's member states. At the same time, the peculiarity of NATO is that it does not have its own armed forces or separate military formations, respectively, it has at its disposal the armed forces of its member countries. According to the author, this property is one of the main advantages of Ukraine's accession to NATO, in order to form high-quality security of its territories and independence.

Turning to a specific analysis of Ukraine's international cooperation with NATO, attention was drawn to the fact that it is quite long, since it was started immediately after the declaration of independence [1]. Accordingly, to establish the current prospects and problems of Ukraine's accession to the above-mentioned organisation, the historical experience of their interaction was investigated. In this context, attention was paid to the end of the 20th century, namely, on February 8, 1994, when Ukraine signed the framework document of the NATO “Partnership for Peace” programme [9]. This event was the beginning of the process of forming international cooperation between these two entities. These relations were somewhat specified and became a formality on July 9, 1997, since during the NATO summit in Madrid, the leaders of NATO member countries on the one hand, and the then President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, concluded and signed the “Charter on a special partnership between Ukraine and NATO” [10]. These events concerned not only the jurisdictional aspects of NATO's interaction with Ukraine, but also practical ones. This is explained by the fact that on the basis of the provisions of the framework document of the NATO “Partnership for Peace” programme [9] and the “Charter on special partnership between Ukraine and NATO” [10], more than 600 joint events were implemented during 1994-1999. In addition, various courses were organised, in particular, military training from NATO representatives, which were mastered by more than 6,000 Ukrainian specialists [17].

Thus, it was noted that already at that time relations between NATO and Ukraine began to strengthen qualitatively, which led to the formation of prerequisites for the future entry of the second into the organisation. However, a special role in this process was played by the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich, which lasted from 2010 to 2014. This is explained by the fact that during the exercise of his power, all the long-term work that concerned the rapprochement of relations between NATO and Ukraine has effectively been destroyed. The implementation of pro-Russian plans and propaganda on the territory of Ukraine provoked contradictions between both the positions of statesmen and civilians regarding the prospects of the Euro-Atlantic process. That is why it was not possible to implement priority legislative initiatives related to the harmonisation of Ukrainian legislation in the context of strengthening bilateral relations between Ukraine and NATO. This statement can be confirmed by such regulations as the Decree of the

President of Ukraine “On Challenges and Threats to the National Security of Ukraine in 2011” of 12/10/2010 [11], the Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Measures to Improve the Efficiency of the Military-Industrial Complex of Ukraine” [12], which primarily played an important role in the development of the defence sector of Ukraine.

However, despite such policies on the part of the Ukrainian NATO statesmen, there was support for Ukraine, in particular for its contribution to peace and security measures. This is confirmed by the fact that as a result of the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine, representatives of the member states expressed support for the independence and state sovereignty of Ukraine. In addition, they condemned Russia's actions and found them arbitrarily violating the norms of international law. This happened on March 2, 2014, as part of an emergency meeting of the NATO – Ukraine Commission, which was held in accordance with Article 15 of the Charter on special partnership between Ukraine and NATO [10]. The result of this event was a decision to completely terminate military-technical cooperation with Russia as an aggressor country and to abandon the non-aligned status [18].

Focusing on the legislative changes in Ukraine, the author noted that there were no effective changes. It is precisely because of this that conflicts and inconsistencies were formed between Ukrainian and foreign approaches to solving specific political issues. However, in this context, it was noted that Ukraine currently belongs to a number of states that are primarily partners of NATO with an expanded scope of capabilities. To achieve this title, on November 22, 2018, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted draft law No. 9037 “On Amendments to the Constitution Regarding the Course of Ukraine to Join the EU and NATO” [13], the essence of which was revealed in the introduction of amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, namely joining the North Atlantic alliance and the European Union. The result was the adoption on February 7, 2019, by the votes of 334 people's deputies of Ukraine of the Law “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine” (on the strategic course of the state to acquire full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) [8]. Such changes certainly had a positive impact on both the positions of the Ukrainian authorities and civilians regarding Ukraine's accession to NATO. At the same time, the regulation indicates the support and legalisation of the civilised, political, military, and economic status and choice of the people of Ukraine.

Moreover, the activities of the legislative branch of the government of Ukraine in the context of the implementation of the Euro-Atlantic process did not end there. For example, the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 307/2021 of June 4, 2021, “On Urgent Measures to Deepen Ukraine's Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” [14], the content of which is that acquiring NATO membership is a priority state task for Ukraine. In addition, it states that in order to increase the chances of successful completion of the Euro-Atlantic process by Ukraine, it is necessary to ensure real progress in all sectors of public life, for example, to introduce the principle of ensuring equal rights and opportunities for women and men in all sectors of public policy implementation. Thus, it can be argued

that due to such regulations, the tasks set for Ukraine within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic process are implemented, characterised by the reform of the basic principles of organising and managing public relations [19].

After analysing the current situation, it is worth noting that it is difficult from the standpoint of Ukraine's accession to NATO. This is conditioned by the fact that active military operations are being conducted on the territory of Ukraine, which contradicts the ideas and principles of the organisation's member states. However, it should be understood that this statement is subjective, since none of the fundamental documents of NATO establishes such a provision. In particular, the priority is the direction chosen by Sweden and Finland, which is based on joining NATO without forming an action plan for NATO membership. In addition, analysing the subjective factors of this process, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that NATO representatives still support the Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine, which was determined in 2008 at the Bucharest Summit. At the same time, they note that the continuation of consideration of the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO is possible only in the event of the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war [20].

Thus, after the analysis, the conditions that Ukraine needs to fulfil in order to join NATO were described. According to the provisions of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty [8], NATO adheres to the “open door policy” in its activities. Accordingly, with the consent of all members of the organisation, any European country can join NATO. Thus, the first stage is the implementation of the “accelerated dialogue” that Ukraine is currently in. In addition, the result of this step is that the country receives an action plan for NATO membership. However, as noted above, Ukraine seeks to avoid this in order to speed up the completion of the Euro-Atlantic process. Despite this, the question arises about the qualitative implementation of a number of reforms of various types, in particular, of a political and economic nature, military nature, and to ensure the introduction of “pre-step” reforms, to redistribute the budget and allocate a separate item to finance NATO, to confirm their readiness to adhere to the NATO Information Management Policy.

All this testifies to the broad policy of NATO, which, despite its status as a military bloc, obliges its member states and candidates to resolve disputes peacefully, through diplomatic means, and try to maintain friendly relations with all countries [21]. Admittedly, the above-mentioned reforms would improve all the most important areas of public life organisation, from democratic to military. This property shows the ability of NATO to respond in time to modern challenges and to protect its members. Therefore, it can be argued that as a result of Ukraine's successful implementation of all reforms, the economy, state policy, armed forces, and legal system will be unified with the approaches of NATO member countries.

As a result, it was established that Ukraine's accession to NATO is absolutely real. This is evidenced by the successful experience of former Soviet countries, such as Latvia and Lithuania, which managed to implement political, economic, and military reforms at the appropriate level and gain membership in the organisation. In addition, the

successful completion of the Euro-Atlantic process will have extremely positive consequences for Ukraine. First of all, the advantage of NATO is its status, namely the military-political bloc, which indicates the possibility of providing it with high-quality security guarantees. The next advantage of joining NATO is that this organisation does not express a purely military character, but also contains political and legal foundations. Based on this, If Ukraine receives the status of a NATO member, it will receive not only security guarantees but also the opportunity to improve its own armed forces, establish civilian control over the armed forces and intelligence services, which would also increase the level of compliance with the rule of law in the state. Another advantage is the opportunity to improve the investment climate in Ukraine, which will have a positive impact on the state economy [22]. Thus, the above indicates that Ukraine has been building relations with NATO for quite a long period, which is characterised by bilateral actions. However, the fact that Ukraine does not have the status of a NATO member state indicates the need to improve and accelerate the Euro-Atlantic process, which, as proved in the study, has a number of advantages and is a promising direction for the future development of Ukraine.

Discussion

O. Semenyi investigated the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO, in particular, he revealed this issue from the standpoint of the lack of such a need and prospects for Ukrainian society [23]. He emphasized especially in his work that the duration of relations between NATO and Ukraine is quite long, but not effective. Based on this, he believes that representatives of neither side have put forward enough initiatives that could have a positive impact on their interaction. In addition, he claims that NATO member countries are strongly opposed to Ukraine's accession to this organisation. The main drawback, in his opinion, is the Russian-Ukrainian war, which was started back in 2014. Accordingly, he asserted that the military operations on the territory of the state cannot guarantee security for other NATO member countries, and also do not allow Ukrainian statesmen to implement the necessary reforms and legislative changes. The author of this study argues that this position is not sufficiently justified, moreover, it contains provisions that do not correspond to reality, in particular, regarding the lack of initiative to join NATO, especially on the part of Ukraine. The author believes that at the moment, the relations between the above-mentioned parties are at the highest level for the entire period of independent Ukraine. This indicates the readiness to introduce changes in relations and positions both in Ukraine and NATO.

The opposite position was put forward by D. Kunterova, since she justified the fact that Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU is a priority area that will solve all existing problems in public administration and in the social sector [24]. She claims that despite the active international policy and fairly effective cooperation of Ukraine with other states, the real result can be obtained only with membership in leading international institutions. In her paper, she explains this from the standpoint of forming bilateral obligations, for example, in NATO it is

the provision of military protection and assistance by its members to each other. The researcher believes that the implementation of both European integration and Euro-Atlantic processes is the vector of development of the state, in particular Ukraine, which will affect all spheres of life, and satisfy both private and public interests of citizens. The author fully agrees with this opinion, moreover, emphasises that Ukraine's accession to NATO will prevent the emergence of other military conflicts on its territory.

Attention should also be paid to the statement of L. Alexiyevs, which establishes the main advantages of Ukraine's acquisition of NATO membership [25]. Among them, the following were highlighted: obtaining guarantees by the state concerning its national security, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; forming the prerequisites necessary for integration into Europe, namely into its political and economic systems; raising the status of the state in the international arena and market. In addition, she was able to identify the advantages that will be useful directly for Ukrainians, in particular: strengthening the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation, especially abroad; increasing the level of transparency of state power, which would help prevent the emergence of corruption; real provision of citizens' rights and freedoms, and effective tools for their protection; improving social living conditions, increasing wages, providing educational and medical services, insurance. The researcher suggests that these conditions really correspond to reality and reveal to a certain extent the goals of the Euro-Atlantic process for Ukraine. In addition, he notes that a number of such prospects are not exhaustive, which indicates the urgency and high need for Ukraine's accession to NATO and, accordingly, the EU.

This issue was also considered by I. Pankevych, however, it was analysed based on the positions of Ukrainian society regarding European integration and Euro-Atlantic processes [26]. He was concluded that the geopolitical mood of Ukrainians is debatable, as it has disagreements. At the same time, he notes that in recent years, the attraction to support and implement the European and Euro-Atlantic orientation has significantly dominated the public masses. In addition, he considered the peculiarities of the geopolitical choice of Ukrainian society, which is mostly formed under the significant influence of foreign policy factors. The most significant of which at the moment is the war unleashed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. At the same time, citizens support European values and see joining the EU and NATO as a priority for Ukraine. The author believes that the considered conclusions clearly describe the attitude of the people to current events and changes in society, while he suggests that if the implementation of public work continues, there will be a successful mobilisation of social support. As a result, this would allow executing all the tasks set for Ukraine and successfully implementing its accession to the EU and NATO.

In addition, the position of N. Pipchenko is also notable, which is based on modelling the likely outcomes and predictions regarding the outbreak of a Russian-Ukrainian war, assuming Ukraine's membership in NATO [27]. The researcher found that if Ukraine were part of NATO, its territory would not be a springboard for military operations.

Moreover, she notes that if any military initiatives were formed regarding the Ukrainian territories, these issues would be resolved in an alternative, that is, not by military means. At the same time, the researcher believes that this position is somewhat contradictory, since it excludes the idea that if Ukraine had directly joined NATO, the military conflict would have been deployed by this, which does not exclude a nuclear threat to the world.

J. Bakotin, sharply criticises NATO representatives in his research [28]. In particular, he claims that in the conditions of the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which was launched on February 24, 2022, they did not make efforts to ensure peace and humanitarian assistance. At the same time, he noted that it was this factor that affected the confidence of Ukrainian society in the entire military-political organisation. The author suggests that such statements should be sufficiently justified so that they do not take the form of slander. At the same time, he notes that since the beginning of the War, NATO has been actively working against the Russian Federation, and in support of Ukrainian citizens, in particular refugees.

