

Parvana Mustafazade**PhD in Political Sciences**National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan**AZ 1001, 30 Istiglaliyyat Str., Baku, Azerbaijan*<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3784-9986>

Azerbaijan-Armenia relations in the post-conflict period (2020-2024)

Abstract. Following the conclusion of the war and the restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, President I. Aliyev's initiative to sign a peace treaty with Armenia remains relevant due to unresolved disputes that maintain tension in the region. The relevance of the topic is also due to the fact that regional stability and the development of communications between Azerbaijan and Armenia are strategically important factors in the process of signing a peace treaty. The main objective of the work was to analyse Azerbaijan's foreign policy strategy in the post-conflict period and the prospects for signing a peace agreement in the context of the current geopolitical configuration. The study used retrospective and political analysis to trace the evolution of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations and interpret political decisions. The chronological arrangement of events contributed to a more detailed understanding of the prospects and possibilities of the negotiation process. It has been proven that regional development is possible provided that there are no mutual territorial claims between the parties. The desire of extra-regional actors to interfere in the settlement of the conflict has a negative impact on the situation, with France playing a destructive role by exacerbating tensions between regional countries. Any attempts to support revanchist sentiments complicate the negotiation process and delay the signing of a peace treaty. It has been determined that, despite the list of problems, Azerbaijan's active diplomatic position and Turkey's initiative make the signing of a peace agreement with Armenia realistic, opening up prospects for regional development, geopolitical strengthening of the South Caucasus, and the implementation of transport and economic projects. The parties maintain bilateral contacts with the aim of resolving contentious issues. If a peace agreement is signed, the states of the region will be able to strengthen trade and economic ties and activate transport and logistics capabilities. The practical value of the work lies in the use of the results to assess the prospects for Azerbaijan-Armenia relations, develop recommendations for regional stability, and prepare training materials on international relations and international law

Keywords: peace treaty; negotiations; strategy; diaspora; constitution; external actors

Introduction

The relevance of the topic was determined by the need to study post-conflict processes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to determine the prospects for signing a peace treaty. The official consolidation of a new stage in relations between the parties could reduce the risk of conflict, strengthen trust, and contribute to the opening of borders and growth in trade and investment. The Second Karabakh War confirmed Azerbaijan's strategic advantage gained after the occupation of its territories during the First War. S. Neset *et al.* (2023) determined that Azerbaijan's victory significantly changed the geopolitical situation in which Armenia weakened and official Baku continued to dominate. The study proves that opportunities for regional economic cooperation have emerged, especially in the fields of energy, transport and logistics. In analysing the issue of the Zangezur corridor after the

Second Karabakh War, M. Caner (2025) demonstrated that Turkey's strengthened role as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the region has made the Iranian government unwilling to make concessions. According to M. Caner, Iran is taking a measured position, refraining from sharp protests in order to avoid escalation and at the same time not giving full support to either side. This approach has allowed Iran to minimise risks without losing influence in a strategically important region. The Zangezur Corridor project is not just a transport initiative, but an important geopolitical tool that could change Iran's strategic position in the Caucasus.

An analysis of the negotiation process, key points, obstacles to the signing of a peace treaty, and legal, political and territorial issues is explored in F. Shafiev's work (2023). The author noted that one of the main problems complicating