Considering the above, the author believes that the investigation of the process of Ukraine's accession to NATO should continue to take place, taking into account all external factors. These include not only the position of Ukrainian representatives, but also foreign ones, in particular NATO member states. In addition, the author noted that at the moment the number of advantages outweighs the disadvantages, which was proved in this study. At the same time, this factor indicates that the Euro-Atlantic process is attracted by the support of not only Ukrainian statesmen, but also the civilian population, and therefore is able to satisfy both public and private interests. The author believes that joining NATO and the EU would completely modify outdated approaches and principles to public administration in Ukraine, which will certainly have a positive impact on the socio-political status of the state in the future.

Conclusions

As a result of the research, the study came to the conclusion that joining NATO is a necessary step for Ukraine on the path of its economic, social, and political development. This position is quite reasonable, since it is formed on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the relations

that were built between these two parties. Accordingly, the paper found that in fact, cooperation in the context of international cooperation between NATO and Ukraine began immediately after the latter gained independence.

In addition, the study carried out a theoretical analysis of NATO; in particular, its essence and purpose were determined. The author suggests that its form, namely the military-political bloc, is quite effective today. At the same time, it is noted that NATO membership for Ukraine will have a positive impact not only on the defence industry, but also on other important public spheres of life. This statement is explained by the fact that joining NATO involves the introduction of a number of reforms that are political, economic, and military in nature. In addition, studying the stages and conditions for the successful completion of the Euro-Atlantic process, the author notes the need to implement budget redistribution in Ukraine, in order to allocate a special sector in it intended to finance NATO. Moreover, the priority tasks for Ukraine today are the development and implementation of institutions that will be able to confirm the state's readiness to implement the NATO Information Management Policy.

In the course of an independent analysis of the topic and the discussion, the study determined the main advantages of joining NATO for Ukraine, both for the state and directly for citizens. Among them, the possibility of forming high-quality security guarantees, the ability to increase the level of professional training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, improve the investment climate in Ukraine; the establishment of appropriate prerequisites necessary for Ukraine's integration into European society, namely, into its political and economic systems. In addition, the paper proved that the successful implementation of the Euro-Atlantic process will strengthen the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation, increase transparency in public administration, and improve the social living conditions of Ukrainians. Thus, joining NATO, especially in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, is still relevant, and most importantly, a priority issue for the further development of Ukraine. That is why, in subsequent studies, attention should be paid to modelling effective ways necessary for the accelerated completion of the Euro-Atlantic process, as a result of which Ukraine should join a number of NATO member states.

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Україна і НАТО: проблеми, виклики, перспективи

Анотація. З початку здобуття Україною незалежності, а саме 24 серпня 1991 року, як теоретики, так і практиканти з соціальних і правових наук вели активну дискусію щодо доцільності її вступу до НАТО. Проте, особливої актуальності це питання набуло після 24 лютого 2022 року, коли Російська Федерація розпочала повномасштабну війну проти України, і безумовно воно залишається на порядку денному досі, оскільки стосується гарантій національної безпеки та незалежності держави. Виходячи з цього, ціль дослідження полягає у визначенні поточних проблем, викликів та перспектив, що стосуються процесу вступу України до НАТО. Для її досягнення в роботу було залучено метод аналізу і синтезу, порівняння, дедукції, а також історичний. В результаті проведення дослідження було встановлено, що вступ України до НАТО є пріоритетним напрямком для її майбутнього розвитку та безпеки. У роботі вдалося проаналізувати основні євроатлантичні перспективи для України, найголовнішою з яких на даний момент є захист її території іншими країнами-членами альянсу. Проаналізовані сучасні виклики дозволили встановити, що в умовах поточної російсько-української війни, українська влада реалізувала низку заходів, спрямованих на розвиток військово-політичної галузі, зокрема відмовилась від позаблокової позиції, затвердила оновлену Стратегію національної безпеки України, а головне затвердила євроатлантичний напрямок розвитку України в Конституції України. У висновку вдалося розкрити не лише пріоритетність вступу України до НАТО, а й також дослідити практичні засоби та інструменти, які використовуються вже на даний момент для реалізації цього процесу. Практична цінність роботи полягає у тому, що її результати можуть бути використаними як теоретиками, для поглибленого вивчення цієї теми, так і практиками, зокрема законодавцями під час розробки нових нормативно-правових актів, пов'язаних з євроатлантичним процесом

Ключові слова: війна, законодавство, міжнародне співробітництво, військово-політична сфера, територіальна цілісність

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The “Ukrainian Question” on the Eve of the First World War

Abstract. After analysing the current socio-political conditions in Ukraine caused by the war unleashed on February 20, 2014 by the Russian Federation, the author noted that they have common features with those that were before the outbreak of the First World War. This fact made this study relevant, since it requires an analysis of the “Ukrainian Question” from the standpoint of different countries at the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, the purpose of the study was to determine the essence of the Ukrainian national question on the eve of the First World War. For this purpose, the study used the methods of analysis and synthesis, comparison, deduction, generalisation, and historical method. As a result, the content of the “Ukrainian Question” was determined for the countries that participated in the First World War. In particular, it was established that Russia's goal was to capture Eastern Galicia, northern Bukovina and Transcarpathia, while under the auspices of the pan-Slavist policy and the Association of “Half-Blood Russian brothers”. Initially, Austria-Hungary also pursued the desire for territorial expansion, in particular, through the annexation of Volhynia and Podillia. As a result, the unification of Western and Eastern Europe was expected. Germany's goal was to divide the Russian empire into different territorial units and to seize the countries of Eastern Europe, in particular Ukraine, and settle its citizens on them. The positions of foreign countries on the “Ukrainian Question” considered in the study allowed for the conclusion that none of them considered the interests and aspirations of the Ukrainian people. The practical significance of the study was revealed in the fact that it can be used by modern researchers, in particular historians, when determining the prerequisites and nature of the current war of Russia against Ukraine

Keywords: territory, national state creation, national revolution, Pan-Slavism, national movement

Introduction

The study of the essence of the “Ukrainian Question”, namely in the modern conditions in which Ukrainians are located, is an acute problem that needs to be resolved. The relevance of this topic is conditioned by the fact that its foundations and problems are reflected at the moment in Ukraine, namely during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Thus, this necessitates not only the analysis of the “Ukrainian Question” on the eve of the First World War, but also the current socio-political conditions on the territory of Ukraine and Europe.

The problem of this study is that it studies the process of establishment and development of the Ukrainian nation, in the conditions of its division between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. At the same time, establishing the essence of the problem of the “Ukrainian Question” before the First World War would determine the prerequisites for its occurrence and approaches to solving it. As for the emergence of this acute problem, it is characterised by a special historical duration, since it was formed at the beginning of the 20th century and, as modern events in Ukraine show, still remains relevant.

Many researchers from various fields, including historians, lawyers, geographers, and political scientists,

have investigated this issue, which certainly indicates its scope and special priority for the future development of Ukraine. Thus, P. Kostyuchok focused on the essence of the “Ukrainian Question”, in the context of one of the most controversial phenomena and harbingers of the First World War [1]. He established that at the beginning of the 20th century, Ukraine was the main object and tool for implementing the military plans of the main warring blocs, namely Europe (Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, and Italy) and the Russian Empire. At the same time, he concluded that both sides aimed to satisfy only their own state interests, ignoring the wishes of Ukrainians, in particular, regarding the recognition of their independence and granting of sovereignty. A similar position is held by V.Yu. Seredyuk, as he argues that the events that took place on the eve of the First World War on the territory of Ukraine were demagoguery [2]. At the same time, he notes that based on its principles, representatives of Ukrainian territories were involved in specific enemy blocs, in order to use their material and human resources. In turn, M. Melentyeva considered the attitude of the Russian Empire to the “Ukrainian Question” [3]. M. Rohde was engaged in the analysis of Germany's approaches to the Ukrainian factor in the system of political interests of this country [4]. She

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is analysed Germany's approach to the Ukrainian factor in its system of political interests. The researcher found that the main goal of Germany was to form a colony and settle its own citizens on the territory of Ukraine. This interest was caused by the high agricultural potential of Ukrainian lands and developed human resources. The study of the Austrian policy on the "Ukrainian Question" was implemented by K. Ostafin [5]. In her study, she proved that Austria-Hungary wanted to push back the Russian Empire, in particular, to form a buffer zone, in order to protect its own territories. In addition, she claimed that Vienna supported the Ukrainian national movement, in particular, in the Austrophilic context.

Based on the above provisions, it was determined that the main goal of the study is to establish the basic principles and content of the "Ukrainian Question" before the outbreak of the First World War. For this purpose, the study performed the following tasks: the essence of the concept of "Ukrainian Question", and the Ukrainian national movement was defined; the main prerequisites for the emergence of such a "Question" were described; the positions of various states regarding Ukraine on the eve of the First World War were established; the common features of the "Ukrainian Question" in the period 1914-1918 with the current situation of Ukrainian territories and people were considered.

The originality of this study is conditioned by the fact that in it the author not only explores the essence of the "Ukrainian Question", but also compares the conditions in which it arose and the modern foundations in which Ukrainian society is now. Thus, the paper was able to describe common features in the ideology of the Russian political leadership, characteristic of the period of the beginning of the First World War and the 21st century, namely the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Materials and Methods

The study of the content of the "Ukrainian Question" on the eve of the First World War was based on an analysis of the attitude of other states to it. Thus, the analysis allowed dividing the topic of the work into such elements as the "Ukrainian Question", the Ukrainian national movement, and aggressive plans of foreign countries. Accordingly, this methodological tool was used to determine the essence and content of personnel that were established in relation to the territories of Ukraine on the eve of the First World War. The synthesis method primarily allowed considering each of the above concepts and describing their properties. In addition, on its basis, a link was established between them, which determined the object of this study.

The comparison method formed the basis for comparing the approaches and positions of different countries that participated in the First World War in relation to Ukrainian territories and citizens. On its basis, it was possible to determine the joint and distinctive plans of the states of Western Europe, and their strategic calculations concerning the division of Ukraine. The comparison was also used for discussion, in particular, to compare various statements of researchers with the opinions of the author and his beliefs.

The deduction was applied during the development of the logical structure of the study. This is explained by the fact that on its basis the main results and conclusions obtained were presented, which occurred in a certain line, namely from the general to the specific. In the study, this was reflected in such a way that at the beginning a general theoretical analysis of the "Ukrainian Question" was carried out, and then these provisions were concretised from the standpoint of the attitude of foreign states to it.

Since the study of the "Ukrainian Question" provided for the analysis of such a period as the beginning of the 20th century, its necessary condition was the involvement of the historical method of research. On its basis, it was possible to investigate the immediate historical events and conditions that formed the basis for the establishment of the Ukrainian national movement, and the implementation of the revolution. In addition, it allowed qualitatively considering the situation and historical aspirations of the states of Eastern Europe before the First World War, in particular, regarding the Ukrainian territories.

The generalisation was used to investigate the results obtained by the author, in particular, regarding the "Ukrainian Question", namely, its content and attitude on the part of European governments and the Russian Empire. In addition, it established the basis for studying the positions of other researchers that were formed during the discussion. In addition, the development and formation of conclusions is based on the method of generalization in the work, namely: embedding the main obtained results and provisions in their content.

The study was conducted in three stages. The first one defines the goal, objectives, and work plan. The analysis of the essence and content of the "Ukrainian Question" was also started, directly before the First World War. At the second stage, the positions of Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany, and Romania regarding Ukrainian territories, as well as Ukrainian citizens were considered. In addition, a discussion was held at this stage, which allowed analysing the statements and opinions of other historians, in particular modern ones, on the issue of the Ukrainian national movement on the eve of the First World War. The third stage was the final one, since on its basis the results were summed up, in particular, conclusions were formed, and promising areas for future scientific developments were considered.

Results

At the beginning of the 20th century, the conditions in which European countries existed were characterised by geopolitical changes caused by the desire to expand their own territories and change strategic centres. The main hotbeds in Europe that existed in contradiction with each other and sought to resolve conflicts by military means were Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. In fact, they did not compete with each other, but created two enemy blocks that represented different interests. This refers to the Triple Alliance, which included Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and the Entente, which included France, Russia, and Great Britain. At the same time, both the first and second blocks aimed to seize new territories, which were characterised not only by a

good geographical location, but also by economic potential and high-quality human resources. Admittedly, in this context, their attention was drawn to the “Ukrainian Question”, since it was the Ukrainian territories that fully met the above conditions. Thus, the analysis of the content of the “Ukrainian Question” takes place from the standpoint of studying the attitude of foreign countries to the national movement in Ukraine and the Ukrainian people as a full-fledged nation [6].

First of all, it was noted that before the outbreak of the First World War, almost the entire territory of Ukraine was divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Based on this, special attention was paid to the attitude of the above-mentioned countries to the Ukrainian national movement and the desire of Ukrainians to recognise independence. The inconsistency of relations between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires is conditioned upon the desire to establish hegemony over Slavic countries, including Ukraine. This was confirmed by the statement of the Imperial Council ambassador of Cisleithania M. Vasilko in 1909 in the Austrian parliament, who substantiated the position on the need to resolve the issue of Russophile advances in Galicia and Bukovina [7].

Studying the peculiarities of the development of Ukraine as part of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, it was noted that to a greater extent they were conditioned by the features of capitalism. This was manifested in the high concentration of production, the great role of foreign capital, the development of monopolies and financial capital. Accordingly, in terms of the level of concentration of industrial production, Ukraine ranked among the first in the world. Despite this factor, attention was drawn to the fact that its economy was in decline, as it developed one-sidedly, while the main part of profitable industries depended entirely on Russia. As for the political structure, it was archaic, characterised by the unlimited autocracy of the Russian Tsar. One of the reasons for the manifestation of this factor was the lack of any force or representative body that could regulate or control the actions of the ruling elite. On this basis, there was not even a question of respecting civil rights and freedoms in Ukraine. This is confirmed by the fact that all segments of the population of the Russian Empire, including Ukrainians who lived in the territories that were part of it, were oppressed. At the same time, the working class, a significant part of which was made up of Ukrainians, was particularly oppressed, both in the economic and political context. Such harassment was seen in the time of the working day, as well as working conditions. In particular, workers had to work 12-13 hours a day, while not receiving wages or receiving them in scanty amounts [8]. In addition, work in production facilities was characterised by the presence of large fines, and the spread of infectious diseases and injuries. In addition, the situation of Ukrainians who lived in the territories that were part of the Russian Empire was negatively affected by the global economic crisis of 1900-1903. This is conditioned by the fact that it caused the closure of a number of factories and production facilities, which primarily provoked an increase in the unemployment rate. As a result, the Tsarist government only increased the exploitation of citizens, which was characterised by

an extension of the working day, and a decrease in the amount of wages.

In addition, spiritual categories, in particular the Ukrainian language, were also significantly oppressed. The author traced the chronology of the main historical events on the eve of the First World War, which in one way or another concerned the destruction of the Ukrainian language. Accordingly, in 1905, the Cabinet of Ministers of Russia rejected the request of Kyiv and Kharkiv universities to lift prohibitions on the Ukrainian language. As a result, the rector of Kyiv University refused 1,400 students to open four departments of Ukrainian Studies with the Ukrainian language of instruction. At the same time, the rationale for this position was that the university is a “national institution”, which is why only Russian can be spoken within its borders. In addition, the Decree of the Senate of the Russian Empire of 1908 determined that educational work in Ukraine is harmful and dangerous for Russia. Attention was also drawn to the Decree of the Prime Minister of the Russian Empire of 1910, on the enrolment of Ukrainians in the category of foreigners and on the Prohibition of any Ukrainian organisations [9]. All this testifies to the long-term anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian Empire, which sought not only to seize Ukraine geographically, but also to destroy the Ukrainian nation.

Having studied directly the approaches and nature of Russia's activities on the territory of Ukraine on the eve of the First World War, attention was drawn to the fact that they were based on the principles of Imperial centralism, and most importantly: the destruction of all manifestations of national separatism. In this context, this refers to Galicia, since these territories were particularly dangerous and threatened the implementation of the aggressive plans of the Russian Empire. At the same time, the absolute majority of Russian society, both chauvinists and liberals, argued about the need to establish control over western Ukrainian territories, since they saw them as an objective threat to the integrity of Russia. This was caused by the development of a broad Ukrainian national movement, which included the establishment of Ukrainian schools, political parties, and national representations in the Sejm and parliament, which certainly testified to the perfection and success of the Ukrainian political movement. In addition, Russian society considered Galicia a hotbed of hostile separatism, since it was from there that Ukrainian propaganda took place, which began to gain its support in the territories of the Dnieper region.

As a result, one of the main tasks and reasons for the entry of the Russian empire into the First World War was the destruction of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia. This was implemented due to the support of Galician Russophilia in western Ukraine, both financially and morally. To a greater extent, this was provided by Russian government and political representatives who carried out anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which testified to the true aggressive intentions of Russia to seize all Ukrainian ethnic territories, respectively, which at that time belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

On the eve of the First World War, ideas about the “Ukrainian danger” were formed in the Russian Empire. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Minister S. Sazonov, in his

speech, clearly noted that one of the main reasons for the deployment of the war was precisely the "Ukrainian Question" [10]. As a result, when entering the First World War, the Russian Empire proclaimed the slogan of liberating the captive Slavs.

Based on the analysis of Russia's policy and goals on the "Ukrainian Question" on the eve of the First World War, it was established that its politicians aimed to destroy any manifestations of Ukrainian nationality. This concerned the Ukrainian history, language, traditions, and other factors that testified to the long historical existence of the Ukrainian nation. The task of the Russian invaders was to ban all foreign (ethnic-Ukrainian) public and cultural organisations, and completely restrict or destroy Ukrainian religious structures, hearths of the Ukrainian language and political parties [11].

Having analysed the conditions of today, namely the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine, the author confidently asserts that the approaches and actions of its political leadership are aimed, as centuries ago, at the destruction of the Ukrainian nation. Just like on the eve of the First World War, Russian society recites the goal of uniting the "Half-Blood Russian brothers" and destroying Ukrainian nationalists.

Special attention was paid to the analysis of the approaches of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as they were also clearly reflected in the solution of the "Ukrainian Question", immediately before and during the First World War. The influence of Vienna was characterised by the support of Ukrainophilism, as a result, it became the predominant current on the basis of which social life was established and implemented in Galicia. The support of the Ukrainian national movement on the part of Austrian officials was caused by the desire to satisfy their own interests. To a greater extent, their intentions concerned the support of the Ruthenians (Rusyns), the inhabitants of the Dnieper region, in order to form a positive attitude towards Austria-Hungary, in order to further separate them from the Russian Empire. In the end, Austrian politicians expected the annexation of part of the Dnieper region to the Habsburg monarchy, but its representatives aimed to independently separate from the Russian Empire and form a state entity in the territories of Volhynia and Podillia [12].

Unlike the Russian Empire, Austrian officials paid a significant part of their attention to the "Ukrainian Question" inside the country. This implies the Ukrainian people who lived in the territories of Galicia and Bukovina, since the success of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in rivalry with Russia depended on their support. At the same time, the Ukrainian movement, like the nation, in these territories did not pose a threat to any of the Eastern European countries, which is why they often received support. This is conditioned by the existence of a number of organisations and communities that only developed and expanded the nationalist movement of Ukrainians. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Warsaw, L. Andrian, in a special memorandum entitled "The Importance of the Ukrainian problem of Galicia for foreign policy in general", noted that for a successful foreign policy and for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the support of the Ukrainian people takes the

first place [13]. At the same time, he noted that the future development of the history of Austria-Hungary depends on their attitude to the Ukrainian nation. Based on the analysis, it was noted that Austria-Hungary also aimed to expand its borders, in particular, at the expense of Volhynia and Podillia, while not destroying the Ukrainian national hearth and not implementing a policy of assimilation in the occupied territories [14].

Special attention was paid to the analysis of ideas and plans of Germany regarding the "Ukrainian Question". To a greater extent, they are determined by its goals for the whole of Eastern Europe, of which Ukraine is also a part. Germany's approaches were radically different from – the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary – because they pursued the desire to form the Central Europe. The essence of this idea was the uncontrolled rule of Germany in the territories of Central Europe, for the future creation of world hegemony. After analysing the specific positions on the basis of which Germany sought to carry out its activities in relation to Ukraine, it was found that it partially supported its independence. At the same time, its political and military leadership adhered to the slogan in its actions: "whoever owns Kyiv can conquer Russia", which is conditioned by their goal, namely, the establishment of a buffer in Eastern Europe necessary to contain the Russian Empire, in particular, the protection of western territories [15].

At the same time, during the outbreak of the First World War, Germany saw the main task to defeat Russia and France, in order to exclude them from a number of large state entities. This is confirmed by the fact that in 1913 General Alfred von Schlieffen developed a military-operational plan for an attack on France and Russia, which resembled a blitz-krieg. His main idea was to eliminate these states as quickly as possible. In this context, the implementation of broad German territorial annexations was expected, which would result in the establishment of vassal states in the east and west of Europe. In this regard, Ukraine was a necessary tool based on which it would be successfully implemented. This is conditioned by the fact that the Ukrainian territories had valuable geopolitical and economic significance. In addition, on the eve of the First World War, German Chancellor Bethmann-Holweg, in his memorandum to the German ambassador in Vienna, noted Germany's intentions to provoke an uprising in Ukraine, as well as Congress Poland, the Baltic states, and the Caucasus in order to turn it into buffer states. Thus, it was noted that Germany's approaches provided for both geographical capture of Ukraine, as well as political and cultural, since they were aimed at establishing their own colony. This indicates that the "Ukrainian Question" was not supported by this state [16].

In addition, Romania also wanted to annex the Ukrainian lands, namely Bessarabia and part of Bukovina, undoubtedly subject to the favourable development of the First World War. At the same time, just like Germany, it did not focus on the Ukrainian national movement and support for the Ukrainian nation. The main goal was to acquire new land, which was characterised by high agricultural potential, and an increase in the number of the labour force. This plan was implemented, because in January 1918, as

a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire, Romanian troops occupied Bessarabia under the slogan of “unification of the entire Romanian people”. In addition, according to the provisions of the Saint-Germain [17], Trianon [18] and Neysky [19] peace treaties, Romania was assigned Transylvania, Southern Dobrudja, and Bukovina. At the same time, the interests of Ukrainians, who at the National Assembly of Bukovina spoke in favour of joining Soviet Ukraine, were not considered. As a result, the territory of Romania was expanded to 295 thousand km², which provoked an increase in the population to 17 million people.

Thus, it was established that the Austro-Hungarian Empire tried to support the “Ukrainian Question”, while wanting to include the Dnieper region in its composition. In turn, the Russian Empire, Germany, and Romania were not interested in its future development; on the contrary, their policy was aimed at its destruction and assimilation of Ukrainian territories.

Discussion

H. Bazhenova [20] investigated the “Ukrainian Question”, in particular, at the turn of the 20th century. Her study was mostly based on the study of the policy of the Russian Empire towards the “Ukrainian Question”. Accordingly, she concluded that as a result of the First World War, not only the Russian Empire was overthrown, but also the lack of a developed national policy was established. In addition, she argued that one of the main tasks during the First World War, which the Russian Empire set for itself, was the conquest of Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina, and Hungarian Ruthenia, which, respectively, were settled by conscious nationalist Ukrainians. This position is confirmed by the slogans of the Russian army: “May there be no more enslaved Rus!”, and also: “to the Russian people in Austria”. In addition, the goal of the Russian Empire was determined not only by geopolitical plans, but also by historical ones. This is explained by the fact that the Russian Empire wanted to destroy any facts and evidence of the historical development of Ukrainians as a nation, and stop the Ukrainian nationalist movement, which has become especially popular in the above-mentioned territories. The study agrees with these statements, moreover, the current policy of Russia is identical, in particular, in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. This indicates that Ukrainians continue to defend their national interests and strengthen their ethnic identity.

In addition, the “Ukrainian Question” from the standpoint of German policy was studied by A. Goltsov [21]. He established that some German politicians sought to seize both the economic potential of Ukrainian territories and use them to satisfy their own interests. In this context, the researcher notes that the positions of such German figures were mainly based on the establishment of German control over Ukraine. Another group of political representatives of Germany provided for the possibility of forming and developing a partially independent Ukrainian state, but this should have taken place under the German protectorate. At the same time, such plans could be implemented only if the military conflict in the East developed favourably, namely, to weaken the Russian Empire. The author considers this position quite interesting in the context of

its continuation in future scientific developments, since it reveals two sides of the representatives of Germany at once, in particular, describes their differences.