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*Corresponding author



the signing of the agreement is the text of the Armenian Constitution. The activities of the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) were also criticised, and it was proposed to maintain direct bilateral contacts between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The interests and goals of the Russian Federation (RF) in the South Caucasus are analysed in a publication by K.S. Anggræni (2022). It is emphasised that the RF was a key actor in the conflict: not only as a mediator, but also as a military party, as it supplied weapons to both countries and subsequently sent peacekeepers to the region. According to the author, Russia may abandon its role as a peacekeeper and become a competitor to Turkey, which in the long run will have a negative impact on its relations with other states in the region. Azerbaijan's geopolitical advantages in the war and the post-war reconstruction of Karabakh have been discussed in the works of M. Kasım & R. Çiçek (2024) and E. Kavtaradze (2024). The authors found that the geographical and demographic characteristics of South Karabakh and the surrounding areas influence the strategic importance of the region, which is why control over the territory gives Azerbaijan military, economic and demographic advantages. R. Wrobel's (2025) study highlighted the complexity of the geopolitical situation in the world and the impact of the Russian occupation on events in Ukraine in the South Caucasus. The weakening of Russia's role in the region and the activation of new players (China, the United States, Turkey and the European Union) have been confirmed. A positive trend towards the signing of a peace treaty has also been demonstrated, emphasising that a shift in the balance of power may push the parties towards compromise. Despite a significant number of studies, there are still gaps in the coverage of this topic, in particular, there is no comprehensive approach to analysing events, the interests of the parties and regional actors. The aim of this article was to study the bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia after the end of the 2020 war and to identify the prospects for signing a peace treaty between the parties.

Materials and Methods

The work used a set of methods that ensured a systematic and thorough analysis of bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the post-conflict period after the 2020 war and the prospects for signing a peace treaty. Scientific publications from 2020-2025, regulatory and legal documents, in particular the Shusha Declaration... (2020), and reports by the Karabakh Liberation Organisation (2021) were used to collect and process the materials. Official data from state bodies (Statement by the President..., 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan..., 2024) were also used. The study included an interpretation of the Declaration on the Independence of Armenia (1990) as a factor influencing the dynamics of bilateral relations and the peace settlement process. A comparative analysis of regulatory and legal documents and official statements made it possible to identify the difference between declarative intentions and the practical implementation of political decisions. The reliability of the information was verified by comparing data from several sources and confirming it with official documents. The analysis was based on theoretical approaches and

political science methods, which made it possible to assess the role of external actors (Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Iran, France) in the negotiation process, based on the works of P. Gawliczek & K. Iskandarov (2023), E. Kavtaradze (2024) and M. Kapanadze & A. Oniashvili (2025). A comprehensive risk assessment, for example, of France's position and Armenia's revanchist sentiments, made it possible to identify factors that could slow down the peace process. A thematic approach ensured a detailed examination of key events, such as border delimitation and the coordination of the text of the peace treaty, while a retrospective analysis helped to trace the dynamics of bilateral contacts, major achievements and problems. The methodology involved systematising data on economic, transport, logistical and security initiatives in the region, which made it possible to assess the potential impact of the peace treaty on the development of regional infrastructure and integration processes. Political analysis provided an assessment of the foreign policy decisions and actions of states, as well as the identification of interrelationships between political, economic and security factors influencing the process of signing the peace treaty. The application of such a systematic approach made it possible to identify cause-and-effect relationships between the actions of regional and non-regional actors and their impact on the pace and effectiveness of the negotiation process.

Results and Discussion

Armenia's occupation of Karabakh lasted from 1989 to 2020, with Azerbaijan's diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict and restore territorial integrity proving unsuccessful. The accumulation of economic and military resources allowed Azerbaijan to develop a long-term strategy aimed at strengthening the economy, modernising the army and securing broader diplomatic support for the return of lost territories. As noted by M. Kapanadze & A. Oniashvili (2025), Azerbaijan has generated significant revenues by exploiting its rich natural reserves. These economic resources have been used to build up its military strength. Baku purchases modern military equipment from Israel, Turkey and other countries. Israel accounted for over 60% of Azerbaijan's arms imports in 2017-2020. Between 2010 and 2020, Azerbaijan purchased a wide range of drones, missiles and mortars from Israel. Turkey played a key role in training Azerbaijani military personnel, providing support, particularly in the use of Bayraktar unmanned systems. Azerbaijan's economic power is several times greater than that of Armenia, and its military budget is approximately five times larger (Kapanadze & Oniashvili, 2025). After Azerbaijan's victory, the parties began a protracted but strategically important process of peace negotiations. Throughout 2020-2024, Azerbaijani-Armenian relations were marked by mutual agreements and contradictions. The negotiation process showed that there were still issues that the parties were trying to overcome. The first problem is constitutional and legal: Azerbaijan demands that Armenia renounce its territorial claims and amend the preamble to the Declaration on the Independence of Armenia (1990). The preamble states that the Republic of Armenia considers the decision to reunite the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region to be in accordance with historical justice and the norms