In addition, the German experience in relation to the “Ukrainian Question” on the eve of the First World War was considered by B. Chernev [22]. His research was conducted from the standpoint of German industrialists, namely, their plans for Ukrainian territories and human resources. They were attracted to the developed natural resources of Ukraine, because if they were captured, they would be able to turn it into their own raw material appendage, which would certainly affect the country's economy. As for their political sentiments, the industrialists were in favour of completely taking control of Ukraine. At the same time, its independence could be only partial and in the necessary areas of life for Ukrainians. In his conclusion, he argues that such an approach would be quite effective since it would lead to the development of international relations on the territory of Ukraine. According to the researcher, such a position was unacceptable from the standpoint of the essence of the “Ukrainian Question”. It proves that the development of the Ukrainian nation cannot provide for the establishment of control over it by another country or even its assimilation. In turn, he believes that in this case, it would be advisable to combine the common interests of German industrialists and Ukrainians, but preserve the latter's independence.

Moreover, S. Blavatsky considered the “Ukrainian Question” separately from the specific positions of representatives of the European government [23]. His study is mostly theoretical in nature, as it reveals the content and foundations on which the Ukrainian national movement took place. At the same time, he somewhat criticises its representatives at that time, as he suggests that receiving assistance from other states, in particular, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was not appropriate enough. He substantiates this position by saying that the main idea of the “Ukrainian Question”, namely, gaining independence and establishing the Ukrainian nation, could not be implemented by representatives of other countries. He notes that the struggle for their ethnic identity should have been carried out directly by Ukrainians. In part, this study agrees with this opinion, since indeed none of the countries that somehow interacted with Ukraine sought its independence. On the contrary, these territories were seized in order to include them in certain states. The author supports the position of S. Blavatsky in the context that Ukrainians could only independently defend their national interests and gain independence and recognition.

From a different standpoint, the “Ukrainian Question” is considered by B. Dziewanowski-Stefańczyk since his research is based on the approaches of Polish scientists and figures [24]. Accordingly, he focuses on the threat of the Ukrainian national movement to other countries. The study is based on the example of Poland, which also had entities that sought to gain Polish independence. In this context, the main threat to the implementation of such plans was not the Russian Empire, but the Ukrainian nationalists, who focused their activities on Western Ukraine. Accordingly, representatives of the Polish nationalist movement believed that active pro-Ukrainian propaganda on

the territory of Eastern Galicia could lead to its loss by the Poles. The author considers this position unfounded, since in fact Ukrainians lived in ethnic Ukrainian territories, and therefore, if they gained independence, these lands should be part of Ukraine, and not Poland. At the same time, based on the conclusions obtained, the researcher suggests that they describe one of the factors of the biased attitude of the international community to the “Ukrainian Question” at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920.

In addition, attention was paid to the study by D. Bondarenko, because the researcher compared the positions of Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire specifically to the South Ukrainian factor [25]. The researcher noted that it was through the south of Ukraine that the cheapest and fastest route from Western Europe to the Middle East and India passed. At the same time, he established that Russia on the eve and during the First World War aimed to strengthen its position near the Black Sea coast in order to continue exporting its goods. In addition, it was in these territories that the main centre of agricultural activity was concentrated, the results of which were received by the Russian Empire. In turn, Austria-Hungary wanted to weaken Russia and its influence in the Black Sea basin. Its positions on the “Ukrainian Question” did not separate the South Ukrainian region, but rather represented it as a full-fledged component of Ukrainian territory. It was in their own interests that they saw the possibility of access to the Black Sea and a dynamic increase in economic potential. The author believes that the conclusions obtained require further investigation, in particular from the standpoint of other countries, namely Germany, since it also expressed a desire to seize the coastal southern territories of Ukraine.

Thus, the discussion allowed the study to establish that the “Ukrainian Question” at the beginning of the 20th century and today causes discussions since it contains a number of contradictory factors. Despite this, it was possible to separate different positions of researchers, in particular, those who describe and support the approaches of Germany, or Austria-Hungary, or the Russian Empire. At the same time, it was possible to describe both their common and distinctive features, which revealed the essence of the “Ukrainian Question” from different positions, and drew a parallel with the current social conditions in Ukraine.

Conclusions

As a result of the study, it was found that the “Ukrainian Question” can be considered from different standpoints,

in particular, the views of representatives of different European countries. However, its essence still remains unchanged, as it concerns the Ukrainian national movement, the desire to establish the Ukrainian nation and gain the independence of Ukraine. The paper established the attitude of the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and even Romania to the “Ukrainian Question”. A common feature of the approaches that all the above-mentioned states have used in relation to Ukraine is the desire to seize its territories. However, the method and purpose of using human and land resources were somewhat different. In particular, it was established that the Russian Empire set two main tasks for itself in the First World War. The first was to capture new territories and to expand the Empire. The second concerned the destruction of everything Ukrainian, which could indicate the independence of Ukraine. It is because of this that the main attention of Russian officials was paid to Galicia, which was the centre of Ukrainian nationalism.

In addition, the paper investigated the “Ukrainian Question” from the standpoint of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, since a significant part of the western territories of Ukraine was part of it. There was no consensus on the role of this state in resolving the “Ukrainian Question” in historical doctrine. However, the author determined that, unlike Russia, Austria-Hungary did not oppress the Ukrainian national movement. At the same time, it was in this way that Austrian officials tried to gain favour in the Dnieper region and eventually seize it. Admittedly, this approach was not perfect, since it does not provide for the establishment of an independent Ukraine, which, accordingly, is the main “Ukrainian Question”.

Germany's position was fundamentally different, since it provided for the seizure not only of the territory of Ukraine, but also of other countries located on the territory of Eastern Europe. Since the goal was to form German colonies, the “Ukrainian Question” was not considered by German officials in any way and was not resolved. As for Romania, it also hoped to seize certain Ukrainian territories, namely Bessarabia and part of Bukovina, while pursuing a policy of assimilation on them. Thus, it was found that none of the countries under study was interested in Ukrainians and did not seek to satisfy them. In subsequent studies, it would be advisable to conduct a comparative analysis of the “Ukrainian Question” on the eve of the First World War and in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014-2022.

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«Українське питання» напередодні Першої світової війни

Анотація. Проаналізувавши поточні суспільно-політичні умови в Україні, що викликані розв'язаною 20 лютого 2014 року Російською Федерацією війною проти неї, автор відзначив, що вони мають спільні риси з тими, що були перед початком Першої світової війни. Цей факт обумовив актуальність роботи, оскільки він вимагає аналізу «українського питання» з точки зору різних країн на початку ХХ століття. Таким чином, метою дослідження було визначення сутності українського національного питання напередодні Першої світової війни. Для цього, в статті було застосовано метод аналізу і синтезу, порівняння, дедукції, узагальнення, а також історичний. У результаті було визначено зміст «українського питання» для країн, що брали участь в Першій світовій війні. Зокрема, було встановлено, що метою Росії було загарбання Східної Галичини, Північної Буковини та Закарпаття, при цьому під егідою політики панславізму та об'єднання «єдинокровних руських братів». Першочергово Австро-Угорщина також переслідувала бажання територіального розширення, зокрема завдяки приєднанню Волині і Поділля. У результаті очікувалося об'єднання Західної і Східної Європи. Німеччина мала на меті розділити Російську імперію на різні територіальні одиниці, а також захопити країни Східної Європи, зокрема Україну, та розселити на них своїх громадян. Розглянуті у дослідженні позиції іноземних країн щодо «українського питання» дозволили дійти висновку, що в жодній з них не було взято до уваги інтереси та прагнення українського народу. Практичне значення статті розкрилося у тому, що воно може бути використаним сучасними науковцями, зокрема істориками під час визначення передумов і характеру поточної війни Росії проти України

Ключові слова: територія, національне державотворення, національна революція, панславізм, національний рух

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Foreign Policy of the Ukrainian State Based on the Diary of Pavlo Skoropadskyi

Abstract. The struggle of the Ukrainian people for independence during the war of national liberation of 1917-1921 is an important period in the history of Ukraine and is relevant today. One of the most prominent figures of this period is P. Skoropadskyi, who made many important political decisions during his rule. The then Ukrainian State pursued an active foreign policy, the investigation of which is relevant for historians, for the purpose of a broad and objective study of this period, and for diplomats who, based on the experience of the past, determine the current geopolitical course of Ukraine. The purpose of the study is an in-depth analysis of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State, based on the memoirs of P. Skoropadskyi. When writing the paper, the following methods were used: analysis, comparison, specification and generalisation of information. Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions were drawn: the foreign policy of the then Ukraine and the Hetman's government was determined by the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; most of all, the Ukrainian State cooperated with Germany, which had an impact on the course of internal political processes. The study discussed in detail the activities of the Germans in the context of the creation of the Ukrainian army and land policy. The issue of whether this cooperation can be considered an occupation was also considered. In addition, Ukraine's international relations with such states and regions as Romania, Bolshevik Russia, Crimea, and Kuban were considered. In the course of the study, in addition to the actual material, the opinions and plans of P. Skoropadskyi's foreign policy activities were considered. The paper outlines the ideas of Hetman and creates the basis for further research on the history of external relations of this period. This study also touched upon an important topic that few researchers had previously considered, namely the problem of relations between Hetman's government and the Entente

Keywords: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, German influence, Hetmanate, Army, Entente

Introduction

The period of the war of national liberation is a very important stage in the establishment of independent Ukraine. This period of history is characterised by many important events that influenced the future development of Ukrainian history. One of these stages of the national liberation revolution was the rule of P. Skoropadskyi. During his relatively short time in power (7 months), Hetman's government was able to develop many branches and spheres of activity of the Ukrainian State, one of which was foreign policy. This element occupied a significant place during the rule of P. Skoropadskyi, so the Hetman left many memories of relations with other countries and his foreign policy imperatives. Thus, the study of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State, based on the memoirs of Hetman, is very important for historians, since the figure of P. Skoropadskyi is ambiguous and debatable, and for diplomats, in order to avoid mistakes of the past and borrow certain ideas.

The study of the history of international relations is always a questionable issue, since it is necessary to carefully

study the nature of cooperation with certain countries, and how the government reacted to conducting diplomatic relations with other countries. In the case of studying the period of international relations of the Ukrainian State in 1918, all of the above is relevant. It should be borne in mind that Ukraine was recognised as independent only in 1918, so this year was the beginning of international relations. In addition, considering specifically the Hetmanate, then its foreign policy course was chosen even before its foundation, so the Ukrainian government cooperated the most with Germany. With this in mind, most of the study was devoted to the consideration of relations between Ukraine and the Germans. It should also be understood that the research was carried out on the basis of an analysis of P. Skoropadskyi's memoirs [1], so first of all the problem was to compare his data with reality. In addition, the memoirs are of particular value for the researcher, since Hetman not only gave his assessment of the actions already performed, but also shared his thoughts on the prospects for cooperation with a number of other countries.

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The beginning of research on this topic falls on the period of independent Ukraine after 1991, since in Soviet times it was unacceptable to write that Ukraine was a sovereign state, let alone that it conducted an independent foreign policy. It is worth mentioning the historian P. Hai-Nyzhnyk [2], who devoted his activity to the study of the history of the period of the war of national liberation and, to a large extent, the activities of P. Skoropadskyi.

Now many researchers have devoted their activities to the study of this topic. In particular, the study of cooperation between the Hetmanate and Germany is a very popular topic. In this paper, in particular, a reference was made to the study by O. Lupandin [3]. In his study, the author provided a thorough analysis of German activities in terms of grain policy, referring to archival documents. Another researcher who has studied the influence of Germany was I. Romanko [4], who, based on archival documents, considered the history of the development of the armed forces of various political groups during the national liberation struggle. However, this work is more of an encyclopedic reference book than a thorough study. Regarding the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State with other countries, important works are the study by M. Gedina [5], in which the author conducts a thorough analysis of the policy of Romania in 1918. Thus, the author considered the issue of Bessarabia, which was important for Hetman's power, from the position of Romania. Interesting is the study by M. Barbulescu [6], who investigated the problem of relations between Romania and Ukraine in 1918. Since this author is a Romanian historian, he represents the opposite Ukrainian position, familiarisation with which is important for this topic. Foreign policy issues were also investigated by S. Gromenko [7], who investigated the relations of the Ukrainian State with Crimea. The author proved that Crimea is certainly part of Ukraine, based on various arguments.

In this paper, a study of the history of foreign relations between the Ukrainian State and other countries will be carried out based on the memoirs of P. Skoropadskyi. *Thus, the purpose of this study* will be to determine how Hetman felt about relations with certain countries, and what plans he had for the future. It should be borne in mind that the Hetmanate existed for a fairly short period of time, which is why many plans were not implemented in reality. Most of all, Ukraine's cooperation was conducted with the Germans, so the bigger part of the paper will be devoted to the study of this particular issue. It will also be necessary to consider the terms of signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, since it largely determined the policy of Ukraine.

The relevance of the study is the examination of the struggle of Ukrainians for their independence during the reign of Hetman P. Skoropadskyi and 1917-1921 in general. The originality of the study consists in P. Skoropadskyi's memories and thoughts, and the problems of relations between the Hetmanate government and the Entente, which were not previously investigated.

Materials and Methods

Investigation of Ukraine's foreign policy based on the diary of P. Skoropadskyi is quite complex and deep, so a number of important methods of the theoretical block

were involved and the writing process took place during the following stages.

The first stage is characterised by the selection of information. Although the study is based on Hetman's memoirs, this source alone is not enough for a thorough and objective investigation. Thus, it was necessary to find and select a large number of sources that complement and more deeply disclose the information provided by P. Skoropadskyi.

At the second stage, the selected information was analysed. A large number of sources were selected, each of which substantiates different opinions on the presented problem. Therefore, it was necessary to carefully read all the works in order to determine the opinion that they defend. In particular, such an issue is the problem of Bessarabia, and, accordingly, relations with Romania. Based on Ukrainian sources, it can be assumed that the inhabitants of the Bessarabian region were inclined to become part of the Ukrainian State, but Romanian historians claim the opposite [6]. Another debatable issue is the German influence on Ukraine's politics. Some researchers claim that at that time Ukraine was in a state of occupation, while others, on the contrary, emphasise the Germanophilism of the Hetman [8; 9].

Separately, it should be noted that at this stage of the study, the analysis of P. Skoropadskyi's memoirs was important and decisive, since the study is based on this source. The analysis of this document was more complex than the previous ones, since in this case, it is necessary to apply the methods of hermeneutical research. It was necessary to understand the true author's idea and determine the main values of Hetman in order to fully understand his principles of foreign policy.

The third stage is characterised by the use of the comparison method. It was important not just to study and analyse P. Skoropadskyi's memories, but also compare them with other sources to determine their reliability and more deeply reveal the topic. In particular, this method was actively used in the study of the issue of German influence and their policy, which they carried out on the territory of Ukraine. In particular, this is an agricultural issue and the problem of creating an army. When studying these events, statistical data were used in comparison with the Hetman's memoirs.

At the fourth stage of writing, the concretisation method was used. A large number of opinions and views were expressed during the study. In addition, reading the memoirs of P. Skoropadskyi, it is evident that this source is characterised by a large number of abstract phrases that can be interpreted in different ways. Therefore, it was necessary to use the method of concretisation, in order to focus on the information that directly reveals the purpose of the study.

The fifth stage was the final one. This stage involved generalisation, since a large amount of information was provided during the study, it was necessary to draw general conclusions, due to which it would be possible to clearly understand the findings.

Results

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (also known as the Treaty of Brest) was signed on February 9, 1918, between representatives of many countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The significance of this treaty for research was very important, since its terms established the basic principles of Ukraine's policy in 1918.

According to the sixth article of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia pledged to recognise the independence of the UPR (Ukrainian People's Republic) and immediately withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine. The text of the peace treaty did not specify any more conditions for one or the other party [10].

However, many researchers note that the terms of the agreement were much broader for Ukraine. In particular, there is an opinion that representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not want to recognise the independence of Ukraine for a long time, since such conditions were unfavourable for the territorial structure of the Empire. Therefore, during long negotiations, the Austrians agreed to recognise the independence of the UPR in exchange for significant food supplies [11].

Polish historian S. Gregorz, as a result of the analysis of many factors, claims that this treaty was also very important for the Germans, because in this way, firstly, the war on the eastern fronts was ended, secondly, Germany had influence over the newly created states, in particular, the UPR, and, thirdly, the Ukrainian side was obliged to transfer food on a significant scale [12].

In his memoirs, P. Skoropadskyi does not describe reflections on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk itself, however, there are passages in which he speaks about the consequences of signing this document. "The Germans were becoming more and more masters of Kyiv. In early March, we were told that the Germans were requisitioning the Calais hotel. The major kindly allowed us to stay for 10 days, and then the hotel was to become their property." [1]

P. Skoropadskyi began relations with representatives of other countries even before the beginning of his rule. In particular, Hetman describes certain contacts with the Germans in his memoirs as follows: "On April 12 and 15, I saw the Germans again. I laid out my plan directly to them and told them that I was asking nothing of them but neutrality, but if they were very empathetic to me, then I would be very grateful if they somehow prevented the Sich Riflemen, who were then a part that was assigned to protect the board and the Central Council. The Germans did not say anything positive to me, but it was clearly clear from them that they sympathised with me" [1].

Thus, on April 29, 1918, by way of a coup, P. Skoropadskyi gained power and declared himself Hetman. The situation in the state at that time was extremely difficult. The absence of an entire state apparatus, four years of active military operations, the absence of an army and much more were the factors that created difficulties in the policy of the Ukrainian State. In Particular, P. Skoropadskyi in his memoirs cites a dialogue with the then Acting Minister of Internal Affairs O. Vishnevskyi, during which it becomes clear that the entire ministry must be created from scratch [1].

As mentioned above, when signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Ukrainian side undertook to transfer most of its own food to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and other Central Powers, in exchange for guarantees of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence.

This topic was considered by historians quite deeply, in particular during the analysis of many documents, O. Lupandin was able to determine the amount of food that the Ukrainians had to transfer to the needs of the Central Powers [3]. This data can be presented as the following Table 1:

Table 1. Status of implementation of the plan for the export of products from Ukraine by the Germans

Product type	Sent as of June 14, 1918	Had to be sent by June 1, 1918
Bread and bread products	6 thousand poods	25.2 thousand poods
Sugar	221 poods	2.2 thousand poods
Eggs	26 million pcs.	280 million pcs.
Potatoes	305 poods	1.7 thousand poods

Source: O. Lupandin [3]

Given the above table, it can be concluded that the plans of the Germans to export food from the territory of Ukraine could not be fulfilled. The difference between planned deliveries and those that were made is enormous.

In his memoirs, P. Skoropadskyi also draws attention to the agricultural issue. Hetman explains why the Germans

and representatives of other countries set such high conditions for collecting food [1]. In particular, this is conditioned by the fact that the form of land ownership in European countries and Ukraine is different, and by the efficiency of work of one rural resident. P. Skoropadskyi even provides statistical data, which is presented in the following Table 2.

Table 2. Comparison of the amount of harvest in Ukraine with other countries

	Number of rural residents per 100 dessiatines area sown	Wheat harvest from 1 dessiatine on average for 1908-1912 in poods	1 villager produces in poods
France	84	88	104.8
Germany	107	138.6	124.5
England	79	148.2	184.6
In Ukraine:			
Kyiv Governorate	150	67	44.4

Table 2. Continued

	Number of rural residents per 100 dessiatines area sown	Wheat harvest from 1 dessiatine on average for 1908-1912 in poods	1 villager produces in poods
Podolian Governorate	147	64	43.5
Volhynian Governorate	137	64	48.9
Kharkiv Governorate	124	54	45.9
Chernihiv Governorate	142	57	40.1
Poltava Governorate	112	64	54.1
Yekaterinoslav Governorate	19	50	53.4
Kherson Governorate	44	47	74.1

Source: P. Skoropadskyi [1]

Considering the above data, it can be concluded that on the territory of the Ukrainian State, if viewed from the standpoint of the political division of the Russian Empire, the wheat harvest in absolute terms was much higher than in other countries. However, in European countries, one villager produced many times more grain than a resident of Ukraine.

According to P. Skoropadskyi, the Germans were guided by their own experience of growing wheat, which is why they set such a large bar for harvesting in Ukraine. It is also necessary to consider the fact that Hetman provided data for 1912, that is, the indicator that was before the first World War.

Based on the research of M. Neibherm, who considered the situation in Eastern Europe, a large number of Ukrainians died on the battlefield, and many rural farms were destroyed. Given this, the yield on the territory of Ukraine as of 1918 was significantly less than in 1912. However, the Germans did not pay attention to this aspect, and still set a high bar for collecting grain products [13].

Thus, despite the fact that the Germans did not comply with the norm for grain collection, but it was necessary to implement it, they resorted to the introduction of a grain monopoly. In his memoirs, P. Skoropadskyi mentions this step as a fundamental mistake. He claims that the introduction of a monopoly on bread did not give any results to the Germans, since they could not collect any more, but they angered most of the peasantry [1].

Another important policy issue of P. Skoropadskyi was an army. The Hetman worked all his life in the military field, so he understood how important this element was in the context of building a strong and independent state. P. Skoropadskyi had big plans to create a combat-ready Ukrainian army, but this was prevented by a number of factors, including foreign policy.

German influence extended not only to the agricultural sector, but also to the defence capability of the Ukrainian State. In his memoirs, Hetman recalls this as follows: "When I first talked about the formation of the army, general Groener said to me: "Why do you need an army? We are here, so your board is safe. In terms of your northern borders, you can rest easy: we will not allow the Bolsheviks" [1]. P. Skoropadskyi also notes that he was very confused by this dialogue, and the only thing he could do was start forming a volunteer division.

Subsequently, the Germans still allowed the Hetman to develop the Armed Forces. In particular, after a meeting with Kaiser Wilhelm in September 1918, an agreement was

reached on a joint Ukrainian-German offensive against Soviet Russia. "After my return from Berlin, the formation of a special corps began, the purpose of which was to attack the sovietdom" [1]. Thus, it can be noted that relations between the Ukrainian State and Soviet Russia were hostile and preparations were being made for a direct confrontation.

In his research, P. Hai-Nyzhnyk focuses on this visit of the Hetman to Germany. The historian claims that the meeting was caused by the failures of the German troops on the Western Front, which is why they needed support from the Ukrainian State. In general, the researcher states that this event was positive for Ukraine [2].

However, it is worth noting that there were also difficulties there, since P. Skoropadskyi planned to create an army of 310 thousand people, and wanted to start recruiting volunteers in November 1918, but under pressure from the Germans, this plan was postponed to the next year. Thus, the actual number of the army was 65 thousand people [4].

Army of the Ukrainian State in 1918




Figure 1. Comparison of the actual number of armed forces of the Ukrainian State from the planned one

Based on this diagram, it can be stated that the German influence on the policy of P. Skoropadskyi was quite powerful, since under this influence the actual number of the army was several times less than planned by the Hetman.

During the period of March-November 1918, there were about 350 thousand German and Austrian military personnel on the territory of Ukraine. It was quite a significant number of people, so the Germans also left their memories of these events. In particular, E.M. Remarque describes the episode when, after the surrender of Imperial Russia, soldiers from the Western Front were relocated to the former Eastern Front.

Thus, it can be argued that German influence on Ukraine was very powerful, but this was not an occupation, since the Ukrainian State retained sovereignty, and allowed the Germans to carry out certain actions on its territory in accordance with the treaty.

In the course of analysing many archival documents, researcher S. Gromenko determined that an important course of foreign policy for P. Skoropadskyi was south-eastern, namely, the territory of the Crimea and Kuban. Despite the fact that at that time there were fewer representatives of Ukrainian nationality in Crimea than others, this territory was very important for the Ukrainian State. The Hetman planned to create a combat-ready fleet that would strengthen Ukraine's position in the foreign political arena, and due to which it would be possible to conduct trade with other states. Thus, P. Skoropadskyi pursued a policy aimed at annexing Crimea to the Ukrainian State [7].

Hetman's quote about this territory is important: "Ukraine cannot exist without owning Crimea, it would resemble torso without legs. Crimea should belong to Ukraine, under any conditions, it does not matter whether it will be a complete merger or broad autonomy, the latter should depend on the desire of the Crimeans themselves. But we need to be completely protected from hostile actions on the part of Crimea. In the economic sense, Crimea, in fact, cannot exist without us" [1].

Thus, P. Skoropadskyi had many views on this issue, so he considered the possibility of full annexation or autonomy. In addition, Hetman draws attention to the will of the Crimeans themselves, which shows a certain level of democracy in relation to this territory.