of international law. Azerbaijan interprets this provision as a territorial claim, which causes contradictions between the parties. Amending the Constitution is one of the most important issues on the path to a peaceful agreement. Following the Second Karabakh War, the parties signed a statement on 10 November 2020 (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russian Federation), according to which the Republic of Armenia guarantees the security of transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to organise the unhindered movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions (Statement by the President..., 2020). However, the Armenian government refuses to fulfil this obligation. The Armenian opposition is creating obstacles to the signing of a peace treaty. Armenia does not provide transport links between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, which blocks the implementation of an important regional infrastructure link. Internal political instability in Armenia complicates strategic decision-making, although the conclusion of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan would create the conditions for strengthening its economy and increasing regional competitiveness.

After signing the joint trilateral statement, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed the citizens, noting the significant losses and retreats of the country's armed forces: materially and psychologically, the Armenian army is weaker and therefore unable to resist. According to Pashinyan, more than 20,000 Armenian soldiers could have been taken prisoner if Armenia had not signed the joint statement of 10 November 2020 (Karabakh Liberation Organisation, 2021). The realities of the military situation were understood not only by Armenia, but also by Russia. In December 2020, Russian President V. Putin confirmed that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. The acceptance and proclamation of this fact was also a result of the geopolitical situation, as the war against Ukraine, pressure from Europe, and the weakening of its influence in the region left it with no other choice (Hushcha, 2025). Russia supported the conflict based on geostrategic considerations and did not contribute to its transformation into a fair and long-term peace agreement, which was in line with its interests in maintaining the status of a "frozen conflict". After the end of the war, the process of withdrawing Russian peacekeepers from the territory of Karabakh began, which was an important step in strengthening Azerbaijan's position. In turn, Turkey managed to strengthen its influence in the region, especially after the signing of the Shusha Declaration...(2020). The document aims to deepen cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the political, economic, security, cultural, humanitarian and educational spheres. According to the declaration, the opening of a corridor connecting the western regions of Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, as well as the construction of the Kars-Nakhchivan railway, will contribute to the strengthening of transport and communication links between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The implementation of this provision will allow Turkey to become a transit point for the region to Europe, bypassing Iran. Azerbaijan's victory in the war meant not only the restoration of territorial integrity, but also the parallel formation of a new geopolitical configuration in the South Caucasus region. Proposals were made to establish a new

format for relations between the leading states in the region. One such idea was the creation of a 3+3 format, involving the countries of the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and three major regional powers: Iran, Russia and Turkey. Turkey initiated the format, but the first meeting at the level of deputy foreign ministers took place in December 2021 in Moscow (Javakhishvili, 2022). Representatives of Georgia did not participate in this meeting due to the Russian Federation's territorial claims against it. However, an important advantage of the 3+3 format is that the states in the region can jointly counter external threats, taking into account their geographical location, history, culture and traditions. Representatives of the participating states held three meetings (Moscow, Tehran, Istanbul). Moscow's pursuit of the 3+3 format appears to be a strategic attempt to restore its influence in the South Caucasus, aimed at restoring Russia's role as a key player in the process of normalising relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in particular with regard to the restoration of transport channels (Wrobel, 2025). As noted by B. Hajiyev (2025), given the trajectory of normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and recent regional events, achieving this goal seems increasingly difficult. In addition, transport and logistics projects of international importance will be implemented in a peaceful environment. Thus, the 3+3 format can be called a regional platform that partially stimulates the rapprochement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In April 2022, Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to prepare a peace treaty following a meeting in Brussels. The initiative to start peace talks came from Azerbaijan. At the same time, non-governmental organisations, in particular Freedom House, periodically report campaigns in the information space that shape its negative image, in particular through critical publications by individual international organisations and media outlets, which Azerbaijan considers biased. This hybrid war became more active immediately after the end of the war (Muxtar-Agabalı, 2024). The Azerbaijani government chose diplomatic means to overcome external pressure and normalise bilateral relations. On 14 March 2022, Azerbaijan proposed a five-point peace initiative to Armenia, which included five points:

- 1) mutual recognition of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of international borders and political independence of states;
- 2) mutual confirmation of the absence of territorial claims against each other and the acceptance of a legal obligation that such claims will not be made in the future;
- 3) renunciation of threats to use force against political independence and territorial integrity in inter-state relations;
- 4) delimitation and demarcation of state borders, establishment of diplomatic relations;
- 5) opening of transport and communications, establishment of other relevant communications and establishment of cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

The peace initiatives proposed by the Republic of Azerbaijan and the five points presented were in the interests of both parties.

The provisions agreed upon by the parties create the conditions for further cooperation and the achievement

of stable peace. The events of 2022 demonstrated the simultaneous presence of both positive and negative trends in the negotiation process. The regional context remains a significant factor in the dynamics of the negotiations, as neighbouring states actively respond to transformations in the security environment. Iran continues to play an important role in regional politics, although its relations with Azerbaijan are periodically characterised by contradictions (Press Release regarding..., 2023). Iran cannot compete with Turkey and Russia in the post-war environment in terms of security, political influence or economic engagement. Unlike Turkey and Israel, Azerbaijan did not invite Iran to participate in the restoration of territories bordering Iran due to tense relations between the two countries (Gevorgyan, 2022). Iran has long held a pro-Armenian position, although its relations with Azerbaijan are based on a shared border, religious and cultural proximity, and economic interaction. At the same time, direct contacts between state representatives always have a positive impact on the normalisation of bilateral relations. Joint projects in the energy and economic sectors strengthen the mutual influence between the states. On 19 May 2024, Iranian President I. Raisi met with Azerbaijani President I. Aliyev at the state border in the area of the Khudafarin and Giz Galasi hydroelectric power plants on the Arax River (Ilham Aliyev and president..., 2024). The implementation of this project has provided an additional

stimulus for regional development, as the Khudafarin reservoir, with a capacity of about two billion cubic metres, provides irrigation for agricultural land and forms a strategic reserve of drinking water. According to E. Hashimov *et al.* (2025), such infrastructure initiatives not only promote inter-state cooperation but also attract the attention of leading global actors. The issue of the Zangezur corridor, which Iran sees as a potential obstacle to its development as a regional transit hub, is a key factor in Tehran's cautious attitude towards Azerbaijan. Among the reasons for rejecting the project are the risk of losing land connections with Armenia and access to the Caucasus, as well as the potential limitation of Iran's influence on Georgia, the Black Sea and Russia (Golmohammadi, & Azizi, 2025). At the same time, the corridor would undermine Iran's ability to control transit routes from Turkey to Central Asia. Iran has an ambiguous position on the presence of Turkey, a NATO member, near its borders. In this context, Tehran and Yerevan are seeking to consolidate their positions against the Azerbaijani-Turkish axis and are considering the possibility of bringing India into their strategic alliance (Koshelnyk, 2023). The Zangezur corridor, marked in Figure 1, passes through Ordubad, Velidag and other key points. Azerbaijan's other transport routes lead to Georgia and Russia (northern routes via Ijevan, Gazakh and Samur), Turkey (routes via Igdir, Dilucu and Kars) and Iran (southern routes via Khoradiz and Astara).



Figure 1. The Zangezur Corridor and other regional transport projects

Source: M. Caner (2025)