Regarding the Kuban, the Hetman said the following: "We have established completely friendly relations with the Kuban and the Black Sea region. There were proposals to conclude an alliance, or even more, that the Kuban should become part of Ukraine on autonomous rights. I really wanted it, but I thought I should not rush it" [1].

British historian I. Armour claims that P. Skoropadskyi tried to establish friendly relations with the newly formed Kuban State, since it was in a similar situation with Ukraine. It is also worth noting that a large number of the Ukrainian population lived on this territory and institutions of the Cossacks were established, so it can be assumed that the Hetman of Ukraine was a certain collector of land, the purpose of which was to restore a strong and great state [14].

At that time, the territory of Bessarabia was included in the Black Sea region, so based on the Hetman's memoirs, it can be stated that friendly relations were also established with this region. In addition, a large number of ethnic Ukrainians lived in this territory, who supported joining the great Ukrainian State [1].

On the other hand, Romania was also interested in the territory of Bessarabia. Thus, this region became a problem that caused hostility between the newly emerged Ukrainian and Romanian states, which needed mutual assistance. At that time, Romania pursued its policy, relying on the help of the Entente, just as the Ukrainians relied on the help of the Germans. Thus, it can be seen that there was a certain confrontation between the Hetmanate and the Entente [12; 13].

In November 1918, the Hetman's reign was coming to an end. At this time, P. Skoropadskyi acknowledged the defeat of the Germans and considered the possibility of cooperation with representatives of the Entente, if appropriate proposals were made from this side, but there were no such proposals and, accordingly, cooperation was not implemented [1].

Thus, the Ukrainian State has managed to establish diplomatic relations with many countries in a fairly short period of its existence. Regarding P. Skoropadskyi and his foreign policy imperatives, it cannot be said that he was a supporter of a certain country and imitated it in everything, because analysing his memoirs, the Hetman was a sincere patriot of Ukraine and his main goal was to defend the actual Ukrainian interests.

Discussion

The period of P. Skoropadskyi's rule is important not only for the history of Ukraine, but also for the history of many other countries. At this time, the Ukrainian State gained significant influence and developed diplomatic relations with its neighbours. Given this, this period became the object of inquiry by many historians from different countries, who often put forward different opinions regarding the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State in 1918.

First of all, the study considered the topic of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, signed on February 9, 1918, as the basis of Pavlo Skoropadskyi's foreign policy, which will come to power in a few months. The significance of this treaty is high, since its signing caused strong changes in the territory of Eastern Europe, so many historians were engaged in its research. One of such historians was V. Mejersky. The researcher claims that the signing of this agreement provided for the occupation of the territory of Ukraine by German troops. This opinion is erroneous, since, as discussed in the paper, the text of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk clearly states that the UPR should be recognised as an independent state [16].

As mentioned above, the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the recognition of Ukraine's independence by the Central Powers provided for the conclusion of certain agreements with these states. First of all, these agreements provided an opportunity for Germans and Austrians to collect Ukrainian grain for their own needs. The same opinion is shared by V. Dornik, who claims that the goal of the Germans was not the occupation, but to collect Ukrainian resources for their own needs, and also in his study, the researcher proves that this operation was a failure. The same opinion was stated in the paper, however, for comparison, it should be noted that V. Dornik makes a very small number of references to the memoirs and diaries of Ukrainian politicians, which indicates an insufficient level of objectivity of his study [17].

The topic of the presence of German troops on the territory of the Ukrainian State was considered by a large number of researchers who presented many opinions and evidence that it was an occupation. Thus, for example, this was the leading idea of the study by L. Lannik. This researcher claims that the period of stay of the Germans on the territory of Ukraine in 1918 was the first occupation

of Ukraine. Thus, the researcher hints that the second occupation was the period of 1941-1944 during the Second World War, and it is identical to 1918. However, it is worth noting that these two periods are completely different both in view of the external political situation and in view of the internal political situation on the territory of Ukraine. In addition, as already noted in the paper, the period of stay of Germans in the Ukrainian State during the rule of P. Skoropadskyi, because, firstly, they recognised the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and, secondly, the Germans did not interfere in internal political affairs, except for issues of Agriculture and the army [8].

The opposite of the opinion that the presence of German troops on the territory of the Ukrainian State was an occupation is the opinion about the Germanophilism of the government of the then country and P. Skoropadskyi in particular. One of the authors who holds this opinion is D. Hamlin [9]. The opinions of this researcher are based on the fact that the future Hetman lived in Germany all his childhood. In addition, the cooperation during 1918 and the meeting with Kaiser Wilhelm are proof that P. Skoropadskyi was impressed by the German ideals and means of conducting political governance of the state. However, as it was noted in the study, Hetman's policy plans often contradicted German intentions, in particular, in the context of creating his own Ukrainian army, as well as P. Skoropadskyi spoke negatively about the actions of the Germans in the context of grain policy. A very important point is that the Germans obtained the right to influence Ukraine even before the approval of the Hetmanate. In addition, P. Skoropadskyi in his memoirs directly states that he is not a Germanophile and his main goal is the development of a strong Ukrainian State [1].

The topic of German influence on the creation and development of the Ukrainian army is also very popular among many researchers. However, this topic was most fully revealed by N. Baranovska. The author examines the history of the creation of the armed forces during the rule of P. Skoropadskyi using a large number of sources, which indicates a high level of objectivity of the mentioned study. Thus, it was considered how the Germans initially denied plans to create a large army by the Hetman, but later gave permission for this. It is also considered that the Ukrainian government, together with the German one, feared the attack of the Bolsheviks and considered them the greatest enemy. The same opinions were expressed in this study, however, the above-mentioned researcher does not refer much to the memoirs of P. Skoropadskyi, as a result of which, his future plans were not considered [18].

Many opinions were expressed by Romanian historians on the issue of Bessarabia. As noted in this paper, the Bessarabian region was the cause of the confrontation between Ukraine and Romania. Thus, until now, historians of these countries hold opposite views. One of such historians is M. Barbulescu [6]. The researcher claims that the actions of the Ukrainian authorities in relation to Bessarabia were aggressive. The historian also claims that the majority of residents of this region were against joining the Ukrainian State. However, as already noted in this paper, based on the memoirs of P. Skoropadskyi, at that time,

Ukraine and the Black Sea region, including Bessarabia, developed friendly relations. In addition, the majority of the population of this region at that time were Ukrainians by ethnic composition [5].

Other regions that were promising subjects of international relations with the Ukrainian State were Crimea and Kuban. Direct relations between Ukraine and these regions did not have time to develop, but their perspective became the basis for creating many studies with different positions. In particular, the view of E. Maudsley, who in his global study on the "civil war" in Russia mentions the territories of the Kuban and Crimea, is of interest. Thus, the researcher claims that the inhabitants of these regions were against joining the Ukrainian State [19]. Considering the Crimea, this is partly true, since the Ukrainian ethnic group was the minority, and P. Skoropadskyi considered the annexation of Crimea more for economic and military-political reasons. Although the study expressed opinions that the Tatars, who made up the majority of the population of Crimea, supported the idea of joining Ukraine, this still remains at the level of assumptions. As for the Kuban, in this case, the situation was completely different. Firstly, the majority of the ethnic composition of this territory, at that time, was made up of Ukrainians, secondly, in this region, there was a system of Cossacks that was favourable to the Hetman's state, and thirdly, P. Skoropadskyi in his memoirs recalled that very friendly relations have developed with this region and there have already been conversations about joining the Ukrainian State. All this was said in the study, but it is also worth adding that P. Skoropadskyi, as an officer of the Russian army, collaborated with the Kuban people for quite a long time, and his style of clothing was characteristic of this region, which also indicates the proximity of the Kuban people to the Ukrainian government [20].

Thus, it can be argued that the Ukrainian State for a short period of its existence was able to conduct a fairly active foreign policy. Most of all, cooperation was shown in relations with Germany, but contacts were established with many other countries and regions.

Conclusions

The Ukrainian State during its existence in 1918 pursued an active foreign policy with neighbouring states, as P. Skoropadskyi recalled in his memoirs. Skoropadskyi gave it a lot of thought. A thorough analysis of these memories allowed the study to achieve its purpose, that is, to determine the course of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian State.

During the study, a number of the following conclusions were made:

- The foreign policy of the Ukrainian State was focused on Germany, since the latter had a significant influence under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Thus, this factor was significant in the policy of Ukraine.
- Despite the intense activity of Germany on the territory of Ukraine, P. Skoropadskyi was not a supporter of it.
- In his memoirs, the Hetman left many of his views on the future foreign policy activities of the Ukrainian State.

P. Skoropadskyi had significant geopolitical ambitions, which consisted in the reunification of all Ukrainian

territories. This aspect is quite interesting, as it shows Hetman's patriotism and the seriousness of his intentions. In particular, his plans included:

- Annexation of Bessarabia as an important part with a large group of ethnic Ukrainians.
- Annexation of Crimea, considering economic and military interests, and based on a democratic approach to the indigenous population, that is, the Tatars.
- The annexation of Kuban, considering the cultural proximity of this territory to the Ukrainian State, and the views of the Hetman in particular.

In addition, during the period of its existence, the Ukrainian State has made enemies. In particular, it was Romania, the conflict with which arise on the basis of the Bessarabian issue, and Bolshevik Russia, which posed a

threat to Ukraine's independence. Moreover, at that time, Romania was under the patronage of the Entente, so on the one hand, there was a hidden hostility between the Hetmanate and the specified geopolitical alliance, and on the other hand, P. Skoropadskyi in his memoirs noted that he was ready to cooperate with the Entente.

Thus the following topics require more in depth consideration:

- Conflict between the Ukrainian State and Romania on the issue of Bessarabia, in order to improve modern relations.
- Relations between the Hetmanate and the Entente, since there were different arguments on this issue.
- Annexation of Crimea and Kuban to what was then Ukraine. This issue has been rather neglected from the Ukrainian standpoint, so it requires further investigation.

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Зовнішня політика Української Держави за щоденником Павла Скоропадського

Анотація. Тема боротьби українського народу за незалежність у період національно-визвольних змагань 1917–1921 років є важливою сторінкою історії України та є актуальною у сьогоденні. Одним з найвизначніших діячів зазначеного періоду є П. Скоропадський, за часів правління якого було прийнято багато важливих політичних рішень. Тогочасна Українська Держава проводила активну зовнішню політику, дослідження якої є актуальним для істориків, з метою широкого та об'єктивного вивчення цього періоду, та для дипломатів, які опираючись на досвід минулого, визначають сучасний геополітичний курс України. Метою наукової роботи є глибоке дослідження зовнішньої політики Української Держави, на основі мемуарів П. Скоропадського. Під час написання роботи було використано наступні методи: аналіз, порівняння, конкретизація та узагальнення інформації. За результатами дослідження було зроблено ряд наступних висновків: зовнішня політика тогочасної України та гетьманського уряду визначалась умовами Брест-Литовського мирного договору; найбільше Українська Держава співпрацювала з Німеччиною, яка мала вплив на перебіг внутрішньо політичних процесів. У статті було детально розглянуто діяльність німців у контексті створення української армії та земельної політики. Також було розглянуто проблему того, чи можна вважати цю співпрацю окупацією. Окрім цього, було розглянуто міжнародні відносини України з такими державами та регіонами як Румунія, більшовицька росія, Крим та Кубань. Під час дослідження, окрім фактичного матеріалу, було розглянуто думки та плани зовнішньополітичної діяльності П. Скоропадського. Дослідження дозволяє ознайомитись з ідеями гетьмана та створює основу для подальших досліджень історії зовнішніх зв'язків цього періоду. Також у цій статті було порушено важливу тему, яку до цього розглядало мало дослідників, а саме проблему взаємовідносин гетьманського уряду з Антантою

Ключові слова: Брест-Литовський договір, німецький вплив, гетьманат, армія, Антанта

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The Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for the 1918 UPR in German and Austrian Historiography

Abstract. The relevance of this topic is conditioned by the fact that in the history of the Ukrainian revolution from 1917 to 1921, additional aspects are revealed when inspecting the terms of the signed Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) and Germany and Austria-Hungary. The study includes an analysis of the circumstances that prompted the Ukrainian leadership to ask for help from the Quadruple Alliance (QA) in February 1918 and conclude a military convention with them. The conclusion of the agreement is a particularly important moment in the history of Ukraine, as it fundamentally affected the future, namely, it contributed to maintaining the country's independence and development. The main purpose of the study is to investigate and analyse the changes that have occurred since the conclusion of the agreement between Ukraine and Austria-Hungary and Germany. The object of research is the process of concluding the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the subject is the document itself. The following scientific methods were used when writing the paper: structural and functional, dialectical, logical analysis, synthesis, comparative analysis, analysis of scientific literature, and generalisation. The main results are the analysis of the practical and theoretical consequences of the peace treaty on the fate of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). The practical significance of the study is that by investigating the mistakes of the UCR in the state creation, it would help to avoid similar problems in the future. During the writing of the paper, statistical data, scientific studies, and historical sources were analysed and scientific works of political figures of that time were reviewed. Important are the works of the chairman of the Central Rada of the UPR Mykhailo Hrushevsky and political and public figure Volodymyr Vynnychenko

Keywords: Ukrainian Central Rada, Treaty of Brest, military convention, Quadruple Alliance, Entente

Introduction

Brest-Litovsk peace treaty – is a peace agreement between the UPR, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria, on the other. According to the study by R. Pyrig, this agreement was the first peace treaty during the First World War. Its signing meant that the countries of the Quadruple Union recognised Ukraine as an independent state. However, officially the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed by the Third Universal of November 20, 1918, by the UCR, which even then wanted to become an active participant in international relations with foreign states. However, such a desire was made impossible due to martial law in Europe [1].

V.D. Bernik in his writings highlighted how the process of signing the treaty took place. At a conference in Brest-Litovsk on December 9, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada had the opportunity to conclude a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. After lengthy negotiations, on February 9, 1918, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was signed between the UPR and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. According to the treaty, martial law in the country was ended, diplomatic, economic, and

consular relations were established between the participants, the issue of prisoners of war was resolved, and borders in the west of Ukraine were determined. At the same time, a secret treaty was concluded with Austria-Hungary, according to which a bill was to be submitted to Parliament on the unification of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina into one crown lands [2].

According to most historians, the relevance of this topic is conditioned by the need for a more detailed analysis of the political activities of the UPR, a new understanding of the mistakes of the treaty, and considering the lessons of diplomatic activity of this period for the implementation of the foreign policy activities of modern independent Ukraine. According to S. Alston, the Soviet authorities regarded this conclusion as a conspiracy of Ukrainian nationalists with German and Austrian imperialists. German and Austrian historiography qualified such actions as the victory of young Ukrainian diplomats. Ukrainian history initially described the treaty positively for the future of the country, but over time this assessment became negative. Russian historians call it – a step by tactical success, but by strategic defeat. However, despite such different

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assessments, the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was considered an important event for the citizens of the then Russian Empire and Europe. The UPR treaty then influenced many events, including relations between Ukraine and its allies and relations with Russia and the Entente [3].

Given the situation that was developing at that time, most researchers tend to justify the actions of the authorities, namely, changing the political course and concluding an agreement with the QA. The main argument was the hopeless situation in Ukraine. However, after conducting a study, N. Tifonova proved that the Ukrainian authorities themselves created such a situation. This was manifested in the inability to defend what was won by the national revolution, and the severance of diplomatic relations with the Entente. If cooperation continues, the countries participating in the Entente military bloc were ready to support the Ukrainian People's Republic, which would ensure its recognition in the post-war period and further create favourable conditions for the development of statehood [4].

Thus, based on the above, *the purpose of this study* can be distinguished. During the study, it is necessary to investigate and reproduce the circumstances of the change in the political course of the UPR and the consequences of signing a peace treaty with the states of the Quadruple Alliance. The originality of this study lies in the concretisation and detailed analysis of the miscalculations of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which would help to avoid such mistakes in the development of a modern independent Ukraine. The main task of the study is to analyse and prove that such political activity was a miscalculation of the Ukrainian Central Rada and had harmful consequences for the establishment of Ukrainian statehood [5].

Materials and Methods

The question of the consequences of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty for the UPR interested many researchers, since a detailed study of the topic would help to avoid miscalculations in modern political activity. For a more accurate study of this topic, the following methods were used: synthesis and logical analysis, structural and functional, dialectical, analysis of scientific literature, and the method of generalisation and comparison of the information obtained.

The structural and functional method was the very first to be used. It is fundamental, because based on this method of research, a plan and main stages of work was built. Using the structural and functional method, the main purpose of the study, tasks, and goals that should be considered were identified, namely: to investigate the circumstances that prompted the UCR to sign a peace treaty and the reasons for changing the political course, to analyse and prove that the conclusion of such a treaty was a mistake of the UCR, and to analyse what changes occurred for the UPR after signing this document in Brest-Litovsk.

The next method used to determine the course of work and the logical structure of the study was dialectical. For a more in-depth investigation, the study first considered the circumstances of signing, how this process went, and the terms of the contract. The next step was to analyse the results of the UPR treaty with the Quadruple Alliance.

In general, the study was based on the consideration of the consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for Ukraine from the standpoint of foreign researchers, namely Austrian and German ones.

Another fundamental method of writing a research paper was the analysis of scientific literature. Using this method, the main part of the work was formed. Research papers, dissertations, theses, and monographs related to this topic were considered and analysed, scientific studies of such political figures as Vynnychenko, Hrushevsky, Doroshenko, and others were reviewed.

An important place was occupied by logical methods, namely, the methods of analysis and synthesis. The first method was used when considering scientific sources and information obtained, and the second method – synthesis – helped to formulate all the information into a logically structured study. It is also necessary to highlight such important methods as generalisation and comparative analysis. The changes that occurred in the Ukrainian People's Republic after the signing of the treaty were analysed. Based on this information, the results and conclusions were formed.

In order to explore the topic in more detail, all the work was divided into 3 stages. The first stage was to form a work plan and structure of the study. The main research objectives, goals, and issues that should be disclosed in the paper were highlighted. The second stage was the most informative, because during it the search for the necessary literature was carried out, and the information received was analysed, and on this basis, everything was formed into the main part of the study. In this part, the reasons for the conclusion of the treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the change in the political course, and the trace it left on the future of the UPR were investigated. At the third stage, the findings were analysed and conclusions were formed.

Results

In the winter of 1918, a meeting of the German government was held in the German capital, where it was decided to sign a peace treaty with the Ukrainian People's Republic. On February 9, the Treaty of Brest was signed between representatives of the UPR, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, on the other [6]. In accordance with Article 1 of the treaty, military operations between the parties were terminated. The second Article established the borders of Ukraine that still existed before the war with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Other articles of the treaty established diplomatic relations between the parties. The UPR pledged to export 1 million tonnes of grain, various cereals, and meat by July 1918. The QA, for its part, was obliged to supply agricultural machinery to Ukraine [7].

At the same time, the Ukrainian People's Republic and Austria-Hungary signed an agreement on the unification of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina into one crown region within Austria-Hungary. Such a declaration had to remain secret, for fear of national contradictions in the Habsburg monarchy. However, the secret could not be preserved. The text of the treaty was published in newspapers, which caused discontent among the Polish part of the population of Austria-Hungary [8].

Modern historians do not have a coordinated opinion regarding these events. Representatives of the Central Powers then very positively assessed the conclusion of the treaty and the then political activities of the UPR in the international arena, which was conditioned by the relevant political and economic circumstances. As noted by German and Austrian historiography, the main purpose of its conclusion was to represent and enter the International Space, establish it as a subject of international relations and international law, end martial law and establish peace, so as to accelerate the process of unification of all Ukrainian lands [9].

After reviewing the works of the then political figures, it can be argued that they recognised this step as a big mistake. The most responsible person who was blamed for everything was M. Hrushevsky. This is evidenced by his written works, in which he foresaw and was aware of the negative results of the agreement [10]. Such a liberation operation gave rise to the German-Austrian conflict, since the German command hindered Austrian-Ukrainian relations, and did not give freedom of action in the zone of their occupation. On March 28, 1918, the high command independently divided Ukraine into occupation zones. The German side got the largest part of the UPR with such major cities as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Novopechersk, and the Crimea, the ports of Mykolaiv, Taganrog, Rostov, and Novorossiysk. The Austrian side received Podillia, Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, and Mariupol [11].

Due to the fact that German and Austrian troops entered the land of the UPR, the Ukrainian authorities were afraid of ambiguous behaviour among the population, so in 1918, the Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Khrystiuk issued a circular to the people's lands, in which he noted: "January 27, 1918, the Ukrainian People's Republic has concluded a democratic, decent, fair peace with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, without annexation and indemnities. With the help of our captured soldiers, organised in Germany and Austria in corps, Austrian Sich Riflemen – Galicians and German troops, our soldiers are clearing Ukraine of Bolshevik rapists. Order and peace are being established in the state, conditions are being created under which local self-government bodies have the opportunity to start streamlining local life, to fulfil the great and honourable duty that the population has assigned to it. It is ordered that all city, county, volost, and village councils immediately begin active, creative, systematic work to serve the needs of working people" [12].

Unfortunately, his fears have become true. Despite the significant concentration of Bolshevik forces on the territory of Ukraine, the German command allocated a small group to conduct the operation. The troops were supposed to occupy only the southern part of Ukraine along with the capital. Gradually, the number of military personnel on the territory of the Ukrainian State increased. In February 1918, the German military commander E. Ludendorff developed a plan that he would liberate Ukrainian lands up to Kyiv and Dnipro from the Bolsheviks without the participation of Austro-Hungarian troops. However, after a short period of time, the general decided that it was necessary to go further to the Left Bank and clear the territory up to the Donbas. Later, Austrian troops launched an operation in the Odesa direction [13].

Even at the beginning of the negotiations, the German side was interested in economic issues. Germany wanted to get more agricultural products from Ukraine as quickly as possible. Ukraine's goal was to develop the state economy through profitable exports and imports, and not to turn the UPR into a young colony of Germany. There were disagreements between the parties on this issue, and during lengthy discussion negotiations, several agreements were adopted for the supply of products that would satisfy both countries. This tactic of the German command prompted the Council of Ministers to issue a number of resolutions banning the export of certain types of agricultural products and resources. The Germans were not satisfied with some aspects, so they especially made sure that the UPR did not sell bread and other products to foreign countries, especially Russia, Georgia, Belarus, and the Don [14].

German units provided mainly a moral road and drove fear into the Bolsheviks. By the end of April, the Bolsheviks left the capital, and a week later the Ukrainian Central Rada returned to Kyiv. After its return, the UCR began to restore state-forming activities and develop the National Army. The rapid advance of German forces into the interior of the state, which is rich in various food products (especially bread), provoked the appearance of Viennese troops on the territories of the UPR. Emperor Karl called such an invasion "peaceful entry into foreign territory." Secretary General of Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Shulgin also agreed with Vynnychenko's opinion. While maintaining contact with the Ukrainian delegation in Brest-Litovsk, he was concerned that the participation of the UCR in the negotiations would negate all the achievements of the newly formed UPR diplomacy with the Entente states [15].

In fact, the Germans occupied Ukrainian land. They independently managed some sectors of the economy. Legislative acts that were in force on the territory of Ukraine were issued: military field courts were established, in April 1918, the order of the commander-in-chief of the German army on the sowing of land was issued, and peasants were forbidden to prevent this, they could no longer take more land from landlords than they could process. This policy was explained by the fact that the Germans were afraid that Ukraine would not be able to fulfil the terms of the contract for the supply of the required amount of bread. This fear arose due to the fact that the peasants could not sow a large amount of land on their own [16]. The Germans gave the order to return the landowners' land ownership. The Ukrainian Central Rada considered such activities as interference in the economic affairs of the UPR and called on Ukrainians not to support the political activities of the Germans. This caused a conflict, and therefore, immediately after the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the territory of Ukraine, German generals dispersed the UCR and began to pursue a policy of subduing the Ukrainian people – they shot the dissatisfied population, and strict contributions were imposed on villages. The overthrow of the UCR was the end of the first stage of the Ukrainian revolution [17].