The Zangezur Corridor project is of strategic importance to Azerbaijan's foreign policy. It was envisaged that the Zangezur transport corridor would pass through a 44-kilometre section of Armenian territory and connect Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. However, the implementation of relevant communication projects, as well as the signing of a peace agreement, is impossible without the mutual consent of the parties. Armenia categorically rejects the use of the term "corridor," emphasising the need to ensure unhindered transit. It is likely that transport and logistics aspects, in particular the issue of the Zangezur corridor, will be discussed after the conclusion of a peace

agreement. At the same time, all countries in the region are interested in the implementation of this project, as the opening of the Zangezur corridor has significant economic potential for most parties, including Armenia. Speaking at the ninth Global Baku Forum on 16 June 2022, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stressed that Armenians have been using the Lachin road without any obstacles or restrictions since 2020, while Azerbaijanis cannot move as freely through Armenia and the Zangezur Corridor to connect with Nakhchivan, which he considers unfair (Shafiev, 2023). Despite the political debate surrounding the Zangezur corridor, the project is of economic importance

to the countries in the region. Azerbaijan and Turkey are advocating for the expansion of political dialogue on its implementation. The implementation of the project could affect economic, political, and transport and communication links between the states in the region. However, not all states are participating in constructive negotiations. In particular, France provides military support to Armenia, as emphasised by B.B. Donmez (2023), and by supporting the militarisation of Armenia, official Paris is undermining regional security. This destabilising position has a negative impact on the prospects for regional cooperation between states. French Foreign Minister K. Colonna travelled to Armenia after Azerbaijan regained control of Karabakh, and following talks on security and defence on 3 October 2023, Colonna announced that weapons would be sent to Armenia to strengthen its defence against Azerbaijan (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France, 2023). France's support reinforces Armenia's revanchist ideas.

The start of the active implementation of the peace treaty signing process is accompanied by challenges initiated by non-regional countries. One example is the resolution adopted on 17 January 2023 by the French Senate, which calls for sanctions against Azerbaijan in connection with the restoration of sovereignty over Karabakh (French Senate adopts Resolution..., 2024). The fact that countries outside the South Caucasus are involved in shaping these initiatives creates additional difficulties for the implementation of the peace process proposed by Azerbaijan to Armenia. Throughout 2023, Armenia tried to take advantage of Western support by presenting itself as a transport hub. That is why, on 26 October 2023, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia proposed the idea of a transport and logistics project called "Crossroads of Peace" at the fifth Tbilisi Silk Road Forum (Kavtaradze, 2024). This was another attempt by the Armenian government to demonstrate its political and economic importance in the region in the context of new logistics projects being implemented in the South Caucasus. However, the project is not realistic, given Armenia's transport and logistics capabilities and terrain. Railways and motorways are not capable of handling international cargo, as they require modernisation and significant investment. After the announcement of this project, no country, including members of the European Union, has shown interest in the "Crossroads of Peace". However, if Armenia can gradually resolve issues that significantly affect the process of signing a peace treaty, this will improve its relations not only with Azerbaijan but also with Turkey. Armenia will be able to export its goods to Europe through the territory of a neighbouring state. The opening of the border with Turkey could reduce logistics costs, especially for trade with Europe. Armenia, in turn, would be able to overcome geopolitical and geographical constraints. In the future, the Armenian government will agree to amend the Constitution by referendum. In 2024, coordination efforts were made regarding the transfer of territories and border delimitation mechanisms, with a significant part of the draft peace agreement agreed upon by the parties, and the issue of corridors and transport links actively discussed given their importance for regional infrastructure and trust (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan..., 2024). On 4 January 2024, H. Hajiyev, Deputy Head of the