In general, there is an opinion that there was a conspiracy between Ukrainian nationalists and Germans. This military operation was prepared long before the UCR

asked for help from the Quadruple Alliance. And to cover up, the official appeal of the UPR to Germany and Austria-Hungary for military assistance was staged. For the first time, the issue of the need for assistance was considered at a meeting of the Council of People's Deputies held on January 30, 1918. It discussed the progress of negotiations between the Ukrainian delegation. As a result of persistent diplomatic activity, after the proclamation of the Quadruple Universal, the Ukrainian delegation was recognised as representatives of independent Ukraine. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria O. Chernin noted that all participants of the meeting recognise the Ukrainian People's Republic as a free and independent state that is able to conclude international legal treaties. General secretary for Military Affairs M. Porsh noted the difficult situation of the Ukrainian state due to the influence of Bolshevik Russia on it and stressed the importance of providing military and technical assistance. The agreement from the German side came quickly and unanimously. It is important that military assistance from Austria-Hungary was received ambiguously. By the decision of the Ukrainian government, the Austrian army was withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine, but the Germans, Poles, and Magyars were withdrawn from the army. That is, they remained, and the Austrians were replaced by Ukrainian riflemen. There were no objections regarding the Germans. General secretary M. Tkachenko noted that only the German army could liberate Ukraine from the Bolsheviks [18].

In 1918, due to the strong interference of the German side in the economic affairs of Ukraine, non-compliance with the terms of the treaty, and other similar reasons, a strong conflict occurred in Ukrainian-German relations, which prompted the Germans to change the Ukrainian government through a coup d'état. Although under the treaty Germany was supposed to remain neutral in such matters, it actively participated in the overthrow of the Ukrainian Central Rada and contributed to the establishment of the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi. Here it is important to note that the Hetman's coup was carried out peacefully, since there was no resistance from society and state authorities [5].

In March 1918, the UCR approved the state symbols of Ukraine – the Trident and the yellow-blue flag. A new territorial and administrative division of Ukraine took place. The Russian language was banned, and all military personnel had to learn Ukrainian for three months. Wage labour and private ownership of land were prohibited. On April 29, a regular meeting of the UCR was held at which the Constitution was adopted, which proclaimed that all power belongs to the people, and democratic freedoms were consolidated. The Constitution consisted of 8 sections and 85 articles. Legislative power belonged to the National Assembly, which was elected for a term of 3 years. The National Assembly had the right to elect the Council of people's ministers and the General Court. The population was granted civil and political rights, regardless of gender, age, nationality, etc. [19]. However, these decisions did not have any importance for the development of the state, because the Central Rada could not fully implement the economic articles and this led to a conflict between

the Ukrainian and Austro-Hungarian and German sides, which led to the fall of democracy in the UPR and the Hetman's coming to power. All power was concentrated in his hands, but there was a great dependence on the German command. After Skoropadskyi's advent to power in June of the same year, it was felt that the German-Ukrainian crisis was in the past and the process of restoring partnership relations began. Proof of this was the memorandum of G. Eichhorn, in which he described the course of foreign political activity in the Eastern Ukraine. Of all the QA members, relations with Germany developed best [4].

It is worth paying attention to the meeting of the Ukrainian, German and Austro-Hungarian delegations held on January 13, 1918. The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the issue of the borders of the Ukrainian People's Republic. According to Austrian historiography, both sides wanted to remain in a long-term and peaceful relationship. That is why Austria-Hungary guaranteed the provision of free national and cultural development to the Ukrainian people living on the territory of Austria, and Ukraine – to the Polish minority that preceded it on its territories.

Discussion

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk – is one of the most difficult and painful stages in the history of Ukraine, but at the same time – memorable. At the time of signing the treaty, the internal situation in Ukraine and in the international arena was extremely difficult. The events of that time developed very quickly, which forced Ukrainian politicians to seek salvation in the Central European states.

O. Nazarchuk highlighted the reasons that prompted the UCR to conclude a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. First of all, this is a threatening situation for Ukraine, which arose due to the entry into its territory of three Bolshevik armies under the leadership of M. Muravyov, I. Kudinsky, and R. Berezin. The Ukrainian Central Rada tried to find a common language with the Entente, but all attempts were unsuccessful. The Entente countries did not recognise the UPR and did not help it. The third reason was the imitation of the Bolsheviks. In Brest, Russia signed a peace treaty with Germany and its allies, and the leadership of the UPR, in order not to lose the support of the Ukrainian army and civilians, was forced to take such a step. At the time of its signing, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was called the Treaty of Brest [5].

S. Pyvovar highlighted a number of favourable circumstances that helped sign the peace treaty: tense relations between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance and the food crisis in Austria-Hungary and Germany, which they wanted to solve with the help of the Ukrainian People's Republic [17].

Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada Mykhailo Hrushevsky described this event as follows: “the treatise gave Ukraine a worthy and honourable peace, returned it to the Western Ukrainian lands, not only occupied during the war, but also previously torn off from it, like Kholmshchyna, Beresteyschyna, Pinshchyna... having established the exchange of prisoners of war without payment, the exchange of goods for the foundation of the contingent (determining the number of goods that should be brought

and exported), the German government immediately began to mobilise and withdraw trained units of Ukrainian military prisoners to Ukraine..." [20].

Volodymyr Vynnychenko also positively assessed the Treaty of Brest in his writings, but he negatively assessed the decisions of Germany and Austria-Hungary to provide military assistance to the UPR. Vynnychenko, as the head of government, was obliged to comply with the decree on conscription of the German army and assistance to internal forces. However, he did not want to take on such responsibility, because in his opinion this agreement would have brought negative consequences and great evil to Ukraine. It was Vladimir who emphasised that the Kaiser's army would bring Ukraine a political, social, and even national reaction [13].

As described by P. Hay-Nyzhnyk, the treaty gave the Ukrainian People's Republic peace and returned those western territories that were not only occupied during the war, but were previously separated from it. The Ukrainian delegation was able to achieve the most favourable conditions during the negotiations. The main thing is that the treaty did not have an imperialist character, that is, it was reached without annexations [11].

According to the study by M. Boitsun, at a conference in Brest on December 29, 1917, the Ukrainian delegation demanded to annex Galicia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovina to its territories or create these territories as autonomy within Austria-Hungary. However, this requirement was rejected [7].

Modern history effectively avoids the fact that the Russo-German negotiations gave the Ukrainian People's Republic a special historical chance to free itself from the imperial yoke. The political activities of the Council of people's commissars actively pushed the Entente to reorient itself to Kyiv, hoping that Ukraine would begin to cooperate with the Don, Romania, the Caucasus, Czechs, Poles, and Slovenes and resist the Austrian-German forces. The policy of the entente, which wanted victory over the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, was quite reasonable and logical. Members of the Entente coalition supported every country that started a war with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. In turn, the members of the military bloc hoped to benefit from providing such support. Western European countries were actively interested in the emergence of a potential ally and were ready to provide material and financial assistance to Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian leadership reacted rather cautiously and with distrust to such increased interest from Western European countries. Ukraine ignored the desire to help and considered that these were manifestations of the imperialists to use the UPR for their own purposes [21].

For Germany and Austria-Hungary, this agreement primarily allowed to import products and raw materials from Ukraine. According to Z. Steiner, there has been a famine in Austria for almost 3 years, especially in winter, while the situation in Hungary was better, but there was a shortage of food. There were similar circumstances in Germany. When they came to Ukraine, the Germans treated themselves with delicious food and even held parades. The soldiers even sent private gifts for Kyiv residents. Arriving

in the capital, German troops quickly established order, so during that period, the number of street crime decreased. But by the end of April 1918, this situation had changed [22].

V.I. Svatko and O.I. Ovcharenko explained that the conclusion of the treaty was quite a complex process, this was conditioned by the fact that Ukraine was considered part of Bolshevik Russia. To sign the agreement, UPR had to withdraw from its membership. This happened on January 22, 1918, after the signing of the Fourth Universal, which proclaimed the UPR an independent state. On February 9, 1918, the treaty was signed when the UCR left the capital. Under the terms of the contract, within six months of 1918, UPR had to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary with 60 million poods of bread, 2,750 thousand poods of meat, 3 million poods of sugar, 400 million eggs, plenty of potatoes, lard, and other agricultural products and raw materials. The Germans also pledged to supply Ukraine with equipment, coal, salt, and other scarce goods, provide weapons and a loan for the UPR in the amount of 1 million karbovanets. Systematic deliveries were regulated by the Economic agreement of the masses of the UNR concluded on April 23, 1918 [8].

According to G. Freud, in a separate peace, Russia's obligations were spelled out. It was supposed to withdraw its troops from the territory of the UPR and stop any activity that is directed against the Ukrainian Central Rada. It should also be noted that after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the signatory countries pledged to establish diplomatic relations among themselves and exchange authorised representatives. Immediately after the ratification of the treaty, the participants wanted to introduce consulates to each other. On March 16, 1918, the Ukrainian embassy was established in Germany. It was located in Berlin. The first Ukrainian ambassador was Oleksander Seviuk [14].

Thus, diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Germany were established and legally consolidated on February 9, 1918, in the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, with an Additional trade and economic treaty and the Appeal of the Ukrainian people to Germany with a request for military assistance. The Ukrainian people immediately wanted to establish peace on their land, so the conclusion of a separate peace was an uncontested decision. The desire to become a free state primarily depends on the determination, cohesion, and professionalism of the political leaders who ruled the Ukrainian People's Republic in those important times. Unfortunately, there were no talented political strategists at that time who could, despite the difficult circumstances, assess the situation in Ukraine and prevent such mistakes.

Conclusions

Thus, the study proves that, despite the different attitude of researchers to the conclusion of peace with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty is certainly a victory for the Ukrainian delegation, since, assessing all the circumstances, there was no other way out. The Ukrainian Central Rada, seeking salvation from the Bolshevik scourge, gave the Ukrainian People's Republic under the occupation of Germany and Austria-Hungary. After the signing of this agreement, Ukraine received recognition in the international arena and was able

to become a full subject of international relations. With the help of the Brest treaty, diplomatic relations were established with the Central European states.

After signing the treaty, the Ukrainian Central Rada appealed to the countries of the Quadruple Alliance to provide military assistance in the fight against the Bolsheviks. On February 21, 1918, German-Austrian troops entered the territory of Ukraine. In April 1918, the UPR was completely liberated from Soviet troops. UCR returned to Kyiv again.

With its arrival on Ukrainian soil, Germany actually established an occupation regime. The Germans independently managed certain sectors of the economy, issued their own laws and regulations that were in force on the territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The Ukrainian

leadership regarded such actions as gross interference in economic life. This caused a conflict between the German command and the Ukrainian Central Rada. The Germans began to move closer to the conservative forces of Ukraine. With their support, the Ukrainian Central Rada was dissolved. On April 29, 1918, the last meeting of the UCR was held, at which the Constitution of the UPR was proclaimed. According to which Ukraine was declared sovereign and independent. These decisions actually had no significance for the future of Ukraine, since a few hours after the meeting, the German command dispersed the Ukrainian Central Rada and contributed to the establishment of the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi, which took all power. With the overthrow of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the first stage of the Ukrainian Revolution also ended.

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Наслідки Брест-Литовського договору для УНР 1918 р. в німецькій та австрійській історіографії

Анотація. Актуальність цієї теми полягає в тому, що в період усвідомлення історії Української революції з 1917 по 1921 роки, знаходяться додаткові аспекти при перегляді умов підписаного Брест-Литовського мирного договору між Українською Центральною Радою (УЦР) та Німеччиною й Австро-Угорщиною. А також аналіз обставин, які підштовхнули українське керівництво попросити допомогу у Четверного Союзу (ЧС) у лютому 1918 року та укласти з ними військову конвенцію. Укладення договору є особливо важливим моментом в історії України, оскільки це кардинально вплинуло на майбутнє, а саме сприяло підтриманню незалежності та розвитку країни. Головною метою статті є дослідження та аналіз змін, які відбулися після укладення угоди між Україною та Австро-Угорщиною й Німеччиною. Об'єктом дослідження є процес укладення Брест-Литовського договору, а предметом є сам документ. При написанні статті було використано такі наукові методи: структурно-функціональний й діалектичний методи, метод логічного аналізу, метод синтезу, метод порівняльного аналізу, метод аналізу наукової літератури, метод узагальнення. Основними результатами є дослідження практичних та теоретичних наслідків мирного договору на долю Української Народної Республіки (УНР). Практичне значення дослідження полягає в тому, що дослідивши прорахунки УЦР в державотворенні допоможе уникнути подібних проблем у майбутньому. Під час написання роботи було проаналізовано статистичні дані, наукові дослідження, історичні джерела та переглянуто наукові праці політичних діячів того часу. Важливими є праці голови Центральної Ради УНР Михайла Грушевського та політичного й громадського діяча Володимира Винниченка

Ключові слова: Українська Центральна Рада, Брестський мирний договір, військова конвенція, Четверний союз, Антанта

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