Presidential Administration for Foreign Policy, stated that significant progress had been made between the parties on the text of the peace agreement, but that "several unresolved issues" remained (Azerbaijan announces "significant progress"..., 2024). The exchange of proposals between the parties showed that the signing of a peace treaty is a possible and important step towards overcoming the contradictions. In March 2024, the Armenian government decided to return four border villages to Azerbaijan, located in a territory recognised by the international community as part of Azerbaijan (Mamedov, 2024). Despite the partial normalisation of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, contradictions between the parties remain. From Azerbaijan's point of view, the main problems are Armenia's possible evasion of its obligations, the strengthening of its military potential through militarisation, its refusal to amend the text of the Declaration of Independence, and the persistence of revanchist ideas in society. At the same time, Armenia does not recognize the term "Zangezur corridor", although the concept of "corridor" is generally accepted in international legal practice. The planned route is intended to connect the territory of Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan and, through the territory of Turkey, to activate transport and logistics links, which should not be regarded as an encroachment on the state sovereignty of another state. The results of this study are consistent with the conclusions of O. Aliksiejchenko (2025) regarding the decline of Russia's influence in the region, which is characterised as a shift in the balance of power. After 2020, significant transformations have been observed, with peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia existing *de facto*, but not yet enshrined *de jure*. The implementation of transport and logistics projects can not only contribute to the gradual normalisation of relations between countries, but also provide additional security guarantees in the region, as confirmed by H. Dumlu & G. Şahin (2024). M. Kapnadze & A. Oniashvili (2025) also emphasised the role of external actors in the conflict. After 2022, Russia lost much of its influence in the region, and its role as a mediator in the conflict proved ineffective. At the same time, it is emphasised that Turkey has been a reliable ally of Azerbaijan, providing military and economic support, as well as facilitating the opening of the Zangezur corridor, which strengthens Turkey's strategic ties with Central Asian and European countries. According to A. Bukia (2025), despite the growing geostrategic importance of the South Caucasus, no local or regional conflict can be effectively resolved without prior agreement among the international community and clearly defined terms of settlement. A. Gevorgyan (2022) also emphasises Iran's position in the conflict, noting that Tehran views the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia as a matter of national security, as the ethnic, religious and ideological components of the region are closely linked to Iranian identity. Direct military escalation involving external actors (in particular Turkey and foreign mercenaries) is seen as a serious threat to this security. A. Gevorgyan characterises Iran's position as strategically cautious, aimed at preventing the spread of Turkish-Azerbaijani influence, without openly supporting either side in the conflict. N. Alizada (2024) viewed Iran as a regional actor that perceived the South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, as part of its "historical plateau,"

and therefore paid particular attention to conflicts in the region. Iran was not an active ally of either Azerbaijan or Armenia, but sought to maintain strategic influence, minimise threats to its own security and act in a “new geopolitical balance”, taking into account the interests of various external actors. France, according to S. Guliyev (2025), has effectively lost its status as a neutral mediator, and its position has proved to be biased in favour of Armenia. Thus, the process of normalising Azerbaijani-Armenian relations is unfolding in a context of multi-level external interference and competition between regional and non-regional actors. Despite this, the gradual resolution of contentious issues demonstrates the parties’ potential to achieve long-term stability, provided there is political will and a rejection of revanchist approaches.

Conclusions

The study confirmed that Azerbaijan and Armenia made some progress in the peace talks between 2020 and 2024. Although the exchange of proposals on the text of the peace treaty was completed, a number of key issues remained unresolved. Among the regional actors that took the initiative to establish relations between the parties to the conflict, Turkey was particularly active. A chronological analysis showed that the prospect of signing a peace treaty in the near future was realistic. Cooperation within the OSCE in Europe has not yielded significant results, so the dissolution of this organisational structure may be in the interests of the parties. The most controversial issue remained the amendment of the Armenian Constitution, which is only possible if a referendum is held. The signing of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia will transform the South Caucasus into one of the important

geopolitical centres, especially in the context of the implementation of transport routes that will integrate the region with Europe through the territory of Turkey. The settlement of transport, logistical and political issues could improve Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, secure export routes to Europe, and help overcome geopolitical constraints. It is emphasised that Azerbaijan’s active foreign policy has enabled the country to achieve its goals through diplomatic means and a consistent position. After the victory, the situation in the South Caucasus began to change rapidly. At the same time, analysis showed that France’s support for Armenia, including military aid and sanctions initiatives against Azerbaijan, creates additional difficulties for the implementation of the peace process and the corridor project. The shift in the balance of power, Armenia’s adaptation to the new realities, Azerbaijan’s diplomatic efforts, and the mediation initiatives of third countries created the conditions for stability and peace in the region. Further research may focus on assessing the effectiveness of diplomatic instruments and the role of external actors in shaping stability in the South Caucasus, as well as analysing the economic and transport integration of the region in the context of the implementation of the peace agreement.

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Conflict of Interest

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